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THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


THE  FOUNDATIONS 
OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 

JARED  SPARKS  MOORE,  Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE    PROFESSOR   OF    PHILOSOPHY   IN 
WESTERN    RESERVE    UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1924 


Copyright  1 92 1,  by 

Princeton  University  Press 

Princeton  N.  J. 


Published  1921 
Second  Printing,  August,  1924 


TO  EDWARD  HERRICK  GRIFFIN,  D.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  EMERITUS  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY,    AND  SOME- 
TIME DEAN  OF  THE  COLLEGE  FACULTY,  IN  THE 
JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 

MY  FIRST  TEACHER  IN   PHILOSOPHY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY 

I  DEDICATE  WITH  SINCERE  RESPECT  AND  AFFECTION  THIS  MY 

FIRST  PUBUSHED  VOLUME 


PREFACE 

The  present  volume  is  designed  to  serve  a  twofold  purpose 
— (i)  as  a  textbook  in  advanced  courses  in  general  psychol- 
ogy, and  (2)  for  general  reading  on  the  subject  of  the  nature 
and  methods  of  mental  science.  The  work  contains  matter 
not  usually  found  in  the  ordinary  brief  textbooks  and  manuals 
of  psychology,  and  yet  it  is  the  endeavor  of  the  author  to 
present  his  material  in  such  a  form  that  it  may  be  grasped  by 
any  interested  reader  who  is  familiar  with  those  facts  of  the 
science  which  may  be  found  recorded  in  any  good  textbook. 

The  only  work  in  English  which  in  any  degree  covers  the 
ground  that  I  myself  have  traversed  is  the  book  by  Boris  Sidis 
on  The  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology. 
But  though  reference  is  frequently  made  in  the  following 
pages  to  this  valuable  work,  a  comparison  of  the  tables  of  con- 
tents of  Dr.  Sidis's  book  and  my  own  will  be  sufficient  to  in- 
dicate our  differences  in  plan  and  aim. 

Another  writer  frequently  cited  in  the  ensuing  pages  is 
Hugo  Miinsterberg,  and  I  wish  to  record  here  my  deep  sense 
of  indebtedness  to  him  for  his  illuminating  work  on  the  great 
problems  of  philosophy  and  of  natural  and  mental  science. 
This  indebtedness  is  manifested  many  times  in  the  ensuing 
work,  notwithstanding  my  differences  with  him  on  many 
points.  I  think  it  may  truthfully  be  said  that  in  his  death 
America  has  lost  its  one  great  theoretical  psychologist — and 
in  so  writing,  I  say  nothing  of  his  invaluable  work  as  a 
pioneer  in  the  fields  of  practical  and  applied  psychology. 

All  quotations  are  in  the  exact  words  of  the  original  writ- 
ers, though  I  have  not  hesitated  to  change  the  marks  of  punctu- 
ation when  such  change  has  seemed  to  be  in  the  interests  of 
clearness.  Words  in  square  brackets  [  ]  have  been  added  by 
the  author  of  this  book. 


Vlll 


PREFACE 


Sections  are  numbered  consecutively  throughout  the  book, 
regardless  of  chapters,  and  numbers  in  parenthesis  in  the  text 
refer  always  to  those  numbered  sections.  Chapters  also  are 
numbered  consecutively,  regardless  of  the  larger  "Books." 
Most  of  the  chapters  are  broken  up  into  "Divisions,"  the  num- 
bering of  which  starts  anew  in  each  successive  chapter. 

I  wish  to  acknowledge  with  gratitude  the  assistance  of  my 
wife  in  the  preparation  of  the  manuscript,  and  of  my  father- 
in-law,  Mr.  D.  W.  Linch,  in  the  drawing  of  some  of  the  cuts; 
and  also  the  interest  of  my  colleagues,  Professor  M.  M.  Curtis 
and  Professor  H.  A.  Aikins. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Preface    vii 

Bibliography  xvii 

Introduction   i 

BOOK  I 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Historic  Concepts  of  Psychology 7 

J.    The  Two  Most  General  Concepts  of  Psy- 
chology    7 

1.  Rational  and  Empirical  Psychology 7 

2.  Rational  Psychology    7 

3.  Empirical  Psychology    8 

2.    The  Schools  of  Rational  Psychology 8 

4.  Spiritualism,  Materialism,  Dualism,  and  Mon- 

ism    8 

5.  Dualism   9 

6.  Monism   10 

7.  Conclusion  of  this  Subject 10 

J.    The  Development  of  Empirical  Psychology  ii 

8.  The  Nature  of  Empirical  Psychology 11 

9.  The  Conditions  of  Scientific  Psychology 12 

a.  Faculty  Psychology   12 

10.  The  Faculty  Theory 12 

1 1.  Criticism  of  Faculty  Psychology 13 

b.  Associationism  15 

12.  The  Associationist  Theory 15 

13.  Principles  of  Associationism 17 

14.  Criticism  of  Associationism 17 


X  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

c.  Modern  Scientific  Psychology 19 

15.  Genesis  of  Scientific  Psychology 19 

16.  Extreme  Views  of  Scientific  Psychology....  19 
Table  L    Historic  Concepts  of  Psychol- 
ogy     21 

II.     Current  Concepts  of  Scientific  Psychology  . .  22 

J.    Points  of  View  in  Psychology 22 

17.  Mental  Process  vs.  Mental  Content 22 

18.  The  Structural  and  Functional  Points  of  View 

in  Psychology 24 

19.  Examples  of  Process  and  Content 25 

Table  II.    Experience  as  Process  and  as 

Content    26 

2.    Structuralism      and      Functionalism      as 

Schools  of  Psychology 2^ 

20.  Contemporary  Schools  of  Psychology 27 

21.  Structuralism   27 

22.  Functionalism    28 

23.  Reconciliation  of  Structuralism  and  Function- 

alism    '. 30 

J.    Behaviorism  31 

24.  General  Position  of  the  Behaviorists 31 

a.  Behavior  vs.  Consciousness 32 

25.  The  Behavioristic  Program 32 

26.  Kinds  of  Behavior 33 

27.  Frost's  Behaviorism 36 

28.  Criticism  of  the  Behavioristic  Program 37 

29.  Behaviorism  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem ...  40 

b.  Behaviorism  and  Introspection 41 

30.  Introspection  as  Psychological  Observation. .  41 

31.  The  Nature  of  Introspection 42 

32.  The  Difficulties  of  Introspection 45 

33.  The  Necessity  and  Limitations  of  Introspec- 

tion     52 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

c.  Conclusion  55 

34.  Reconciliation  of  Behaviorism  and  Mentalism  55 

35.  Behaviorism  and  the  Biological  Sciences....  58 
Table  III.    The  Biological  Sciences 62 

36.  Behaviorism  and  Psychology 61 

III.  Current  Concepts  of  Psychology,  Continued  68 

1.  Self-Psychology 68 

a.  Statement  and  Defence  of  the  Principle 68 

37.  Self-Psychology 68 

38.  Inadequacy  of  Structuralism  and  Functional- 

ism  69 

39.  Positive  Considerations 70 

40.  The  Nature  of  the  Psychologist's  Self 70 

41.  Self -Psychology  as   Reconciliation  of   Struc- 

turalism and  Functionalism 71 

b.  Criticism  of  Self-Psychology  74 

42.  The  Metaphysical  Nature  of  Self-Psychology  74 

43.  The  Alleged  Universality  of  Self-Conscious- 

ness    yy 

44.  The  Indefinability  of  the  Self 80 

45.  Self-Psychology   as  Reconciliation   of   Struc- 

turalism and  Functionalism   81 

46.  Self -Psychology  and  Sociology 83 

2.  General  Conclusions   84 

47.  The  Relations  of  the  Contemporary  Schools.  84 

48.  The  Definition  of  Psychology   84 

Table  IV.     The   Current    Concepts    of 

Scientific  Psychology  86 

BOOK  II 
THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY 

IV.  Psychology  and  Metaphysics 89 

49.  The  Problem  of  the  Basis  of  a  Scientific  Psy- 

chology    89 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

/.    The  Problem  of  Science 89 

50.  The  General  Problem  of  Science 89 

51.  Scientific  Description   90 

52.  Scientific  Explanation 91 

53.  The  Concept  of  Causation 91 

54.  The  Nature  and  Kinds  of  Scientific  Hypothe- 

ses     92 

55.  The  Validity  of  Conceptual  Hypotheses 94 

56.  Is  Science  purely  Descriptive? 95 

Table    V,      Stages    of    the    Scientific 

Method   97 

2.    The  Problem  of  Metaphysics,  and  its  Re- 
lation TO  Science  97 

57.  The  General  Problem  of  Metaphysics 97 

58.  The  Artificiality  of  Science 98 

59.  Psychology  and  Meanings 100 

60.  Must  Metaphysics  be  Rejected? 105 

5.    Psychology  as  Science  and  as  Metaphysics  106 

61.  Aspects  of  Personality 106 

62.  Psychology  vs.  Metaphysics 108 

63.  Corresponding  Attitudes  toward  Nature 109 

4.  Psychology  and  Real  Life iii 

64.  Psychology  and  the  True  Personality 1 11 

65.  Physical  Science  and  the  Real  World 113 

66.  The  Necessity  of  a  Scientific   Study  of  the 

Mind 115 

67.  The  Place  of  the  Contemporary  Schools  of 

Psychology 117 

5.  Psychology  and  Other  "Mental  Sciences"  117 

68.  The  Mental  Sciences  and  the  Fine  Arts 117 

69.  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences 120 

Table   VL     The   Classification   of   the 

Sciences 121 

70.  Psychology  and  Religion 122 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

V.     Psychology  and  the  Material  Sciences 125 

1.  Theories  of  their  Differentiation 125 

71.  The  Problem 125 

y2.  The  Inner  Sense  Theory 125 

73.  The  Immediate  Experience  Theory 127 

74.  Criticism  and  Conclusions 129 

2.  The  Differentiation  of  Mental  from  Ma- 

terial Facts  132 

75.  The  Non-Spatial  Character  of  Mental  Objects  132 

76.  Consciousness  as  Potential  Energy 134 

yy.  The  Privacy  of  Mental  Facts  vs.  the  Commun- 
ity of  Physical  Facts  138 

78.  Sidis's  Doctrine  of  Mental  vs.  Physical 142 

79.  Various  Secondary  Characteristics  of  Mental 

Phenomena    146 

80.  The    Interpretation    of    the    Mental-Physical 

Distinction    148 

81 .  Conclusion    149 

J.    Conditions  of  Psychological  Description.  . .  150 

82.  General  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Psychology  150 

83.  Munsterberg's  Theory 150 

84.  Criticism  of  Munsterberg's  Doctrine 152 

BOOK  III 

THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

VI.     The  Postulates  in  General 159 

1.  The  Statement  of  the  Postulates 159 

85.  The  Postulates   159 

Table  VII.    Summary  of  the  Postulates  162 

2.  The  Principle  of  Psychocerebral  Parallel- 

ism      163 

86.  Psychophysical  and  Psychocerebral  Parallelism  163 
Note  on  the  Principle  of  Independence.    166 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

5.    The   Principle   of   Independent   Psychical 

Causation 168 

a.  The  Problem  of  Psychological  Explanation . ...    168 

87.  The  Problem 168 

h.  The  Difficulties  of  Independent  Psychical  Causa- 
tion       169 

88.  The  Laws  of  Psychology 169 

89.  Causation  in  the  Physical  and  Mental  Realms  170 

c.  The  Cerebral  Theory  of  Psychical  Causation. . .    174 

90.  The  Cerebral  Theory 174 

91.  Criticism  of  the  Cerebral  Theory 176 

d.  Defence  of  the  Independence  Theory 178 

92.  Methods  of  Explanation  in  Psychology 178 

Table  VIIL     Theories  of  Psychological 

Explanation    1 79 

93.  The    Difficulties    of    Independent    Psychical 

Causation   180 

94.  The  Problem  of  Sensations 181 

95.  The  Problem  of  the  Discontinuity  of  Mental 

Life    184 

Table  IX.  Difficulties  in  Accepting  the 
Principle  of  Independent  Psychical 
Causation,  and  How  they  may  be  Met  185 

e.  The  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Psychology 185 

96.  Sidis's  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Mental  Life. .  . .    185 

97.  Criticism  of  the  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Psy- 

chology       186 

VII.     The  Subconscious 189 

1.  The  Concept  of  the  Subconscious 189 

98.  Meaning  of  the  Term 189 

99.  The  Place  of  the  Concept  in  Modern  Psychol- 

ogy        189 

100.  The  Grounds  for  Postulating  the  Subconscious  190 

2.  Evidences  of  the  Subconscious 192 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xv 

1 01.  Phenomena  involving  Personal  Continuity. . .    192 

102.  Phenomena  having  no  Conscious  Causes....   195 

103.  Phenomena  apparently  involving  Intelligence.    197 

J.    Dissociation  and  the  Coconscious 198 

104.  Meaning  of  the  Terms 198 

105.  Examples  of  Dissociation   200 

VIII.     Theories  of  the  Subconscious 202 

J.    Types  of  Theory  202 

106.  The  Main  Problem   202 

107.  The  Dual  Mind  Theory 203 

108.  The  Ultra-Marginal  View  of  the  Subconscious  204 

109.  The  Subconscious  as  the  Subliminal 207 

2.    Criticisms  of  the  Concept  of  the  Subcon- 
scious       208 

no.  The  Subconscious  and  its  Critics 208 

111.  The  Subconscious  as  Self -Contradictory 209 

112.  The  Subconscious  as  Futile 211 

113.  The  Subconscious  as  Gratuitous 211 

J.    The  Theory  OF  Unconscious  Cerebration.  . .  215 

114.  The  Cerebral  Explanation   of  the   So-called 

Subconscious   Phenomena    215 

115.  Criticism  of  the  Theory  of  Unconscious  Cere- 

bration     217 

1 16.  Consciousness  and  Content 219 

4.    Recent  Developments  in  the  Theory  of  the 

Subconscious   220 

1 17.  Freud  and  Prince 220 

118.  Freud's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious 220 

119.  Prince's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious 221 

120.  Comparison   and    Suggested   Modification   of 

Freud's  and  Prince's  Theories 222 

Table  X.     Classification   of   Psychical 
States,  etc 224 


xvi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

5.    Conclusions 225 

121.  Principles  of  Psychological  Explanation 225 

122.  The  Explanation  of  Memory 226 

123.  Explanation  of  the  Varieties  of  the  Subcon- 

scious       228 

124.  Sidis's  Criticism  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Un- 

conscious    230 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Following  is  an  alphabetical  list  of  all  the  books  (not  peri- 
odicals) which  are  cited  in  the  reference  lists  at  the  close  of  the 
several  chapters,  arranged  according  to  authors. 

Calkins,  Mary  WhitoN' — 

An  Introduction  to  Psychology  (Macmillan:    1901). 
A  First  Book  in  Psychology  (Macmillan:    Fourth  Edi- 
tion, 1914). 

CORIAT,  ISADOR  H. — 

Abnormal  Psychology   (MofiFat,   Yard   &  Co. :    Second 
Edition,  1914). 
DuNLAP,  Knight — 

A  System  of  Psychology  (Scribners:   1912). 
Freud,  Sigmund — 

The  Interpretation  of  Dreams   (trans,  by  A.  A.  Brill. 
Macmillan:   1913). 
Galloway,  George — 

The  Philosophy  of  Religion  (Scribners:    1914). 
Hart,  Bernard — 

The   Psychology    of   Insanity    (Cambridge    University 
Press:    1912). 
Hoffman,  Frank  Sargent — 

The  Sphere  of  Science  (Putnams:    1898). 
Holt,  Edwin  Bissell — 

The  Freudian  Wish,  and  its  Place  in  Ethics  (Henry  Holt 
&  Co.:    1915). 
James,  William — 

Principles  of  Psychology  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.:    1890). 
Psychology,  Briefer  Course  (Henry  Holt  &  Co. :    1892). 
The    Varieties    of    Religious    Experience     (Longmans, 
Green,  &  Co. :   1902). 
Jastrow,  Joseph — 

The  Subconscious  (Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.:    1906). 
Klemm,  Otto — 

A  History  of  Psychology  (trans,  by  E.  C.  Wilm  and  R. 
Pintner.     Scribners:    19 14). 


xviii  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Meyer,  Max  Friedrich — 

The  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Behavior  (Richard 
G.  Badger,  Boston:    191 1). 
More,  Louis  Trenchard — 

The  Limitations  of  Science  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.:    1915). 

MiJNSTERBERG,  HUGO 

Psychology  and  Life  (Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co. :   1899). 

Science  and  Idealism  (Do.:    1906). 

The  Eternal  Values  (Do.:    1909). 

Psychotherapy  (Moffat,  Yard  &  Co. :   1909). 

Psychology  General  and  Applied  (Appletons:    1914). 
Myers,  Frederic  W.  H. — 

Human  Personality,  and  its  Survival  of  Bodily  Death 
(Two    vols.      Longmans,    Green    &    Co. :      1903. 
Abridged  Edition,  i  vol.,  1907). 
Parmelee,  Maurice — 

The  Science  of  Human  Behavior  (Macmillan :   1913). 
Paton,  Stewart — 

Human  Behavior  (Scribners:  1921). 
Pearson,  Karl — 

The  Grammar  of  Science  (Third  Edition,  Vol.  I.    Lon- 
don, A.  &  C.  Black:    191 1). 
Prince,  Morton — 

The  Unconscious  (Macmillan:    1914). 
ROYCE,  JosiAH — 

Studies  of  Good  and  Evil  (Appletons:   1898). 

Outlines  of  Psychology  (Macmillan:    1903). 
Scripture,  E.  W. — 

The  New  Psychology  (Scribners:    1898). 
Sellars,  Roy  Wood — 

Critical  Realism  (Rand,  McNally  &  Co.,  Chicago:  1916). 
SiDis,  Boris — 

The  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnorm^d  Psychology 
(Richard  G.  Badger,  Boston:    191 4). 
Titchener,  Edward  Bradford — 

A  Textbook  of  Psychology  (Macmillan:    1910). 

A  Beginner's  Psychology  (Macmillan:    1915). 
Villa,  Guido — 

Contemporary  Psychology  (Macmillan:    1903). 
Ward,,  James — 

Psychological  Principles  (Cambridge  University  Press: 
1918). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xix 

Watson,  John  Broadus — 

Behavior:   An  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psychology 

(Henry  Holt  &  Co.:    1914). 
Psychology  from  the  Standpoint  of  a  Behaviorist  (Lip- 
pincott:    1919). 
Wells,  Frederic  Lyman — 

Mental  Adjustments  (Appletons:    191 7). 

WUNDT,  WiLHELM 

Outlines  of  Psychology  (trans,  by  C.  H.  Judd.     Third 
Revised  English  Edition.     Leipzig  and  New  York, 
1907). 
Yerkes,  Robert  Mearns — 

Introduction  to  Psychology  (Henry  Holt  &  Co. :   191 1). 


Essays,  Philosophical  and  Psychological,  in  Honor  of  William 

James  (Longmans,  Green  &  Co.:   1908). 
Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  by  former  students  of 

Edward  Garman  (Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.:    1906). 
Subconscious  Phenomena,  by  various  authors    (Richard  G. 

Badger,  Boston:   191  o). 


INTRODUCTION 

"There  are  periods  in  the  growth  of  science  when  it  is  well 
to  turn  our  attention  from  its  imposing  superstructure  and  to 
carefully  examine  its  foundations."  With  these  words  Karl 
Pearson  opened  the  preface  to  the  first  edition  of  his  Gram- 
mar of  Science,  and  they  are  fitting  words  with  which  to  in- 
troduce our  present  study  also.  This  is  an  age  of  great  de- 
velopment in  all  fields  of  scientific  investigation,  and  in  no 
field  more  strikingly  than  in  that  of  psychology.  But  although 
there  are  many  builders  of  foundations — such  men  as  Pear- 
son, More,  Enriques,  Mivart,  Poincare — it  is  chiefly  the  physi- 
cal and  biological  sciences  in  whose  bases  they  are  interested, 
and  rarely  are  the  separate  claims  of  psychology  given  their 
just  due,  if  indeed  they  are  considered  at  all. 

Nor  are  the  psychologists  themselves  altogether  free  from 
blame  in  this  matter.  Justly  proud  of  the  freedom  which 
their  science  now  enjoys — liberated  comparatively  late  in  time 
as  it  was  from  the  shackles  of  metaphysical  speculation,  and 
resting  securely  upon  the  hard  rock  of  empirical  fact — they  are 
giving  their  time  and  attention  almost  entirely  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  experimental  method  and  the  discovery  of  indi- 
vidual facts  by  its  means,  to  the  serious  neglect  of  the  broader 
significance  of  these  facts.  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  there 
is  no  interest  among  psychologists  in  the  foundation  principles 
of  their  science,  but  I  do  mean  that  the  interest  is  relatively 
slight,  and  that  what  work  is  being  done  in  this  field  is  griev- 
ously lacking  in  unity  either  of  aim  or  of  result.  We  find,  in 
other  words,  not  one  science  of  psychology  but  many — struc- 
turalist psychologies,  functionalist  psychologies,  behaviorist 
psychologies  and  others,  each  one  claiming  to  be  the  truly 
scientific  psychology,  but  having  aims  and  ideals  inharmonious 
with  all  the  rest.     Experimentation  goes  merrily  on,  building 


2  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

up  a  truly  "imposing  superstructure"  where  a  half-century 
ago  was  nothing  at  all,  but  instead  of  one  foundation  fitly 
joining  all  the  parts  a  number  of  distinct  and  mutually  de- 
structive foundations.  What  psychology  needs  most  of  all 
today  is  not  so  much  more  superstructure  as  a  stronger  foun- 
dation, not  so  much  an  analytic  examination  of  facts  as  a 
synthetic  view  of  the  entire  field. 

It  is  for  the  purpose  of  at  least  securing  a  synthetic  glimpse 
if  not  a  complete  view  of  this  field  that  the  present  work  has 
been  undertaken.  The  situation  and  problem  are  these :  First, 
as  to  the  situation,  psychology  is  today  undoubtedly  an  em- 
pirical, inductive,  observational,  experimental,  positive  and 
concrete  science.  It  is  no  longer  a  branch  of  philosophy,  nor 
is  it  necessarily  any  more  closely  affiliated  with  philosophy  than 
are  any  of  the  physical  or  biological  sciences;  for  all  sciences, 
non-psychological  as  well  as  psychological,  must  have  a  philo- 
sophical foundation.  But  at  this  point  arises  the  problem: 
is  psychology  also  a  distinct  science  among  its  sister  sciences? 
Is  it,  or  can  it  become,  as  independent  of  physiology,  of  neu- 
rology, of  biology,  as  it  is  of  philosophy?  Is  the  introspective 
study  of  the  mind  scientific  psychology,  or  is  the  latter  term 
applicable  only  to  the  experimental  study  of  behavior?  Cer- 
tainly the  tendency  today  is  strongly  toward  the  second  of 
these  alternatives,  but  as  over  against  this  tendency  it  is  the 
underlying  purpose  of  this  book  to  defend  the  thesis  that 
scientific  psychology  is  independent  alike  of  metaphysics  on 
the  one  hand  and  of  the  biological  sciences  on  the  other,  that 
there  can  be  a  complete  science  of  psychology  on  this  indepen- 
dent basis,  and  that  introspection  is  really  scientific  and  the 
distinctive  method  of  scientific  psychology;  and  to  undertake 
the  task  of  establishing  some  of  the  essential  principles  upon 
which  such  a  complete  and  independent  science  of  psychology 
must  and  may  be  built  up. 

The  work  will  be  divided  into  three  parts;  discussing  (i) 
the  various  definitions  or  conceptions  of   psychology  which 


INTRODUCTION  3 

have  been  suggested  in  the  past  and  are  being  expounded  to- 
day, with  the  aim  of  drawing  a  synthetic  and  positive  con- 
clusion as  to  the  merits  of  these  various  conceptions;  (2)  the 
field  of  scientific  psychology,  its  distinctiveness  from  meta- 
physics on  the  one  hand  and  from  physical  and  biological  sci- 
ences on  the  other;  and  (3)  the  postulates  necessary  for  the 
construction  of  a  scientific  psychology,  with  especial  attention 
to  the  problems  of  parallelism,  psychical  causation,  and  the 
subconscious.  And  in  closing  these  introductory  remarks  I 
again  emphasize  the  fact  that  my  aim  is  primarily  not  criti- 
cal but  constructive,  and  not  constructive  in  the  sense  of  seek- 
ing to  build  a  new  foundation  for  psychology  but  of  synthetiz- 
ing  the  foundations  upon  which  the  science  is  even  now  built. 
For  the  chief  need  of  psychology  today,  and  of  philosophy  too, 
is  by  no  means  the  establishment  of  new  schools,  but  the 
synthesis  of  the  diverse  but  perfectly  harmonizable  truths  that 
the  great  thinkers  of  the  past  have  contributed  to  the  treasury 
of  present  day  knowledge. 


BOOK  I 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


LIBRARY 

STATE  TEACHERS  COLLEGE 
SANTA  BARBARA.  CALIFORNIA 


XQ>1. 


CHAPTER  I 

Historic  Concepts  of  Psychology 

I.  The  Two  Most  General  Concepts  of  Psychology. 

1.  Since  the  beginning  of  man's  interest  in  the  study  of  his 
own  mental  life  that  interest  has  taken  a  twofold  form,  one 
metaphysical  and  the  other  scientific.  The  metaphysical  in- 
terest, springing  primarily  from  the  religious  needs  of  man, 
the  hope  of  immortality  and  the  belief  in  a  soul  life  surviving 
the  death  of  the  body,  gradually  takes  the  form  of  what  we 
know  later  as  Rational^  psychology:  the  scientific  interest, 
arising  out  of  man's  intellectual  nature,  fulfilled  in  a  truly 
scientific  procedure,  lakes  the  form  of  what  has  long  been 
known  as  EmpiricaV  psychology.  These,  then,  are  the  two 
most  general  concepts — conceptions  or  ideals — of  what  psy- 
chology is  and  means,  that  have  appeared  in  the  history  of 
that  branch  of  human  knowledge. 

2.  Rational  Psychology  has  for  its  problem  the  nature,  ori- 
gin, and  destiny  of  the  soul.  As  such  it  is  a  branch  of  phi- 
losophy, and  not  strictly  speaking  a  science  at  all.^  Philosophy 
has  among  its  various  problems  that  of  the  general  nature  of 
reality,  the  part  of  philosophy  which  studies  this  problem  be- 
ing metaphysics.    As  the  soul,  if  it  exists  at  all,  is  one  of  the 

iJhe  use  of  these  terms  comes  from  the  old  antithesis  in  the  theory 
of  knowledge  between  reason  and  experience,  "empirical"  being  the  adjec- 
tive corresponding  to  the  noun  "experience."  However,  the  words  have  a 
well-established  meaning,  and  that  which  we  term  "empirical  psychology," 
as  will  soon  appear,  has  by  no  means  always  been  "scientific" :  hence  it 
is  better  to  retain  the  terms  chosen  than  to  reject  them  for  no  better 
reason  than  their  merely  etymological  ambiguity. 

'  The  significance  of  this  distinction,  which  is  a  distinction  of  the  first 
importance,  will  appear  later  (v.  especially,  Chap.  IV). 


8  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

most  important  of  all  realities,  rational  psychology,  which  has 
the  soul  for  its  subject-matter,  is  one  of  the  chief  divisions  of 
metaphysics.  All  the  individual  truths  about  the  soul  or 
mental  life  which  rational  psychology  derives,  therefore,  arc 
deduced  from  the  general  concept  or  definition  of  what  the 
soul  itself  is. 

3.  Empirical  Psychology,  on  the  contrary,  is  interested  in 
the  facts  of  mental  life  just  as  they  appear  in  our  experience 
for  their  own  sake,  without  inquiring  into  the  real  inner  na- 
ture of  the  soul,  or  even  caring  whether  there  is  such  a  reality 
as  a  soul.  Rational  psychology  asks  what  mind  or  soul  is, 
empirical  psychology  asks  what  the  mind  does  or  how  it  acts. 
Hence,  the  latter  usually  discards  the  word  "soul"  altogether, 
substituting  for  it  such  terms  as  "mind,"  "self,"  or  "con- 
sciousness." It  has  come,  therefore,  in  recent  years  to  be 
spoken  of,  by  its  adherents  proudly  and  by  its  critics  reproach- 
fully, as  a  "psychology  without  a  soul."  This  designation 
serves  clearly  to  mark  off  the  empirical  from  the  metaphysical 
type  of  psychology,  and  at  the  same  time  to  emphasize  the 
fact  that  empirical  psychology  is  by  its  very  nature  incomplete 
and  one-sided,  and  by  no  means,  as  its  devotees  too  often 
claim,  the  last  word  on  the  subject  of  mental  life.  It  also 
warns  us  not  to  allow  ourselves  to  imagine  for  one  moment 
that  because  rational  psychology  is  older  than  empirical,  and 
empirical  psychology  alone  fashionable  today,  the  problems 
and  methods  of  metaphysics  are  therefore  no  longer  of  any 
importance.  There  is  as  valuable  a  place  for  metaphysical 
psychology  in  the  world  of  thought  today  as  there  ever  was, 
and  there  always  will  be  such  a  place.  This  point,  however, 
must  be  postponed  until  a  later  period  in  our  investigations.' 

2.  The  Schools  of  Rational  Psychology.* 

4.  The  schools  of  rational  psychology  are  distinguished 
primarily  according  to  their  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 

8  V.  Chap.  IV. 

*  Cf.,  throughout  this  chapter,  Table  I,  on  p.  21. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  9 

mind:  hence  a  classification  of  them  is  rather  a  classification 
of  theories  of  mind  than  of  concepts  of  psychology.  On  the 
question  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  there  have  always  been  two 
schools  in  rational  psychology — spiritualism  and  materialism; 
and  on  the  question  of  the  degree  of  relationship  between  the 
soul  and  the  body,  two — dualism  and  monism.  Spiritualism 
in  psychology  is  the  doctrine  that  all  the  phenomena  of  mental 
life  are  manifestations  of  a  non-material  soul,  materialism 
in  psychology  is  the  theory  that  all  psychical  processes  are 
modes  or  manifestations  of  matter.  According  to  the  dual- 
istic  conception,  mind  and  matter  are  two  sharply  opposed 
substances:  according  to  the  monistic  conception,  mind  and 
matter  are  in  some  way  identified,  as  different  manifestations 
of  one  form  of  reality.  It  follows  from  these  definitions  that 
dualism  if  consistent  must  necessarily  be  spiritualistic  in  its 
theory  of  the  soul,  but  that  monism  may  be  either  spiritualistic 
or  materialistic  according  as  this  "one  form  of  reality"  is  re- 
garded as  primarily  spiritual  or  material  in  nature.  There 
are,  then,  ultimately  but  three  distinct  schools  of  rational 
psychology — Dualism,  Spiritualistic  Monism,  and  Materialism. 
Dualism  is  the  original  school,  the  two  forms  of  monism 
arising  out  of  the  necessity  for  resolving  the  inevitable  diffi- 
culties of  the  dualistic  position. 

5.  Dualism. — The  dualistic  view  of  human  nature  appears 
early  in  the  history  of  the  race,  the  experiences  of  dreams  and 
of  the  permanent  sleep  we  call  death  naturally  leading  to  the 
conviction  that  man  has  a  soul  which,  though  bound  up  with 
the  body  during  the  waking  hours,  wanders  freely  out  of  the 
body  in  sleep,  and  at  the  time  of  death  becomes  separated  from 
that  body  forever.  Primitive  conceptions  of  the  soul  are,  in- 
deed, crude  and  in  many  ways  materialistic,  the  "soul"  being 
thought  of  as  little  more  than  a  detachable  shadow  of  the 
body ;  but  as  time  goes  on  the  concept  becomes  more  and  more 
spiritualized,  until  in  the  systems  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  we 
have  a  purely  idealistic  notion  of  what  constitutes  the  essen- 
tial element  of  human  nature.     According  to  Aristotle,  how- 


10  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

ever,  the  soul  is  not  so  much  an  outside  principle  separate 
from  the  body,  but  rather  is  identified  with  the  vital  principle 
which  dwells  in  and  energizes  the  body.  The  psychology  of 
Scholasticism  continues  this  notion  of  immanent  dunlism,  as 
we  may  call  it,  and  it  is  not  until  the  time  of  Descartes  (1596- 
1650)  that  the  dualistic  conception  reaches  its  logical  climax 
in  the  transcendent  view  that  the  soul  is  a  substance  entirely 
distinct  from  the  body  and  interacting  with  it  from  outside. 

6.  Monism. — It  is  this  problem  of  interaction  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  explaining  it  that  have  led  to  the  formulation  of  the 
monistic  theory  that  mind  and  matter  are  not  distinct  realities, 
but  different  manifestations  of  one  fundamental  reality.  Just 
as  the  dualistic  theory  of  the  universe  is  in  its  primitive  form 
materialistic  in  its  concept  of  the  soul,  but  can  become  con- 
sistent only  when  the  latter  concept  has  been  spiritualized;  so 
the  monistic  theory  of  the  universe  as  we  first  find  it  in  Spi- 
noza (1632-1677)  is  a  neutral  type  of  monism,  the  universe 
being  regarded  as  fundamentally  neither  spiritual  nor  material, 
but  such  a  general  monistic  metaphysics  inevitably  involves 
either  a  spiritualistic  or  a  materialistic  psychology — whatever 
the  universe  at  large  may  be,  the  soul  must  be  either  material 
or  non-material. 

Dualism  being  necessarily  spiritualistic,  spiritualistic  mon- 
ism is  the  natural  heir  of  the  older,  and  by  Spinoza  and  his 
adherents  discarded,  view  of  the  soul.  As  representatives  of 
this  concept  after  Spinoza  we  may  name  especially  Leibniz, 
Berkeley,  Kant  and  his  followers,  and  Lotze.  In  reaction 
against  this  view  is  the  opposing  doctrine  of  materialism, 
traceable  to  its  origin  in  the  Greek  philosopher  Democritus. 
and  finding  modern  representatives  of  quite  different  types  in 
Hobbes,  Diderot,  Moleschott,  Buchner,  Haeckel,  and  others. 

7.  But  it  would  take  us  too  far  afield  to  dwell  upon  the 
distinction  and  relationship  between  the  various  schools  of 
rational  psychology,  or  to  so  much  as  hint  at  a  comparison 
and  criticism  of  them.  Such  a  task  belongs  to  the  philosopher, 
and  not  to  the  psychologist  in  the  current  sense  of  that  word. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  ii 

But  it  is  well  to  be  familiar  with  the  meanings  of  these  philo- 
sophical concepts,  not  only  because  this  makes  the  far  differ- 
ent problems  of  empirical  psychology  stand  out  all  the  more 
clearly  by  contrast,  but  also  because  those  philosophical  prob- 
lems still  exist  and  still  cry  for  solution.  I  repeat  that  empiri- 
cal psychology  has  not  superseded  rational  psychology,  but 
has  merely  added  itself  to  the  latter.  Today  the  term  "psy- 
chology" when  used  by  itself  always,  and  rightly,  means  em- 
pirical or  scientific  psychology;  and  the  term  "rational  psy- 
chology" is  nowadays  little  favored,  the  broader  term  "meta- 
physics," of  which  rational  psychology  is  one  branch,  doing 
service  for  the  parts  as  well  as  the  whole,  because  of  the  in- 
extricable interrelation  of  all  metaphysical  problems.  But 
both  adjectives  are  of  permanent  value,  notwithstanding. 

3.  The  Development  of  Empirical  Psychology. 

8.  By  empirical  psychology  is  meant  a  study  of  mind  which 
is  based  on  observation  of  the  facts  of  mental  life,  not  derived 
deductively  from  general  metaphysical  concepts.  It  is,  or 
aims  to  be,  scientific  rather  than  philosophical  in  that  it  starts 
with  facts  of  observation,  and  aims  to  determine  the  connec- 
tions between  these  facts  and  so  far  as  possible  to  formulate 
the  laws  which  govern  these  connections. 

Empirical  methods  of  studying  mental  life  were  employed 
as  early  as  Plato  and  Aristotle,  in  both  of  whose  writings 
valuable  comments  on  mental  phenomena,  with  analyses  of 
the  mind  and  classifications  of  psychical  processes,  are  to  be 
found.  Especially  is  this  true  of  Aristotle,  to  whom  we  owe 
the  first  systematic  treatise  on  psychology.  Throughout  the 
middle  ages  the  empirical  interest  was  active  along  with 
but  always  strictly  subordinated  to,  the  metaphysical.  In  fact 
this  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  Greek,  medieval,  and  most 
modern  psychology  before  the  middle  of  the  last  century — 
empirical  methods  of  study  cropping  up  from  time  to  time, 
but  always  in  subordination  to  rational  or  philosophical  in- 
terests.    Modem  empirical  psychology  may  properly  be  said 


12  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  begin  with  John  Locke  (1632-1704),  with  whom  the  em- 
pirical interest  was  even  stronger  than  the  metaphysical,  but 
whose  psychology  is  nevertheless  but  an  outgrowth  of  his 
general  metaphysical  thought.  It  is  not  until  the  latter  half — 
indeed,  hardly  until  the  last  quarter — of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury that  psychology  finally  attains  its  independence  of  phi- 
losophy and  its  present  status  as  a  distinct  science. 

9.  Conditions  of  Scientific  Psychology. — A  scientific  psy- 
chology must  not  only  describe  mental  facts,  it  must  also  ex- 
plain them.  Like  other  sciences,  psychology  has  passed 
through  two  stages  in  its  history — a  purely  descriptive  stage, 
and  a  descriptive  and  explanatory  stage.  But  even  explana- 
tory psychology  is  not  necessarily  scientific  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  term,  so  long  as  psychological  facts  are  explained,  as 
they  long  were,  in  terms  of  philosophical  concepts.  Two  im- 
portant transitional  schools  which  appear  in  the  prescientific 
period  of  the  history  of  empirical  psychology  must  therefore 
be  discussed  before  we  are  prepared  to  understand  the  meth- 
ods and  ideals  of  modern  scientific  psychology — the  schools  of 
Faculty  Psychology  and  of  Associationism. 

a.  Factilty  Psychology 

10.  The  so-called  faculty  theory  of  the  mind  in  one  form  or 
another  practically  dominates  empirical  psychology  from  the 
very  beginning  until  the  eighteenth  century,  although  the  word 
"mental  faculty"  itself  appears  for  the  first  time  in  the  sys- 
tem of  Christian  Wolff  (1679-1754). 

According  to  this  doctrine  the  mind  is  thought  of  as  divided 
into  compartments — faculties  or  powers — which  are  regarded 
as  independent  forces,  and  all  individual  mental  phenomena 
are  explained  as  products  or  expressions  of  these  faculties. 
Such  class-concepts  of  modern  psychology  as  sensation,  mem 
ory,  imagination,  thought,  feeling,  will,  desire,  etc.,  are  re- 
garded by  this  school  not  merely  as  convenient  groups  of 
mental  processes  but  as  actual  forces  which  produce  the 
phenomena  included  under  those  heads.    Thus  we  see  because 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  13 

we  have  a  faculty  of  sensation,  we  think  by  means  of  our 
thought  faculty,  we  act  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  our  will  is 
an  independent  faculty  which  is  free  from  the  restraints  of 
physical  causation. 

Throughout  the  history  of  the  science,  however,  there  has 
ever  existed  a  strong  tendency  toward  the  reduction  of  the 
number  of  faculties,  the  many  lesser  faculties  being  subordi- 
nated to  a  few  ruling  ones.  The  usual  groupings  have  been 
either  into  two  faculties — one  passive  and  the  other  active, 
knowledge  and  desire  or  will;  or  into  three — knowledge,  feel- 
ing, and  will. 

Such  a  division  of  mind  is  analogous  to  the  traditional 
grouping  of  teachers  in  the  universities  into  the  great  facul- 
ties of  philosophy  (or  arts  and  sciences),  law,  medicine,  and 
theology;  each  being  further  divisible  into  a  number  of  lesser 
faculties — as  natural  science,  history,  literature,  etc.  Just  as 
every  teacher  is  a  member  of  certain  of  these  groups,  and  acts 
by  their  authority;  so  every  psychical  process  was  thought  of 
as  a  product  of  some  particular  mental  faculty,  and  considered 
to  be  explained  when  referred  to  the  proper  one. 

Of  the  two  groupings,  the  active-passive  division  practically 
dominated  the  whole  history  of  psychology  until  the  time  of 
Wolff,  to  whom  reference  has  already  been  made,  and  who 
was  the  first  to  employ  the  term  "faculty"  and  to  formulate  a 
systematic  doctrine  based  on  that  principle.  Following  him, 
to  John  Nicolas  Tetens  (1736-1807)  is  due  the  introduction 
of  the  threefold  division  into  intellect,  feeling,  and  will — a 
third  faculty,  feeling,  being  added  to  the  Wolffian  two — 
which,  further  elaborated  by  Immanuel  Kant,  became  the  rul- 
ing psychological  concept,  on  the  continent  at  least,  through- 
out the  ensuing  century. 

II.  Criticism  of  Faculty  Psychology. — Modem  scientific 
psychology,  however,  has  rejected  absolutely  the  entire  faculty 
conception  of  the  mind  and  of  mental  science,  and  this,  I 
think  we  can  say,  for  three  reasons — 

(i)   The  division  of  the  mind  into  faculties  is  an  artificial, 


14  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

not  a  natural,  division — a  grouping  of  psychical  processes  for 
convenience  in  study  and  exposition,  not  an  actual  division  in 
the  substance  or  reality  of  the  mind  or  soul.  Modern  psychol- 
ogists recognize  that  whatever  the  mind  may  in  its  essential 
nature  be,  it  works,  normally  at  least,  as  a  unit,  not  as  a  col- 
lection of  separate  faculties;  that  every  momentary  state  of 
consciousness  is  at  the  same  time  a  knowing,  feeling,  and  de- 
siring state,  the  difference  between  the  three  being  one  of 
phases  of  a  single  psychosis^  rather  than  of  three  distinct  and 
separately  acting  psychical  forces;  that  whenever  there  is  ap- 
parent division  in  the  mind,  as  in  the  phenomena  of  so-called 
dissociation  (hypnosis,  hysterical  somnambulism,  etc.)  it  is  a 
division  which  actually  cuts  through  all  the  so-called  faculties, 
each  temporary  portion  of  mind  being  not  restricted  to  one 
"faculty"  but  manifesting  itself  in  all  the  ways  that  a  com- 
plete and  normal  mind  would  do. 

(2)  The  reference  of  the  various  individual  processes  to 
the  appropriate  faculties  merely  classifies  them,  but  does  not 
explain  them.  It  is  a  common  fallacy  to  think  that  because 
we  have  found  the  name  of  a  thing,  and  thereby  the  class  to 
which  it  belongs,  we  have  for  that  reason  explained  it;  but 
this  is  far  from  the  case,  classification  never  being  equivalent 
to  explanation,  but  merely  pointing  the  way  toward  the  latter. 
Mental  faculties  are  merely  class-names,  then,  not  causes  or 
forces,  and  we  have  no  more  justification  for  thinking  of  the 
faculty  of  perception,  for  example,  as  causing  or  producing 
individual  perceptions  than  we  have  for  thinking  of  the  idea 
of  "man"  as  causing  or  producing  individual  men. 

(3)  Finally,  the  whole  conception  of  faculties  as  causes  or 
forces  is  a  confusion  of  the  empirical  point  of  view  with  the 
metaphysical.  The  faculty  theory  involves  the  thought  that 
in  some  way  or  other  the  mental  faculties  are  more  real — more 
substantial  or  permanent — than  the  individual  processes.     It 

5  The  term  "psychosis"  should  be  thought  of  in  general  psychology  as 
indicating  any  single  moment  of  consciousness  taken  as  a  whole,  the 
whole  state  of  the  mind  at  any  individual  moment. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  15 

is  a  theory  of  what  the  mind  really  is — viz.,  a  collection  of 
faculties — formulated  to  explain  the  mental  processes  of  every- 
day life.  But  an  explanation  of  facts  formulated  in  terms  of 
metaphysical  concepts  is  not  the  kind  of  explanation  which 
science  demands:  hence  the  faculty  view  has  no  longer  any 
standing  in  modern  scientific  psychology. 

b.  Associationism 

12.  About  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  there  ap- 
peared in  England  a  new  school  of  empirical  psychology  known 
as  Associationism,  which  was  destined  to  play  an  important 
part  in  moulding  the  science  as  we  know  it  today.  The  two 
concepts  with  which  we  are  in  the  present  stage  of  our  investi- 
gations concerned — that  of  mental  faculties  and  that  of  as- 
sociationism— are  undoubtedly  the  most  influential  concepts 
ever  proposed  in  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  mental 
life. 

But  it  is  extremely  important  not  to  confuse  this  modem 
theory  of  associationum  with  the  familiar  and  long  recognized 
fact  of  association  on  which  that  theory  was  founded.  The 
fact  of  association  as  a  phenomenon  of  mental  life  was  recog- 
nized by  Aristotle,  and  to  him  we  owe  the  classic  grouping  of 
association-phenomena  under  the  three  heads  of  similarity, 
contrast,  and  contiguity  or  temporal  succession.  That  we  re- 
member things  by  associating  them  with  other  things,  and 
that  we  are  especially  likely  to  associate  objects  that  are  much 
alike  or  strikingly  different,  and  events  which  happen  at  the 
same  time  or  in  immediate  succession,  are  commonplaces  of 
experience  and  of  empirical  psychology  throughout  its  history. 
It  was  left  to  David  Hume  (1711-1776)  and  David  Hartley 
( 1 704-1 757),  however,  to  raise  this  familiar  fact  into  the  ex- 
alted position  of  being  the  central  and  dominating  principle  of 
explanatory  psychology,  "the  sufficient  explanation  of  all  con- 
scious experience,""  and  thus  to  establish  a  new  school.     As- 

•  Calkins,  Inlrod.,  p.  439. 


i6  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

sociationism  as  a  doctrine  is  so  called  because  it  makes  the 
fact  of  association  the  essential  principle  of  mental  life. 

Of  the  two  British  thinkers  already  named,  Hume  is  to  be 
thought  of  rather  as  the  builder  of  the  philosophical  founda- 
tions of  associationism/  Hartley  as  the  actual  creator  of  as- 
sociationism  as  a  school  of  psychology.^  The  central  prin- 
ciple of  Hume's  philosophy  was  that  the  entire  universe  ma- 
terial as  well  as  mental,  is  merely  a  collection  (i.e.,  association) 
of  what  he  termed  in  psychological  language  "impressions  and 
ideas" — that  that  which  we  call  the  soul  or  self  ("I")  has  no 
substantial  reality,  but  is  merely  a  "bundle"  of  impressions 
and  ideas,  and  that  the  material  universe  is  like  the  psychical 
in  its  constitution.  Impressions  and  ideas  are  thus  the  ele- 
ments of  all  things,  the  things  themselves  being  built  up  out  of 
these  elements  through  "association."  These  fundamental 
principles  Hartley  applies  and  develops  in  the  more  special  field 
of  empirical  psychology  and  nerve  physiology. 

Associationism  is  primarily  and  distinctively  a  British  school 
of  psychology,  all  English  psychologists  of  the  later  eighteenth 
and  most  of  the  nineteenth  centuries  being  influenced  by  it, 
of  whom  we  may  name  as  especially  representative  of  this 
school  three — ^James  Mill,  Alexander  Bain,  and  Herbert 
Spencer;  but  a  school  of  similar  type  and  springing  out  of 
the  ideas  of  the  British  associationists  was  founded  in  Ger- 
many by  Johann  Friedrich  Herbart  (1776-1841),  and  has  had 
quite  as  profound  an  influence  on  continental  nineteenth  cen- 
tury psychology  as  the  theories  of  Hume  and  Hartley  have  had 
in  Great  Britain.  In  its  philosophical  foundations  Herbart- 
ianism  differs  from  Humianism  in  its  acceptance  of  a  soul- 
snbstance  as  the  creator  of  ideas,  but  this  is  a  metaphysical 
distinction  and  on  the  empirical  side  the  similarities  between 
the  British  and  German  schools  are  far  more  fundamental 
than  the  differences. 

7  First  in  his  Treatise  of  Human  Nature   (1739). 
^Observations  on  Man  (1749). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  17 

13.  Principles  of  Associationism. — The  tenets  of  the  asso- 
ciationist  school  will  become  considerably  clearer,  however,  if 
we  sum  them  up  under  the  three  following  propositions: 

( 1 )  Every  idea®  is  an  independent,  more  or  less  permanent. 
and  revivable  reality.  Herbartianism,  of  course,  would  reject 
this  proposition  as  a  theoretical  statement,  but  for  all  practical 
purposes  Herbart  accepts  the  principle. 

(2)  Every  idea  is  endowed  with  the  power  of  association 
with  other  ideas;  so  that  when  one  member  of  the  group  is 
"revived,"  the  others  are  revived  along  with  it.  This  is  a 
statement  of  the  fact  of  association,  though  psychologists  to- 
day would  not  favor  the  use  of  the  terms  "power  of  associa- 
tion" and  "revival";  which  terms  nevertheless  accurately  rep- 
resent, I  think,  the  associationist  view. 

(3)  All  complex  mental  processes  are  explicable  on  these 
principles  of  the  permanent  reality  (Proposition  i)  and  as- 
sociative power  (Proposition  2)  of  ideas.  This  proposition 
represents  the  essential  distinctive  principle  of  the  school  that 
"association  is  the  sufficient  explanation  of  all  conscious  ex- 
periences." It  is  as  characteristic  of  Herbartian  as  of  British 
psychology,  for  according  to  Herbart  all  conscious  experience 
is  but  the  result  of  the  constant  activity  and  interaction  of 
ideas  which  in  the  unconscious  field  of  the  mind  come  into 
conflict  with  one  another,  the  stronger  sometimes  reenforcing 
and  sometimes  suppressing  the  weaker.  Here  we  have  a  pure- 
ly mechanical,  almost  physical,  conception  of  ideas  as  real 
forces  in  the  universe  of  mental  life — the  consistent  and 
logical  conclusion  of  the  three  premises  of  associationism. 

14.  Criticism  of  Associationism. — These  three  principles 
may  be  criticized,  and  must  we  believe  be  rejected,  on  the  fol- 
lowing grounds : 

(i)  The  doctrine  of  associationism  is  a  metaphysical,  not  a 
scientific,  doctrine.     From  this  point  of  view  it  has  no  ad- 

"  I  use  the  term  "idea"  here  in  John  Locke's  sense  of  it,  as  including  all 
mental  states  or  contents — perception,  feelings,  etc.,  as  well  as  what  mod- 
ern scientific  psychology  calls  ideas. 


i8  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

vantage  over  the  faculty-theory,  in  that  it  merely  substitutes 
"ideas"  for  the  older  "faculties"  as  the  units  of  mental  re- 
ality, conceiving  these  ideas  as  forces  which  produce  the 
phenomena  of  mental  life.  The  metaphysical  nature  of  the 
doctrine  is  also  clearly  brought  out  in  the  phrase  "power  of 
association,"  it  being  impossible  to  state  in  empirical  terms 
the  nature  of  such  a  "power," 

(2)  On  the  empirical  side,  associationism  entirely  miscon- 
ceives the  nature  of  ideas.  Ideas  are  not  permanent  things, 
but  passing  phases  of  mental  life.  An  idea  is  an  event  in 
time,  "belongs  to  a  given  moment  and  cannot  be  revived  at 
another  time.""  My  idea  of  the  character  and  policies  of 
William  II  may  be  today  in  its  significance  precisely  what  it 
was  ten  years  ago,  or  it  may  have  changed  completely,  but  in 
neither  case  is  there  any  actual  numerical  identity  between 
them.  Today's  experience  of  my  postage  stamp  box  may  be 
the  same  as  yesterday's,  but  today's  experience  is  a  part  of 
today's  stream  of  consciousness  and  yesterday's  experience  a 
part  of  yesterday's  stream  of  consciousness;  and  though  I 
may  say  the  stamp  box  is  today  identically  the  same  box  as 
it  was  yesterday,  yet  is  my  experience  of  it  today  as  a  fact  of 
consciousness  a  different  fact  from  my  experience  of  it  yes- 
terday. 

(3)  On  another  count  is  associationism  empirically  false, 
in  that  it  reverses  the  trice  genetic  order  as  between  the  indi- 
vidual ideas  and  their  association.  Ideas  are  not  independent 
realities,  existing  first  in  isolation  and  afterwards  combined 
after  a  mechanical  fashion  into  groups :  rather,  ideas  always 
come  into  the  mind  as  members  of  complex  groups,  which 
may  or  may  not  afterward  be  analysed  into  their  constituent 
factors.  In  other  words,  the  relation  among  ideas  is  always 
an  organic  rather  than  a  mechanical  relation,  the  unit  being 
not  the  individual  idea  but  the  total  "stream  of  consciousness" 
of  which  the  single  ideas  are  but  factors,  and  distinguishable 
from  the  rest  only  through  analysis. 

1"  Calkins,  Introd.,  p.  441.     Italics  mine. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  19 

(4)  Finally,  contrary  to  the  third  proposition  of  associa- 
tionism,  the  principle  of  association  is  quite  inadequate  to  ex- 
plain by  itself  all  the  complex  phenomena  of  mental  life. 

c.  Modern  Scientific  Psychology 

15.  Empirical  psychology  does  not  become  truly  scientific 
until  it  has  divorced  itself  entirely  from  all  metaphysical  limi- 
tations and  presuppositions.  As  a  science,  psychology  is  not 
interested  in  the  nature  of  the  soul,  the  reality  of  ideas,  or  the 
explanation  of  mental  phenomena  in  terms  of  forces  which 
can  neither  be  experienced  themselves  nor  inferred  from  what 
is  experienced.  Scientific  psychology  has  for  its  problems 
solely  the  discovery  of  the  facts  of  mental  life,  the  careful 
description,  analysis,  and  classification  of  those  facts,  and 
the  determination  so  far  as  possible  of  the  **laws"  of  their 
connection  (Le.,  the  formulation  of  propositions  summing  up 
in  brief  form  the  facts  as  to  their  connection). 

It  is  impossible  to  name  any  exact  date  as  marking  the 
emancipation  of  psychology  from  metaphysics  and  the  birth 
of  psychological  science.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  during  the 
last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  the  opening  years 
of  the  twentieth  an  advance  away  from  metaphysics  has  been 
made  of  a  nature  so  striking  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  what- 
ever that  now  we  have  a  science  of  psychology  whose  right  to 
be  called  a  science  in  as  real  a  sense  as  physics,  chemistry,  bi- 
ology and  all  the  rest  are  so  called  is  impregnable. 

16.  Extreme  Views  of  Scientific  Psychology. — Two  errors, 
however,  are  commonly  made  with  regard  to  this  position 
which  must  be  referred  to  briefly  and  overruled  before  we 
pass  on  to  more  positive  considerations :"  one  is  that  psychol- 
ogy is  scientific  only  so  far  as  it  brings  the  facts  of  mental 
life  into  close  and  constant  dependence  upon  the  facts  of 
nerve  physiology,  the  other  that  psychology  is  scientific  only 
so  far  as  it  uses  the  experimental  methods  of  the  laboratory. 
Neither  of  these  positions  may  be  admitted,  however,  and  it  is 

'^  F.  Calkins;  Inirod.,  pp.  442-444. 


20  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

one  of  the  main  purposes  of  this  book  to  confute  the  first  of 
them  and  insist  that  there  is,  and  endeavor  to  demonstrate 
how  there  can  be,  a  science  of  psychology  which  is  quite  as 
independent  of  nerve  physiology  on  the  one  hand  as  it  is  of 
metaphysics  on  the  other — all  this  without  denying  for  an  in- 
stant the  great  importance  of  that  science  called  physiological 
psychology  which  has  for  its  subject-matter  the  relation  be- 
tween mental  processes  and  physiological  processes. 

As  to  the  claims  of  the  laboratory  psychologist,  we  admit  the 
great  value  of  the  psychological  laboratory,  and  that  "the  most 
obvious  distinction  of  the  present-day  psychology  is  certainly 
its  experimental  methods"  ;^^  and  yet  insist  that  after  all  intro- 
spection is  the  distinctive  method  of  psychology,  and  that  a 
psychological  experiment  can  never  be  more  than  an  arrange- 
ment of  the  conditions  for  more  accurate  and  useful  intro- 
spection, just  as  a  chemical  or  biological  experiment  is  merely 
an  arrangement  of  the  conditions  for  observation  of  its  phe- 
nomena to  the  best  advantage.  The  true  laboratory  of  the 
psychologist  is  his  own  mind,  which  he  carries  about  with 
him  always,  and  the  best  equipped  laboratory  building  is  no 
more  than  an  external  aid  to  the  observation  of  the  workings 
of  his  own  and  other  person's  minds — just  as  the  telescope  is 
the  external  aid  of  the  astronomer,  or  the  microscope  of  the 
histologist.  The  difficulties  of  introspection  are,  of  course 
obvious,  but  the  claims  of  some  that  they  are  insuperable  is, 
I  think,  unproven.  The  matter  will  be  considered  at  length  in 
the  course  of  the  following  chapter. 

12  op.  cit.,  p.  444. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  21 

TABLE  I 

Historic  Concepts  of  Psychology 
I.    RATIONAL  OR  METAPHYSICAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

A.  Dualism. 

1.  QucLsi-Materialistic  (primitive  man) 

2.  Spiritualistic:   Plato,  Aristotle,  etc. 

a.  Immanent  (Aristotle) 

b.  Transcendent  (Descartes) 

B.  Monism. 

1.  Spiritualistic:  Spinoza,  Leibniz,  Berkeley,  Kant,  etc. 

2.  Materialism:    Democritus,  Hobbes,  Diderot,  Mole- 

schott,  Biichner,  Haeckel,  etc. 

Ii.  EMPIRICAL  PSYCHOLOGY:    Plato,  Aristotle,  Locke, 
etc. 

A.  Transitional  Schools — 

1.  Faculty-Psychology:     Plato,    Aristotle;    Scholastic- 

ism; Wolff,  Tetens,  Kant. 

2.  Associationism:  Hume,  Hartley;  Mill,  Bain,  Spencer. 
a.  German  Form:  Herbart,  etc. 

B.  Modern  Scientific  Psychology. 

REFERENCES 
General — 

Klemm,  Part  I. 

Villa,  Chap.  I. 

Wundt,  Outlines,  Section  2. 

Calkins,  Introd.,  Chap.  XXVIII. 

Faculty-Psychology — 

Klemm,  pp.  44-69. 
Assoc  ia  tionism — 

Klemm,  pp.  87-1 11. 

Calkins,  Introd.,  pp.  438-442. 

Modern  Scientific  Psychology — 
Klemm,  pp.  141-155. 
Calkins,  Introd.,  pp.  442-444. 


CHAPTER  II 

Current  Concepts  of  Scientific  Psychology 

I.  Points  of  View  in  Psychology. 

17.  Mental  Process  vs.  Mental  Content. — In  every  experi- 
ence we  may  distinguish  between  the  act  of  experiencing  and 
the  object  or  "content"  of  that  experience — in  other  words, 
between  experience  taken  as  process  and  experience  taken  as 
content.  The  word  "experience"  itself  is  ambiguous,  and 
covers  both  these  meanings.  As  between  the  two  it  will  be 
recognized  that  the  content  of  experience  may  be,  and  perhaps 
always  is,  extremely  complex,  and  analyzable  into  a  number  of 
simpler  components — as,  for  example,  my  experience  of  a 
symphony,  a  painting,  the  World  War,  or  life  in  general :  the 
act  or  process  of  experience,  however,  the  experiencing  of 
this  content,  is  at  every  moment  a  single  act  of  consciousness, 
a  simple  and  unanalyzable  fact.^ 

This  distinction  between  process  and  content  applies  equally 
to  experience  taken  as  a  whole,  and  to  every  individual  type 
or  instance  of  experience.  For  almost  all  classes  of  experi- 
ences there  are  at  least  two  terms  in  common  use,  one — usu- 

^  V.  Dunlap,  A  System  of  Psychology,  pp.  12  f.  (cf.  also  his  "The  Self 
and  the  Ego,"  Psych.  Rev.,  1914,  xvi,  63).  "It  is  often  said  that  the  con- 
tent is  not  complex,  but  is  simple  and  unitary;  and  that  the  elements  into 
which  we  apparently  resolve  it  by  analysis  are  really  new  content  brought 
into  existence  by  our  analysis.  In  stricter  language,  this  really  means 
that  while  the  content  which  you  apprehend  is  complex,  and  may  be  re- 
solved into  its  elements,  the  apprehension  or  experience  of  the  content 
[i.e.,  the  process]  is  not  itself  a  complex  made  up  of  the  apprehensions 
of  the  different  elements."  For  example,  the  percept  of  an  orange  is 
analyzable  into  sensations  of  color,  odor,  pressure  and  taste,  but  the  ex- 
perience of  perceiving  the  orange  is  not  analyzable  into  an  experience  of 
seeing  a  color  plus  an  experience  of  smelling  an  odor,  etc. — rather  the 
whole  orange  comes  into  consciousness  in  a  single  experience. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  23 

ally  participial  in  form — indicating  mental  process,  and  the 
other — usually  a  noun^ — symbolizing  content.  Thus  the  terms 
"perceiving,"  "remembering,"  "thinking,"  "feeling,"  "will- 
ing," etc.,  refer  to  mental  processes — the  terms  "percept," 
"image,"  "idea,"  etc.,  to  mental  contents.  And  so  also  with 
phrases — the  expressions  "I  think  so  and  so,"  for  example, 
and  "I  have  such  and  such  an  idea"  being  equivalent,  the 
former  expressing  the  process-side  of  the  same  experience 
and  the  latter  the  content-side.  In  many  cases,  indeed,  there 
is  a  third  indifferent  term  which  covers  both  aspects  of  the 
experience — such  terms  as  sensation,  perception,  memory, 
thought,  feeling,  and  volition. 

In  all  this  discrimination  between  process  and  content,  how- 
ever, we  must  not  allow  ourselves  to  think  of  these  as  separable 
kinds  of  experience,  but  rather  as  merely  discriminate  aspects 
of  experience,  quite  inseparable  in  fact.  The  terms  do  not  in 
any  particular  instance  refer  to  separate  experiences,  but  to  one 
identical  experience,  considered  from  different  points  of  view.' 
As  Titchener  expresses  it,'  the  term  "mental  content"  refers 
to  the  qualitative  aspect  of  experience — what  kind  of  an  ex- 
perience it  is,  whether  of  a  color,  a  tone,  an  emotion  or  an 
idea;  whereas  the  term  "mental  act"  or  "process"  refers  to 
the  temporal  course  or  durational  aspect  of  the  experience — 
the  experience  as  a  momentary  phase  in  the  mental  life  of  the 
individual. 

But  it  would  be  equally  an  error  to  ignore,  as  many  psychol- 
ogists do,  the  distinction  we  have  been  discussing.  To  many 
the  distinction  seems  abstract,  unreal,  and  valueless.  I  gladly 
admit  the  first  characterization,  though  deny  that  it  is  an  ob- 
jection, as  all  science  must  deal  to  some  degree  or  other  with 
abstractions.    As  to  the  second,  it  may  or  may  not  be  true,  but 

'  To  make  process  and  content  distinct  mental  facts  would  be  to  fall 
into  a  similar  error  to  that  of  the  faculty  psychologists,  who  divided  the 
mind  into  distinct  and  separate  parts. 

'  The  Experimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought  Processes,  p.  60. 


24  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

this  makes  no  difference  provided  the  distinction  is  useful.* 
To  the  third  objection,  that  it  is  not  useful  I  return  a  vigorous 
denial,  and  the  remainder  of  this  and  the  following  divisions 
of  this  chapter  are  to  be  devoted  to  a  defence  of  the  necessity 
of  the  process-content  distinction.  In  the  meantime  let  me 
refer  the  reader  in  confirmation  of  my  position  to  an  article  by 
Dr.  E.  Stanley  Abbot,^  in  which  the  distinction  is  shown  to  be 
both  real  and  important  by  the  fact  that  either  content  or  pro- 
cess may  to  some  extent  be  altered  independently  of  the  other. 
For  example,  a  gradual  increase  in  the  intensity  of  a  thermal 
stimulus  applied  to  a  definite  point  on  the  skin  gives  success- 
ively three  qualitatively  distinct  (i.e.,  distinct  in  content)  sen- 
sations—(i)  of  "warmth,"  (2)  of  "heat,"  and  (3)  of  "pain" 
— although  the  same  psychical  process  is  involved  throughout. 
18.  The  Structural  and  Functional  Points  of  View  in  Psy- 
chology.— Corresponding  to  these  aspects  of  experience  there 
are  two  points  of  view  either  of  which  psychology  may  adopt 
in  its  general  study  of  the  mind — the  structural  and  the  func- 
tional points  of  view.  This  division  of  interest  in  the  field  of 
psychology  corresponds  again  to  a  similar  division  of  interest 
in  the  field  of  biology,  represented  by  the  customary  division 
of  the  latter  science  into  morphology — the  study  of  the  struc- 
ture of  organisms,  "structural  biology" — and  physiology — the 
study  of  the  activities  of  the  organism  and  the  functions  of 
their  various  organs,  "functional  biology."  Psychologists  too 
may  be  interested  primarily  either  in  the  structural,  "content" 
side  of  their  science,  or  in  its  functional,  "process"  side. 
Structural  psychology  treats  the  mind  statically,  as  if  it  were 
a  fixed  thing  like  the  body  which  it  inhabits  :*  functional  psy- 
chology treats  the  mind  dynamically,  as  continuously  active 
and  never  fixed,  or  as  a  stream  of  constantly  changing  pro- 
cesses. 

4  V.  inf.,  Ch.  IV. 

'^  "The   D3mamic   Value   of    Content,"   Jour.    Phil.,   etc.,    Vol.    xiv,    pp. 
41  ff.  (1917). 

^  I  use  this  term  figuratively,  of  course. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  25 

Now  it  must  be  admitted  at  once  that  the  functional  point 
of  view  in  psychology  is  truer  to  the  real  inner  nature  of  the 
mind  than  the  structural  point  of  view.  The  mind  is  certainly 
in  no  sense  a  fixed  thing — there  is  no  real  "morphology  of  the 
mind,"  nothing  in  psychology  to  correspond  literally  to  mor- 
phology as  a  biological  science.  And  yet,  if  the  distinction 
between  process  and  content  is  a  significant  one,  there  must  be 
a  significance  in  the  broader  distinction  between  structural 
and  functional  psychology  which  is  based  upon  that  other 
one.  And  furthermore,  as  I  shall  proceed  to  demonstrate, 
both  points  of  view  are  necessary  to  a  thorough  understand- 
ing of  mental  life,  necessary  if  psychology  is  to  be  a  complete 
science  as  in  the  Introduction  we  claimed  it  to  be. 

19.  Examples  of  Process  and  Content.' — The  distinction  be- 
tween process  and  content  will  be  clearer,  and  the  necessity  of 
both  the  structural  and  functional  points  of  view  for  a  com- 
plete psychology  more  obvious  if  we  illustrate.  Let  us  take, 
then,  examples  of  different  types  of  experience  and  examine 
them  as  far  as  possible  from  the  two  points  of  view. 

(i)  When  we  use  the  term  perception  we  may  be  thinking 
either  of  the  process  of  "perceiving,"  or  the  "percept"  as  a 
content  of  consciousness  to  be  distinguished,  for  example,  from 
an  idea  or  an  emotion.  Perception  may  be  defined  function- 
ally as  the  consciousness  of  particular  material  things  at  the 
time  stimulating  the  sense-organs;  or  we  may  first  define  the 
percept,  and  then  define  perception  as  the  process  of  forming 
percepts,  this  being  the  structural  method  of  approach.  From 
the  latter  point  of  view  the  percept  is  analyzable  into  two 
groups  of  elementary  contents — sensations  and  memory - 
images;^  functionally,  perception  may  be  thought  of  as  in- 
cluding the  two  subordinate  processes  of  sensation  and  apper- 
ception, though  this  is  not  strictly  speaking  an  analysis. 

(2)   In  the  case  of  sensation  there  are  not,  unfortunately, 
two  separate  terms  in  common  usage  to  mark  the  process- 

^  Or  "primary"  and  "secondary  sensations,"  according  to  Sidis   (v.  his 
Foundations,  Chs.  xix-xxiv)  and  others. 


26 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


content  distinction,  and  the  word  "sensation"  itself  covers 
both  aspects.  It  is,  however,  highly  advisable  that  this  dis- 
tinction should  be  preserved  in  the  sensory  field,  and  it  is  quite 
legitimate  to  use  as  many  do,  the  verb  "to  sense"  and  the 
participial  form  "sensing"  for  the  process  side  of  sensation, 
and  the  term  "sensum,"  "sense-datum,"  or  "sensate"  for  the 
content  side.  Sensing  includes  seeing,  hearing,  smelling,  etc., 
the  corresponding  sensates  being  lights  and  colors,  noises  and 
tones,  odors,  etc.,  respectively. 

(3)  In  the  so-called  higher  cognitive  experiences,  we  dis- 
tinguish in  memory  between  the  process  of  "remembering" 
and  the  "memory-image"  as  content;  in  imagination,  between 
the  "imagining"  process  and  the  "image  of  imagination"  as 
content;  in  thought,  between  the  "thinking"  process  and  the 
"idea"  or  "concept"  as  content  of  thought. 

(4)  It  is  unnecessary  to  continue  our  distinctions  in  any 
detail  into  the  fields  of  affection  and  conation,  where  termin- 
ology is  still  less  developed  than  in  the  cognitive  field.  We 
speak  of  "feeling"  as  a  process,  and  "a  feeling"  as  content, 
and  so  of  "emotion  and  "tJte  emotions,"  etc. ;  but  whereas  we 
have  the  functional  verb  "to  feel,"  we  have  no  corresponding 
term  in  the  case  of  emotion.  There  is  no  structural  noun  to 
correspond  to  the  functional  "will"  or  "willing,"  but  we  may 
use  the  far  better  term  "volition"  in  either  sense,  retaining 
the  participial  "willing"  but  rejecting  the  noun,  which  latter 
we  may  be  content  to  leave,  along  with  the  words  "soul," 
"reason,"  "intellect,"  etc.,  to  the  philosopher. 

The  following  table  may  make  the  above  discussion  clearer : 

TABLE  II.— EXPERIENCE  AS  PROCESS  AND  AS  CONTENT 


Types  of  Experience 

Perception 

Sensation 

Memory 

As  Process 

Perceiving 

Sensing 

Remembering 

As  Content 

Percept 

Sensate 

Memory-image 

Types  of  Experience 

Imagination 

Thought 

Feeling 

As  Process 

Imagining 

Thinking 

Feeling 

As  Content 

Image  of 
Imagination 

Concept 

Feeling 

npulse 

Volition 

Impulse 

Willing 

Impulse 

Volition 

THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  27 

Types  of  Experience     Emotion 
As  Process  Emotion 

As  Content  Emotion 

2.  Structuralism  and  Functionalism  as  Schools  of  Psychology 

20.  Insistence  on  either  the  structural  or  functional  point 
of  view  to  the  exclusion  or  complete  subordination  of  the 
other  by  different  psychologists  has  led  to  the  establishment 
of  two  opposing  schools  in  contemporary  psychology,  known 
respectively  as  the  structuralist  and  the  functionalist  schools. 
Beside  these  there  are  two  other  concepts  of  the  science  now 
in  the  field — the  latest,  Behaviorism,  and  an  earlier  view 
known  as  Self -Psychology.  We  shall  proceed  throughout  the 
remainder  of  this  chapter  and  the  next  to  consider  each  of  these 
existent  theories  of  what  psychology  is,  in  the  order  named.* 

21.  Structuralism  views  the  mind  entirely  from  the  stand- 
point of  structure.  Its  typical  definition  would  be.  Psychol- 
ogy is  the  science  of  mental  states  or  mental  contents.  Its 
method  is  to  take  some  momentary  psychosis  or  state  of  con- 
sciousness, analyze  it  into  its  elementary  contents,  and  then 
show  how  these  elements  combine  to  form  the  more  complex 
contents  with  which  experience  is  ordinarily  concerned."  The 
leading  contemporary  exponent  of  this  school  is  Professor  E. 
B.  Titchener,  other  important  recent  and  contemporary  repre- 
sentatives being  Wundt,  Yerkes,  and  Munsterberg.  Professor 
Titchener's  definition  of  psychology  as  "science  of  mental  pro- 
cesses" is,  however,  inconsistent  with  structuralism,  the  tenn 
"process"  being  characteristically  functional  rather  than  struc- 
tural; but  the  use  of  this  term  is  to  a  large  extent  justified  on 
the  ground  that  it  makes  explicit  the  fact  that  mental  contents 
are  not  really  "unchanging  objects"  but  constantly  changing." 
The  entire  concept  of  mental  content  and  the  structural  point 
of  view  in  general  are,  of  course,  abstractions;  but  necessary 

*C/.,  through  the  ensuing  discussion,  Table  IV  at  the  end  of  the  next 
chapter. 

•  Cf.,  for  example,  the  analysis  of  percepts  into  sensations  and  after- 
images (19). 

^°  Titchener,  Tcxt-Dook  of  Psychology,  pp.  15,  16. 


28  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

abstractions,  for  without  them  one  important  aspect  of  mental 
life  would  fail  to  receive  scientific  treatment. 

22.  Functionalism  views  the  mind  entirely  from  the  stand- 
point of  function,  its  typical  definition  being,  Psychology  is 
the  science  of  mental  processes  or  functions.  The  concept  of 
mental  function  is  by  no  means  clearly  defined,  or  interpreted 
with  any  degree  of  unanimity  by  those  who  use  it,  but  the 
underlying  principle  of  the  school  seems  to  be  that  all  mental 
processes  should  be  thought  of  as  different  ways  in  which  the 
entire  psychophysical  organism  adjusts  itself  to  the  varying 
conditions  of  the  environment  according  as  they  affect  the 
life  and  well-being  of  the  organism  itself,  "All  our  sensa- 
tions," says  President  Angell,  the  leading  champion  of  this 
doctrine,  "all  our  emotions  and  all  our  acts  of  will"  must  be 
regarded  merely  "as  so  many  expressions  of  organic  adapta- 
tions to  our  environment."^^  Functionalists  generally  deny 
the  value  of  the  distinction  between  process  and  content,  and 
so  of  any  structural  analysis  of  the  mind :  each  process  is  to 
be  described  in  its  wholeness,  not  analyzed  into  its  constituent 
parts.  Sensation,  for  example,  is  to  be  described  by  relating 
how  the  psychophysical  organism — i.e.,  the  individual  as  a 
single  mind-body  affair,  not  merely  as  mind — acts  in  the  pro- 
cess of  sensing  a  physical  stimulus,  as  distinguished  from  its 
modus  operandi  in  the  process  of  judging,  willing,  or  desir- 
ing, etc.  Sensation  is  not  so  much  a  complex  of  elements  as 
it  is  a  way  of  acting  on  the  part  of  the  entire  individual. 
Functionalism  thus  treats  mental  processes  rather  as  phases  of 
a  single  mental  activity,  than  as  complexes  of  simpler  ele- 
ments, and  in  so  doing,  as  has  been  admitted,  is  truer  than 
structuralism  to  the  real  nature  of  mental  life;  but  we  still 
insist,  and  shall  hope  soon  to  demonstrate,  that  though  a 
valuable  and  even  essential  method  of  treatment  so  far  as  it 
goes,  it  is  nevertheless  an  incomplete  method. 

The  concept  of  mental  function  as  mode  of  reaction  to  en- 
vironment has  obvious  biological  relationships,  if  not  a  purely 

^^  Psychology,  p.  7. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  29 

biological  origin.  Functionalists  however,  are  insistent  that 
their  view  by  no  means  involves  any  admission  that  psychol- 
ogy is  merely  a  branch  of  biology,  as  many  of  their  critics  have 
maintained.  A  psychophysical  organism  is  more  than  a  merely 
physical  organism,  and  mind  does  make  a  difference  to  be- 
havior: it  is  the  task  of  the  psychologist,  then,  to  show  how 
the  reactions  of  the  individual  to  his  environment  differ  from 
what  they  would  be  were  he  merely  body  and  not  both  body 
and  mind. 

The  close  relationship  of  functionalist  psychology  to  bi- 
ology, however,  has  led  many  of  the  more  radical  followers 
of  this  general  viewpoint  (as  Pillsbury  and  W.  McDougalP^) 
to  renounce  all  mental  or  subjective  terms  in  their  definition 
of  the  science  and  to  prefer  the  simple  statement  that  Psychol- 
ogy is  the  science  of  behavior.  Pillsbury  justifies  this  on  the 
ground  that  all  subjective  definitions,  as  "science  of  mind"  or 
"science  of  consciousness,"  are  meaningless  until  the  terms 
"mind"  and  "consciousness"  are  further  defined,  whereas  the 
definition  "science  of  behavior"  is  self -explaining  and  ex- 
presses better  than  any  other  what  psychology  really  means  to 
the  ordinary  man.  Such  a  definition,  Professor  Pillsbury 
thinks,  does  not  involve  in  the  least  any  change  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  subject-matter  of  the  science:  "by  adopting  the 
definition  we  change  our  description  of  the  science,  not  the 
science  itself."  This  last  statement  is  undoubtedly  true  so  far 
as  Professor  Pillsbury's  own  textbooks  are  concerned,  but  it 
is  extremely  doubtful  that  his  definition  really  describes  the 
science  as  he  himself  expounds  it,  as  his  chapters  are  con- 
cerned throughout  with  the  phenomena  of  consciousness — 
sensation,  perception,  memory,  feeling,  and  all  the  rest — and 
not  with  "behavior"  in  any  distinct  sense  at  all.  The  only 
consistent  followers  of  this  definition  are  the  "behaviorists" 
who  have  thrown  over  all  psychology  in  the  older  sense  of  the 
term,  functional  as  well  as  structural;  and  of  them  we  shall 
soon  speak  more  fully. 

"President  Angell,  in  his  recent  Introduction  to  Psychology    (1918), 
adopts  the  same  position. 


30  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

23.  Reconciliation  of  Structuralism  and  Functionalism. — A 
reconciliation  between  these  two  schools  of  psychology  is  to 
be  found  in  a  recognition  of  the  importance  and  even  necessit> 
of  both  the  structural  and  functional  points  of  view  for  a 
complete  understanding  of  mental  life/^  The  functional 
method  would  seem  prima  facie  to  have  the  advantage  be- 
cause of  the  admitted  fact  that  it  is  undoubtedly  a  more  natural 
and  less  artificial  mode  of  treatment  of  mental  problems,  but 
a  closer  examination  of  its  procedure  and  results  will  make  it 
clear  that  a  strict  adherence  to  it  to  the  exclusion  of  the  struc- 
tural method  would  leave  psychology  maimed,  impotent,  and 
completely  at  the  mercy  of  physiology.  If  psychology  is  to 
be  a  complete  and  independent  science,  both  methods  must  be 
used  to  complement  each  other. 

My  reasons  for  this  assertion  are  as  follows.  So  far  as  the 
so-called  cognitive  processes  are  concerned,  they  may  all  be 
described  in  either  structural  or  functional  terms — perceiving 
as  a  form  of  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  individual  to  present 
physical  stimuli  in  the  environment,  or  the  percept  as  a  com- 
bination of  sensations  and  memory-images;  memory  as  an  at 
titude  of  the  mind  toward  past  experience,  or  as  a  combination 
of  images;  judgment  as  an  interpretation  of  present  experience 
in  terms  of  the  past,  or  as  a  combination  of  concepts,  etc.  A 
complete  description  even  in  this  field,  it  is  true,  would  call 
forth  both  points  of  view  in  combination,  but  the  phenomena 
may  be  described  from  either  standpoint  alone  in  purely  psy- 
chological terms,  and  without  passing  beyond  the  legitimate 
bounds  of  a  distinct  and  purely  mental  science.  But  when  we 
come  to  the  affective  and  conative  processes  the  situation  is 
quite  different,  for  these  cannot  be  described  at  all  <w  mental 
processes  except  in  structural  terms.    The  physiological  accom- 

13  This  requirement  may,  perhaps,  best  be  met  by  dividing  psychology  into 
two  branches — Psychostatics  or  structural  psychology,  and  Psychodynani' 
ics  or  functional  psychology  (v.  Thorndike,  Elements  of  Psychology, 
Parts  I  and  II). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  31 

paniments  of  feeling  and  emotion^*  may  be  described  and  the 
effects  produced  by  the  will  in  the  physical  world,  but  affec- 
tion and  conation  themselves  in  their  psychological  nature  as 
mental  processes  cannot  be  described  in  any  other  way  than 
by  analyzing  them  into  their  elements. 

3.  Behaviorism. 

24.  The  year  1913  marks  the  birth  of  the  most  radical  of  all 
psychological  concepts,  that  of  "Behaviorism."  This  doctrine 
is  an  extreme,  and  yet  perfectly  logical,  development  of  the 
functionalist  position,  and  is  far  more  consistent  in  its  work- 
ing out  than  the  intermediate  "radical  functionalism"  (as  we 
may  call  it)  of  Pillsbury  and  McDougall;  for  it  not  only  ac- 
cepts the  definition  of  these  two  writers  theoretically,  but 
vigorously  puts  this  definition  into  practice.  The  Behaviorist 
movement  was  initiated  and  the  doctrine  founded  by  Profes- 
sor John  B.  Watson  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  in  two 
articles  in  the  Psychological  Review  and  the  Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy, later  combined  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  book  Behav- 
ior (1914)/'    Others  who  have  helped  to  elaborate  the  doc- 

"For  evidence  that  this  is  the  case,  v.  Watson,  Psychological  Rev., 
XXVI,  pp.  165  fF.  (1919). 

1*  Professor  Watson  has  recently  (1919)  published  a  book  entitled  Psy- 
chology from  the  Standpoint  of  a  Behaviorist,  in  which  he  carries  out  his 
program  with  reference  to  human  psychology.  One  is  rather  amused  in 
reading  this  book  by  the  strenuous  efforts  made  and  the  circumlocutions 
employed  by  the  author  to  avoid  the  use  of  terminology  involving  con- 
sciousness (e.g.,  pp.  89,  sentence  beginning  second  line  from  bottom;  91, 
sentence  beginning  on  last  line).  On  one  occasion,  where  the  ordinary 
terms  designative  of  the  leading  emotions  seem  involuntarily  to  slip  out, 
the  writer  apologetically  comments,  "We  use  these  terms  which  are  cur- 
rent in  psychology  with  a  good  deal  of  hesitation"  (p.  199)  I  Thought  is 
merely  "speech  habits,"  implicit  or  laryngeal  behavior;  one  does  not 
introspect,  he  "gives  a  verbal  report";  one  is  never  conscious  of  white 
light  when  his  optic  nerve  is  stimulated  by  a  mixture  of  complementary 
color  waves,  he  "reacts  to  it  as  to  a  ..  .  white  light";  the  mental  arith- 
metic of  our  childhood  becomes  "subvocal  arithmetic";  etc.  The  very 
adjective  with  which  he  qualifies  his  new  science  of  "objective  psychol- 
ogy" is  question-begging,  in  that  all  science,  psychological  as  well  as 
material,  is  by  its  very  nature  objective. 


32  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

trine  or  have  promulgated  similar  views  are  Professors  E.  L. 
Thorndike,  E.  P.  Frost,  B.  H.  Bode,  E.  S.  Abbot,  and  E.  B. 
Holt. 

Behaviorism  is  characterized  primarily  by  two  fundamental 
principles,  one  as  to  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  of  psy- 
chology, and  one  as  to  the  nature  of  the  method  of  that  science. 
First,  behaviorism  insists,  as  does  radical  functionalism  in 
theory,  that  the  true  subject-matter  of  psychology  is  not  mind 
or  consciousness  but  behavior — that  consciousness  cannot  be 
studied  scientifically,  that  the  concept  of  consciousness  is  a 
metaphysical  rather  than  a  psychological  concept,  and  that  con- 
sequently all  problems  as  to  the  mind  or  consciousness  are  for 
philosophy  rather  than  psychology  ("rational"  rather  than 
"empirical"  psychology)  to  solve.  Secondly,  as  to  method, 
behaviorism,  unlike  radical  functionalism  in  this  point,  rejects 
introspection  as  unscientific  if  not  impossible,  and  makes  ex- 
periment and  observation  of  behavior  the  sole  methods  of  psy- 
chological research.  We  must  carefully  consider  each  of  these 
points  in  turn. 

a.  Behavior  vs.  Consciousness 

25.  The  BeJmvioristic  Program. — "Psychology  as  the  be- 
haviorist  views  it,"  says  Professor  Watson,"  is  a  purely  ob- 
jective experimental  branch  of  natural  science"^^ — vis.,  of 
biology.  "Its  theoretical  goal  is  the  prediction  and  control  of 
behavior."  The  older  view  of  psychology  as  the  science  of 
mind  or  of  consciousness  he  thinks  has  been  totally  barren  of 
results  in  the  past,  and  is  absolutely  futile  and  hopeless  for  the 
future.  "Psychology  has  failed  signally  during  the  fifty  odd 
years  of  its  existence  as  an  experimental  discipline  to  make 
its  place  in  the  world  as  an  undisputed  natural  science.  "^^ 
Psychologists  of  the  older  schools  still  dififer  radically  among 
themselves  on  some  of  the  most  fundamental  problems  of 
their  science,  and  there  is  no  hope,  so  long  as  present  methods 

'^^  Behavior,  p.  i. 
"  Op  cit.,  p.  6. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  33 

are  adhered  to,  that  any  greater  uniformity  will  be  attained  in 
respect  to  these  matters  in  the  future.  The  time  has  come, 
then,  "when  psychology  must  discard  all  reference  to  con- 
sciousness"^* and  devote  itself  entirely  to  the  purely  objective 
study  of  behavior.  The  study  of  consciousness  as  a  subjective 
phenomenon  of  the  human  individual  may  be  a  legitimate 
topic  for  the  philosopher,  but  its  problems  are  speculative  and 
not  open  to  scientific  treatment.  Thus  the  behaviorist  does 
not  necessarily  deny  mind  or  consciousness,  or  that  conscious 
processes  seem  to  be  different  from  physiological  processes, 
but  only  that  consciousness  can  be  studied  scientifically. 

Pillsbury's  position  is  recognized  by  Watson,  and  I  think 
rightly,  as  an  illogical  compromise  between  the  structural  and 
the  biological  points  of  view.  "It  is  possible  to  write  a  psy- 
chology, to  define  it  as  Pillsbury  does  (as  the  'science  of  be- 
havior'), and  never  go  back  on  the  definition:  never  to  use 
the  terms  consciousness,  mental  states,  mind,  content,  will, 
imagery,  and  the  like.""  This  is  a  thoroughgoing  as  distin- 
guished from  a  half-hearted  "behavioristic  program,"  which 
its  originator  has  now  developed  in  actuality  in  his  textbooks 
of  animal*"  and  human"  psychology. 

26.  Kinds  of  Behavior. — I  shall  henceforth  use  the  terms 
"mentalism"  and  "mentalists"  for  all  schools  of  psycholog}' 
and  of  psychologists  that  consider  mind  or  consciousness  the 
true  subject-matter  of  the  science,  as  opposed  to  the  "behavior- 
ists"  who  deny  that  principle.  "Mentalism"  is,  I  think,  less 
oi>cn  to  objection  than  the  term  "subjectivism"  which  is  com 
monly  used  in  opposition  to  the  "objectivism"  of  the  behavior- 
ists. 

Now  the  mentalist — and  the  ordinary  man  who,  in  his 
terminology  at  least,  is  certainly  always  a  mentalist — thinks 
the  most  important  distinction  of  types  of  behavior  or  of 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  7. 
"  Op.  cit.,  p.  9. 
«»  Op.  cit. 
21  y.  our  note  15  sup. 


34  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

motor  activity  is  that  which  subsists  between  unconscious  or 
mechanical  behavior  on  the  one  hand  and  consciously  con- 
trolled or  psychomotor  activity  on  the  other.  To  him,  me- 
chanical behavior  is  interesting  only  so  far  as  it  may  develop 
later  into,  or  may  have  degenerated  from,  psychomotor  be- 
havior; and  psychomotor  behavior  itself  is  interesting  only  so 
far  as  it  is  the  expression  of  consciousness.  Outwardly — 
i.e.,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  external  observer — these 
two  forms  of  behavior  differ  only  in  their  relative  complexity. 
When  there  is  a  single  stimulus  to  action,  or  a  group  of  stimuli 
all  calling  forth  a  similar  reaction,  the  response  itself  is  im- 
mediate and  we  have  mechanical  or  "unconscious"  behavior; 
but  when  there  are  a  number  of  mutually  interfering  stimuli, 
each  of  which  would  if  occurring  alone  lead  to  a  different  re- 
sponse from  every  other,  there  is  a  necessary  interval  of  delay 
for  the  purpose  of  harmonizing  the  various  possible  responses, 
before  any  action  can  take  place.  In  the  latter  instance  we 
have  "conscious"  or  psychomotor  behavior — or  behavior  "after 
deliberation,"  in  mentalistic  terms :  what  the  outside  observer 
sees  merely  as  a  more  or  less  unaccountable  period  of  delay, 
the  agent  himself  recognizes  as  a  period  of  deliberation. 

This  distinction  may  be  made  clearer  in  the  light  of  the  fol- 
lowing diagram.  In  the  left-hand  figure  the  arrow  represents 
the  immediate  nerve  process  from  stimulus  (S)  through  the 
central  portion  of  the  nervous  system  (C)  to  motor  reaction 
(M),  the  waved  line  through  the  circle  C  indicating  the  pos- 
sible circuitousness  of  the  cortical  portion  of  the  nerve  pro- 
cess. In  the  right  hand  figure  we  have  three  mutually  inter- 
fering stimuli  (Si,  S2,  S3)  any  of  which  if  allowed  to  continue 
its  course  unhindered  would  produce  an  immediate  response 
(Ml,  M2,  Mg  respectively)  :  in  this,  for  simplicity's  sake,  I 
have  assumed  that  Si  and  S3  have  both  been  thwarted,  and  S2 
alone  allowed  to  continue  itself  through. 

So  much  for  the  mentalist's  interpretation,  but  what  says 
the  behaviorist?  That  the  period  of  delay  can  and  must  be 
interpreted  in  objective  terms,  not  in  terms  of  "conscious  de- 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  35 

"Unconscious"  Behavior  "Conscious"  Behavior 

c 


liberation."  The  period  of  delay  is  merely  one  of  adjustment 
and  harmonization  of  the  conflicting  stimuli — not,  as  the 
mentalist  tells  us,  also  one  of  conscious  deliberation.  Both  the 
described  types  of  activity, — that  in  which  the  response  is  de 
layed  as  well  as  that  in  which  it  is  immediate — belong  under 
the  head  of  what  Watson  calls  "explicit"  behavior;  but  in  the 
former  case  there  is  also  another  kind  of  not  yet  described 
behavior  involved,  which  he  denominates  "implicit"  behavior." 
Explicit  behavior  consists  in  the  visible  activities  of  the  larger 
muscles  of  the  body,  those  activities  which  are  "plainly  ap- 
parent to  direct  observation,"  and  may  be  either  of  the  im- 
mediate or  the  delayed  type :  implicit  behavior,  which  is  called 
into  being  only  when  the  response  is  delayed,  consists  in  cer- 
tain imperceptible  (to  the  outside  observer,  at  least)  internal 
muscular  activities,  "involving  only  the  speech  mechanisms" — 
especially,  Watson  thinks,  the  muscles  of  the  larynx  and  the 
tongue.  "Where  explicit  behavior  is  delayed  (i.e.,  when  de- 
liberation ensues),  the  intervening  time  between  stimulus  and 
response  is  given  over  to  implicit  behavior  (to  'thought  pro- 
cesses')." Up  to  the  present  time,  it  is  true,  experimentation 
and  observation  have  reached  only  to  the  explicit  type  of  be- 
havior, but  it  is  the  firm  conviction  of  Dr.  Watson  that  in 
course  of  time  implicit  behavior  also  will  yield  to  the  same 
"objective"  methods  of  investigation. 

I  attempt  to  indicate,  in  the  subjoined  table,  Professor  Wat- 
son's classification  of  types  of  behavior.     The  lines  indicate 

22  v.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  19  flF. 


36  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  the  mentalist's  "unconscious"  behavior  is  purely  of  the 
expHcit  type,  but  that  the  mentalist's  "conscious"  behavior  in- 
cludes implicit  and  explicit  activities. 

KINDS  OF  BEHAVIOR 

Mentalist  Behaviorist 

Classification  Classification 

Unconscious  or  Mechanical Immediate  Explicit 

Conscious  or  Psychomotor Delayed       --  Implicit 

2y.  Frost's  Behaviorism. — Professor  Eliott  P.  Frost,  for- 
merly of  Yale  University,  has  pronounced  a  behavioristic  sys- 
tem of  psychology,  which,  notwithstanding  its  unusually  bar- 
barous terminology,  is  worthy  of  a  brief  description.  His 
system  actually  antedates  Watson's  in  its  origin  by  a  few 
months,^^  and  is  unique  in  that  he  still  uses  the  terms  "con- 
scious" and  "awareness,"  though  in  a  peculiar  and  purely 
physiological  sense. 

"Any  simple  single  sensorimotor  path"  through  the  nervous 
system  from  sense-organ  to  muscle  Frost  designates  an 
"alpha-arc" :  such  an  arc  is  always  aroused  into  activity  by  a 
peripheral  stimulus  and  issues  in  some  motor  act  or  form  of 
behavior  (Watson's  "immediate  response").  "Whenever  an 
alpha-arc  functions  so  as  to  include  the  specific  cortical  struc- 
tures," additional  nerve-cells  are  brought  into  activity,  and 
"such  a  further  arc,  aroused  by  an  alpha-arc  rather  than  by  a 
peripheral  stimulus"  (Watson's  "delayed  response")  Frost 
calls  a  "beta-arc."  "In  brief,  when  a  stimulus  falls  upon  a 
sensitive  neural  mechanism,  it  will  normally  arouse  an  alpha- 
arc,  and  this  alpha-arc  may  in  turn  arouse  a  beta-arc." 

To  the  functioning  of  either  an  alpha-  or  beta-arc  the  term 
"awareness"  is  applied,  though  in  a  pure  physiological  sense 
as  noted  above.  We  may  speak  of  an  alpha-arc  as  being 
"aware  of  the  external  stimulus"  which  initiated  it,  and  of  a 
beta-arc  as  "aware  of  the  alpha-arc"  which  initiated  it;  but 
no  arc  can  be  aware  of  "itself,"  and  in  no  case  does  "aware- 
ness" involve  "consciousness." 

23  Psychological  Review,  May  1912.    Watson's,  same  Review,  March  1913. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  37 

Behavior  is  classified  by  Frost  under  the  three  categories  of 
"preconsciousizing,  consciousizing,  and  consciousized  be- 
havior." "Pre-consciousizing"  behavior  is  the  reflex,  mechani- 
cal type;  a  "consciousizing  process"  is  any  nerve  process 
which  involves  reference  to  some  preceding  nerve  process 
rather  than  to  some  external  stimulus;  and  "consciousized" 
behavior  is  that  which  has  become  mechanical  as  the  result  of 
a  number  of  "consciousizing"  processes.  A  beta-arc-process 
is  always  a  "consciousizing"  process:  an  alpha-arc  process  is 
either  "pre-consciousizing"  (i.e.,  reflexes,  alpha-arcs  that  have 
never  become  connected  with  beta-arcs)  or  "consciousized" 
(i.e.,  habitual  mechanisms,  which  originally  involved  beta- 
arcs  also  but  no  longer  do). 

What  the  mentalist  would  call  the  experiencing  of  the  color 
red  is  interpreted  by  Frost  as  follows : — The  response  of  the 
retina  to  the  ether  vibrations  produced  by  so-called  red  in- 
volves an  alpha-arc,  and  gives  the  organism  what  may  be 
called  "red-awareness."  "If  this  arc  now  an  instant  later 
arouses  a  consciousizing  process  (beta-arc)  we  get  what  we 
may  call  the  'sensation  red' " ;  but  what  the  mentalist  calls 
'consciousness"  is  sufficiently  accounted  for  in  Frost's  beha- 
vioristic  system  as  merely  beta-arc-functioning  after  the  man- 
ner just  described. 

The  central  problem  of  animal  psychology,  according  to 
Frost,  is  not  "are  animals  conscious?  but,  does  their  behavior 
indicate  consciousizing"?;  and  the  problems  of  human  psy- 
chology become  not,  what  kind  of  consciousness  does  such 
and  such  behavior  express  ?  but,  is  such  behavior  pre-conscious- 
izing, consciousizing,  or  consciousized? 

Except  to  note  again  the  unfortunate  complexity  of  thi^ 
terminology,  I  shall  say  no  more  regarding  the  particular  sys- 
tem of  behaviorism  formulated  by  Professor  Frost,  but  pass 
at  once  to  a  general  criticism  of  the  behavioristic  program. 

28.  Criticism  of  the  Behavioristic  Program. — The  mental- 
ist is  u.sually  quite  willing  to  accept  all  that  is  really  positive 
in  the  behaviorist's  program,  but  insists  that  nevertheless  in 


38  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

addition  to  the  proposed  science  of  behavior  there  is  also  room 
for  a  science  devoted  to  the  study  of  mind  or  consciousness. 
There  are  undoubtedly  persons  whose  temperament  and  tal- 
ents lead  them  naturally  in  the  direction  of  the  investigation 
of  behavior  as  the  most  interesting  field  of  inquiry,  but  there 
are  as  surely  others  "to  whom  mental  process  as  mental  pro- 
cess is  the  only  fascinating  and  ultimately  worthy  subject 
of  study"  and  who  are  therefore  "not  likely  to  rest  content 
with  any  such  program  as  that  depicted"  by  Professor  Wat- 
son and  his  followers.  The  mentalist  "justly  urges  that  to 
recognize  and  describe  the  external  expressions  of  love,  hate,, 
and  anger,"  for  example,  "is  as  different  from  the  actual 
experience  of  these  thrilling  emotions  and  from  the  descrip- 
tion of  them  as  immediately  felt,  as  is  the  inspection  of  a 
good  meal  from  the  consumption  of  the  same."  "Something 
corresponding  to  consciousness  in  its  vague  common  meaning 
does  exist,"  and  if  so  there  should  be  room  for  a  science  whose 
problems  arise  within  the  compass  of  such  consciousness.^* 
The  behaviorist  may  be  satisfied,  let  us  say,  to  understand  the 
nerve  processes  which  underlie  and  condition  various  forms  of 
outward  behavior  in  animals  and  men :  the  psychologist,  how- 
ever, inevitably  pushes  his  inquiry  farther  and  asks,  does  the 
animal  knozv  that  and  why  he  is  acting  in  such  and  such  a 
way?  does  he  remember  having  been  in  this  particular  place 
before?  are  human  emotions  merely  organic  sensations  or 
something  more?  can  /  (not  my  nervous  system  with  its 
"alpha"  and  "beta"  arcs)  be  conscious  of  more  than  two  or 
three  objects  at  once?  etc.,  etc. 

The  first  objection  which  the  mentalist  opposes  to  the  be- 
haviorist's  program,  therefore,  is  that  the  concept  of  behavior 
— even  that  of  "implicit  behavior" — is  inadequate  to  account 
for  all  that  goes  on  between  stimulus  and  reaction  and  to 
satisfy  the  scientific  curiosity  of  mankind.  Reflection  inevita- 
bly shows  that  consciousness  is  different  from  behavior,  that 
mental  processes  are  different  and  distinguishable  from  their 

24Angell,  Psychological  Reviezv,  Vol.  XX,  pp.  267-269   (1913). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  39 

physiological  accompaniments  and  expressions  and  their  ef- 
fects in  the  physical  world ;  and  this  being  the  case,  there  must 
inevitably  be  individuals  in  the  world  who  will  wish  to  devote 
their  entire  attention  to  the  study  of  those  mental  processes. 

In  confirmation  of  the  inadequacy  of  a  purely  materialistic 
program,  Dr.  Abbot  has  shown^**  the  importance  of  mental 
content  to  behavior.  Content,  he  tells  us,  "enters  dynamically 
into  the  causal  series  of  reactions  that  lead  from  sensation  to 
behavior."  Reaction  to  an  optical  stimulus,  for  example,  dif- 
fers according  to  the  content  of  the  sensation,  as  when  one  is 
annoyed  by  the  glare  of  a  superfluous  light  in  one's  eyes  and 
proceeds  to  put  it  out.  In  such  a  course  of  behavior  the  con- 
tent of  the  sensation  (intense  white  light)  determines  the 
percept  (that  of  an  unnecessary  and  painfully  glaring  electric 
light  shining  into  my  eyes),  the  latter  perceptual  content  de- 
termines the  affection  (a  feeling  of  annoyance),  the  content 
of  affection  determines  the  impulse  to  put  out  the  light,  and 
the  content  of  the  impulse  determines  the  action  which  fulfils 
it. 

Even  biology,  as  we  are  reminded  by  Professor  C.  J.  Her- 
rick,*"  is  an  incomplete  science  with  consciousness  left  out. 
"Possibly  the  new  psychology  may  learn  to  get  along  without 
consciousness,"  he  tells  us,  "but  biology  cannot  do  so."  "The 
analysis  of  the  behavior  of  both  lower  animals  and  men  speaks 
unequivocally  in  favor  of  regarding  consciousness  as  a  positive 
biological  factor  in  animal  evolution."  So  long  as  there  are 
biologists  who  believe  in  the  reality  and  dynamic  importance 
of  consciousness,  surely  psychologists  need  not  despair  of  the 
value  and  distinctiveness  of  their  science ! 

One  other  point.  Functionalism  and  behaviorism  in  psy- 
chology are  both,  from  one  point  of  view,  the  natural  develop- 
ment of  what  is  known  as  the  "motor  theory  of  conscious- 
ness," the  central  principle  of  which  is  that  all  consciousness  is 
conditioned  by  motor  activity — that  consciousness  is  depen- 

"Jour.  of  Phil..  Vol.  XIV,  pp.  41  ff.  (1917). 
'"Jour,  of  Phil.,  Vol.  XII,  pp.  543  IT.  (1915). 


40  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

dent  not  only  on  the  reception  of  some  stimulus  by  a  sense- 
organ  and  the  conduction  of  the  resultant  nerve  impulse  on  up 
to  the  brain,  but  on  the  further  conduction  of  this  impulse  on 
to  the  muscle  and  its  consequent  response.  A  complete  sen- 
sorimotor current  through  the  nervous  system  is,  according 
to  this  theory,  essential  to  the  appearance  of  consciousness, 
and  if  the  motor  channels  are  blocked  there  can  be  no  con- 
sciousness. If  this  is  so,  it  may  well  be  that  consciousness  is 
merely  a  secondary  by-product  of  nervous  activity,  and  the 
distinctive  study  of  mental  phenomena  quite  superfluous  and 
valueless.  The  theory  is  well  criticised,  however,  by  Profes- 
sor H.  C.  McComas,^'^  who  shows  that  there  is  no  convincing 
experimental  evidence  for  such  a  view,  and  that  even  the 
milder  and  quite  innocuous  but  almost  universally  accepted 
dogma  that  all  conscious  processes  express  themselves  in  motor 
activity  is  far  from  proven.  "No  one  will  deny  that  there  is 
a  deep-seated  tendency  for  the  incoming  impressions  to  go  out 
into  motor  expressions ;  but  there  is  nothing  more  than  a  ten- 
dency." 

29.  Behaviorism  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem. — I  leave  to 
the  last  the  exposition  and  criticism  of  one  of  the  most  strik- 
ing arguments  in  favor  of  behaviorism  and  in  derogation  of 
consciousness  as  a  separate  factor  in  the  life  of  the  individual 
v/hich  has  yet  appeared.^^  The  author  is  the  same  Dr.  Abbot 
whose  defence  of  the  structural  side  of  consciousness  has  al- 
ready twice  been  referred  to  (17,  28),  and  yet  in  this  earlier 
published  article  of  his  we  have  what  amounts  to  a  modern 
adaptation  of  the  materialism  of  a  half-century  ago. 

Mind,  according  to  Dr.  Abbot,  is  but  a  term  for  brain- 
functioning:  as  the  function  of  the  lungs  is  respiration,  and 
the  function  of  the  legs  is  ambulation,  so  the  function  of  the 
brain  is  cogitation.  The  individual  thinks  with  his  brain 
just  as  he  walks  with  his  legs,  or  breathes  with  his  lungs. 
"We  do  not  think  of  opposing  or  contrasting  respiration  or 

^'^Psychological  Review,  Vol.  XXIII,  pp.  397  ff.  (1916). 

28  Abbot,  Psychological  Review,  Vol.  XXIII,  pp.  117  ff.  (1916). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  41 

running  with  lungs,  legs,  or  body:  neither  should  we"  oppose 
or  contrast  mind  with  brain  or  body  (dualism,  5).  Nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  should  we  say  that  mind  and  brain  are  identi- 
cal, two  aspects  of  the  same  reality  (monism,  6),  any  more 
than  we  would  say  that  respiration  is  identical  with  the  lungs 
or  running  with  the  legs.  Mind  in  short  "is  related  to  body  as 
function  or  activity  is  related  to  structure."  According  to  this 
view,  then,  instead  of  two  kinds  of  psychology,  structural  and 
functional,  psychology  is  the  functional  side  of  neurology  and 
neurology  the  structural  side  of  psychology. 

It  would  hardly  be  fair  to  call  this  materialism  in  the  strict 
sense  of  that  term,  but  its  implications  are  certainly  material- 
istic. In  saying  that  thought  is  a  function  of  the  brain  as 
respiration  is  a  function  of  the  lungs,  Dr.  Abbot  is  overlook- 
ing one  important  point.  Respiration  is  a  visible,  audible,  and 
even  tangible  activity,  and  the  air  respired  a  material  sub- 
stance: both,  therefore,  are  common  objects  of  experience  tD 
all  conscious  beings,  "objective"  facts,  observable  with  the 
senses,  and  therefore  physical.  Thought,  on  the  contrary,  is 
a  purely  individual,  private,  "subjective"  phenomenon,  and  so 
not  physical  at  all.  The  true  "function"  of  the  brain  as  neu- 
rology studies  the  latter  is  not  thought  or  consciousness  or 
"mind,"  but  the  coordination  and  central  control  of  nerve- 
impulses  from  and  to  different  parts  of  the  nervous  system, 
and  these  are  as  "objective"  in  their  nature  as  breathing,  run- 
ning, and  all  the  rest.  (Cf.  sects.  75-77,  inf.) 

b.  Behaviorism  and  Introspection 

30.  It  is  customary  to  say  that  psychology  uses  the  same 
method  for  the  discovery  of  its  facts  as  other  sciences — 
namely,  observation;  but  that  psychological  observation  be- 
cause of  the  peculiar  nature  of  metal  facts  is  of  two  kinds, 
one  distinctive  of  psychology — introspection,  and  the  other  an- 
alogous to  the  method  used  in  the  objective  sciences — obser- 
vation of  behavior,  through  which  the  underlying  facts  of 
consciousness  are  inferred.     Furthermore,  it  is  customary  to 


42  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

add  that  observations  in  either  form  may  be  carried  on  under 
experimental  conditions  or  non-experimentally,  thus  adding  a 
third  method,  really  preliminary  to  observation  proper, — 
namely,  experimentation.  Of  these  three  methods  however, 
behaviorism  rejects  introspection  as  unscientific,  and  accepts 
only  experiment  and  observation  of  behavior  as  the  sole  true 
psychological  methods.  Behaviorism's  opposition  to  the 
mentalist  view  of  psychology  is  really  the  result  rather  than 
the  cause  of  its  rejection  of  the  introspective  method:  hence 
a  critical  study  of  that  method,  and  an  appreciation  of  its  un- 
doubted difficulties,  is  essential  to  a  thorough  refutation  of 
the  behavioristic  doctrine. 

31.  The  Nature  of  Introspection. — Introspection  is  most 
simply  defined  as  the  direct  observation  of  one's  own  mental 
processes  (Angell).  It  is  direct  observation  (observation  of 
the  object  of  psychological  interest  directly)  as  opposed  to  the 
method  of  observation  of  behavior  which  is  indirect  as  it  is 
used  by  the  psychologist.  By  this  distinction  I  mean  merely 
to  emphasize  the  fact  that  when  the  biologist  observes  behavior 
he  is  interested  in  that  behavior  for  its  own  sake,  and  the 
method  is  consequently  for  the  biologist  a  method  of  direct 
observation ;  but  when  the  psychologist  observes  behavior  he  is 
doing  so  for  the  purpose  of  inferring  therefrom  the  underlying 
mental  conditions  in  which  alone  he  is  interested,  hence  for 
him  introspection  is  the  direct  method  of  observing  conscious- 
ness and  observation  of  behavior  is  an  indirect  method  of  ob- 
serving (better,  inferring)  consciousness. 

The  modern  concept  of  introspection  is  the  scientific  suc- 
cessor of  the  historic  pre-scientific  doctrine  of  "the  inner 
sense."  According  to  this  theory,  which  we  shall  meet  with 
again  in  another  connection  (72),  just  as  there  is  an  "outer 
sense,"  constituted  of  what  we  even  today  commonly  call  "the 
five  senses,"  to  make  us  aware  of  physical  things,  so  there  is 
also  an  "inner  sense"  by  which  we  come  to  know  the  things  of 
the  mind.    In  this  view,  the  world  of  knowledge  falls  into  two 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  43 

distinct  spheres,  and  the  mind  is  endowed  with  two  distinct 
organs  by  which  to  become  conscious  of  them. 

That  this  doctrine  of  an  inner  sense  added  to  the  five  outer 
senses  is  based  upon  a  false  though  tempting  analogy  becomes 
evident,  however,  so  soon  as  we  inquire  into  the  nature  of  such 
an  interior  faculty.  To  observe  physical  things  we  look  at 
them,  feel  them,  smell  them,  and  in  all  possible  ways  bring 
them  into  contact  with  our  bodily  sense-organs — the  objects 
are  outside  of  me,  and  impress  themselves  upon  me  from 
without:  in  introspecting,  on  the  contrary,  the  objects  intro- 
spected are  a  part  of  myself — /  think,  /  remember,  /  feel 
pleased,  /  will.  There  is  in  introspecting  no  intermediate 
organ  between  myself  and  the  object  of  my  knowledge,  as  in 
perceiving  there  is  a  sense-organ  (the  eye,  the  ear,  etc.)  be- 
tween myself  and  the  physical  object.  The  only  resemblance 
between  sense-perception  and  introspection,  between  "outer" 
and  "inner  sense,"  is  that  they  both  give  us  direct  knowledge  of 
their  respective  objects;  but  they  do  so  in  such  different  ways 
as  to  make  the  term  "sense"  entirely  inapplicable  to  intro- 
spection. 

What,  then,  positively  is  introspection?  It  is  a  cognitive 
process  of  the  form  of  thought  or  judgment — "reflection 
upon"  experience.  Cognition  as  a  phase  of  consciousness  in- 
cludes, let  us  say,  both  presentative  (sensation  and  perception, 
"outer  sense")  and  ideational  processes;  ideational  processes 
are  memory,  imagination,  and  thought;  thought  includes  the 
three  logical  or  logic-ward  processes  of  conception,  judgment, 
and  reasoning;  one  of  the  highest  products  of  conception  is 
the  concept  of  the  self,  and  one  of  the  highest  forms  of  think- 
ing that  thinking  about  the  self  which  we  term  self-conscious, 
ness.  Without  inquiring  at  this  point  into  the  nature  of  self- 
consciousness,  we  can  at  least  recognize  that  without  self- 
consciousness  introspection  is  impossible:  unless  one  has  at- 
tained that  step  in  intellectual  development  which  we  call 
self-consciousness,  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  introspect. 

To  introspect,  then,  is  to  reflect  upon  one's  experience.    To 


44  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

experience  pain  is  to  have  impressed  upon  one's  nervous  sys- 
tem a  stimulus  of  a  specific  nature :  to  introspect  the  sensation 
of  pain  is  just  to  set  that  sensation  in  the  foreground  of  con- 
sciousness, to  recognize  especially  that  it  is  a  part  of  my  ex- 
perience, to  make  this  sensation  something  more  than  a  sen- 
sation or  presentation — namely,  an  object  of  judgment.  To 
remember  is  to  bring  into  consciousness  some  object  or  event 
which  no  longer  exists  in  my  actual  experience,  but  which  is 
recognized  as  having  been  at  some  previous  time  an  object 
or  event  in  my  actual  experience:  to  introspect  a  memory  is 
to  examine  and  analyze  the  image  aroused  in  my  mind  by  the 
act  of  recollection,  and  so  to  make  this  image  not  merely 
something  experienced  but  something  judged  to  be  of  such 
and  such  a  nature.  What  I  remember,  then,  is  the  object  or 
event  itself,  but  what  I  introspect  is  the  image  of  that  object 
or  event  in  my  present  consciousness :  just  as  in  perception 
what  I  perceive  is  the  physical  object  itself  present  in  my  en- 
vironment, but  what  I  introspect  is  the  experience  produced 
in  me  by  the  presence  of  that  object. 

Finally,  in  the  affective  and  conative  spheres  the  distinc- 
tion between  having  an  experience  and  introspecting  it  is  still 
more  evident.  Thus  to  "have  an  emotion"  is  to  "feel"  angry, 
excited,  pleased,  or  what  not,  while  to  introspect  that  emotion 
is  to  know,  to  "judge,"  that  I  have  an  emotion,  and  to  inquire 
into  the  constitution  of  the  emotional  experience;  but  to  know 
that  I  have  an  emotion  and  to  know  what  that  involves  is 
quite  a  different  matter  from  merely  experiencing  emotion. 
In  the  same  way  to  know  that  I  am  willing  to  perform  a  cer- 
tain action  and  to  know  what  that  willing-process  involves  is 
a  quite  different  matter  from  the  actual  process  of  willing  that 
action.  In  all  these  cases  we  have  on  the  one  hand,  experience 
— conative,  affective  or  cognitive — and  on  the  other  hand, 
judgment  about  experience,  which  is  as  such  always  cognitive. 

Modern  psychology  substitutes  for  the  old  doctrine  of  two 
distinct  organs  of  knowledge,  one  in  the  field  of  physical 
things  and  one  in  the  field  of  psychology,  the  theory  that  the 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  45 

distinction  between  introspection  and  outward  observation  is 
one  of  point  of  view  only.  Introspection  differs  from  ex- 
ternal observation,  says  Pillsbury/^  only  in  the  attitude  of 
mind  which  we  take  toward  the  object  of  observation.  When 
we  observe  a  physical  object,  as  a  light,  "the  question  in  mind, 
expressed  or  implied,  is  as  to  what  the  object  may  be  in  itself 
or  in  relation  to  other  objects.  When  we  introspect,  on  the 
contrary,  we  ask  what  the  experience  means  to  us  and  what 
its  relation  may  be  to  other  mental  processes.  Exactly  the 
same  experience  may,  and  usually  does,  furnish  the  starting- 
point  for  both."  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  light,  if  we  are  in- 
quiring what  kind  of  a  light  it  is,  and  what  produces  it,  we  are 
observing  objectively;  but  if  we  are  interested  in  its  effect 
upon  us,  or  in  knowing  why  we  were  attracted  by  it,  the  pro- 
cess is  one  of  introspection.  In  the  same  way,  we  may  add. 
with  introspection  of  ideational,  affective,  and  conative  pro- 
cesses :  so  long  as  we  are  interested  in  the  idea  as  true  or  false, 
in  the  emotional  experience  as  needing  expression,  or  the  situ- 
ation which  aroused  the  emotion  as  calling  for  an  immediate 
response  on  the  part  of  ourselves,  or  the  willing  as  producing 
results  in  the  outside  world,  introspection  is  lacking ;  but  when 
we  become  interested  in  the  idea,  the  emotion,  or  the  will-act 
as  a  phase  of  individual  experience  and  in  its  relations  to 
other  experiences  antecedent  or  consequent,  the  process  be- 
comes by  that  very  change  of  interest  introspective. 

32.  The  Difficulties  of  Introspection. — From  the  very  na- 
ture of  introspection  as  thus  educed  certain  serious  difficulties 
inevitably  follow,  and  it  is  chiefly  on  account  of  the  apparent 
insuperability  of  these  difficulties  that  behaviorists  have  been 
led  to  throw  over  the  introspective  method  altogether.  A 
closer  examination  of  them  will,  however,  it  is  hoped,  show 
them  to  be  after  all  not  absolutely  fatal — to  be  difficulties,  in- 
deed, but  by  no  means  final  obstacles  to  any  use  of  introspec- 
tion or  to  the  acceptance  of  consciousness  as  the  legitimate 
subject-matter  of  psychology. 

"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  I,  225-228. 


46  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

(i)  The  chief  objection  offered  to  the  method  is  that  in- 
trospection being  itself  a  mental  process  necessarily  inter- 
feres with  or  alters  the  mental  process  which  is  being  intro- 
spected. When  I  observe  a  physical  phenomenon,  as  a  bio- 
logical or  chemical  process,  that  process  goes  on  quite  inde- 
pendently of  myself — I  do  not  interfere  with  it,  I  merely 
watch  it :  in  such  a  case  there  are  two  distinct  processes  going 
on  in  the  world — the  biological  or  chemical  process  in  the 
outer  object,  and  the  observation  and  perception  process  in 
my  own  mind.  When  I  introspect  a  mental  process,  on  the 
contrary,  as  a  memory  or  an  emotion,  there  are  two  processes 
going  on  in  my  own  experience — the  memory  or  the  emotion 
itself,  and  the  introspecting  of  that  memory  or  emotion;  and 
I  cannot  examine  into  such  a  process  without  by  that  very  act 
interfering  with,  altering,  or  in  some  way  modifying,  that 
process. 

Many  psychologists  have  called  attention  to  this  difficulty;®" 
and  unquestionably  experience  confirms  their  statements.  As 
soon  as  I  begin  to  ask  myself  "what  am  I  doing  when  I  per- 
ceive, remember,  think,  feel,  or  act,"  those  processes  are  no 
longer  what  they  were  before.  If  I  introspect  memory  or 
imagination,  it  is  no  longer  memory  or  imagination  only,  but 
memory-thought-about  or  imagination-thought-about.  In  the 
affective  and  conative  spheres,  again,  the  difficulty  becomes 
especially  obvious :  as  soon  as  I  begin  to  introspect  an  emotion 
or  a  volition,  the  emotion  or  volition  tends  at  once  to  disap- 
pear. For  example,  if  I  am  suddenly  placed  in  a  situation 
arousing  an  emotion  of  extreme  terror,  I  am  not  likely  to 
have  presence  of  mind  enough  to  stop  and  ejaculate — "See 
here!  I  am  a  psychologist,  and  as  such  am  interested  not  in 
the  object  of  my  terror  but  in  the  terror  experience  itself. 
Now  what  is  really  going  on  in  my  mind  as  I  pass  through 
this  singular  and  thrilling  experience?"  If  I  do  so,  the  emo- 
tion itself  will  begin  to  die  out  as  I  start  to  examine  it.     So, 

3°  V.   Scripture,   The   New  Psychology,   Chap.    I    (especially   pp.  8-10). 
Also  almost  any  textbook  of  the  "mentalist"  schools. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  47 

if  I  am  planning  to  carry  out  into  action  an  important  reso- 
lution, and  stop  to  examine  before  the  action  takes  place  what 
is  going  on  in  my  mind  in  the  process  of  determining  upon 
that  action,  the  action  itself  will  be  delayed  and  the  determin- 
ing-process come  to  an  end. 

Another  aspect  of  this  same  difficulty  is  brought  out  in  the 
statement  of  Comte^^  that  in  introspection  "the  mental  energy, 
instead  of  being  concentrated  is  divided,  and  divided  in  two 
divergent  directions.  The  state  of  mind  observed,  and  the 
act  of  mind  observing,  are  mutually  in  an  inverse  ratio;  eacli 
tends  to  annihilate  the  other."  "The  mind  in  watching  its 
own  workings,"  says  Stout,^^  "must  necessarily  have  its  atten- 
tion divided  between  two  objects — on  the  one  hand,  the  mental 
operation  itself  which  is  to  be  observed,  and  on  the  other,  the 
object  to  which  this  mental  operation  is  directed." 

The  result  of  this  is  that  "if  the  introspective  effort  is  sus- 
tained and  strenuous,  it  is  apt  to  destroy  the  very  object  which 
it  is  examining.  For,  by  concentrating  attention  on  the  sub- 
jective process,  we  withdraw  it  from  the  object  of  that  process, 
and  so  arrest  the  process  itself. "^^  "In  order  to  observe,  your 
intellect  must  pause  from  activity;  yet  it  is  this  very  activity 
that  you  want  to  observe.  If  you  cannot  effect  the  pause,  you 
cannot  observe;  if  you  do  effect  it,  there  is  nothing  to  ob- 
serve."" As  James,  in  his  usual  graphic  way,  writes:  "the 
attempt  at  introspective  analysis"  is  "like  seizing  a  spinning 
top  to  catch  its  motion,  or  trying  to  turn  up  the  gas  quick 
enough  to  see  how  the  darkness  looks.  ""^ 

The  usual  way  of  meeting  this  difficulty  is  to  admit  it  and 
fall  back  upon  what  is  called  the  "primary  memory."  We  ob- 
serve mental  processes,  it  is  said,  not  at  the  instant  they  are 

•*  Quoted  by  Scripture,  loc.  cit.  Comte's  aspersions  on  introspective 
psychology  in  the  first  chapter  of  his  Positive  Philosophy,  are  singularly 
prophetic  of  recent  behavioristic  criticism. 

8'  Manual  of  Psychology,  pp.  44  f . 

'3  Stout,  loc.  cit. 

**  Quoted  from  Comte,  Scripture,  loc.  cit. 

"  Principles  of  Psychology,  I,  243  f. 


48  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

going  on,  but  immediately  after,  or  just  as  the  process  is  dy- 
ing away.  The  usual  description  of  our  consciousness  of  time 
helps  us  here:  the  moments  of  consciousness  do  not  succeed 
one  another  as  beads  on  a  chain,  or  as  drops  of  water  falling 
from  a  poorly  closed  faucet  (though  James,  in  his  later  works, 
plainly  intimates  that  they  do)' — rather,  the  consciousness  of 
passing  time  is  a  rhythmical  succession  of  overlapping  mo- 
ments, every  new  moment  arising  in  consciousness  while  the 
preceding  one  is  fading  away.  Thus  moment  B,  the  moment 
of  the  introspection  process,  observes  moment  A,  the  object  of 
the  introspection,  before  the  latter  has  completely  gone. 

It  is  often  said  that  to  adopt  this  explanation  is  to  reject 
direct  observation  and  substitute  memory,  or  to  identify  intro- 
spection with  retrospection,  and  so  to  subject  our  psychologi- 
cal knowledge  to  all  the  vagaries  and  defects  of  memory. 
"Unaided  observation,"  says  Scripture,  "was  crude  enough; 
so-called  'reflection,'  or  introspection  of  memory,  is  still 
cruder."  But  the  term  "primary  memory"  which  I  have  used 
in  the  above  description  is  as  much  a  misnomer  as  the  term 
"after-image" :  an  after-image  is  not  really  an  image  at  all, 
but  a  sensation  persisting  after  the  original  stimulus  has  been 
removed,  and  should  be  properly  termed  an  after-sensation — 
so  "primary  memory"  is  not  really  memory  at  all,  but  of  the 
same  nature  as  the  "after-image"  or  after-sensation  itself.  To 
accept  this  explanation  is  not  to  deny  that  introspection  has 
defects  and  is  not  always  reliable,  but  merely  to  insist  that 
this  unreliability  is  not  the  unreliability  of  memory  (which  is 
notorious),  but  the  lesser  unreliability  to  which  all  observation, 
in  physical  as  well  as  mental  science,  is  subject.  Most  of  the 
processes  of  physical  nature  can  be  observed  while  they  are 
at  their  best,  though  this  is  not  always  the  case,  whereas  it  is 
an  essential  characteristic  of  psychological  observation  that 
the  data  can  be  observed  only  when  they  are  fading  away. 

Confirmation  of  this  latter  point  is  found  in  Pillsbury's  de- 
fence of  introspection.^"     It  is  obviously  impossible,  he  says, 

3"  Loc.  cit. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  49 

to  maintain  two  opposite  points  of  view  at  once — as,  for  ex- 
ample, that  of  introspection  and  that  of  external  observa- 
tion. "You  can  no  more  introspect  at  the  same  time  you  [in 
the  physical  sense]  observe  than  you  can  look  at  an  animal  at 
one  and  the  same  instant  as  a  chemist  and  a  biologist,  or  at  a 
man  as  friend  and  as  physician."  And  this,  he  continues,  "is 
all  that  can  be  meant  when  we  say  that  it  is  impossible  to 
introspect  a  process  during  its  course," — the  attitude  of  per- 
ceiving, feeling,  etc.,  and  the  attitude  of  observing  those  pro- 
cesses, cannot  be  maintained  at  one  and  the  same  time. 

There  is  no  harm,  I  think,  in  the  common  saying  that  intro- 
spection is  always  retrospection,  provided  we  understand  the 
term  "retrospection"  to  include  looking  back  upon  what  is 
passing  away  ("primary  memory")  as  well  as  looking  back 
upon  what  is  past  and  has  in  the  interval  been  forgotten  (mem- 
ory in  the  true  sense).  If  introspection  were  always  of  the 
latter  type,  we  should  have  good  cause  perhaps  to  despair  of 
its  absolute  value  for  science  if  not  of  its  partial  validity;'^ 
whereas  the  fact  that  introspection  is  really  retrospection  in 
the  first  sense  of  the  term  gives  us,  on  the  contrary,  excellent 
grounds  for  hope  for  the  future  of  our  science. 

As  to  the  general  objection  we  have  been  considering,  that 
introspection  as  itself  a  mental  process  necessarily  alters  the 
facts  which  it  observes,  Scripture^^  has  shown  that  the  results 
of  external  observation  are  open  to  the  same  charge.  "Intro- 
spection does  distort  things  and  lead  to  erroneous  conclusions," 
he  admits,  "but  so  does  all  observation.    The  objections  to  in- 

"  Stout  has  shown  (he.  cit.),  furthermore,  that  even  if  introspection 
is  always  by  means  of  memory  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  we  need 
not  despair  absoUitely ;  for  "by  calling  up  a  process  in  memory  imme- 
diately after  it  is  over"— or  even,  I  should  add,  after  a  longer  interval — 
"we  are  often  able  to  notice  much  that  escaped  us  when  it  was  actually 
going  on.  In  like  manner  the  astronomer  can  call  up  in  memory  the 
image  of  a  star  which  has  just  passed  across  his  vision,  and  can  then 
notice  details  which  had  escaped  him  at  the  moment  of  its  actual  appear- 
ance." 

*"  Of),  cit ,  pp.  IOI2. 


50  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

trospection  apply  just  as  completely  to  physical  or  botanical 
observations  as  to  psychological  ones."  In  introspection  we 
emphasize  the  process  introspected,  and  thus  distort  it  in  rela- 
tion to  everything  else  in  the  mind,  but  this  is  true  also  of  ex- 
ternal observation:  "whatever  we  pay  attention  to  becomes  a 
more  prominent  object  than  the  rest  of  our  experience."  "I 
observe  the  sparks  from  an  electrical  machine,  or  the  flower  in 
the  field,  and  utterly  overlook  the  machine  itself,  or  the  other 
plants  in  the  field. — If  I  wish  to  carefully  observe  the  con- 
struction of  the  machine,  I  must  neglect  the  spark;  if  I  wish 
to  study  the  tree,  I  neglect  the  flower.  Likewise  if  I  observe 
a  memory,  I  overlook  an  emotion,"  and  so  give  a  more  or  less 
defective  and  distorted  account  of  the  former.  But  "these 
difficulties  are  inevitable  in  any  science,  they  are  necessary 
consequences  of  the  method  of  observation,"  not  restricted  to 
the  internal  or  introspective  form  of  that  method. 

(2)  Two  other  objections  to  introspection  remain  to  be 
briefly  treated.  The  first  of  these,  that  introspection  often 
leads  to  contradictory  results,  we  need  hardly  but  mention. 
Of  course  the  same  thing  is  true  of  external  observation, 
unanimity  among  physical  scientists  being  only  somewhat 
more  common  than  among  psychologists.  Titchener  names 
some  interesting  examples,  and  shows  that  the  prospects  for 
resolving  present  differences  among  psychologists  as  to  some 
of  the  facts  of  their  science  are  sufficient  to  bid  us  hope.^'' 
"No  scientific  method  is  infallible,"  and  though  the  difficulties 
peculiar  to  the  introspective  method  are  more  serious  than 
those  which  mark  the  method  of  external  observation,  they 
are  not  fatal  to  the  use  of  introspection  altogether. 

(3)  That  which  is  superficially  the  most  serious  difficulty 
of  all,  however, — one  which  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the  fre- 
quent contradictory  results  just  referred  to,  and  is  essentially 
inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  introspection — has  been  stated 
most  clearly  by  Watson  and  the  behaviorists.  It  is  the  fact 
that  introspection  is   essentially   an  individual  method,   and 

^^  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  XXIII,  436-439. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  51 

each  psychologist  can  introspect  only  his  own  mental  processes. 
Psychology,  as  it  "is  generally  thought  of,"  says  Professor 
Watson,  "has  something  esoteric  in  its  methods.  If  you  fail 
to  reproduce  my  findings  it  is  not  due  to  some  fault  in  your 
apparatus  or  the  control  of  your  stimuli,  but  it  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  your  introspection  is  untrained.  The  attack  is  made 
upon  the  observer,  and  not  upon  the  experimental  setting."*" 

But  the  very  statement  of  the  difficulty  contains  within  itself 
its  own  criticism.  Professor  Watson,  being  an  experimental- 
ist solely,  assumes  that  the  only  fit  "apparatus"  for  a  psycholo- 
gist is  a  laboratory  apparatus ;  but  it  has  already  been  empha- 
sized (30)  that  experimentation,  whether  within  or  without 
a  laboratory  building,  can  never  be  anything  more  than  a  pre- 
liminary or  assistant  to  observation,  and  that  the  true  labora- 
tory of  the  psychologist  is  his  own  mind.  Introspection  is 
the  psychologist's  "apparatus,"  as  his  mind  is  his  laboratory: 
"if  you  fail  to  reproduce  my  findings,  it"  is  "due  to  some  fault 
in  your  apparatus"  (namely,  in  your  introspection — or,  of 
course,  as  is  quite  as  likely  to  be  the  case,  in  mine).  So,  as 
to  the  last  sentence  quoted,  the  observer's  mind  is  the  central 
object  of  experiment  in  psychology,  and  when  an  "attack  is 
made  upon  the  observer"  it  is  made  upon  the  central  part  of 
the  experiment,  whether  or  not  the  "setting"  is  also  attacked. 

As  to  the  charge  of  esotericism,  it  rests  upon  a  confusion  be- 
tween what  is  esoteric  or  secret  and  what  is  merely  individual. 
The  "esoteric"  is  that  which  is  restricted  to  a  select  few,  but 
introspection  is  a  method  open  to  all :  the  vuiteriuls  of  intro- 
spection are  individual,  but  the  use  of  those  materials  is  po- 
tentially universal.  Of  course,  introspection  of  one  individual 
mind  by  that  same  one  individual  would  be  quite  useless — the 
findings  of  every  individual  introspector  must  be  supplemented 
by  collaboration  with  other  introspectors.  As  Stout  puts  it, 
"introspection,  to  be  effective  for  the  advancement  of  science, 
must,  like  other  modes  of  observation,  be  carried  on  by  a 

*°  Behavior,  pp.  6  f . 


52  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

number  of  experts  in  cooperation.  Each  must  communicate 
to  the  rest  his  own  results,  for  confirmation  or  rejection."" 

Hence,  in  conclusion,  we  may  state  that  whereas  introspec- 
tion is  undoubtedly  full  of  difficulties,  the  difficulties  are  not 
after  all  so  much  greater  than  those  that  characterize  the  out- 
ward type  of  observation,  and  are  in  no  sense  insuperable: 
they  justify  the  supplementation  of  introspection  by  other 
methods  (as  indirect  observation  through  observation  of  be- 
havior), but  not  the  rejection  of  the  introspective  method 
altogether  as  the  behaviorists  would  insist.*^  Further  and 
positive  defence  of  introspection  may  well  be  left  to  another 
section. 

33.  The  Necessity  and  Limitations  of  Introspection. — Not- 
withstanding its  difficulties,  introspection  is  the  only  method 
by  which  mental  processes  can  be  observed,  and  if  we  are  to 
have  a  psychology  of  consciousness  as  distinguished  from  a 
"psychology"  of  behavior  we  must  use  that  method,  faulty 
as  it  is.  The  fact  of  its  defectiveness  adds  to  the  difficulty  of 
psychology,  but  does  not  make  such  a  science  impossible. 

Then  the  fact  that  "radical  functionalists,"  who  insist  with 
the  behaviorists  that  the  true  subject-matter  of  psychology  is 
behavior  and  not  consciousness,  nevertheless  accept  the  intro- 
spective method ;  and  that  even  biologists  admit  its  usefulness ; 
affords  the  half-sceptical  and  half-believing  mentalist  con- 
siderable cheer.  Thus  Pillsbury  "tells  us  that  "to  give  over 
introspection  altogether  is  to  abandon  the  method  that  has 
given  much  if  not  most  of  the  body  of  knowledge  that  we  have 
at  present,  and  to  insist  that  we  use  only  a  method  that  has 

*i  Op.  cit.,  pp.  45  f. 

*2  Says  Professor  Stratton  {Experimental  Psychology  and  Culture,  p. 
3,  note)  :  The  "fugitive  character  of  many  of  our  mental  states  has  often 
been  pointed  to  in  proof  of  the  impossibility  of  introspection.  The  truth 
of  course  is,  that  only  by  means  of  introspection  do  we  know  that  our 
mental  processes  are  changeable  and  elusive.  It  is  curious  that  when 
critics  make  such  short  work  of  self-observation  as  a  psychological 
method,  they  do  not  see  that  most  of  the  facts  they  bring  forth  as  evi- 
dence of  its  fundamental  inadequacy  are  obtained  only  by  this  very  self- 
observation." 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  53 

so  far  been  little  tried,"  and  which  has  in  many  cases  "when 
tested  proved  relatively  futile";"  and  Herrick  assures  us  that 
"conscious  processes  are  biological  realities  which  cannot  be 
ignored  in  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  things,  and  the  biol- 
ogist can  see  no  reason  why  they  should  not  be  observed  in 
the  only  way  open  to  him — namely,  by  introspection."** 

But  to  insist  on  the  necessity  of  introspection  is  by  no  means 
to  deny  that  the  method  has  obvious  limitations,  (i)  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  purely  a  descriptive  and  in  no  sense  an  ex- 
planatory method.  "Introspection  can  never  give  us  a  system 
of  psychology.  .  .  .  Introspection  is  psychological  observation; 
and  observation  is  a  way  of  getting  facts, .  .  ,  data,  materials  of 
science."*^  "The  data  of  introspection  are  never  themselves 
explanatory;  they  tell  us  nothing  of  mental  causation,  or  of 
physiological  dependence,  or  of  genetic  derivation.  The  ideal 
introspective  report  is  an  accurate  description,  made  in  the  in- 
terests of  psychology,  of  some  conscious  process.  Causation, 
dependence,  development  are  then  matters  of  inference."*® 

Titchener  thinks,  however,  that  introspection  is  still  further 
limited — namely,  to  the  structural  facts — and  has  no  func- 
tional value.  "We  cannot  observe  an  experiencing;  we  are 
not  called  upon,  in  psychology,  to  observe  an  experienced; 
what  we  observe  is  experience."*'^  Though  Titchener  does  not 
in  so  many  words  limit  introspection  to  structure  as  opposed 
to  function,  and  though  his  terminology  is  ambiguous,**  the 
limitation  is  there.  Pillsbury,  on  the  contrary,  limits  intro- 
spection to  functional  facts.  "The  real  subject-matter  of  psy- 
chology is  the  fact  that  we  attain  conclusions,  that  we  per- 
ceive distance,  that  we  are  prepared  to  act,  rather  than  the 
imagery,  or  the  movements  that  accompany,  precede,  or  suc- 

*K')dcnce,  XLI,  378   (191 5). 

**  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XII,  547  (1915). 

*''  Titchener,  0/),  ft/.,  447. 

*"  Op.  cit.,  486. 

*^  Op.  cit..  498. 

••"He  uses  the  term  "content-process"  in  a  purely  structural  sense. 


54  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

ceed."*®  In  this  sentence,  Pillsbury  rules  out  at  once  struc- 
turalism ("imagery")  on  the  one  hand  and  behaviorism 
("movements")  on  the  other:  what  we  discover  through  intro- 
spection, he  thinks,  is  the  facts  that  we  perceive,  attain  con- 
clusions, etc., — and  these  are  functional  phenomena — not  the 
structural  products  (percepts,  conclusions,  etc.)  or  motor  ex- 
pressions of  these  processes. 

In  reality,  analysis  of  the  introspective  method  as  we  have 
already  attempted  it  gives  no  countenance  to  the  theory  that 
either  structural  or  functional  facts  are  the  more  difficult:  if 
we  avoid  the  errors  and  guard  ourselves  against  the  difficul- 
ties inherent  in  the  nature  of  introspection  as  such,  we  will 
find  mental  structure  and  mental  function — "experiencing," 
as  well  as  "experience,"  images  and  percepts  as  well  as  reason- 
ing and  perceiving — equally  open  to  observation.  And,  fur- 
thermore, if  we  accept  the  program  of  reconciliation  between 
structuralism  and  functionalism  already  set  forth  (23),  ap- 
plication of  the  introspective  method  to  both  the  structural 
and  functional  sides  of  mind  becomes  not  merely  valid  but 
imperative. 

Introspection,  then,  is  a  purely  descriptive  method — a 
method  of  observation  and  discovery — but  it  is  of  universal 
applicability  throughout  the  field  of  mental  phenomena.  There 
is  a  further  limitation  to  the  universality  of  introspection  as  a 
descriptive  method,  however:  (2)  introspection  is  unlimited  in 
the  scope  of  its  applicability,  within  the  field  of  description  as 
distinguished  from  that  of  explanation,  but  within  that  field  it 
is  necessarily  incomplete,  in  the  sense  that  its  findings  must  be 
supplemented — not  merely  the  findings  of  the  individual  intro- 
spector  by  the  collaboration  of  other  introspections,  but  the 
findings  of  all  introspectors  by  use  of  the  two  auxiliary  meth- 
ods of  observation  of  hehceuior  and  experiment.  Introspec- 
tion is  the  central  and  distinctive  psychological  method,  but 
can  only  meet  with  well-deserved  ridicule  and  scorn  if  it  claims 
for  itself  a  monopoly  or  insists  on  its  all-sufiiciency,  to  the  ex- 

^^Loc.  cit. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  55 

elusion  of  the  other  auxiUary  methods.  Between  the  exalta- 
tion of  introspection  and  the  contemptuous  rejection  of  any 
assistance  from  the  experimentalist  and  the  biologist  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  equally  contemptuous  rejection  of  introspec- 
tion altogether  on  the  other,  there  is  a  happy  middle  course 
which  consists  in  admitting  the  central  and  unique  place  of 
hitrospection  as  the  psychological  method,  and  yet  recogniz- 
ing the  auxiliary  and  supplementing  value  of  external  obser- 
vation and  experimentation. 

"No  one  method  is  complete  in  itself,"  says  Pillsbury,""  and 
with  his  words  we  may  conclude  our  lengthy  study  of  intro- 
spection. Introspection  must  be  supplemented  by  external  ob- 
servation and  experiment  if  description  is  to  be  complete,  and 
description  itself  must  be  supplemented  by  explanation  if 
scientific  curiosity  is  to  be  completely  satisfied,  and  the  method 
of  explanation  in  science  is  inductive  inference.  "To  obser- 
vation, direct  and  indirect — we  add  induction  as  the  necessary 
method  of  psychological  science."^^  And  in  a  complete  science 
of  psychology  all  four  methods  are  used — introspection,  ob- 
servation of  behavior,  experimentation,  and  inference — "no 
matter  to  what  school  the  investigator  belongs."^^ 

c.  Conclusions 

34.  Reconciliation  of  Behaviorism  and  Mentalism. — In  our 
criticisms  of  structuralism  and  functionalism  we  insisted  that 
for  a  complete  understanding  of  mental  life  a  combination  of 
both  structural  and  functional  points  of  view  is  essential :  in 
the  same  way  now,  in  criticism  of  the  narrow  behavioristic 
position,  I  should  insist  that  if  our  understanding  of  human 
behavior  is  to  be  complete  the  "objective"  and  "subjective" 
points  of  view  must  be  combined.  To  the  behaviorist,  as  we 
have  seen,  behavior  is  a  purely  objective  or  physiological  af- 

50  Op  cit.,  379. 

"1  Ladd — Psychology,  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,  pp.  24  f.     (Quoted  by 
Titchcner,  op  cit.,  447.) 
"nilsbury,  he.  cit. 


56  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

fair;  to  the  mentalist,  consciousness  is  too  often  a  self-sufficient 
object  of  interest  in  the  human  economy :  a  comprehensive  view 
of  human  Hfe,  however,  must  find  room  for  both  conscious- 
ness and  behavior — or,  if  you  will,  subjective  and  objective 
behavior.  We  criticise  the  behaviorist  not  merely  for  his 
scornful  attitude  toward  the  older  psychology,  but  also  for  his 
narrow  conception  of  behavior' — for  presuming  to  think  that 
human  life  or  behavior  can  be  explained  in  purely  objective 
or  physiological  terms.  Mentalistic  psychology  does  not,  or  at 
least  should  not,  claim  to  be  an  all-sufficient  science  of  human 
behavior,  but  only  a  science  of  that  part  of  human  nature 
which  we  call  psychical;  but  behaviorism  does  make  such  a 
claim,  and  therein  lies  its  error. 

In  support  of  my  general  contention,  I  again  quote  Profes- 
sor Herrick.  "It  is  a  legitimate  scientific  procedure,"  he  says, 
"to  isolate  for  experimental  purposes  any  phenomena  from 
their  setting,  providing  that  in  the  end  the  corresponding  syn- 
thesis is  affected."  So,  "while  it  is  possible  and  legitimate  to 
neglect  consciousness  in  any  particular  programme  of  the 
study  of  behavior,  it  is  both  inexpedient  and  unscientific  to 
eliminate  the  introspective  method  from  the  behavioristic  pro- 
gramme as  a  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  mischie- 
vous to  assume  that  because  certain  useful  generalizations  can 
be  drawn  from  a  purely  introspective  study  of  consciousness, 
therefore  behavior  can  be  neglected  in  the  psychologist's  pro- 
gramme as  a  whole."  If  psychology  is  to  maintain  its  place 
among  the  sciences,  it  must  not  isolate  itself  from  the  rest  of 
natural  process  by  limiting  its  interest  to  pure  introspection  or 
to  purely  objective  behavior."^' 

53  Herrick,  op.  cit.,  pp.  549-551.  While  indorsing  these  words  in  their 
main  contention,  I  do  beheve,  as  it  is  one  of  the  main  objects  of  this  work 
to  demonstrate,  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  have  an  "independent  psy- 
chology" which  ignores  physiology  and  objective  behavior,  just  as  it  is 
perfectly  possible  to  have  a  physiology  or  a  biology  which  ignores  con- 
sciousness. Dr.  Herrick's  main  point,  I  take  it,  is  that  either  of  these 
sciences  is  incomplete  as  a  study  of  man  as  a  whole,  and  in  this  I  am 
heartily  in  agreement  with  him. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  57 

It  makes  no  essential  difference  whether  we  consider  con- 
sciousness a  form  of  behavior — "subjective,"  as  distinguished 
from  "objective"  or  physiological,  behavior;  or  whether,  as 
seems  to  me  generally  better  from  the  point  of  view  of  clear- 
ness of  language,  we  restrict  the  term  behavior  to  the  objec- 
tive type  as  the  expression  of  consciousness.  Neither  does  it 
make  any  essential  difference  whether  we  restrict  psychology 
entirely  to  the  field  of  consciousness,  and  create  a  new  science 
for  the  study  of  objective  behavior,  and  a  new  one  again  for 
the  study  of  human  behavior  in  its  unity  as  both  mental  and 
physiological;  or  whether  we  use  the  term  psychology  to 
cover  the  entire  field.  Professor  Herrick  would  seem  to  favor 
the  latter  usage — behavior  must  not  be  neglected  in  the  psy- 
chologist's programme,  psychology  must  not  limit  its  interest 
either  to  pure  consciousness  or  to  objective  behavior.  Pro- 
fessor Harvey  Carr°*  also  urges  this  extension  of  the  term, 
proposing  "the  somewhat  unorthodox  view  that  the  mental 
functions  with  which  psychology  concerns  itself  are  in  reality 
psychophysical, — and  that  psychology  should  study  and  at- 
tempt to  comprehend  these  functions  in  their  entirety,"  thus 
including  "within  its  domain  activities  which  lie  outside  the 
field  of  consciousness."  Such  a  view,  he  thinks,  "offers  a 
mediating  point  of  contact  for  the  two  extremes  of  subjectiv- 
ism and  behaviorism." 

To  the  present  writer,  on  the  contrary,  it  would  seem  far 
better  to  follow  the  other  terminology  proposed  above — 
namely,  to  make  "psychology"  mean  what  it  says  it  does,  "the 
science  of  mind,"  but  to  admit  the  need  of  a  science  of  ob- 
jective behavior  and  also  of  a  science  of  "behavior"  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  that  term  (subjective  and  objective).  The 
two  sides  of  man's  nature  may  be  distinguished  for  the  pur- 
pose of  specialization,  yielding  the  distinct  special  sciences  of 
consciousness  (psychology)  and  of  behavior;  but  they  must 
be  united  again  for  the  purpose  of  comprehensiveness,  and  a 
science  which  will  consider  them  in  their  mutual  relations  is 

'*  Psychological  Rnncw,  XXIV,  181   ff  (1917). 


58  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

imperatively  called  for.^^  A  consideration  of  the  problem  of 
the  relations  of  these  various  sciences  having  to  do  v^ith  hu- 
man behavior  to  one  another  and  to  the  biological  sciences  in 
general  will  be  undertaken  at  this  point. 

35.  Behaviorism  and  the  Biological  Sciences. — Most  critics 
of  the  behaviorist  program  will  be  willing,  I  think,  to  accept 
the  statement  that  to  deny  behaviorism  in  psychology  is  not 
to  deny  that  there  is  a  perfectly  valid  place  in  the  world  for 
a  new  "science  of  behavior,"  but  only  to  deny  that  such  a 
science  may  probably  be  called  psychology.  To  designate  the 
proposed  new  science,  the  term  "praxiology"  has  been  sug- 
gested by  Mercier  and  by  Dunlap;  and  if  we  are  interested  in 
connecting  the  science  of  human  behavior  with  the  study  of 
the  behavior  of  the  lower  organisms,  the  term  "tropology" 
might  well  be  considered.  In  delimiting  the  field  of  psychol- 
ogy from  that  of  physiology,  McDougall  asserts  that  "physi- 
ology investigates  the  processes  of  the  parts  or  organs  of 
which  any  organism  is  composed,  while  psychology  investi- 
gates the  activities  of  the  organism  as  a  whole — that  is,  those 
in  which  it  operates  as  a  whole  or  unit";^^  and  substituting 
the  term  "praxiology,"  or  any  other  agreed  upon,  for  "psy- 
chology," we  may  indorse  this  statement  in  our  delimitation 
of  the  new  science  of  behavior.  But  wherein  lies  the  distinc- 
tion between  praxiology  thus  defined  and  the  older  science  of 
biology?  In  answering  this  question  we  shall  find  it  useful  to 
distinguish  "biology"  proper  from  the  "biological  sciences"  in 
general,  first  inquiring  as  to  what  the  former  term  covers, 
and  then  into  the  relations  between  it  and  the  other  sciences 
of  the  general  group. 

Biology,  the  science  of  life  or  of  living  things,  is  commonly 
divided  in  two  ways :  first  into  morphology,  the  science  of  the 
forms  or  structure  of  living  things,  and  physiology,  the  science 
of  the  activities  of  living  things  and  the  functions  of  their 

^^Cf.,  A.  H.  Jones,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XII,  462  ff.  (1915),  espe- 
cially p.  471. 

5°  Psychology  the  Science  of  Behavior,  p.  35. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  59 

various  parts;  secondly,  into  botany,  the  science  of  plant  life, 
and  zoology,  the  science  of  animal  life.  A  fifth  division, 
biogeny  or  genetics,  has  to  do  with  the  problems  of  the  origin 
of  life  and  the  development  of  living  things,  and  includes  the 
two  subdivisions — phylogeny,  the  science  of  the  origin  and 
development  of  species,  and  ontogeny,  the  science  of  the  ori- 
gin and  development  of  individual  organisms. 

In  addition  to  these  there  are  three  other  well-organized 
and  highly  important  sciences  whose  relation  to  and  intercon- 
nection with  biology  are  so  close  as  to  make  some  general 
grouping  inclusive  of  them  all  a  desideratum — namely,  an- 
thropology, psychology,  and  sociology.  Anthropology  is  un- 
doubtedly a  biological  science,  in  that  it  has  to  do  with  that 
most  highly  developed  of  all  "living  things,"  man;  and  yet  it 
is  an  extension  rather  than  a  division  of  biology.  Psychology 
also  is  a  biological  science,  for  it  has  to  do  with  mental  life; 
and  all  that  the  mentalist  insists  upon  in  opposition  to  the  bc- 
haviorist  is  that  mental  life  is  distinct  from  physical  life,  and 
therefore  that  psychology  cannot  fairly  be  regarded  as  a 
branch  of  biology  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  latter  term.  Sociol- 
ogy, finally,  is  the  science  of  social  life,  and  so  in  the  broadest 
sense  a  biological  science,  though  not  a  branch  of  biology 
proper.  Furthermore,  whereas  psychology,  as  we  have  been 
contending,  is  a  purely  mental  science ;  man  being  at  the  same 
time  both  mind  and  body,  and  society  having  at  the  same  time 
mental  and  physical  factors,  anthropology  and  sociology  have 
affiliations  at  once  with  psychology  on  the  one  hand  and  bi- 
ology on  the  other. 

And  now,  what  is  to  be  done  with  praxiology,  our  new 
science  of  behavior?  Physiology  was  defined  incidentally 
above  as  "the  science  of  the  activities  of  living  things  and  the 
functions  of  their  various  parts,"  but  an  examination  of  the 
definition  easily  discloses  its  dual  nature,  although  it  is  only 
recently,  as  a  result  of  the  agitation  of  the  behaviorists,  that 
this  fact  has  been  widely  recognized.  The  definition,  that  is  to 
say,  includes  two  distinct  subjects  of  investigation — (i)   the 


6o  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

functions  and  activities  of  the  various  organs  of  an  organism 
in  their  relation  to  one  another,  the  subject-matter  of  physi- 
ology proper;  and  (2)  the  activities  of  the  organism  as  a  whole 
in  its  relation  to  its  environment,  the  subject-matter  of  praxi- 
ology.  This  distinction  is  on  the  lines  of  that  of  Professor 
McDougall  recorded  above,  and  our  only  quarrel  with  him 
is  with  regard  to  his  confusion  of  praxiology  with  psychology, 
Praxiology,  then,  is  to  be  thought  of  as  a  third  division  of 
biology,  according  to  the  first  principle  of  division  of  that 
science  as  cited  above,  and  as  such  coordinate  with  morphol- 
ogy and  physiology. 

But  we  are  not  yet  quite  through  with  our  list  of  biological 
sciences.  It  was  said  above  (34)  that  though  the  two  sides 
of  man's  nature,  mental  and  physical,  may  be  studied  sepa- 
rately, as  by  psychology  and  praxiology  respectively,  never- 
theless "a  science  which  will  consider  them  in  their  mutual 
relations  is  imperatively  called  for."  Such  a  science  has  al- 
ready been  established  and  a  journal  devoted  to  its  progress 
started,  by  Dunlap  and  others  under  the  name  of  "Psycho- 
hiology."^"^  Psychobiology,  therefore,  is  devoted  to  a  compre- 
hensive study  of  behavior  in  all  its  aspects,  and  covers  the 
grounds  to  which  the  sciences  of  psychology  and  biology 
(especially  in  its  divisions  of  praxiology)  separately  devote 
themselves. 

Just  one  more  word  and  I  am  through  with  this  part  of 
our  subject.  There  may  be  some  who  will  demur  at  our  sharp 
separation  of  psychology  as  a  purely  mental  science  and  prax- 
iology as  a  purely  physical  one,  and  will  insist  that  any  genu- 
ine study  of  behavior  must  include  all  its  factors.  But  let  any 
such  consider  the  situation  in  other  fields.  The  interrelation 
between  mental  and  physical  factors  in  behavior  can  hardly  be 
closer  than  that  between  the  chemical  and  the  physiological 
processes  involved  in  digestion,  for  example,  and  is  certainly 
not  less  intimate  than  the  relation  which  subsists  throughout 

5'^  Now  consolidated  with  another  review  under  the  name,  Journal  of 
Comparative  Psychology. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  6i 

the  organic  world  between  the  structure  and  the  activities  of 
organisms;  and  yet  chemistry,  and  even  morphology,  are  ad- 
mitted as  sciences  having  an  independent  field  from  that  of 
physiology.  The  distinction  between  structural  and  functional 
psychology  is  analogous  to  that  between  morphological  and 
physiological  biology,  and  the  distinction  between  psychology 
and  praxiology  is  analogous  to  that  between  physiology — or, 
still  better,  physics — and  chemistry.  Just  as  we  have  distinct 
sciences  of  physics  and  chemistry,  and  a  compound  science  of 
physical  chemistry  to  investigate  the  ground  common  to  both; 
and  separate  sciences  of  psychology  and  physiology,  with  their 
fields  combined  in  physiological  psychology;  so  we  may  fitly 
have  separate  and  independent  sciences  of  psychology  and 
praxiology,  and  a  compound  science  of  psychobiology  to  study 
the  complex  behavior  of  the  psychophysiological  organism  in 
all  its  phases.  In  all  these  cases,  the  distinctions  are  for  the 
purpose  of  specialization  and  the  combinations  for  this  pur- 
pose of  comprehensiveness,  according  to  the  principle  asserted 
at  the  close  of  the  preceding  section  (34).  Behaviorists  would 
admit  praxiology  only  to  the  ranks  of  the  sciences,  and  reject 
psych(jlogy,  thus  leaving  no  room  for  psychobiology;  Profes- 
sor Carr  (34)  would  identify  psychology  with  psychobiology, 
thus  denying  to  psychologists  the  right  to  specialize  in  tht 
purely  mental  aspect  of  human  behavior;  the  view  we  have 
been  defending  would  give  equal  right  to  all  phases  of  the 
general  problem. 

In  the  appended  table  I  have  endeavored  to  summarize  the 
above  contentions  as  to  the  biological  sciences  and  their  rela- 
tionships {v.  p.  62). 

36.  Behaviorism  and  Psychology. — Now,  in  bringing  to  a 
close  at  last  this  lengthy,  and  I  fear  tedious,  exposition  and 
criticism  of  behaviorism,  what  final  estimate  are  we  to  give  as 
to  its  place  in  the  world  of  scientific  theory  and  its  probable 
influence  on  the  psychology  of  the  future?  Three  things, 
I  think:— 

(i)   In  the  first  place,  as  was  said  in  the  beginning  of  the 


62 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


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THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  63 

previous  section,  however  high  an  estimate  we  may  place  upon 
the  new  science  of  behavior,  in  any  case  it  is  not  psychology. 
Scientific  psychology  as  the  mentalist  views  it  may  be  impos- 
sible; but  if  so  we  shall  have  to  give  it  up  altogether — "prax- 
iology"  is  neither  identical  with  it,  nor  yet  an  adequate  substi- 
tute for  it. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  improve  upon  what  Mr.  Henry 
Rutgers  Marshall  has  said  upon  this  point,^^  and  I  therefore 
quote  from  him  at  length  without  apology.  "I  am  ready,"  he 
says,  "to  agree  most  heartily  that  such  men  as  Professor 
Thorndike  and  Professor  Watson  are  engaged  in  founding  a 
new  science  of  behavior  which  not  only  promises  important  re- 
sults, but  which  is  already  giving  us  points  of  view  which  are 
most  significant — I  can  readily  see,  also,  that  men  of  a  cer- 
tain temperament  who  have  begun  as,  and  who  still  call  them- 
selves, psychologists  may  become  dissatisfied  with  the  slow 
advance  made  in  this  field,  and  may  feel  it  best  to  abandon  it, 
and  to  undertake  the  investigation  of  behavior  in  which  their 
special  talents  will  yield  more  immediate  effective  result.  But 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  identification  of  this  study  of  be- 
havior with  psychology  involves  an  astounding  confusion  of 
thought. 

"The  study  of  behavior  is  a  thoroughly  objective  science; 
just  as  thoroughly  objective  as  the  studies  of  anatomy  or 
physiology.  That  there  are  .  .  .  existences  of  the  mental  order 
type  .  .  .  can,  however,  not  be  questioned ;  nor  can  it  be  ques- 
tioned that  it  is  quite  natural,  and  presumably  legitimate,  to 
group  these  existences  together  in  what  we  thus  call  the  mental 
order.  And  this  is  what  has  been  for  a  long  time  described  as 
the  study  of  psychology, 

"Now  it  is  open  to  anyone  to  hold  that  this  study  is  futile 
and  unimportant.  That  is  a  matter  of  opinion;  which  we  can- 
not feel  to  be  well-grounded,  however,  when  we  consider  the 
long  array  of  masterful  thinkers  who  have  not  considered  the 
study  of  psychology,  as  thus  defined,  to  be  either  futile  or 

'*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  715  (1913)- 


64  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

unimportant.  But  to  hold  that  the  science  of  behavior  is 
really  what  psychology  ought  to  aim  to  develop  seems  to  me 
to  be  a  thoroughly  unwarranted  view,  and  one  which  must 
lead  to  serious  loss  to  both  psychology  and  the  new,  and  very 
evidently  valuable  study  of  behavior." 

(2)  My  second  and  third  points  may  be  more  briefly  stated. 
And  the  former  of  these  is  that  the  behaviorist  movement  has 
a  positive  significance  for  psychology.  As  a  refutation  of  the 
older  concepts  it  is,  I  should  insist,  a  failure^ — it  has  not  suc- 
ceeded and  will  not  succeed  in  destroying  psychology,  but  it 
has  succeeded  in  putting  psychologists  on  the  defensive.  It 
has  above  all  the  value  of  a  challenge  to  psychologists  of  the 
older  schools  to  arouse  themselves  to  stronger  efforts  in  de- 
fense of  their  position.  It  has  thus  performed  a  real  service — 
not  only  for  biology,  in  showing  that  there  is  a  need  in  the 
world  for  a  new  special  science  of  behavior — ^but  also  for 
psychology,  in  forcing  it  to  defend  itself  against  the  charge 
that  it  cannot  be  a  true  science  so  long  as  it  takes  mind  rather 
than  behavior  for  its  field  of  investigation.  Too  long  have 
psychologists  taken  for  granted  that  the  subjective  phenomena 
of  mental  life  could  be  studied  scientifically  as  properly  as  the 
objective  phenomena  of  behavior,  but  no  longer  may  they  as- 
sume this  without  apology;  behaviorist  criticism  has  shown 
that  this  claim  is  at  least  open  to  question,  and  has  left  to  the 
mentalist  the  task  of  reviewing  his  forces  and  defending  his 
position.  And  such  a  challenge  and  attack  is  sure  to  be  of 
positive  benefit  to  psychology. 

(3)  After  all,  the  underlying  motive  of  the  behaviorist 
movement  is  not  so  much  a  logical  criticism  of  the  foundations 
of  the  mentalist  psychology  as  it  is  despair  of  its  fruitfulness. 
Professor  Watson  warns  us  "that  two  hundred  years  from 
now,  unless  the  introspection  method  is  discarded,  psychology 
will  still  be  divided  on  the  question  as  to  whether  auditory 
sensations  have  a  quality  of  'extension,'  whether  intensity  is 
an  attribute  which  can  be  applied  to  color,  whether  there  is  a 
difference  in  'texture'  between  image  and  sensation;  and  upon 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  65 

hundreds  of  others  of  like  character."^®  Possible,  we  reply; 
but  still  we  hope  that  long  before  that  time  many,  if  not  all, 
of  these  problems  will  have  found  their  solution.  And  this 
is  our  final  point :  we  cannot  rest  our  defense  of  mentalism  on 
a  priori  grounds  alone.  Psychology  is  a  new  science,  and  the 
problems  referred  to  above  are  among  its  newest  problems, 
and  yet  the  advance  made  through  the  despised  introspective 
method  in  the  last  fifty  years  is  in  itself  impressive  and  an 
earnest  of  hope  for  the  future.  We  can,  then,  but  go  on  un- 
waveringly, making  the  most  of  our  imperfect  methods  be- 
cause we  know  that  we  can  make  no  progress  whatever  with- 
out them,  and  having  done  this  in  a  spirit  of  hope  instead  of 
despair,  accept  the  issue. 

REFERENCES 

The  Distinction  of  Content  and  Process 
Dunlap,  System,  pp.  7-14. 
Abbot,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  XIV,  41  ff.  (1917). 

Current  Concepts — 

Calkins,  First  Book:  pp.  273-276. 

"       Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  IV,  673  fT.  (1907). 

Relations  of  Structural  and  Functional  Psychology — 

Titchener,  Philosophical  Rev.:  VII,  449  ff.  (1898).     (From 

the  structural  point  of  view.) 
Angell,  Philosophical  Rev.:  XII,  243  ff. ;  especially  pp.  243- 
252  (1903).     (From  the  functional  point  of  view.) 

Structuralism — 

Caldwell,  Psychological  Rev.:  V,  401  ff.  (1898). 

"       VI,   187  ff.   (1899). 
Titchener,  Philosophical  Rev.:  VIII,  290 ff.  (1899). 
Calkins,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  IV,  678-680  (1907). 
Calkins,  First  Book:  pp.  273  f. 

Func  tionalism — 

Calkins,  First  Book:  pp.  274-276. 

Calkins,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  IV,  680-683  (1907). 
Angell,  Psychological  Rev.:  XIV,  63  ff.  (1907). 
Herrick,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  XII,  543  ff.  (1915). 

8"  Behavior,  p.  8. 


66  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Motor  Theory  of  Consciousness 

Dewey,  Psychological  Rev.:  Ill,  357  ff,  (1896). 
Miinsterberg,  Psych,  and  Life:  pp.  35-99 ;  especially  pp.  93-99. 

"  Psych.  General  and  Applied:  pp.  139-144. 

Criticism  by  McComas,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXHI,  307  ff. 
(1916). 

Radical  School 

Kirkpatrick,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  IV,  542  ff,  (1907). 

Pillsbury,  Science:  XLI,  371  ff.  (1915). 

Tawjiey,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  XII,  29  ff.  (191 5). 

Behaviorism — 

Watson,  Behavior:  Ch.  I. 

"        Psychological  Rev.:  XXIV,  329  ff.  (1917). 
Holt,  The  Freudian  Wish:  Ch.  II,  and  Supplement. 
Sidis,  Foundations:  Ch.  VI. 
Frost,  Psychological  Rev.:  XIX,  246 ff.  (1912). 

"      Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.:  X,  716  ff.  (1913). 

"      Psychological  Rev.:  XXI,  204 ff.  (1914). 
Bode,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXI,  46 ff.  (1914). 

"       Jour,  of  Philosophy:  XIV,  288  ff.  (1917). 
Bawden,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXV,  171  ff.  (1918). 
Abbot,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXIII,  117  ff.  (1916). 
Weiss,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXIV,  301  ff.,  353  ff.  (1917). 

Criticisms 

Yerkes,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  VII,  113  ff.   (criticism  of  the 

general  biological  point  of  view.     1910). 
Angell,  Psychological  Rev.:  XX,  255  ff.  (1913). 
Marshall,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  X,  710 ff.   (1913). 
"       "  "  XV,  258  ff.  (1918). 

Reply  by  Bode :  Op.  cit.,  pp.  449  ff. 
"    Weiss:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  631  ff. 
Mind:  XXIII,  180  ff.  (1914). 
Herrick,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  XII,  543  ff.  (1915). 
McComas,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXIII,  397  ff.  (1916). 
Muscio,  Monist,  XXXI,  pp.  i82ff.  (1921). 

Books  and  Articles  on  the  Science  of  Human  Behavior 

{"Praxiology") 

Parmelee,  The  Science  of  Human  Behavior. 

Meyer,  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Behavior. 

Watson,  Psychology  from  the  Standpoint  of  a  Behaviorist. 

Paton,  Human  Behavior. 

Yerkes,  Science:  XXXIX,  625  ff.  (1914). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  67 

Carr,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXIV,  181  ff.  (1917). 
Kantor,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXVI,  i  ff.  (1919). 

The  Problem  of  Introspection — 

History 

Klemm:  pp.  69-87,  212-215. 

Criticisms 

Watson,  Behavior  (especially,  Ch.  I). 
Dodge,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXIII,  214  ff.  (1912). 
Dunlap,  Psychological  Rev.:  XIX,  4045,  (1912). 
Bode,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  X,  85  ff.  (1913). 

Defences 

Scripture,  The  New  Psychology:  Ch.  I. 
Pillsbury,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  I,  225  ff.  (1904). 
Titchener,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXIII,  427  ff.,  485  ff. 

(1912). 
Calkins,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXVI,  499-505  (1915). 
Pepper,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXIX,  208  ff.  (1918). 
Laird,  Mind:  XXVIII,  385 "ff.  (i9i'9). 


CHAPTER  III 
Current  Concepts  of  Psychology,  Continued 
I.  Self -Psychology 

a.  Statement  and  Defence  of  the  Principle 

37.  At  the  opposite  extreme  from  behaviorism  are  to  be 
found  those  psychologists  whose  typical  definition  is  that  Psy- 
chology is  the  science  of  the  self.  This  is  the  most  conserva- 
tive school,  since  it  represents  the  least  possible  divergence 
from  the  older  and  purely  philosophical  conception  of  psy- 
chology. The  theologico-philosophical  term  "soul"  is  dis- 
carded, and  the  term  "mind,"  together  with  all  others  which 
specifically  limit  psychology  to  the  field  of  "mental  processes" 
or  "states,"  are  regarded  as  inadequate.  The  doughtiest 
champion  of  this  view  is  Professor  Mary  Whiton  Calkins  of 
Wellesley  College,  and  I  shall  draw  my  summary  of  its  prin- 
ciples entirely  from  her  writings;  but  a  similar  general  posi- 
tion has  been  defended  also  by  many  other  psychologists — as 
Franz  Brentano,  G.  F.  Stout,  J.  M.  Baldwin,  Josiah  Royce, 
James  Ward,  J.  E.  Creighton,  and  C.  H.  Judd.  In  fact,  until 
the  time  of  the  differentiation  of  the  various  contemporary 
schools  toward  the  close  of  the  last  century  all  psychologists 
were  self -psychologists,  and  it  is  only  in  recent  years  that 
their  position  has  been  questioned  at  all. 

Over  against  the  view  "that  the  basal  fact  of  psychology  is 
the  psychic  event" — the  mental  process  or  content — and  "that 
a  self  is  a  mere  series  or  system  of  such  psychic  events,"  Miss 
Calkins  insists  that  the  basal  fact  of  psychology  is  the  con- 
scious self,  meaning  by  self  "what  the  plain  man  means  by 
self,  insofar  as  this  does  not  involve  the  view  that  body  con- 
stitutes part  of  a  self."^     All  experience,  she  observes,  is  the 

'^Psychological  Review,  XIII,  63  f.  (1906). 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  69 

experience  of  some  self,  and  is  meaningless  apart  from  that 
self — or,  as  William  James  puts  it,  "every  'state'  or  'thought' 
is  part  of  a  personal  consciousness"  }  any  attempt,  therefore, 
to  study  experiences  in  abstraction  from  the  self  to  which  they 
properly  belong  is  certain  to  result  in  a  false  or  distorted 
psychology. 

Miss  Calkins  defends  her  position  first  negatively,  by  dem- 
onstrating the  inadequacy  of  the  structuralist  and  functional- 
ist concepts,  and  then  on  positive  grounds;  and  we  shall  in 
what  follows  observe  the  same  order. 

38.  Inadequacy  of  Structuralism  and  F iinctionalism. — Miss 
Calkins  denominates  structuralism  "idea  psychology,"  and 
criticises  it  on  the  ground  that  "it  arbitrarily  neglects  a  part 
of  our  immediate  consciousness,"  and  "offers  an  inadequate 
description  of  consciousness."^  "I  cannot  be  conscious  of  an 
idea  [i.e.,  of  any  mental  content]  except  as  idea  of  a  self.  .  .  . 
If,  therefore,  I  define  psychology  as  science  of  ideas,  I  raise 
the  inevitable  question,  'whose  idea?'  and  then  refuse  arbi- 
trarily to  answer  the  question."  "The  'idea'  is  immediately 
experienced  as  idea  of  a  self,  or  subject,  mind,  ego — call  it 
as  one  will.  To  refuse  to  deal  with  this  self  is  indeed  theo- 
retically possible,  but  it  is  a  needlessly  abstract,  an  artificial, 
an  incomplete  procedure."*  Hence  the  program  of  structural- 
ism is  inadequate  and  must  be  rejected. 

So,  too,  with  functionalism.  "This  doctrine  is  not  so  clearly 
cut  nor  so  precisely  formulated  as  that  of  idea-psychology, 
for  the  word  'function'  is  used  with  different  shades  of  mean- 
ing by  diflferent  writers  of  this  group";  but  "common  to  all 
'functional'  theories  is  the  conception  of  function  as  activity." 
I  cannot,  however,  "study  mental  functions  without  at  the 
same  time  studying  the  functioning  self.  For  just  as  the  study 
of  ideas  raises  the  unavoidal)le  question,  'whose  idea?'  so  the 
consideration  of  mental  functions  involves  the  question,  *func- 

^  Psychology,  Briefer  Course,  152. 
^  First  Hook  in  Psychology,  273  f. 
*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  IV,  678. 


70  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

tions  of  whom?'  To  define  psychology  as  science  of  mental 
functions  without  referring  the  functions  to  the  functioning 
self,  is  therefore,  an  entirely  artificial  proceeding."^ 

39.  Positive  Considerations. — Miss  Calkins  rests  her  posi- 
tive defense  of  her  doctrine  of  psychology  on  the  testimony  of 
introspection  to  the  universality  of  self-consciousness.®  "I 
cannot  be  conscious  of  an  idea  except  as  idea  of  a  self;  im- 
plicitly, if  not  explicitly,  I  am  always  conscious  of  a  self,  as 
having  the  idea  or  experience."^  "There  is  no  consciousness 
which  is  not  self-consciousness."  The  self-consciousness  of 
the  baby,  the  sleepy  adult,  or  the  animal,  to  be  sure,  is  a  vague 
and  unreflective  self-consciousness;  "but  anything  less  than 
self-consciousness  would  not  be  consciousness  at  all:  to  be 
conscious  is  to  be  conscious  of  a  conscious  self."®  Even  the 
trained  psychologists  who  deny  consciousness  of  the  self  im- 
plicitly assert  it,  and  "constantly  describe  and  define  conscious- 
ness in  terms  of  the  self  or  I."® 

H  all  this  is  true,  then,  of  course  for  psychologists  to  ignore 
the  self  is  to  leave  their  science  incomplete  and  weakened  at 
a  vital  point. 

40.  The  Nature  of  the  Psychologist's  Self. — But  what  does 
the  psychologist  mean  by  "the  self  as  basal  fact  in  psychology?" 
Two  answers  have  been  offered  to  this  question.  "The  first 
identifies  the  self  .  .  .  with  the  psychophysical  organism  .  .  . 
in  a  word,  it  conceives  the  self  as  mind-in-body  or  mind-plus- 
body :  according  to  this  view,  body  constitutes  part  of  self.  The 
second  theory  conceives  of  self  as  not  inclusive  of  body :  accord- 
ing to  this  view,  body  is  not  part  of  self,  though  it  may  well 
be  regarded  as  closely  related  to  self.     On  the  basis  of  these 

5  First  Book,  274  f . 

6  Op.  cit.,  278  f. 

7  Op.  cit.,  274. 
^Psychological  Review,  XIII,  67  f. 

^  First  Book,  278.  This  claim  that  introspection  inevitably  bears  wit- 
ness to  the  universality  of  self-consciousness  Miss  Calkins  defends  at 
length  against  the  weight  of  psychologists  who  deny  it,  in  The  Ameri- 
can Journal  of  Psychology,  XXVI,  505-524. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  71 

two  theories  of  the  psychologist's  self,  there  are  three  dis- 
tinguishable forms  of  self-psychology.  ( i )  In  the  first  place, 
the  self  may  be  conceived  as  psychophysical  organism,  and  psy- 
chology may  be  regarded  as  science  of  the  processes  or  func- 
tions of  the  conscious  body,  the  mind-and-body  complex.  . . 
(2)  A  second  logically  possible  form  of  self -psychology  would 
regard  the  self. .  .as  mind-without-body,  self  unrelated  to  body. 
...  (3)  The  third  view.  .  .of  the  psychologist's  self  regards  the 
self  as  distinct  from  body,  but  related  to  it."" 

The  first  of  these  views  of  the  self  seems  to  be  involved, 
Miss  Calkins  thinks,  in  "the  practical  procedure  of  most  of  our 
present-day  functional  psychologsts" ;  and  it  is  certainly  in- 
volved in  the  procedure  of  those  whom  we  studied  in  the  di- 
vision of  this  chapter  devoted  to  behaviorism,  who  refuse  to 
separate  even  for  purposes  of  specialization  a  mentalist  psy- 
chology from  a  purely  physiological  praxiology,  and  insist 
upon  always  combining  the  two  aspects  of  behavior  in  every 
study  of  the  latter.  Mind-plus-body  may  constitute  the  human 
individual,  but  the  term  self  can  have  meaning  only  with  ref- 
erence to  the  mind-factor.  The  study  of  mind-plus-body  is, 
of  course,  psychobiology  (34-36). 

But  to  insist  that  "self  is  non-inclusive  of  body"  is  by  no 
means  to  accept  Miss  Calkin's  "second  form  of  self-psychol- 
ogy" and  to  regard  the  self  as  pure  mind  unrelated  to  any 
body.  Professor  Calkins  rightly  repudiates  that  doctrine, 
which  she  quite  properly  insists  no  one  really  defends  anyway, 
and  accepts  as  her  own  view  the  third — that  psychology  "re- 
gards self  as  distinct  from  body,  but  related  to  it."  Psychol- 
ogy, in  other  words,  has  to  do  purely  and  solely  with  the  mind, 
and  this  is  true  whether  or  nQt  we  accept  the  teaching  of  the 
"self -psychologists"  in  toto;  but  common  sense  recognizes  that 
mind  as  we  know  it  is  inevitably,  in  some  way  or  other,  bound 
up  with  body. 

41.  Self -Psychology  as  Reconciliation  of  Structuralism  and 
Functionalism. — In  an  earlier  section  (23)  I  insisted  on  the 

^''Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  V,  13  f. 


72  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

importance  of  both  the  structural  and  functional  points  of 
view,  and  the  necessity  of  combining  them  in  any  complete 
study  of  mental  life.  Miss  Calkins,  in  her  Presidential  address 
before  the  American  Psychological  Association  in  1905,^^ 
made  these  same  points,  and  offered  self -psychology  as  the 
reconciling  concept  between  structuralism  and  functionalism. 
"Self -psychology,"  we  read,  "the  doctrine  that  the  conscious 
self  is  the  basal  fact  of  psychology,  harmonizes  the  essential 
doctrines  of  a  structural  and  of  a  functional  psychology" ;  and 
this  because  "consciousness,  which  always  implies  a  conscious 
self,  is  a  complex  alike  of  structural  elements,  and  of  rela- 
tions of  self  to  environment."^^ 

First,  as  to  functionalism.  "The  cardinal  conception  of  a 
functional  psychology,  that  of  consciousness  as  involving  in- 
ternal relations  to  environment,  is,"  says  Miss  Calkins,  "an 
integral  factor  of  self-psychology."^^  "H  the  term  'function' 
be  taken  with  the  meaning  'reaction  to  environment,'  and  if 
the  environment  be  then  described,  in  Professor  Angell's 
words,  as  'social'  and  not  merely  'physical,'  it  must  follow 
that  a  'function'  is  a  social  relation — in  other  words,  a  per- 
sonal attitude."^*  "From  all  this  it  follows  that  functional 
psychology,  rightly  conceived,  is  a  form  of  self -psychology, 
that  its  basal  phenomenon  is  the  psychologist's  self,  and  that 
its  significant  contributions  to  psychology  are,  first,  its  doc- 
trine of  the  inherent  relatedness  of  self  to  environment,  and 
second,  its  insistence  on  the  progressive  efficiency  or  utility 
of  these  relations. "^^  In  briefer  terms :  functional  psychology 
defines  consciousness  in  terms  of  reaction  to  environment; 
this  environment  is  not  merely  physical  but  social;  hence  the 
relation  between  individual  and  environment  is  a  social  or 
personal  relation,  a  relation  of  "selves"  to  one  another,  and 

*i  Psychological  Review,  XIII,  61-81. 

12  Op.  cit.,  76. 

13  Op.  cit.,  7Z. 

^^  First  Book,  275. 

1^  Psych.  Rev.  article,  75. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  73 

"functional  psychology"  becomes  a  form  of  "self -psychology" 
without  recognizing  itself  as  such. 

Self-psychology,  then,  according  to  Miss  Calkins,  is  func- 
tional psychology  come  to  a  realization  of  its  own  significance : 
functional  psychology  carried  out  to  its  logical  conclusion  is 
self -psychology.  The  relation  between  her  own  doctrine  and 
structurcdisfn  is,  however,  conceived  by  Miss  Calkins  after  a 
different  fashion :  the  structural  treatment  of  mental  phe- 
nomena apart  from  the  self  is  an  abstract  and  artificial  pro- 
cedure, but  is  recognized  as  a  legitimate  procedure  if  supple- 
mented by  and  subordinated  to  the  broader  treatment  of  those 
phenomena  as  expressions  of  the  self.  In  her  first  textbook, 
An  Introduction  to  Psychology  (1901),  Professor  Calkins 
treated  psychology  as  both  "science  of  selves"  and  "science  of 
ideas"  (contents)  :  in  her  later  work,  A  First  Book  in  Psy- 
chology (first  edition,  1909),  she  "abandoned  this  double 
treatment,  with  the  intent  to  simplify  exposition,  not,"  she 
says,  "because  I  doubt  the  validity  of  psychology  as  study  of 
ideas,  but  because  I  question  the  significance  and  the  adequacy, 
and  deprecate  the  abstractions,  of  the  science  thus  conceived."^" 

"Every  conscious  expression,"  Miss  Calkins  avers,  "may  be 
studied  from  either  point  of  view"" — that  of  structural  an- 
alysis, or  that  of  self-reference — though  the  former  is  incom- 
plete and  artificial  and  the  latter  only  the  natural  method  of 
treatment.  In  her  "Introduction"  she  distinguishes  "two  great 
classes  of  facts — Selves  and  Facts-for-the-selves,"  the  latter 
being  divisible  again  into  "inner"  or  mental  and  "outer"  or 
physical  facts ;  and  psychology  is  distinguished  from  the 
physical  sciences,  whose  concern  is  with  the  last  named  "outer" 
facts,  as  having  for  its  aim  "the  study  of  selves  and  of  the 
inner  facts-for-selves.""  "Atomistic"  (structural)  psychol- 
ogy studies  the  "inner  facts-for-selves"  (contents  of  con- 
sciousness) in  their  isolation:  self -psychology  studies  them  as 
referred  to  the  self  "for"  which  they  are. 

*"  First  Book,  Preface,  p.  vii. 

"  Psych.  Rev.,  VII,  378. 

^*0p.  cit.,  6.     Cf.  also,  Philosophical  Rev.,  IX,  493   f.,  497-501. 


74  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

For  example,  perception  may  be  described  structurally  as  a 
complex  of  sensational  elements,  but  in  its  fuller  treatment 
is  to  be  viewed  as  involving  a  consciousness  of  a  real  or  pos- 
sible sharing  of  my  experience  with  a  number  of  other  selves. 
Imagination,  which  has  a  similar  structure,  is  distinguished  by 
self-psychology  from  perception  as  involving  a  consciousness 
of  being  experienced  by  myself  alone.  An  emotion  is  de- 
scribed structurally  as  a  complex  of  sensational  and  affective 
elements,  but  more  completely  as  a  passive  relation  of  the  self 
to  other  selves  or  to  other  impersonal  objects.  Will  has  a 
similar  structural  composition  to  emotion,  but  is  characterized 
by  an  active  rather  than  a  passive  attitude  of  the  self  to  the 
outside  world.  All  mental  processes  are  described  in  the  In- 
troduction to  Psychology  in  this  twofold  way. 

We  may,  I  think,  acknowledge  the  incompleteness  of  the 
structural  method  of  description,  as  we  have  indeed  already 
done  (23),  and  yet  insist  that  the  functional  treatment  is  a 
sufficient  supplement  to  the  other:  in  so  doing  we  deny  the 
compulsive  force  of  the  arguments  for  the  explicit  reference 
of  all  mental  processes  to  the  self.  Criticism,  however,  we 
reserve  for  the  next  section,  noting  at  this  point  in  closing  our 
exposition,  merely  the  difference  between  Miss  Calkins's  "rec- 
onciliation of  structuralism  and  functionalism"  and  our  own 
In  our  treatment  we  accepted  both  structural  and  functional 
methods  for  what  they  are  worth,  and  insisted  only  that  they 
must  be  combined  in  any  complete  psychology:  Miss  Calkins, 
on  the  other  hand,  though  accepting  structuralism  as  a  valuable 
but  incomplete  method,  denies  the  value  of  the  functional  point 
of  view  altogether,  except  so  far  as  it  may  be  regarded  as  im- 
plicitly identical  with  the  point  of  view  of  self -psychology. 

b.  Criticism  of  Self -Psychology 

42.  The  Metaphysical  Nature  of  Self-Psychology. — The 
leading  objection  to  self-psychology  is  that  it  is  a  metaphysi- 
cal rather  than  a  scientific  psychology.  To  study  mental  pro- 
cesses in  themselves,  analyzing  them,  classifying  them,  and 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  75 

formulating  the  laws  of  their  connection  as  the  structuralist 
does,  or  describing  them  as  varieties  of  reaction  to  environ- 
ment as  the  functionalist  does,  is  undoubtedly  a  scientific  pro 
cedure;  but  to  explain  them  as  expressions  of  a  permanent, 
underlying  self  is  decidedly  a  philosophical  procedure,  with- 
out scientific  value  or  justification. 

To  assert  this  does  not  imply  a  denial  that  there  is  a  scien- 
tific concept  of  the  self  with  which  psychology  has  a  real  con- 
cern, but  merely  that  the  concept  of  the  self  which  Miss  Cal- 
kins employs  in  her  arguments  is  the  metaphysical  rather  than 
the  scientific  "self."  Her  "self"  is  described  as  "relatively 
persistent,"  "complex,"  "unique,"  "related  to  objects";"  the 
"I"  which  ktiows,  rather  than,  in  James's  terminology,  the 
"me"  that  is  known  and  can  be  studied  scientifically.  It  is  a 
self  to  which  all  experiences  must  be  referred,  "whose"  are 
the  ideas  of  the  structuralist  and  the  functions  of  the  function- 
alist.^" But  the  "self"  of  scientific  psychology  is  merely  a 
convenient  term  for  the  sum-total  or  interrelated  system  of  all 
the  experiences  of  any  given  individual  from  birth  to  death; 
just  as  the  term  "nature"  as  used  in  the  physical  sciences 
stands  for  the  sum-total  or  interrelated  system  of  all  physical 
phenomena,  not  for  any  "permanent"  and  "unique"  reality 
underlying  those  phenomena.  To  go  beyond  this,  and  to 
speak  of  the  Self  or  Nature  as  anything  more  than  a  sum- 
total  of  phenomena,  is  to  leave  the  bounds  of  science  and  enter 
the  realm  of  metaphysics. 

"The  great  objection  to  introducing  the  self  as  a  means  of 
psychological  explanation,"  says  Professor  Stratton,^^  is  that 
the  ego  is  not  a  particular  mental  process  among  other  pro- 
cesses; it  is  not  an  event  in  experience,  out  of  which  other 
events  may  flow.  The  older  attempts  to  employ  it  in  scientific 
explanation  were  very  much  like  accounting  for  the  climate  of 
California  by  saying  that  nature  causes  it.  .  .  .  But  nature  is  a 

^*  First  Book,  p.  3 ;  and  elsewhere  in  her  writings. 

20  0/*.  cil.,  274  and  275.    Cf.  sup.,  (38). 

**  Experimental  Psychology  and  its  Bearing  upon  Culture,  300  f. 


76  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

collective  system  of  occurrences,  and  to  use  it  as  a  principle 
of  explanation  would  be  equivalent  to  saying  that  'the  AH' 
does  some  particular  thing."  "So  it  is  in  psychology.  .  .  .  The 
soul  is  not  a  particular  mental  phenomenon  among  other  phe- 
nomena. It  is,  rather,  the  personal  system  within  which  any 
particular  mental  events  occur.  It  bears  the  same  relation  to 
the  particular  mental  facts  of  my  mind  that  nature  does  to 
the  events  of  the  physical  world." 

That  the  problem  of  the  self-psychologist  is  metaphysical  is 
also  involved  in  the  statement  of  Miss  Calkins,  adapting  to 
herself  one  of  Miinsterberg's  doctrines,  that  the  "primary  in- 
terest" of  self -psychology  is  "to  understand — not  to  analyze 
into  elements. "^^  But  the  problem  of  understanding,  or  in- 
terpreting the  meanings  of,  mental  processes  is,  as  we  shall 
later  demonstrate  at  length,^^  characteristically  the  metaphysi- 
cal problem  concerning  the  self.  "The  problem  of  a  science  is 
to  describe  accurately  the  phenomena  which  it  observes :  self- 
psychology  has  an  additional  problem,"  "to  understand,  to  ob- 
tain a  fuller  understanding  of  the  relations  of  selves,  and  to 
acquire  a  deeper  acquaintance  with  one's  own  nature"  ;^*  and 
this  is  decidedly  a  metaphysical  problem. 

To  these  criticisms  of  the  self-psychology  concept,  Professor 
Calkins  replies  that  they  are  based  upon  an  unwarranted  con- 
fusion between  the  philosophical  and  psychological  conceptions 
of  the  self,  which  are  in  reality  quite  distinct.^^  Philosophy 
studies  "the  ultimate  nature  of  every  phenomenon  of  science, 
.  .  .  and  it  seeks  not  only  to  relate  each  phenomenon  with  every 
other,  but  to  fit  it  into  a  complete  scheme  of  reality.  ...  As  op- 
posed to  philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  psychology  sturdily  re- 
fuses to  study  the  nature  of  the  soul,  its  permanence  or  im- 
mortality and  its  relation  to  matter,  and  simply  analyzes  the 
forms  of  self-consciousness,  or  studies  people  in  their  social 

^^Philosophical  Review,  IX,  495  (1900). 

23  Inf.,  Ch.  IV. 

24  Curtis,  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  XXVI,  01. 

^^  First  Book,  276.  Cf.  Phil.  Rev.,  IX,  491  f.,  and  other  references  on 
this  paragraph. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  -jy 

relations."^^  "Psychology  does  not  reason  about  the  place 
of  its  selves  in  total  and  ultimate  reality,  but  simply  accepts 
them  on  their  face  value  as  observed  facts."^^  "Obviously, 
therefore,"  Miss  Calkins  concludes,  "the  self  cannot  be 
drummed  out  of  the  psychologist's  camp  by  arguments  di- 
rected against  one  form  or  another  of  the  philosophical  con- 
ception."^'* 

But  this  defence,  perfectly  true  as  it  is  in  itself,  quite  misses 
the  point  of  the  criticism.  The  critic  himself  insists  upon  this 
same  distinction,  but  points  out  that  the  psychological  concep- 
tion of  the  self  is  that  of  a  mere  "interrelated  system  of  mental 
phenomena";  and  that  any  deeper  conception  of  something 
which  "expresses  itself  through"  or  "has"  ideas,  feelings, 
sensations,  etc.,  is  necessarily  a  philosophical  conception.  We 
may  define  psychology  as  the  "science  of  selves"  in  the  same 
way  that  we  may  define  physical  science  as  the  "science  of 
nature,"  but  neither  is  a  very  illuminating  definition  if  we  ad- 
here to  the  empirical  conception  of  "self"  and  "nature"; 
whereas,  if  we  go  beyond  that  empirical  conception  in  either 
case,  we  pass  from  science  to  metaphysics.  It  is  better,  then, 
for  psychology  to  avoid  such  a  term  as  "self"  altogether  in 
its  general  conception  of  its  field  of  study. 

43.  The  Alleged  Universality  of  Self-Consciousness. — Miss 
Calkins  bases  her  conception  positively  on  "the  testimony  of 
introspection,"^®  the  alleged  empirical  fact  that  self-conscious- 
ness is  always  present,  that  "there  is  no  consciousness  which  is 
not  self-consciousness"  (39).  But  the  great  mass  of  psychol- 
ogists deny  this  so-called  "fact  of  introspection."  If  Miss 
Calkins  claims,  says  Professor  Titchener,  for  example,  that 
"the  self-attitude  is  introspectively  discernable  in  every  con- 
sciousness, then  I  can  only  say  that  her  mind  must  dilTer  from 
mine  not  specifically  but  generically.     Self -consciousness  is, 

^*  Introduction,  5. 
"Psychological  Review,  XIII,  67. 
2«  First  Book,  276. 
2"  First  Book,  278. 


78  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

certainly,  part  of  the  subject-matter  of  psychology;  but  it  is 
I  think,  of  comparatively  rare  occurrence.  And  it  would  seem 
more  natural  ...  to  treat  it  as  one  among  the  whole  number  of 
mental  functions  than  to  make  it  the  differentia  of  a  whole 
psychology."^"  In  a  very  thorough,  though  modestly  entitled, 
"systematic  experimental  introspective"  study  of  the  phe- 
nomenon of  self -consciousness,  published  in  The  American 
Journal  of  Psychology,^^  the  same  critic  has  shown,  from  the 
reports  of  a  number  of  graduate  students  and  teachers  of 
psychology,  that  "self -consciousness  is,  in  many  cases,  an  in- 
termittent and  even  a  rare  experience"  and  that  descriptions 
of  it  when  it  does  occur  vary  considerably. 

One  instance  of  a  definition  of  a  mental  process  from  the 
point  of  view  of  self -psychology  will  suffice,  I  think,  to  il- 
lustrate the  failure  of  that  point  of  view.  Perception,  says 
Professor  Calkins,  involves  an  awareness  "that  I  am  sharing 
the  consciousness  of  other  perceiving  agents,"  as  distinguished 
from  imagination  which  lacks  this  awareness  (41).  But, 
objects  Professor  Margaret  F.  Washburn,  this  is  simply  not 
the  case.  "A  perception  never  under  ordinary  circumstances 
involves  a  consciousness  that  other  people  share  one's  experi- 
ence. When  I  sit  alone  in  my  study  and  look  at  my  bookcase, 
I  have  not  the  slightest  reference  to  other  minds  in  my  mental 
attitude.  Subsequent  reflection  assures  me  that  other  people 
would  share  the  bookcase  experience  if  they  were  here,  but 
I  do  not  distinguish  the  perceived  bookcase  from  an  imagined 
bookcase  by  consciously  referring  to  other  minds  at  all."^^ 
Reference  to  selves,  then,  is  a  matter  of  after-reflection  rather 
than  of  immediate  experience  and  consequently  a  logical  or 
metaphysical  rather  than  a  psychological  affair;  and  what  is 
true  of  perception  and  self-psychology  is  true  of  all  other 
mental  phenomena. 

Now  if  self-psychology  is  to  rest  its  defence  on  empirical 

^°  Philosophical  Review,  XV,  91. 

«  XXII.  540-552. 

^^  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  II,  715. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  ^^ 

considerations — and,  of  course,  it  must  do  so  if  it  is  not  to 
forfeit  its  claim  entirely — and  if  the  alleged  facts  of  intro- 
spection prove  to  be  by  no  means  universal,  it  would  seem  that 
there  is  nothing  left  for  self -psychology  to  do  but  accept  the 
inevitable.  Professor  Calkins,  however,  is  not  to  be  dismayed 
by  the  opposition  of  inconvenient  facts.^^  "The  self -psycholo- 
gist has  no  way  of  answering  an  opponent  who  asserts,  T  have 
no  consciousness  of  self.'  In  other  words,  psychology  as 
science  of  selves  can  be  studied  only  by  one  who  believes,  or 
assumes,  that  he  is  directly  conscious  of  himself.  But  even 
to  an  opponent  who  denies  the  fact  from  which  he  starts,  the 
self -psychologist  can  at  least  show  the  plausibility  or  respecta- 
bility of  his  position  by  pointing  out,  first  that  some  or  all  of 
those  who  deny  the  existence  of  a  self-for-psychology  im- 
plicitly assume  the  existence  of  such  a  self;  and  second,  that 
many  psychologists  of  admitted  worth  explicitly  adopt  the 
conception. 

"To  substantiate  the  first  of  these  statements"  Miss  Cal- 
kins refers  to  the  universal  use  of  the  term  "I"  by  psycholo- 
gists of  every  school  in  describing  conscious  phenomena — as, 
"we  find  in  our  consciousness  only  ideas,  feelings,  etc.";  '7 
attend  to  a  color,"  *7  perceive  objects";  and  insists  that  the 
opponent  of  self-psychology  should  avoid  such  terms  in  his 
descriptions.  Well,  we  reply,  so  he  does  in  his  severest  moods. 
and  it  is  only  to  obviate  the  charge  of  pedantry  or  unnecessary 
circumlocution  that  he  does  not  always  do  so.  Just  as  the 
astronomer  says  for  brevity,  "Alpha  Centauri  crossed  the  mer- 
idian at  lo"  13"  5*,"  so  the  psychologist  says,  "I  perceive  ob- 
jects" :  when  he  is  considering  the  general  constitution  of  the 
sidereal  universe,  however,  the  astronomer  exercises  greater 
care  in  the  use  of  his  words,  and  so  does  the  structural  psy- 
chologist when  he  is  analyzing  a  psychosis  or  conscious  mo- 
ment most  precisely.  If  one  says  at  one  time,  "I  perceive  ob- 
jects," he  will  probably  on  another  occasion  remark  that  "a 
l)ercept  is  made  up  of  sensations  and  memory  images,"  or  some 

^^  First  Book,  27S-2Sa. 


8o  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

such  thing,  without  being  conscious  of  any  inconsistency  be- 
tween the  two  statements,  or  of  the  former  expression  as  be 
ing  any  truer  or  less  true  scientifically,  or  more  significant, 
than  the  latter.  And  as  to  "assuming  the  existence  of  a  self" 
when  making  these  assertions,  this  is  far  different  from  im- 
plying that  every  experience  involves  a  consciousness  of  self : 
"one  may  'assume  the  existence  of  a  self  without  assuming 
that  one  is  always  conscious  of  that  self"^* — ^the  former  is  an 
assumption  to  be  justified  on  philosophical  grounds,  the  latter 
one  to  be  verified  or  rejected  on  grounds  of  introspection. 

Finally,  Miss  Calkins  claims  in  defence  of  her  views  not 
only  the  "some  or  all"  of  her  opponents  who  "implicitly  as- 
sume the  existence  of"  a  self,  but  also  the  "many  psychologists 
of  admitted  worth"  who  "explicitly  adopt  the  conception"^^ — 
naming  Professors  Ward,  Judd,  and  others.  But  an  examina- 
tion of  the  references  shows  nothing  more  than  occasional 
obiter  dicta  about  psychology  and  the  self  in  which  the  latter 
term  hardly  means  more  than  "mind"  or  "sum-total  of  mental 
phenomena,"  and  by  no  means  the  self  which  "expresses  it- 
self through"  those  phenomena.  The  defence,  therefore,  falls 
through  at  all  points. 

44.  The  Indefinability  of  the  Self. — In  a  monograph  writ- 
ten in  German,  and  entitled  "Der  Doppelte  Standpunkt  in  der 
Psychologic,"  Miss  Calkins  writes  i^*'  "This  I,  the  self  or  sub- 
ject, cannot,  of  course,  be  defined,  for  it  is  the  most  intimate, 
most  fundamental  thing  that  we  know,  and  on  that  account 
cannot  be  reduced  to  other  terms.  This  I  is  simply  the  I; 
everyone  knows  for  himself  what  it  is." 

Now  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  know  a  thing  without  being 
able  to  define  it:  everything  individual  is  indefinable  just  as 
far  as  it  is  individual,  since  to  define  means  to  relate  the  ob- 
ject defined  to  other  objects  of  a  similar  nature  already 
known.    The  unique,  therefore,  cannot  be  defined;  and  if,  as 

34  Josephine  N.  Curtis,  American  Journal  of  Psychology^  XXVI,  96. 

3^  First  Book,  loc.  cit. 

3«  P.  34  f .     Quoted  by  Curtis,  op.  cit.,  73. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  8i 

Miss  Calkins  asserts,"  the  self  is  unique,  it  is  as  such  indefin- 
able. And  yet  the  self — mine  and  yours — the  individual,  the 
unique,  is  perfectly  knowable.  But  only  the  definable  can  be 
a  fit  object  of  scientific  study :  to  define,  to  point  out  the  es- 
sential characteristics  of  a  thing,  is  a  central  problem  of 
science,  and  what  cannot  be  defined  cannot  be  described  or  ex- 
plained in  any  systematic,  scientific  fashion. 

Professor  Eleanor  A.  McC.  Gamble,  joining  bravely  in  the 
defence  of  self -psychology  against  its  critics,  insists  that  we 
do  not  find  the  self  "by  introspection,  but  in  introspection. 
Miss  Curtis  asks :  'What  answer  can  Miss  Calkins  make  to  the 
l^erson  who  says,  "I  do  not  know  what  the  I  is"  ?'  The  retort 
is  easy.  Miss  Calkins  would  ask,  'Who  is  this  I  who  does  not 
know  what  the  I  is?'  The  self  is  the  introspector.  When  I 
can  see  my  own  eyes  without  a  mirror,  then  I  shall  be  able  to 
find  my  own  self  by  introspection."^*  But  the  would-be  cham- 
pion exactly  gives  away  her  claim  by  her  admission.  Intro- 
spection is  the  psychological  method,  and  only  that  which  can 
be  an  object  of  introspection  can  be  "the  basal  fact  of  psychol- 
ogy." The  self  as  "introspector,"  which  can  be  found  "not 
hy  introspection  but  in  introspection,"  is  the  "pure  ego"  of 
m.etaphysics,  not  the  "empirical  Me"  of  psychology;  and  wo 
come  back  again,  for  the  puqx)ses  of  science,  to  the  only  em- 
pirical self  there  is,  namely,  "the  sum-total  of  all  mental 
phenomena." 

45.  Self -Psychology  as  Reconciliation  of  Structuralism  and 
Functionalism. — It  will  be  remembered  that  Miss  Calkins  re- 
jects structuralism  and  functionalism  as  abstract  and  artificial, 
and  offers  her  own  view  as  a  concrete  reconciliation  of  the 
other  two.  This  reconciliation  is  to  be  accomplished  (i)  by 
recognizing  the  functional  point  of  view  as  at  bottom  and 
when  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion  identical  with  the  point 
of  view  of  self -psychology,  and  (2)  by  giving  to  the  structural 
method  of  treatment  a  place  alongside  of  but  subordinate  to 

"First  Book,  3;  etc. 

»^  Psychological  Bulletin,  XII,  196. 


82  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  pro  founder  method  which  describes  all  mental  processes 
as  varying  expressions  of  a  self  (38,  41). 

A  study  of  the  actual  results  produced  by  applying  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  "double  standpoint"  or  twofold  treatment  of 
mental  processes  to  the  problems  of  mental  life  inevitably 
leaves  the  investigator,  however,  it  is  to  be  feared,  with  the 
impression  of  two  distinct  sciences  rather  than  of  a  single 
science  with  two  mutually  dependent  divisions.  And  this  im- 
pression becomes  more  firmly  fixed  when  we  find  that  the  self- 
psychology  point  of  view  is  admitted  to  be  of  value  only  for 
descriptive  purposes,  and  that  the  structural  method  alone 
gives  a  causal  explanation  of  mental  phenomena.  But  every 
true  science  should  cover  both  the  problems,  and  to  distin- 
guish them  thus  sharply  is  virtually  to  divide  psychology  into 
two  sciences. 

As  to  the  abstract  and  artificial  nature  of  structuralism  and 
functionalism,  that  is  no  valid  objection  to  them,  since  all 
science  is  as  such  abstract  and  artificial  (inf.,  Chap.  IV). 
Every  science,  in  order  to  give  its  attention  undisturbedly  to 
one  special  group  of  phenomena,  voluntarily  excludes  from 
its  consideration  certain  questions  which  naturally  arise  but 
are  outside  its  own  field.  To  Miss  Calkins's  assertion  that  in 
conceiving  psychology  as  science  of  ideas  we  inevitably  raise 
the  question,  Whose  idea?  Miss  Curtis  pertinently  replies 
that  "many  psychologists  have  conceived  psychology  as  science 
of  ideas  without  raising  the  question:  indeed,  these  psycholo- 
gists see  no  more  necessity  for  raising  it  than  the  physiologist 
sees  for  asking  'Whose  muscle  ?'  ".^^  The  question  is  there, 
perhaps,  but  it  is  a  philosophically  rather  than  a  "scientifically 
relevant"  question. 

Again,  as  to  the  claim  that  "psychology  is  most  naturally" 
treated  as  self-psychology,*®  this  is  unfortunately  one  of  the 
most  serious  arguments  against  that  treatment.  It  is  per- 
fectly true  that  it  is  most  natural  to  describe  mental  processes 

39  0/'.  cit,  70,  n.  II. 
*°  First  Book,  vli. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  83 

as  expressions  of  a  self,  or  as  products  of  a  faculty,  but  this 
is  the  very  method  of  treatment  which  modem  scientific  psy- 
chology has  been  struggling  to  banish  from  the  world.  The 
most  natural  way  of  treating  anything  is  to  take  it  just  as  it 
is,  uncritically  and  unreflectively,  and  this  is  the  method  of 
common  sense  which  yields  for  us  the  casual  knowledge  of 
the  "plain  man";  the  scientific  way,  on  the  contrary,  is  to 
analyze,  to  criticize,  and  to  formalize  the  facts  of  everyday 
experience,  and  in  doing  so  science  is  preeminently  abstract 
and  artificial,  and  not  natural  at  all.  'Tf,  then,  self-psychology 
is  more  'natural'  than  other  psychology,  in  the  sense  of  stand- 
ing nearer  to  the  view  of  the  plain  man,  self-psychology  loses 
thereby  rather  than  gains;  for  the  more  'natural'  or  common- 
sense-like  it  gets,  the  less  scientific  it  becomes."" 

46.  Self -Psychology  and  Sociology. — Just  one  more  point 
before  concluding.  According  to  Miss  Calkins,  "the  basal 
fact  of  psychology  is  the  individual  self  in  its  relations,  pri- 
marily social  relations;  the  unit  of  sociology  is  the  inter- 
related system  of  selves,"  "the  social  organism,"  "the  com- 
munity."" The  former  portion  of  this  sentence  is  what  we 
have  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  been  engaged  in  confuting, 
the  latter  portion  seems  to  express  a  truth  provided  we  identify 
the  word  "unit"  with  the  earlier  term  "basal  fact." 

If,  however,  we  substitute  for  the  rejected  statement,  the 
following — "the  basal  fact  of  individual  psychology  is  the  in- 
dividual experience,  the  interrelated  system  of  which  experi- 
ences constitutes  what  we  call  the  self" ;  we  may  then  assert 
that  the  basal  fact  of  social  psychology  is  that  self  as  above 
defined,  in  its  relations  to  other  selves;  and  that  the  basal  fact 
of  sociology  is,  as  Miss  Calkins  tells  us,  "the  interrelated  sys- 
tem of  selves"  which  constitutes  "the  social  organism."  We 
have,  then,  this  hierarchy  of  "units"  or  "basal  facts" — the  in- 
dividual experience,  the  self  as  interrelated  system  of  such 
experiences,   and   the   community   as   interrelated   system   of 

**  Curtis,  op.  cit.,  96  f. 

*^ Psychological  Review,  XIII,  67. 


84  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

selves.  In  accepting  this  view  w^e  give  credit  to  what  is  un- 
doubtedly valuable  in  "self -psychology"  without  admitting  its 
claim  in  the  field  of  individual  psychology,  and  we  can  then 
indorse  the  statement  of  Miss  Gamble  that  "self -psychology  is 
worth  while,  not  because  it  tells  us  anything  worth  knowing 
about  the  self  in  itself,  that  self  which  is  not  open  to  intro- 
spection [ — and  is  therefore  not  a  psychological  object  at  all, 
but  a  philosophical  one — ]  but  because  it  gives  standing  ground 
for  the  scientific  treatment  of  the  relation  of  person  to  per- 
son."^ 

2.  General  Concliisions. 

47.  The  Relations  of  the  Contemporary  Schools. — Self- 
Psychology  and  Behaviorism,  though  both  of  them  are  more 
closely  allied  to  functionalism  than  to  structuralism,  are  at 
opposite  extremes  in  their  doctrine  of  what  constitutes  "the 
basal  fact  of  psychology."  Self -Psychology  accepts  both  the 
concept  of  the  Self  and  that  of  Consciousness  as  fit  subjects 
for  psychological  investigation,  though  of  course  regarding 
the  former  as  "basal"  and  the  latter  as  secondary  to  it ;  Behav- 
iorism rejects  both  concepts;  the  intermediate  schools  accept 
Consciousness,  but  reject  the  Self.  The  respective  claims  of 
each  can  be  justified  only  by  actual  trial  as  to  their  usableness 
in  scientific  psychology,  and  we  have  been  contending  in  the 
above  pages  that  such  a  pragmatic  test  demonstrates  that 
whereas  Consciousness  is  a  proper  psychological  concept,  the 
Self  as  anything  more  than  the  system  of  contents  or  processes 
is  a  metaphysical  concept,  and  as  such  outside  the  field  of 
scientific  psychology. 

In  a  table  which  will  be  found  at  the  bottom  of  page  85  I 
endeavor  to  illustrate  concisely  the  relations  of  the  various 
schools. 

48.  The  Definition  of  Psychology. — From  our  discussion 
and  comparison  of  the  various  definitions  and  concepts  of 
psychology  now  current,  we  should  be  able  to  derive  a  posi- 

*3  op.  cit.,  199. 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


85 


tive  definition  which  shall  avoid  the  errors  of  the  individual 
schools  and  yet  allow  for  the  full  intension  of  the  concept. 
Such  definitions  in  common  use  as  "science  of  mental  states," 
"of  mental  processes,"  "of  consciousness"  and  the  like,  must 
be  rejected  as  too  narrow — the  first  because  of  its  overempha- 
sis of  the  structural  position,  the  second  because  of  its  over- 
emphasis of  the  functional  position,  and  the  third  because  it 
implies  the  non-existence  of  a  subconscious  field.**  Each  of 
the  definitions,  "science  of  mind"  or  "of  the  mind,"  "science 
of  experience,"  "of  mental  phenomena,"  or  "mental  life"  in- 
dicates briefly  just  what  the  subject-matter  of  psychology  is. 
Of  these,  probably,  "science  of  mental  phenomena"  is  the  most 
accurate,  but  as  all  sciences  have  to  do  with  phenomena,  the 
word  is  hardly  necessary  to  the  definition.  "Science  of  mental 
life"  allies  psychology  most  closely  with  the  biological  sciences, 
and  therefore  has  advantages  from  that  point  of  view.  "Sci- 
ence of  experience"  is  perhaps  a  little  too  vague.  The  simplest 
definition  is,  after  all,  the  most  natural  and  common  one,  "the 
science  of  mind."  This  cannot  be  criticized  as  too  broad,  pro- 
vided the  significance  of  the  word  "science"  is  appreciated 
and  the  term  "mind"  carefully  defined ;  and  of  course  no  defi- 
nition of  any  science  can  stand  alone,  or  be  thoroughly  un- 
derstood until  the  terms  it  uses  have  been  themselves  further 
defined. 


Admits  Consciousness 


Admits  Self 


Rejects  Self 


Rejects  Consciousness 


Self -Psychology  <- 


Structuralism 
Functionalism . 


-^  Behaviorism 


Mentalism 


(The  arrows  indicate  that  Behaviorism  and  Self -Psychology  are  both 
developments  of  Functionalism,  but  in  opposite  directions.) 

**This  problem  has  not  yet  been  touched,  but  will  occupy  all  of  the  later 
chapters  VII  and  VIII;  and  the  point  is  important  enough  to  be  men- 
tioned, at  least,  in  the  present  connection. 


86  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

TABLE  IV 
The  Current  Concepts  of  Scientific  Psychology 


Schools  and  Leading  Representatives 
Structuralism  (Wundt,  Miinsterberg,  Titchener) 

Functionalism   (Angell,  Judd) 

Radical  School  (Pillsbury,  McDougall) 
Behaviorism   (Watson,  Frost,  Holt,  Bode) 
Self-Psychology      (Calkins,     Baldwin,     Royce, 
Ward,    Stout,   Brentano?) 


Typical  Definitions 
Science  of  mental  states 

or  contents 
Science   of    mental   pro- 
cesses or   functions 
Science  of  behavior 
Science   of  behavior 
Science  of  the  self 


REFERENCES 
Self-Psychology — 

Calkins,  Introduction:  Ch.  I. 
"         First  Book:  pp.  273-280. 
"         Philosophical  Rev.:  IX,  490  ff.   (1900). 
"         Psychological  Rev.:  VII,  377  ff.  (1900). 
"       XIII,  61  ff.  (1906). 
Jour,  of  Philosophy:  IV,  676  ff. ;  V,  12  ff.  (1907-8). 
"         Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXVI,  495  ff.  (1915). 
"         Psychological  Bulletin:  XIII,  20  ff,   (1916).     (Bib- 
liography. ) 
"        and    others.    Psychological    Rev.:    XXIV,    278 ff. 
(1917);  XXV,  164 ff.  (1918). 
Thilly,  Philosophical  Rev.:  XIX,  22  ff.  (1910). 
Creighton,  Philosophical  Rev.:  XXIII,  159  ff.  (1914). 
Gamble,  Psychological  Bulletin:  XII,  195  ff.  (1915). 
Ward,  Psychological  Principles,  pp.  29-41. 

Criticisms 

Washburn,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  II,  713  ff.  (1905). 
Titchener,  Philosophical  Rev.:  XV,  93  ff.  (1906). 
Pillsbury,  Philosophical  Rev.:  XVI,  307  ff.  (1907). 

Reply  by  Calkins,  Psychological  Bulletin:  V,  27  ff. 

Rejoinder  by  Pillsbury,  Psychological  Bulletin:  V,  60  ff. 
Tawney,  Jour,  of  Philosophy:  V,  459  ff.  (1908). 

Reply  by  Calkins,  Ibid.,  634  ff. 
Titchener,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXII,  540  ff.  (1911). 
Curtis,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychology:  XXVI,  68 ff.  (1915). 

Reply  by  Gamble,  Psychological  Bulletin:  XII,   194  ff. 

(1915)- 
McDougall,  Psychological  Rev.:  XXIII,  i  ff.  (1916). 


BOOK  II 
THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER  IV 

Psychology  and  Metaphysics 

49.  The  Problem  of  the  Basis  of  a  Scientific  Psychology. — 
We  have  now  advanced  to  the  point  where  we  should  be  pre- 
pared to  formulate  and  understand  our  problem,  the  problem 
upon  the  discussion  and  solution  of  which  we  shall  be  engaged 
throughout  the  remainder  of  this  book.  This  problem  is,  in 
briefest  terms,  the  problem  of  the  basis  of  a  scientific  psychol- 
ogy, and  may  be  stated  most  concisely  in  the  form  of  a  ques- 
tion, namely :  What  are  the  essential  conditions  of  a  complete, 
and  at  the  same  time  independent,  science  of  psychology — i.e., 
independent  alike  of  metaphysics  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the 
various  biological  sciences  on  the  other? 

In  answering  this  question  we  shall  find  that  the  determina- 
tion of  the  essential  conditions  of  completeness  depends  upon 
the  prior  determination  of  the  broader  principles  underlying 
the  independence  of  scientific  psychology,  and  the  forward- 
ing of  the  latter  endeavor  involves  in  its  turn  two  subsidiary 
problems:  first,  the  differentiation  of  psychology  from  meta- 
physics; and,  second,  the  differentiation  of  psychology — not 
from  the  biological  sciences  merely,  for  that  has  to  a  large 
extent  been  done  already — but  from  the  non-mental  sciences 
in  general. 

I .  The  Problem  of  Science. 

50.  The  General  Problem  of  Scietice. — All  science'  has  for 
its  problem  the  systematic  Description  and  Explanation  of 
facts  or  phenomena.  By  a  fact  or  phenomenon  is  meant  any 
object  of  observation,  or  of  direct  and  immediate  (unmedia- 
ted)  knowledge;  or  whatever  conceivably  might  become  such. 

1 1  confine  the  ensuing  discussion  entirely  to  the  field  of  "pure"  as  dis- 
tinguished from  "applied"  science. 


90  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Facts  or  phenomena  constitute  the  materials  or  data  of  all 
sciences,  and  the  systematic  description  and  explanation  of 
those  facts  constitutes  the  twofold  problem  of  science.  Each 
individual  science  limits  itself  to  the  investigation  of  some 
particular  group  of  facts — psychology,  to  that  group  of  facts 
known  as  "mental,"  whatever  that  term  may  later  be  defined 
to  mean. 

51.  Scientific  Description  is  distinguished  from  ordinary  or 
"commonsense"  description  in  two  ways — (i)  in  being  ana- 
lytical, and  (2)  in  being  systematic.''  In  other  words,  and  in 
the  first  place,  the  ordinary  unscientific  "man  in  the  street" 
describes  the  facts  which  come  to  his  observation  just  as  they 
are  in  their  general  outlines,  whereas  for  the  scientist  this  is 
only  the  first  step  in  description,  and  must  be  supplemented  by 
analysis  of  the  phenomenon  into  its  constituent  parts,  and 
finally  into  its  elements  or  those  parts  which  cannot  be  further 
analyzed ;  for  all  phenomena,  except  those  which  can  be  shown 
to  be  elementary  already,  are  in  themselves  complex  and 
analyzable  into  constituents  which  are  elementary.  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  science  has  for  its  ideal  the  arrangement  of  its 
facts,  which  ordinarily  come  to  observation  in  no  particular 
order  and  with  no  particular  relation  to  one  another,  into  an 
organized  system,  in  which  every  fact  has  a  place  in  relation 
to  every  other  fact  of  its  "class,"  and  every  class  of  facts  has 
its  proper  relation  to  every  other  class. 

The  problem  of  scientific  description,  therefore,  is  itself 
threefold:  (i)  Definition  and  General  Description,  in  which 
so  far,  except  for  greater  accuracy,  science  is  hardly  distin- 
guishable from  commonsense;  (2)  Analysis,  which  continues 
until  finally  the  elements,  or  further  unanalyzable  factors,  of 

2  "By  the  description  of  an  object"  says  Professor  Titchener,  "we  mean 
an  account  so  full  and  so  definite  that  one  to  whom  the  object  itself  is 
unfamiliar  can  nevertheless,  given  skill  and  materials,  reconstruct  it  from 
the  verbal  formula."  (American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  XXIII,  p. 
165,  1912).  This  definition  states  the  general  nature  and  aim  of  descrip- 
tion, but  does  not  discriminate  scientific  description  from  description  of 
the  ordinary  type. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY        91 

the  phenomena  studied  have  been  disclosed;  and  (3)  Classi- 
fication, or  arrangement  of  the  facts  into  classes  and  finally 
into  a  single  organized  system  including  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  groups  studied  by  the  particular  science  in  question.  If, 
then,  psychology  is  to  be  a  complete  and  independent  science, 
it  must  have  for  its  first  main  problem  the  description — i.e., 
general  description,  analysis  and  classification — of  mental  phe- 
nomena. 

52.  Scientific  Explanation  is  the  determination  of  the  con- 
ditions under  which  the  facts  to  be  explained  occur,  and  with- 
out which  they  do  not  occur.  The  procedure  ordinarily  con- 
sists (i)  in  the  formulation  of  some  "law"  summing  up  the 
various  conditions  and  their  results,  and  (2)  in  the  applica- 
tion of  this  law  to  the  fact  to  be  explained,  by  showing  the 
fact  to  be  a  special  instance  of  the  general  law.  A  "law"  in 
the  scientific  sense  is  merely  a  summary  statement  in  general 
terms  of  certain  observed  uniformities  in  the  order  or  rela- 
tions of  phenomena — a  brief  statement  "in  mental  shorthand 
of  as  wide  a  range  as  possible  of  the  sequences  of  our  sense- 
impressions."^  The  fact  is  not  explained  by  the  law,  but  by 
the  other  facts  (the  "causes")  which  according  to  the  state- 
ment of  the  law  are  conditions  of  the  fact  to  be  explained. 

For  example,  the  law  of  gravitation  is  a  brief  statement  of 
the  uniform  relation  which  subsists  between  the  motions  of 
various  particles  of  matter  in  the  universe.  The  fact  that  a 
book  falls  from  my  hand  to  the  floor  when  the  support  of  my 
hand  is  removed  is  not  explained  by  the  law  of  gravitation, 
but  by  the  fact  of  the  removal  of  the  support  of  my  hand  (the 
"cause"  of  the  fall)  ;  the  whole  sequence  of  events  being  one 
instance  out  of  the  numerous  instances  of  the  falls  of  things 
(and  other  allied  phenomena)  which  occur  constantly  in  the 
world,  and  which  the  "law  of  gravitation"  sums  up  in  one 
brief  formula. 

53.  The  Concept  of  Causation:  Scientific  explanation  is  es- 
sentially causal  in  its  nature,  and  the  problem  of  scientific  ex- 

•  Pearson,  The  Grammar  of  Science  (Third  Edition,  1911),  Vol.  I,  p.  112. 


92  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

planation  consists  primarily  in  the  determination  of  the  causal 
connections  between  the  facts  that  have  been  observed,  de- 
scribed, analyzed,  and  classified.  A  fact  (B)  is  held  to  be  suffi- 
ciently "explained"  for  scientific  purposes  when  it  is  shown  to 
be  the  effect  of  some  antecedent  cause  (A) — i.e.,  when  its  ex- 
istence affords  a  special  instance  of  the  general  principle  that 
whenever  A  (the  "cause")  takes  place,  B  (the  "effect")  takes 
place  also.  This  is  all  that  the  concept  of  cause,  the  central 
concept  of  scientific  explanation,  connotes — viz.,  that  event 
upon  the  occurrence  of  which  a  definite  consequent  event  will, 
and  without  which  that  consequent  event  cannot,  occur.  The 
invariable  and  unconditionally  present  antecedent  is  the  cause, 
the  invariable  consequent  is  the  effect,  and  the  presence  of  the 
cause  sufficiently  explains  the  presence  of  the  effect  for  all 
scientific  purposes.  Of  course,  the  presence  of  the  cause  may 
itself,  and  ultimately  will,  generate  another  problem  of  ex- 
planation; but  this  problem  is  solved  by  treating  this  cause  as 
effect,  and  searching  for  its  antecedent  cause,  and  so  on  as  far 
as  the  needs  of  the  particular  problem  may  demand.  But  any 
further  or  deeper  discussion  of  the  phenomenon  than  this  car- 
ries the  investigator  outside  the  realm  of  science  altogether. 

An  essential  presupposition  of  all  science  is  the  so-called 
general  principle  of  causation — vis.,  that  every  event  has  a 
cause,  or  that  every  event  is  the  effect  of  some  antecedent 
cause — and  scientific  explanation  itself  is  the  reference  of 
facts  to  their  causes.  If,  then,  psychology  is  to  be  a  complete 
and  independent  science,  it  must  have  for  its  second  main 
problem  that  of  explaining,  or  determining  the  causal  rela- 
tions of,  mental  phenomena. 

54.  The  Nature  and  Kinds  of  Scientific  Hypotheses. — Any 
provisional,  tentative  explanation  of  phenomena,  any  sug- 
gested law  which  has  not  been  thoroughly  verified,  is  known 
in  science  as  an  "hypothesis."  These  are  of  two  distinct 
kinds,  one  of  which  we  may  call  "phenomenal"  hypotheses  or 
explanations,  and  the  other  "conceptual"  hypotheses  or  ex- 
planations. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY        93 

A  phenomenal  hypothesis  is  one  which  explains  complex 
facts  or  phenomena  in  terms  of  simpler  phenomena.  If  a 
phenomenon  is  defined,  as  above  (50),  as  "any  object  of  ob- 
servation, or  of  direct  and  immediate  knowledge,"  then  a 
phenomenal  hypothesis  is  one  which  makes  use  of  phenomenal 
terms.  In  the  physical  sciences,  perception  is  the  mental 
process  used  in  observing,  so  that  all  phenomenal  hypotheses 
in  the  physical  sciences  are  stated  in  perceptual  terms :  in  psy- 
chology, the  method  of  observation  is,  of  course,  introspection. 
Explanations  of  the  phenomenal  type  include  the  explanation 
of  chemical  reactions  as  the  result  of  the  combination  of  cer- 
tain chemical  elements,  of  sound  as  the  product  of  vibrations 
in  the  atmosphere,  of  memories  as  the  revival  of  previous  per- 
ceptual experiences,  and  the  like. 

When  a  phenomenal  explanation  of  any  fact,  however,  is 
either  impossible  or  incomplete,  science  resorts  to  the  second 
type  of  hypothesis,  namely,  a  conceptual  one.  A  conceptual 
hypothesis  is  one  which  explains  facts  in  terms  of  specially 
constructed  concepts,  which  have  no  known  phenomenal  (per- 
ceptual or  introspective)  existence.  In  resorting  to  this  type 
of  explanation,  the  scientist  leaves  the  world  of  observed  facts 
altogether,  and  by  an  exercise  of  the  scientific  imagination  pur- 
posely constructs  a  world  of  fictitious  objects,  which  cannot  be 
perceived  by  the  senses  and  may  have  no  phenomenal  reality 
whatsoever.  Such  a  procedure  is,  as  was  hinted  above,  fol- 
lowed in  any  case  in  which  a  phenomenal  explanation  is  im- 
possible, and  also  to  supplement  phenomenal  explanations  when 
the  latter  are  incomplete. 

For  example,  though  the  phenomenon  of  sound  may  be  ex- 
plained in  phenomenal  terms  as  the  product  of  vibrations  of 
the  atmosphere,  which  latter  is  itself  a  phenomenon  that  we 
may  become  directly  conscious  of  in  numerous  other  ways,  the 
allied  phenomenon  of  light  cannot  be  so  explained;  hence  the 
science  of  physics  constructs  in  explanation  of  the  latter  the 
purely  fictitious  ether,  and  the  purely  conceptual  theory  that 
light  is  the  result  of  vibrations  in  this  ether.    Again,  the  con- 


94  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

cepts  of  atoms  and  electrons  have  been  constructed  by  scien- 
tists for  the  purpose  of  carrying  the  explanation  of  physical 
and  chemical  phenomena  beyond  the  point  to  which  purel} 
phenomenal  explanations  would  carry  us.  So  in  various  other 
fields :  nerve  fibres  are  phenomena,  nerve  currents  are  con- 
cepts; falling  bodies  are  phenomena,  the  force  of  gravity  is  a 
concept;  and  so  forth. 

Thus  science  does  not  merely  occasionally  resort  to  concep- 
tual hypotheses,  but  on  the  other  hand  deals  largely  with  con 
ceptual  constructions  which  not  only  have  no  perceptual 
equivalents,  but  may  even  possess  qualities  contradictory  of 
perceptual  experience — as  in  the  attribution  of  the  properties 
of  weightlessness  and  frictionlessness  to  the  hypothetical  ether. 
Mathematics  makes  unusually  free  use  of  such  impossible  and 
contradictory  concepts — as,  for  instance,  its  notably  contra- 
dictory concept  of  the  square  root  of  minus  i,  etc.;  but  these 
are  absolutely  essential  to  any  advance  in  mathematical,  or  any 
physical,  science.  And  if  this  is  true  of  the  physical  sciences, 
psychology,  if  it  is  to  be  complete,  must  be  at  liberty  also  to 
make  free  use  of  conceptual  as  well  as  phenomenal  hypotheses 
in  explanation  of  its  facts. 

55.  The  Validity  of  Conceptual  Hypotheses. — But  the  sci- 
entist must  not  be  permitted  to  run  amuck  in  the  field  of  fic- 
titious concepts.  It  is  not  merely  that  a  concept  satisfies  the 
scientist's  vanity,  or  his  love  of  creating  something,  which 
justifies  the  use  of  that  concept.  There  are  just  two  tests  of 
the  validity  and  raison  d'etre  of  a  conceptual  hypothesis — a 
theoretical  test  and  a  practical  test.  ( i )  The  theoretical  test 
is  that  the  hypothesis  or  concept  in  question  does  actually  in- 
crease our  understanding  of  the  facts;  and  (2)  the  practical 
test  is  that  by  means  of  the  proposed  concept  or  hypothesis  we 
are  enabled  to  predict  and  prepare  for  future  recurrences  of 
those  facts,  and  perhaps  to  produce  or  control  them.  If  a  con- 
ceptual hypothesis  satisfies  both  of  these  tests  it  is  fully  justi- 
fied; if  one  of  them,  it  is  partially  justified;  if  neither  of  them, 
it  is  not  justified,  and  should  be  rejected. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY        95 

56.  Is  Science  purely  Descriptive? — Many  students  of  the 
subject  of  scientific  method  deny  that  science  explains  facts  at 
all,  and  insist  that  its  function  is  purely  descriptive.  Among 
these,  two  are  especially  prominent — Karl  Pearson*  and  Louis 
T.  More/  According  to  Pearson,  "the  object  of  science  is  to 
describe  in  the  fewest  words  the  widest  range  of  phenomena."* 
"Science  answers  no  why — it  simply  provides  a  shorthand  de- 
scription of  the  how  of  our  sense-impressions."^  Scientific 
"laws  simply  describe,  they  never  explain,  the  routine  of  our 
perceptions."  The  law  of  gravitation,  for  example,  "is  a  brief 
description  of  how  every  particle  of  matter  in  the  universe  is 
altering  its  motion  with  reference  to  every  other  particle.  It 
does  not  tell  us  why  particles  thus  move."* 

Of  course,  we  may  reply,  this  is  largely  a  matter  of  defining 
what  we  mean  by  explanation,  and  what  we  shall  mean  by  it 
in  this  present  book  we  have  already  stated  quite  fully  enough. 
If  we  mean  by  explaining,  "explaining  fully,"  then,  of  course, 
we  must  admit  at  once  that  science  does  not  explain;  but  if 
we  mean,  as  we  do,  merely  the  determination  of  the  causal  re- 
lations of  things,  in  the  sense  of  the  term  "cause"  above  de- 
fined (55) — the  reference  of  facts  to  their  causes — then  we 
have  a  right  to  insist  that  explaining  is  one  of  the  essential 
problems  of  science.  Explanation,  it  is  true,  is  hardly  more 
than  an  especially  comprehensive  description;  and  no  scientific 
explanation  is  final,  but  at  once  arouses  the  question  of  how  to 
explain  the  explanation;  but  notwithstanding  all  this,  expla- 
nation is  something  more  than  merely  analyzing  and  classify- 
ing, and  should  be  treated  as  distinct  from  description.  Con- 
ceptual explanation,  moreover,  is  not  in  any  sense  descriptive, 
since  wc  can  only  "describe"  phenomena. 

Professor  More's  criticisms  of  scientific  explanation  are  di- 

*The  Grammar  of  Science,  Vol.  I   (Third  Edition,  191 1). 
^The  Limitations  of  Science  (1915). 
«  Op.  cit..  p.  339. 
'  Op.  cit..  p.  333. 
•  Op.  cit.,  p.  99. 


96  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

rected  more  particularly  against  the  possible  danger  of  con- 
fusing scientific  explanation,  especially  when  of  the  conceptual 
type,  with  metaphysics.  "The  domain  of  physics"  he  says, 
"is  concerned  with  the  discovery  of  phenomena  and  the  for- 
mulation of  natural  laws  based  on  postulates  which  are  de- 
termined by  experience  and  generally  accepted  as  true;  the 
causes  of  phenomena  ...  lie  in  the  province  of  the  meta- 
physician." The  problems  of  the  nature  of  the  ether,  the  shape 
of  atoms,  etc.,  are  metaphysical  rather  than  scientific  prob- 
lems. This  would  rule  out  of  science  all  conceptual  or  non- 
phenomenal  hypotheses.  "This  does  not  mean,"  he  adds,  "that 
such  questions  should  not  be  discussed,  but  the  method  of  this 
discussion  and  the  results  obtained  are  properly  the  method 
and  results  of  metaphysics,  and  are  not  in  the  category  of 
physical  phenomena  and  laws."^  Again,  "men  of  science  have 
two  principal  functions  to  perform;  first,  to  observe  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  world,  and  when  certain  connections  and  dif- 
ferences are  found  in  these  phenomena,  to  classify  them  under 
laws."  (Not,  be  it  noted,  to  explain  them  by  reference  to 
laws).  "But,  allured  by  their  great  and  legitimate  success, 
they  have  also  tried  to  discover  the  hidden  causes  of  phe- 
nomena, with  the  result  that  a  sort  of  fictitious  world  has  been 
created  by  them,  in  which  the  laws  of  objective,  or  physical- 
phenomena  are  inextricably  confounded  .with  the  deductions 
of  subjective  psychology.  Science  is  metaphysical,  and  at  the 
same  time  pretends  to  supplant  metaphysics. "^° 

How  far  Professor  More's  strictures  on  the  metaphysical 
tendency  of  modern  science  may  be  justified  we  shall  be  more 
competent  to  discuss  after  we  have  become  familiar  with  the 
problem  of  metaphysics  itself  ;^^  but  the  writer's  insistence 
that  explanation  and  the  determination  of  causes,  and  the  use 
of  conceptual  hypotheses,  are  not  scientific,  we  have  already 
condemned  in  our  previous  discussion. 

8  The  Limitations  of  Science,  pp.  1 13  f . 
10  Op.  cit.,  pp.  187  f. 
^^Cf.inf.,  (60). 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY        97 

TABLE  V 
Stages  of  the  Scientific  Method 
I.    THE  ACQUISITION  OF  FACTS :     Observation 

II.  THE  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  FACTS 

1.  Definition  and  General  Description 

2.  Analysis  of  the  facts  into  their  constituent  parts  or  factors ;  ulti- 
mately into  their  Elements 

3.  Classification:   arrangement   of   the   facts   into   Classes;  ultimately, 
into  a  Systetn  of  all  the  facts  of  the  assigned  group. 

III.  THE  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  FACTS. 

1.  Formulation  of  Laws:  determination  of  Causes. 

2.  Application  of  the  Laws:  reference  of  facts  to  their  causes. 

2.  The  Problem  of  Metaphysics,  and  its  Relation  to  Science. 

57.  The  General  Problem  of  Metaphysics. — The  keywords 
of  the  problem  of  science  are  Description  and  Explanation,  the 
keyword  of  the  problem  of  metaphysics  is  Interpretation. 
That  is  to  say,  metaphysics  has  for  its  problem  the  interpre- 
tation of  phenomena.  Now,  to  "interpret"  anything  is  to  de- 
termine its  meaning.  If  the  fundamental  presupposition  of 
all  science,  without  accepting  which  no  science  would  be  pos- 
sible, is  that  every  fact,  every  event,  has  a  cause;  the  funda- 
mental presupposition  of  metaphysics  is  that  every  fact  has 
a  meaning,  and  its  problem  is  to  determine  what  are  the  mean- 
ings of  facts — i.  e.,  to  interpret  them. 

Again,  philosophical  interpretation  is  tclcological — i.e.,  it 
has  to  do  with  the  purposes  or  "ends"  of  things.  Science  has 
to  do  entirely  with  causes  and  ignores  purposes:  the  aim  of 
scientific  explanation,  as  we  have  seen,  is  to  discover  the  causal 
connections  of  phenomena.  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  to  do  entirely  with  purposes,  and  ignores  causes:  the  aim 
of  philosophical  interpretation  is  to  discover  the  purposes  or 
teleological  relations  of  phenomena.  From  the  philosophical 
point  of  view,  each  fact  is  treated  not  as  the  effect  of  some 
antecedent  cause,  but  as  the  expression  of  a  Meaning  or  as 
the  fulfilment  of  a  Purpose. 

Once  more :  science,  in  its  study  of  physical  and  mental  phe- 


98  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

nomena,  completely  ignores  the  values  of  things — their  utility 
to  man,  their  beauty,  or  their  eternal  significance — but  for  the 
philosopher  value  is  everything,  the  fact  nothing  except  so 
far  as  it  is  a  symbol  of  a  value.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
metaphysical  problem  may  be  defined  as  that  of  evaluation, 
determining  the  Values  of  phenomena. 

Science,  then,  tells  us  what  the  facts  are,  and  how  they  have 
come  to  be:  metaphysics  attempts  to  determine  for  us  their 
meanings,  their  purpose  in  the  universe,  and  their  eternal 
worth.  This  being  the  case,  of  course,  science  must,  in  its 
descriptive  aspect,  at  least,  precede  metaphysics — we  cannot 
know  what  facts  mean  until  we  already  know  what  the  facts 
are,  we  cannot  interpret  the  facts  until  we  have  first  described 
them.  Scientific  description,  then,  is  as  necessary  a  prelimi- 
nary to  philosophical  interpretation  as  it  is  to  causal  explana- 
tion, but  whereas  description  is  an  end  in  itself  to  the  sci- 
entist, as  well  as  a  means  toward  attaining  the  end  of  expla- 
nation, it  is  for  the  philosopher  merely  a  means  toward  the 
true  end  of  interpretation. 

The  problem  of  rational  or  metaphysical  psychology,  as  a 
branch  of  metaphysics  or  philosophy  in  general,  is,  therefore, 
the  interpretation  of  mental  phenomena  in  terms  of  Meaning, 
Purpose,  and  Value. 

58.  The  Artificiality  of  Science. — If  it  is  true  that  science 
ignores  value,  then  the  artificiality  of  scientific  method,  the 
abstractness  of  its  content,  and  the  incompleteness  of  its  point 
of  view  must  be  at  once  evident.  For  the  obvious  fact  of  our 
daily  lives  is  that  "we  live  in  a  world  of  values.""  "We," 
says  Professor  Titchener,  "approve  good  manners;  we  avoid 
extravagance  and  display;  we  aim  at  efficiency;  we  try  to  be 
honest;  we  should  like  to  be  cultivated.  Everywhere  and  al- 
ways our  ordinary  living  implies  this  reference  to  values,  to 
better  and  worse,  desirable  and  undesirable,  vulgar  and  re- 
fined." But  all  this  merely  emphasizes  the  fact  "that  ordinary 
living  is  not  scientific.  .  .  .  For  Science  deals,  not  with  values, 

*2  Titchener,  a  Beginner's  Psychology,  p.  i   (1915). 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY        99 

but  with  facts.  There  is  no  good  or  bad,  sick  or  well,  useful 
or  useless,  in  science.  When  the  results  of  science  are  taken 
over  into  everyday  life,  they  are  transformed  into  values;  the 
telegraph  becomes  a  business  necessity,  the  telephone  a  house- 
hold convenience,  the  motor-car  a  means  of  recreation;  the 
physician  works  to  cure,  the  educator  to  fit  for  citizenship,  the 
social  reformer  to  correct  abuses.  Science  itself,  however, 
works  simply  to  ascertain  the  truth,  to  discover  the  fact." 

"Again,"  continues  Professor  Titchener,  "we  live  in  a  world 
whose  centre  is  ourself."  "This  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  we  are  all  selfish,"  but  that  "we  live  in  a  universe  which 
revolves  about  the  Me."  "And  this,  once  more,  is  the  same 
thing  as  saying  that  our  ordinary  living  is  not  scientific.  For 
science,  which  deals  with  facts,  is  on  that  account  impersonal 
and  disinterested."  "Science  aims  at  truth :  it  deals  with  facts, 
with  the  nature  of  things  given,  not  with  values  or  meanings 
or  uses;  and  it  deals  wjth  these  materials  impersonally  and 
disinterestedly."" 

Professor  Miinsterberg  has  on  numerous  occasions  pointed 
out  the  same  truth.  "In  our  practical  experience  things  have 
their  meaning  just  through  our  attitude;  their  existence  is 
bound  up  with  our  interest  in  them."  But  not  so  in  the  scien- 
tific realm.  The  standpoint  of  the  scientist  "is  an  artificial 
one;  it  involves  certain  abstractions.  The  world  is  in  a  way 
cut  ofiF  from  our  life-attitudes,  and  has  been  made  a  mere  ob- 
ject of  awareness;  "but" — and  here  lies  the  justification  for 
this  abstractness  and  artificiality  of  science — "in  this  abstrac- 
tion lies  at  the  same  time  its  incomparable  strength.  It  allows 
us  to  understand  the  processes  in  the  world  as  results  of  laws, 
and  thus  to  bring  them  into  mathematical  relations,  and  finally 
to  master  them  and  to  put  nature  in  harness."" 

Again.  "If  the  psychologist  approaches  mental  life,  he  has 
no  interest  in  asking  whether  the  mental  states  are  valuable 
or  not.     He  does  not  care  whether  the  will  impulses  in  the 

"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  2-4. 

1*  Miinsterberg,  The  Eternal  Values,  p.  13. 


lOO         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

mind  are  good  or  bad,  moral  or  immoral,  whether  the  imagin- 
ings of  the  mind  are  beautiful  or  ugly,  whether  the  thoughts  in 
the  mind  are  wise  or  foolish,  whether  the  emotions  of  the  mind 
are  holy  or  sinful.  The  dissecting  botanist  is  interested  in  the 
ugliest  weed  as  much  as  in  the  beautiful  flower,  the  chemist 
cares  for  the  constitution  of  the  deadly  poison  as  much  as  for 
that  of  the  helpful  drug.  In  the  same  way  the  psychologist 
is  surely  interested  in  the  analysis  of  the  criminal  act  as  much 
as  in  that  of  the  heroic  deed,  in  the  babbling  of  the  insane  mind 
as  much  as  in  the  reasoning  of  the  thinker,  in  the  silliest  play 
of  the  infant  as  much  as  in  the  highest  creative  processes  of 
the  artistic  mind.  He  remains  the  mental  observer  who  un- 
derstands and  explains  mental  events  without  forming  a 
judgment  on  them.  As  soon  as  he  begins  to  evaluate  them  he 
oversteps  the  boundaries  of  his  realm,  and  is  trespassing  on 
the  fields  of  logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics. "^'^ 

The  upshot  of  these  considerations  is:  (i)  That  real  life, 
the  life  of  everyday  practical  experience,  is  dominated  by  ideas 
of  values — good  and  bad,  beautiful  and  ugly,  useful  and  use- 
less, etc.;  (2)  that  science  entirely  ignores  values,  and  con- 
cerns itself  disinterestedly  with  the  facts  as  they  are,  regard- 
less of  their  values  and  uses;  (3)  that  science  is,  therefore, 
characteristically  abstract  and  artificial;  but  (4)  that  it  is  quite 
properly  so,  for  by  means  of  the  strictly  mechanistic  method 
of  science  we  are  enabled  not  only  to  understand  the  forces  of 
nature  better,  but  to  bring  them  under  control  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind.  And  if  all  this  is  true  of  science  in  general,  it 
is  equally  so  of  the  specific  science  of  psychology. 

59.  Psychology  and  Meanings. — But  at  this  conclusion  one 
may  naturally  demur.  All  that  has  been  said  above  we  may 
freely  admit  so  far  as  the  physical  sciences  are  concerned,  and 
yet  we  may  seriously  hesitate  to  accept  the  distinction  in  its 
application  to  mental  phenomena.  Whatever  the  situation 
with  regard  to  physical  things,  one  may  say,  is  it  not  true  that 
the  very  essence  of  a  mental  process — an  idea,  a  memory,  a 

15  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  pp.  9  f . 


LIBHAPIY 

•TATE  TEACHERS  COLLEat 
SANTA  BARBARA.  CALIFORNIA 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHQT  OGV — tet 

perception — is  its  meaning,  its  import?  But  as  a  matter  of 
fact  the  distinction  applies  as  well  to  the  mental  world  as  to 
the  physical,  and  the  question  must  be  answered  in  the  nega- 
tive. The  evidence  that  mental  processes  "may  be  treated 
scientifically  as  bare  facts"  and  "are  not  intrinsically  meaning- 
ful" is  set  forth  by  Titchener  under  six  heads." 

In  the  first  place  (i)  "meaning  may  be  stripped  from  the 
mental  process  to  which  it  normally  belongs."  {E.g.,  a  woid 
— "house,"  for  instance — will  lose  all  its  significance  and  be- 
come a  mere  meaningless  sound  if  repeated  aloud  to  oneself 
several  times).  On  the  other  hand,  (2)  an  experience  at  first 
meaningless  may  later  "take  on  a  meaning" ;  as,  for  example, 
when  that  which  at  first  seems  to  be  a  mere  tangle  of  lines 
turns  out,  on  further  investigation,  to  be,  let  us  say,  a  meteor- 
ological record;  or  when  a  series  of  meaningless  marks  comes 
later  on  to  be  interpreted  and  understood  as  a  sentence  in 
Greek  or  Hebrew.  (3)  "An  experience  and  its  meaning  may 
be  disjointed  in  time" ;  as  when  one  fails  to  see  the  point  of  a 
joke  until  sometime  after  hearing  it,  or  in  the  reverse  and 
very  common  situation  in  which  one  knows  what  one  wishes 
to  say  and  yet  cannot  for  a  while  put  the  meaning  into  words. 
(4)  "One  and  the  same  experience  may  have  several  mean- 
ings" or  possible  meanings;  as  a  word,  "a  bit  of  bad  hand- 
writing, a  distant  object,  an  obscure  patch  in  a  painting,"  etc 
Or,  (5),  reversing  the  last-named  distinction,  "one  and  the 
same  meaning  may  attach  to  several  experiences";  as  when  a 
word  and  a  graphic  symbol  may  represent  the  same  idea  (e.g., 
the  word  "triangle"  and  the  mathematical  symbol  "A").  Fi- 
nally, (6)  meaning  and  mental  process  are  independent  vari- 
ables; "richness  and  fullness  of  experience  do  not  necessarily 
correspond  with  wealth  of  meaning,"  nor  does  "poverty  of 
experience  .  .  .  necessarily  mean  loss  or  reduction  of  mean- 
ing." (E.g.,  complexity  of  style  and  theme  certainly  does  not 
conduce  toward  clearness  of  understanding,  nor  does  the  sig- 
nificance of  a  word  depend  upon  the  number  of  its  syllables). 

1"  Op.  cit.,  pp.  26-30. 


A02^ 


I02  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

And  yet,  notwithstanding  the  incontestable  truth  of  these 
distinctions,  the  critic  may  remain  unconvinced.  Do  not,  he 
may  insist,  all  our  experiences  in  their  inmost  nature  mean 
something  ?  Is  not  a  perception  always  a  perception  of  some- 
thing, an  idea  an  idea  of  something?  Sensations  in  them- 
selves may  be  meaningless ;  but  do  we  as  a  matter  of  fact  ever 
actually  experience  a  "pure,"  "mere,"  "meaningless,"  sensa- 
tion? "We  have  no  reason,"  admits  Professor  Titchener," 
"to  believe  that  mind  began  with  meaningless  sensations,  and 
progressed  to  meaningful  perceptions.  On  the  contrary,  we 
mxust  suppose  that  mind  was  meaningful  from  the  very  out- 
set." "What,  then,  from  the  psychological  point  of  view,  is 
this  meaning?"  In  other  words,  "What  mental  processes  .  .  , 
are  the  scientific  equivalents  of  what  we  know  in  everyday  life 
as  meaning?"  Or,  most  briefly  stated,  "what  processes  carry 
the  meaning  ?"^^ 

The  answer  is,  that  from  the  psychological  point  of  view 
meaning  is  context.  To  elucidate : — Every  perception  is 
analyzable  into  an  associated  group  of  sensations  and  imager, 
of  which  the  sensations  constitute  a  central  core  and  nucleus, 
and  the  associated  images  form  as  it  were  a  context  or  "fringe" 
which  binds  together  the  whole  and  gives  it  a  definite  meaning. 
Thus,  when  I  hear  the  sound  of  a  bell,  the  sound  sensations 
call  into  consciousness  at  once  a  number  of  associated  visual, 
tactual,  motor,  and  possibly  further  auditory,  images  derived 
from  past  experiences  of  this  particular  bell  or  of  others  more 
or  less  like  it ;  all  these  fusing  together  into  a  single  experience 
which  I  call  "the  perception  of  a  bell,"  and  in  which  the  sound 
sensations  occupy  the  centre  of  attention,  and  the  associated 
images  constitute  the  fringe  of  meaning  that  makes  the  sensa- 
tions not  "mere"  sensations  but  symbols  of  a  physical  object. 
Likewise,  in  visually  perceiving  an  orange,  the  sensations  of 
color  and  brightness  arouse  contextual  images  of  smell,  taste, 

^'^  A   Test  Book  of  Psychology,  p.  369. 
"^  Beginner's  Psychology,  pp.  117  f. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      103 

touch,  which  enable  us  to  "recognize"  the  object — i.e.,  give  a 
meaning  to  the  sensations. 

Similarly,  every  idea  has  a  core  or  nucleus  of  images,  and 
a  fringe  of  associated  images  and  possibly  also  of  sensations 
(kinaesthetic  in  most  cases)  which  give  meaning  to  the  nuclear 
images.  The  most  efficient  nuclear  symbol  of  the  idea  is  the 
word,  (as  "triangle,"  "horse"),  but  a  representative  image 
(as  the  figure  A,  or  the  picture  of  some  particular  horse)  may 
do  as  well,  provided  it  is  consciously  accepted  as  a  mere  sym- 
bol of  the  concept  and  of  no  interest  in  itself. 

In  all  these  cases,  the  meaning  of  the  perception  or  idea  is 
"carried"  by  the  contextual  images  or  sensations,  and  it  is 
context  which  gives  meaning  to  every  experience,  and  yet  it 
would  be  inaccurate  to  say  that  the  meaning  of  a  sensation  or 
symbolic  image  is  through  and  through  nothing  but  its  asso- 
ciated images  or  sensations,  for  this  would  be  a  violation  of 
the  principle  that  psychology  is  not  concerned  with  meanings 
All  that  is  implied  is  that  the  meanings  of  our  experiences  are 
represented^®  in  the  realm  of  mental  processes  by  "the  fringe 
of  related  processes  that  gathers  about  the  central  group  of 
sensations  or  images."^"  Psychologically,  meaning  is  context, 
but  logically  and  metaphysically  meaning  is  much  more  than 
psychological  context;  or,  to  put  it  the  other  way  around, 
whatever  meaning  may  be,  psychology  is  concerned  with  it 
only  so  far  as  it  can  be  represented  in  terms  of  contextual 
imagery. 

18  Let  no  epistemologist  from  my  use  of  this  word  jump  to  the  con- 
clusion that  I  am  here  advocating  or  binding  myself  to  a  representative 
theory  of  knowledge.  That  is  a  philosophical  question  of  the  ultimate 
nature  of  the  relation  between  ideas  and  reality,  whereas  we  are  con- 
cerned here  merely  with  the  principles  of  scientific  method  in  psychology. 
The  ordinary  man  knows  (or  thinks  he  knows)  without  introspection  or 
argument  that  things  are  and  that  his  ideas  are  true:  the  psychologist 
introspects  his  consciousness  of  meaning,  and  finds  in  his  mind  imagery 
which  symbolizes  or  represents  its  object.  The  plain  man  does  not,  and 
perhaps  the  philosopher  should  not,  dualize  mind  and  world:  the  psycholo- 
gist and  the  physicist  must  do  just  that.     (v.  Chap.  V.) 

2*>/f  Bccjinncr's  Psychology,  p.   118. 


I04         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

That  is  to  say,  the  true  meaning  of  the  percept  of  the  bell 
is  its  reference  to  the  real  objective  bell;  but  the  bell  is  not  in 
the  mind,  and  consequently  the  reference  to  it  cannot  be  a 
psychological  datum,  but  is  rather  a  logical  or  metaphysical 
problem ;  this  reference  to  an  objective  thing  may  be  however, 
and  is,  represented  in  the  mind  by  certain  contextual  images 
as  above  described,  and  these  constitute  its  meaning  "translated 
into  the  language  of"  psychology.  So  the  true  meaning  of  an 
idea  lies  in  its  logical  reference  to  an  objective  system  of 
ideas,  but  this  may  be  represented  subjectively  by  the  contex- 
tual images  or  sensations. 

One  more  illustration,  from  the  American  Journal  of  Psy- 
chology article  above  referred  to.  To  say  that  one  is  puzzled 
(e.g.)  is  to  use  terms  not  descriptive  of  psychological  facts, 
but  expressive  of  "the  import  of  a  practical  situation."  Per- 
plexity as  a  psychological  condition  is  analyzable  into  verbal, 
organic,  and  kinaesthetic  imagery,  and  an  affective  factor; 
but  its  primary  interest  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  condi- 
tion in  which  one  is  perplexed  about  something,  and  this  is  not 
a  psychological  fact  but  a  logical  one.^^  Psychology,  then,  is 
not  concerned  at  all  with  the  reality  of  our  percepts  or  with 
the  truth,  falsity,  or  logical  uncertainty  of  our  ideas,  any  more 
than  it  is  with  the  rightness  or  wrongness  of  our  conduct,  but 
only  with  the  constitution  of  these.^^ 

21  Op.  cit.,  p.  i68. 

22  Professor  Titchener  works  out  the  distinction  between  psychological 
constitution  and  logical  meaning  in  various  special  fields  very  thoroughly 
though  simply  in  his  Beginner's  Psychology.  I  append  the  page  refer- 
ences.— 

Tactile-motor  Sensations :  pp.  45-48. 

Organic  Sensations :  pp.  64  f. 

Attention:   pp.  90-93. 

Perception  of  Distance:   pp.  129  f. 

Association:  pp.  145-149,  162-165,  168  f.  (Cf.  his  Text  Book,  pp.  374- 
378). 

Memory :  pp.  184-186.  (A  memory-image  means  past  experience,  but 
this  meaning  is  represented  in  the  present  memory-experience  by  the  as- 
sociated images  which  constitute  the  "recognition"  feeling  or  "feeling  of 
familiarity.") 

Thought  and  Language:  pp.  267-275.    (Cf.  Text  Book,  pp.  517  f.) 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      105 

60.  Must  Metaphysics  Be  Rejected  f — We  have  assigned  to 
science  the  realm  of  facts  or  phenomena,  and  to  metaphysics 
the  realm  of  values.  In  this,  metaphysics  is  an  elaboration  of 
commonsense,  as  both  of  these  have  for  their  world  a  world 
of  values. 

Many  critics,  however, — as,  for  example,  Pearson — would 
demur  at  this  division  of  the  spoils  of  experience  between 
science  and  metaphysics.  "The  material  of  science,"  says 
Pearson,  "is  coextensive  with  the  whole  life,  physical  and 
mental,  of  the  universe.  ...  To  say  that  there  are  certain 
fields — for  example,  metaphysics — from  which  science  is  ex- 
cluded, wherein  its  methods  have  no  application,  is  merely  to 
say  that  the  rules  of  methodical  observation  and  the  laws  of 
logical  thought  do  not  apply  to  the  facts,  if  any,  which  lie 
within  such  fields.  These  fields,  if  indeed  such  exist,  must  lie 
outside  any  intelligible  definition  which  can  be  given  of  the 
word  knowledge."^'  Science  "claims  that  the  whole  range  of 
phenomena,  mental  as  well  as  physical — the  entire  universe — 
is  its  field.  It  asserts  that  the  scientific  method  is  the  sole 
gateway  to  the  whole  region  of  knowledge."^*  "There  is  no 
sphere  of  inquiry  which  lies  outside  the  legitimate  field  of 
science.  To  draw  a  distinction  between  the  scientific  and 
philosophical  fields  is  obscurantism."^' 

L.  T.  More,  on  the  other  hand,  takes  an  almost  contrary 
position.  "The  domain  of  physics,"  he  says,  "is  concerned 
with  the  discovery  of  phenomena  and  the  formulation  of  nat- 
ural laws  based  on  ,  .  .  experience  .  .  .;  the  causes  of  phe- 
nomena and  the  discussion  of  the  postulates  of  science  lie  in 
the  province  of  the  metaphysician.  This  does  not  mean  that 
such  questions  should  not  be  discussed,  but  the  method  of  their 
discussion  and  the  results  obtained  are  properly  the  method 
and  results  of  metaphysics,  and  are  not  in  the  category  of 
physical  phenomena  and  laws.""    "The  limitations  of  science 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  15. 
**  Op.  cit.,  p.  24. 
"  Op.  cit..  p.  37. 
*•  The  Limitations  of  Science,  pp.  13  f.    Quoted  also  above  (56). 


io6         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

are  due  solely  to  the  fact  that  there  are,  in  addition  to  material 
forces,  others  of  an  essentially  different  kind  which  may  be 
called,  for  lack  of  a  better  name,  spiritual  powers.  And  so 
long  as  men  of  science  restrict  their  endeavor  to  the  world  of 
material  substance  and  material  force,  they  will  find  that  their 
field  is  practically  without  limits.  .  .  .  And  it  should  distress 
no  one  to  discover  that  there  are  other  fields  of  knowledge  in 
which  science  is  not  concerned. "^^ 

Both  Pearson  and  More  agree,  as  we  have  already  seen 
(56),  that  the  problem  of  science  is  description  only;  but 
whereas  More  is  willing  to  hand  over  to  another  discipline, 
metaphysics,  the  problem  of  explanation  and  hypothesis. 
Pearson  denies  that  there  can  be  any  room  for  metaphysics  in 
the  thinker's  universe.  The  reconciliation  of  the  conflict  be- 
tween these  two  writers  is  to  be  found,  I  think,  in  the  accep- 
tance of  Pearson's  claim  that  the  "material"  or  subject-matter 
of  science  is  coextensive  with  the  whole  universe,  physical  and 
mental,  and  an  insistence  that  the  distinction  between  science 
and  metaphysics  is  not  one  of  subject-matter  but  of  point  of 
view,  problem,  and  method.  The  value  point  of  view  and  the 
problem  of  interpretation  are  metaphysical,  whereas  science 
abstracts  from  value  and  has  for  its  problem  description  and 
explanation — meaning  by  explanation  what  has  already  been 
asserted  of  it  (52-55);  and  in  the  admission  of  that  latter 
problem  we  take  a  stand  in  opposition  both  to  Pearson  and  tc 
More.  More  is  right,  therefore,  in  distinguishing  metaphysics 
from  science  and  insisting  on  its  right  to  exist,  but  wrong  in 
assigning  the  problem  of  explanation  to  that  discipline.  No 
fact  is  outside  the  field  of  scientific  investigation,  but  on  the 
other  hand  a  scientific  study  of  the  universe  is  incomplete  un- 
less supplemented  by  a  metaphysical  interpretation  of  the 
truths  which  science  has  worked  out. 

3.  Psychology  as  Science  and  as  Metaphysics. 

61.  Aspects  of  Personality. — Persons  may  be  regarded  from 
cither  one  of  two  quite  opposite  points  of  view — (i)  as  Ob- 

27  Ibid.,  pp.  260  f . 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      107 

jects  of  scientific  investigation,  or  (2)  as  Subjects  similar  to 
myself  to  be  understood  and  appreciated.  I  may,  according 
to  my  own  purpose  at  the  moment,  view  another  personality 
in  either  way:  I  may  wish  merely  to  enter  into  "personal  re- 
lations" with  him — to  discover  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  his 
conversation  and  behavior  (interpretation) ,  and  thereby  share 
those  purposes  and  meanings  with  him  (appreciation)  ;  or  I 
may  wish  to  study  him  scientifically,  to  discover  what  pro- 
cesses are  going  on  in  his  mind — what  perceptions,  memories, 
ideas,  emotions,  desires,  etc.,  are  present  in  his  consciousness 
(description) — and  how  they  are  related  to  one  another  and 
to  his  past  experience  (explanation). 

As  Miinsterberg  puts  it :  "In  the  most  trivial  conversations 
or  in  the  most  momentous  situations  of  life,  the  mind  with 
which  we  are  dealing  may  ...  be  to  us  either  a  self  into 
whose  purposes  we  enter,  or  a  bundle  of  mental  states  which 
are  linked  together."^*  "If  I  meet  a  friend  and  we  enter  into 
a  talk,  I  try  to  understand  his  thoughts  and  to  share  his  views. 
I  agree  or  disagree  with  him ;  I  sympathize  with  his  feelings, 
I  estimate  his  purposes.  In  short,  he  is  for  me  a  centre  of 
aims  and  intentions  which  I  interpret:  he  comes  in  question 
for  me  as  a  self  which  has  its  meaning  and  has  its  unity.  .  . 
His  personality  lies  in  his  attitude  towards  the  surroundings, 
towards  the  world."  Here  is  one  aspect  of  his  personality  and 
one  way  in  which  I  may  treat  him.  "Yet  I  may  take  an  en- 
tirely different  relation  to  the  same  man.  I  may  ask  myself 
what  processes  are  going  on  in  his  mind,  what  are  the  real 
contents  of  his  consciousness — that  is,  what  perceptions  and 
memory  pictures  and  imaginative  ideas  and  feelings  and  emo- 
tions and  judgments  and  volitions  are  really  present  in  his 
consciousness.  I  watch  him  to  find  out,  I  observe  his  mental 
states,  I  do  not  ask  whether  I  agree  or  disagree.  .  .  .  What  I 
now  find  is  not  a  self  which  shows  itself  in  its  aims  and  pur- 
poses and  attitudes,  but  a  complex  content  of  consciousness 
which  is  composed  of  numberless  elements.     I  might  say  in 

^^  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  p.  12. 


io8         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  first  place  that  my  friend  was  to  me  a  subject  whom  I 
tried  to  understand  by  interpreting  his  meaning;  and  in  the 
second  case,  an  object  which  I  understand  by  describing  its 
structure,  its  elements,  and  their  connections."^^  "In  one  case 
T  wanted  to  interpret  the  man,  and  finally  to  appreciate  him; 
in  the  other  case  I  wanted  to  describe  his  inner  life,  and 
finally  to  explain  it.  The  man  whose  inner  life  I  want  to 
share  I  treat  as  a  subject,  the  man  whose  inner  life  I  want  to 
describe  and  explain  I  treat  as  an  object."^^ 

And  "this  twofold  way  of  looking  into  the  neighbor's  mind 
shows  itself  no  less  when  we  think  of  our  own  mental  life. 
.  .  .  Our  love  and  hate,  our  likes  and  dislikes,  our  agreeing 
and  disagreeing,  our  thinking  of  this  and  of  that,  are  the  acts 
which  stand  for  our  personal  life.  We  live  in  those  feelings 
and  emotions,  and  thoughts;  we  ourselves  are  those  inner 
activities.  And  yet  we  may  consider  this  same  inner  life  as 
if  we  were  spectators  looking  on  at  that  procession  of  inner 
events,  observing  the  happenings  of  our  own  consciousness 
[introspection].  Then  we  give  our  attention  to  the  structure 
of  our  memories  and  imaginative  ideas,  perceptions  and 
thoughts;  and  even  our  feelings  and  emotions  and  volitions 
then  lie  before  us  like  objects  of  which  we  become  aware. 
...  A  greater  contrast  can  hardly  be  imagined :  on  the  one 
side  the  stream  of  life  in  which  our  will  and  feeling  and 
thought  are  to  us  meaning  and  expression  of  our  self,  and  on 
the  other  side  the  neutral  taking  account  of  the  processes  in 
our  mind  as  if  they  were  a  spectacle  which  we  are  objectively 
watching.  "^^ 

62.  Psychology  vs.  Metaphysics. — "Both  ways  of  looking 
on  man,"  says  Munsterberg,  "are  constantly  needed, "^^  both 
are  necessary  for  a  thorough  and  comprehensive  understand- 
ing of  our  fellows.     "We  actually  rely  on  both  in  every  prac- 

^^  Psychotherapy,  pp.  ii  f.     Italics  mine. 
2°  Op.  cit.,  p.  13.    Italics  mine. 
3^  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  pp.  12  f. 
32  Psychotherapy,  p.  12. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      109 

tical  situation,  and  wherever  we  recognize  the  one  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  other,  we  neglect  certain  life  interests.  The 
teacher  may  look  on  the  pupil  in  the  schoolroom  as  a  free  re- 
sponsible individual  and  may  understand  him  as  a  centre  of 
meaning.  But  if  this  were  all  he  would  neglect  the  mechanism 
of  that  young  mind ;  he  might  fatigue  its  will  power,  overbur- 
den its  memory  mechanism,  neglect  the  hygienic  conditions  of 
its  working  and  interfere  with  the  processes  of  assimilation. 
On  the  other  hand,  .  .  .  the  teacher  may  look  on  the  child 
only  as  a  mental  mechanism,  where  every  change  must  be  un- 
derstood as  an  effect  of  psychophysical  causes,  and  every 
thought  and  feeling  be  regarded  as  a  content  of  consciousness. 
But  if  this  were  all,  the  best  meaning  of  instruction  would  be 
lost.  A  naked  calculation  of  causes  and  effects  would  intrude 
where  personal  sympathy  and  personal  tact  ought  to  control 
the  intercourse.  The  ideal  value  of  the  instruction  would  be 
lost.  The  child  would  be  to  the  teacher  nothing  but  a  case  of 
psychophysical  activity  [a  valueless  object],  instead  of  being 
a  free  individual  [a  purposeful  subject]  with  growing  re- 
sponsibility worthy  of  personal  interest."^' 

Now,  "if  these  two  tendencies  of  practical  life,"  these  two 
distinct  ways  of  looking  at  personality,  "are  carried  to  their 
extreme  systematic  form,  they  lead  to  two  developed  systems 
of  psychology,  the  causal  and  the  purposive."^*  The  causal 
attitude  carried  out  systematically  and  applied  to  personality 
or  consciousness  in  general  becomes  scientific  psychology,  the 
purposive  attitude  so  carried  out  and  applied  becomes  rational 
psychology  or  metaphysics}^ 

63.  Corresponding  Attitudes  toward  Nature. — But  there  is 
after  all  nothing  unique  about  the  fact  that  we  may  take  either 
one  of  two  quite  distinct  attitudes  toward  personality,  for  the 
same  thing  is  true  of  our  relations  to  the  physical  world  about 
us,  the  world  of  nature. 

**  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  p.  294. 

•*  Op.  cit.,  p.  295.     Italics  mine. 

"C/.  Psychotherapy,  pp.  13  f.;  The  Eternal  Values,  pp.  16-18. 


no         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

"I  see  before  me  the  ocean  with  its  excited  waves  splashing 
against  the  rocks  and  shore,  I  see  the  boats  tossed  on  the 
stormy  sea,  and  I  am  fascinated  by  the  new  and  ever  new  im- 
pulses of  the  tumultuous  waves.  The  whole  appears  to  me 
like  one  gigantic  energy,  like  one  great  emotional  expression, 
and  I  feel  deeply  how  I  understand  this  beautiful  scenery  in 
appreciating  its  unity  and  its  meaning.  Yet  would  I  think 
that  it  is  the  only  way  to  understand  this  turmoil  of  the  waters 
before  me?  I  know  there  is  no  unity  and  no  emotion  in  the 
excited  sea;  each  wave  is  composed  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  single  drops  of  water,  and  each  drop  composed  of  billions 
of  atoms,  and  every  movement  results  from  mechanical  laws 
under  the  influence  of  the  pressing  water  and  air.  There  is 
hydrogen  and  there  is  oxygen,  and  there  is  chloride  of  sodium, 
and  the  dark  blue  color  is  nothing  but  the  reflection  of  bil- 
lions of  ether  vibrations.  But  have  I  really  to  choose  between 
two  statements  concerning  the  waves,  one  of  which  is  valu- 
able and  the  other  not?  On  the  contrary,  both  have  funda- 
mental value.  If  I  take  the  attitude  of  appreciation,  it  would 
be  absurd  to  say  that  this  wave  is  composed  of  chemical  ele- 
ments which  I  do  not  see ;  and  if  I  take  the  attitude  of  physical 
explanation,  it  would  be  equally  absurd  to  deny  that  such  ele- 
ments are  all  of  which  the  wave  is  made.  From  one  stand- 
point, the  ocean  is  really  excited;  from  the  other  standpoint, 
the  molecules  are  moving  according  to  the  laws  of  hydro- 
dynamics. If  I  want  to  understand  the  meaning  of  this  scene, 
every  reminiscence  of  physics  will  lead  me  astray;  if  I  want 
to  calculate  the  movement  of  my  boat,  physics  alone  can  help 
me."^« 

The  former  attitude  that  we  take  toward  the  ocean,  toward 
nature  in  general,  and  toward  the  world  of  art,  is  the  aesthetic 
attitude,  the  attitude  of  appreciation  and  interpretation — the 
other  attitude  is  scientific,  the  attitude  of  description  and  ex- 
planation ;  and  both  are  valid,  both  are  true,  both  are  valuable. 
Each  must  be  kept  separate  from  the  other,  because  confusion 

36  Psychology,  pp.  lo  f .    Italics  mine. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      in 

between  them  will  ruin  the  usefulness  of  both.  As  a  psycho- 
logical attitude  toward  one's  friend  jeopardizes  friendship 
and  a  personal  attitude  toward  mind  in  general  makes  a  scien- 
tific study  of  mind  impossible;  so  physical  analysis  or  dis- 
section of  a  beautiful  flower  or  picture  or  musical  composition 
will  destroy  its  beauty,  and  a  sentimental  attitude  toward 
either  will  render  a  study  of  it  from  the  point  of  view  of 
physics  impossible. 

4.  Psychology  and  Real  Life. 

64.  Psychology  and  the  True  Personality. — All  experiences, 
then,  to  return  to  the  mental  world,  are  at  the  same  time  ( i ) 
compounds  of  sensations,  affections,  etc.,  or  phases  of  the 
stream  of  consciousness;  and  (2)  expressions  of  the  purposes 
and  inner  meanings  of  the  self — according  to  the  point  of 
view.  But  though  this  is  true,  it  would  be  absurd  to  insist  that 
the  two  attitudes  are  equally  true  to  the  real  inner  nature  of 
the  mind, 

*Tf  you  and  I  talk  with  each  other,  I  not  only  take  you  as 
a  subject  whom  I  am  to  understand,  but  I  feel  myself  as  a 
subject  who  agrees  and  disagrees,  who  likes  and  dislikes  what 
you  say,  and  who  wants  his  own  opinion  to  be  understood. 
It  is  quite  improbable  that  I  am  watching  my  mental  states  as 
objects,  while  we  are  engaged  in  our  conversation.  But  if  I 
afterward  begin  to  think  about  it,  I  may  very  well  call  back 
those  ideas  and  emotions  of  mine  and  make  them  pass  before 
my  inner  eye  as  mere  mental  happenings  which  come  and  go 
like  the  clouds  and  the  sunshine  and  the  landscape  outside." 
There  is  no  question,  however,  that  "the  first  standpoint  is  the 
more  natural  one,"  and  the  "second  a  somewhat  artificial" 
though  often  necessary  one.  In  the  same  way,  "it  is  more 
natural  to  drink  water  than  to  analyze  it  in  the  laboratory," 
though  "if  we  want  to  understand  what  we  can  expect  from 
the  water,  we  must  determine  its  constitution  and  examine  its 
properties." 

"^  Miinsterbcrg,  Psychology  General  and  Applied,  pp.  13  f. 


112  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  true  personality,  mental  life  as  it  is  actually  experi- 
enced by  the  individual  himself,  is  certainly  not  a  mere  ag- 
gregate of  sensations,  ideas,  feelings,  etc.,  but  a  living  unity, 
a  system  of  purposes.  Our  various  acts,  feelings,  and  thoughts 
are  partial  phases  or  expressions  of  that  unitary  personality — 
not  distinct  entities — teleologically,  not  causally,  intercon- 
nected. "We  remain  identical  with  ourselves  in  our  inner 
personal  life  because  every  purpose  is  .  .  .  bound  up  with  the 
general  purpose  of  ourselves."  But  if,  as  psychologists,  we 
wish  to  study  our  own  and  other  minds  scientifically,  we  must 
take  the  more  artificial  causal  attitude:  "the  purposive  unity 
must  transform  itself  into  endless  complexity,  and  our  [true] 
self  becomes  a  composite  of  .  .  .  elements."^*  Thus  any 
scientific  study  of  the  mind  involves  a  "tremendous  transfor- 
mation of  reality,"^®  the  real  inner  life  of  personality  being 
transformed  into  a  complex  of  distinct  elements  which  are  in 
themselves  merely  constructions  of  the  scientific  imagination. 

A  single  instance  will  help  to  clarify  our  point.  "Let  us 
take,"  says  Professor  Washburn,  "the  emotion  of  sympathetic 
joy.  I  can  describe  this  as  the  attitude  in  which  I  [i.e.,  my 
true  unitary  personality]  recognize  and  rejoice  in  the  exis- 
tence of  joy  in  another  self.  I  can  also  describe  it  perfectly 
well  in  terms  of  process  psychology.  The  emotion  of  joy  in 
general  may  be  structurally  analyzed  into  the  sensational  ele- 
ments of  the  idea  or  ideas  occasioning  the  emotion,  the  sen- 
sational elements  resulting  from  the  bodily  changes  involved, 
and  the  resultant  affective  tone  derived  from  all  these  sen- 
sational components.  When  the  emotion  is  one  of  sympathetic 
joy,  the  only  modification  that  our  structural  analysis  needs  is 
this:  the  occasioning  idea  is,  in  such  a  case,  an  idea  of  the 
emotion,  that  is,  a  weakened  reproduction  of  the  emotion,  as- 
sociated with  certain  ideas  which  mean  to  us  the  personality  of 
another — ideas  of  his  appearance  and  movements  or  words, 

88  Munsterberg,  Psychotherapy,  p.  52. 

39  Munsterberg,  Psychology  General  and  Applied,  p.  289. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      113 

perhaps.""  Professor  Calkins  instances  this"  as  an  argument 
for  "self -psychology,"  but  the  point  of  the  quotation  is  rather 
to  emphasize  the  inadequacy  and  artificiality  of  any  scientific 
treatment  of  mental  processes. 

65.  Physical  Science  and  the  Real  World. — Precisely  the 
same  situation  exists  with  reference  to  the  physical  sciences 
To  criticize  the  psychologist  because  his  treatment  of  mind  as 
a  complex  of  elements  is  untrue  to  the  real  nature  of  person- 
ality, says  Miinsterberg,  is  as  stupid  as  it  would  be  "to  cast 
up  against  the  physicist  that  his  moving  atoms  do  not  represent 
the  physical  world  because  they  have  no  color  and  sound  and 
smell.  If  they  sounded  and  smelled,  the  physicist  would  not 
have  fulfilled  his  purpose."*^  The  world  of  psychology  is 
not  the  world  of  real  life,  nor  is  the  physicist's  world  the 
world  of  sensory  experience. 

So,  Titchener:  "The  world  which  is  most  familiar,  and  to 
which  our  response  is  most  direct  and  certain,"  is  a  "world  of 
things  and  people,  of  boats  and  trains,  of  relatives  and  stran- 
gers, of  quarrels  and  reconciliations,  of  successes  and  fail- 
ures." Physics,  however,  "deals  not  with  boats  and  trains, 
but  with  masses  and  distances  and  velocities;  and  psychology 
deals  not  with  quarrels  and  successes,  but  with  emotions  and 
voluntary  actions,"*^  affective  elements  and  conative  trends 

Commonsense,  we  may  add  in  explanation  of  the  above,  is 
interested  in  boats  and  trains  because  we  can  use  them  m  our 
daily  life,  and  is  interested  in  our  quarrels  and  successes  be- 
cause they  mean  something  for  our  future  happiness  or  the 
reverse.  Science,  on  the  other  hand,  both  physical  and  mental 
science,  is  interested  in  the  constitution  of  these  things  and  in 
the  laws  of  their  functioning,  and  in  their  external  significance 
only  so  far  as  a  knowledge  of  this  may  throw  light  on  the  im- 
mediately scientific  problems. 

*'*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  Vol.  II,  p.  715  (1905). 

*^  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc..  Vol.  V,  pp.  121  f.  (1908). 

*^  Atlantic  Monthly,  May,  1898,  p.  613. 

*^  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  XXIII,  p.  167  (1912). 


114         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  concepts  of  physical  science — such  concepts,  for  ex- 
ample, as  energy,  atoms,  electrons,  ether,  and  even  matter  it- 
self— are  as  much  constructions  of  the  scientific  imagination 
as  the  psychologist's  concepts  of  mental  elements  and  of  mind 
as  a  mere  sum-total  of  such  elements  (54).  To  take  the 
former  as  ultimately  real  is  the  metaphysical  error  of  ma- 
terialism. Physical  science  considers  the  world  as  a  mechan- 
ism, and  for  that  reason  transforms  the  reality  of  the  physical 
world  as  we  know  it  in  our  ordinary  experience  into  a  world 
which  is  not  recognizable  at  all  to  the  man  of  commonsense. 

"It  puts  in  the  place  of  perceivable  objects  imperceivable 
atoms  which  are  merely  products  of  mathematical  construction 
quite  unlike  any  known  thing."  "These  atoms  are  scientific- 
ally true,  as  their  construction  is  necessary  for  that  special 
logical  purpose" ;  "but  it  is  absurd  to  think,  with  the  material- 
istic philosopher,  that  these  atoms  form  a  reality  which  is 
more  real  than  the  known  things,  or  even  the  only  reality." 
"The  physical  science  of  matter  is  true,  and  is  true  without 
limit,  and  without  exception:  materialism  is  wrong  from  be- 
ginning to  end."** 

In  the  same  way,  to  regard  the  mental  contents  and  elements 
of  structural  psychology  as  ultimately  real  is  the  metaphysical 
error  of  psychologism.  "Psychology  is  right,  but  the  psychol- 
ogism  which  considers  the  psychological  elements  and  their 
mechanism  as  reality  is  wrong  from  its  root  to  its  top,  and 
...  is  not  a  bit  better  than  materialism."  "The  psychical 
mechanism  has  no  advantage  over  the  physical  one ;  both  mean 
a  dead  world  without  ends  and  values — laws,  but  no  duties; 
effects,  but  no  purposes;  causes,  but  no  ideals.  There  is  no 
mental  fact  which  the  psychologist  has  not  to  metamorphose 
into  psychical  elements ;  and  as  this  transformation  is  logically 
valuable,  his  psychical  elements  and  their  associative  and  in- 
hibitory play  are  scientifically  true.  But  a  psychical  element, 
and  an)^hing  which  is  thought  as  combination  of  psychical 
elements  and  as  working  under  the  laws  of  these  psychical 

**  Miinsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life,  p.  20.     Italics  mine. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      115 

constructions,  has  as  little  reality  as  have  the  atoms  of  the 
physicist.  Our  body  is  not  a  heap  of  atoms;  our  inner  life  is 
still  less  a  heap  of  ideas  and  feelings  and  emotions  and  voli- 
tions and  judgments,  if  we  take  these  mental  things  in  the 
way  the  psychologist  has  to  take  them,  as  contents  of  con- 
sciousness made  up  from  psychical  elements. "*'' 

The  upshot  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  mental  and  physical 
science  are  exactly  on  a  par  with  reference  to  the  reality  of 
their  concepts.  "Neither  physical  objects  nor  psychical  ob- 
jects represent  reality,  but  both  are  ideal  constructions  of  the 
subject"*" — transformations  of  reality  made  for  the  purposes 
of  science,  and  so  having  scientific  truth  even  though  not  in 
themselves  objectively  real. 

66.  The  Necessity  of  a  Scientific  Study  of  the  Mind. — From 
our  discussion  of  the  problems  and  methods  of  science,  and  of 
the  relations  between  psychology  and  real  life,  two  comple- 
mentary truths  with  regard  to  the  scientific  method  of  study- 
ing the  mind  stand  out  sharply  before  us — (i)  the  incom- 
pleteness, one-sidedness,  and  even  unreality,  of  the  scientific 
view  of  the  mind;  and  (2)  its  logical  necessity  and  scientific 
truthfulness.  We  have  seen  that  a  real  understanding  of  the 
mind  of  one's  friend  depends  not  so  much  upon  an  analysis 
of  its  contents  as  upon  an  appreciation  of  its  tneanings — am 
entering  into  and  sympathizing  with  the  feelings  and  attitudes 
of  the  friend,  rather  than  an  impersonal  observation  of  his 
behavior  and  a  critical  examination  into  what  lies  beyond. 
And  yet  there  is  the  complementary  truth  that  this  impersonal, 
critical,  scientific  method  of  studying  the  mind  has  neverthe- 
less an  essential  function  to  perform.  Let  us  see  why  this  is 
so,  and  what  this  function  is. 

Philosophy,  as  we  have  seen,  is  concerned  solely  with  ends 
or  purposes,  science  with  the  means  or  instruments  for  the  at- 
tainment of  those  ends.  Physical  science  transforms  the  re- 
ality of  the  living  universe  into  a  mechanism  of  atoms  and 

«» Op.  cit..  pp.  20  f . 
*«  Op.  cit.,  p.  19. 


ii6         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

electrons  because  it  is  only  through  an  understanding  of  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  nature  that  man  has  been  able  to  be- 
come master  of  nature  and  to  conform  its  processes  to  the 
fulfilment  of  his  own  purposes.  In  the  same  way,  the  psy- 
chologist has  transformed  the  reality  of  the  living  personality 
into  a  mechanism  of  sensations  and  affections  because  it  is 
only  through  that  means  that  he  may  become  in  some  degree 
the  master  of  his  own  nature  and  the  fashioner  of  his  own 
destiny.  The  psychologist  wishes  "to  understand  the  inner  life 
as  a  system  of  causes  and  effects,  and  to  recognize  every  ex- 
perience as  the  necessary  result  of  foregoing  conditions,  in 
order  to  foresee  what  will  happen  in  the  mind  and  to  influence 
it.  If  this  is  the  purpose,  any  reconstruction  of  the  inner  life 
which  helps  toward  this  goal  must  be  welcomed  as  psychologi- 
cal truth.  "*^ 

It  is  an  important  ethical  maxim  that  we  should  treat  other 
persons  always  as  ends,  never  as  means,  and  as  a  rule  of 
moral  conduct  this  is  an  inviolable  principle.  But  all  minds — 
other  people's  as  well  as  our  own — are  means  sometimes,  for 
certain  specific  momentary  purposes.  Just  as  we  use  material 
objects  as  instruments  for  the  attainment  of  our  own  ends, 
so  persons  may  become  instruments  for  the  attainment  of 
one  another's  ends;  consequently,  an  understanding  of  the 
mechanism  of  the  mind  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  use  our  own 
minds  as  instruments  for  the  accomplishment  of  our  purposes. 

The  justification  for  the  scientific  treatment  of  the  mind, 
then,  is  a  twofold  justification — theoretical  and  practical — a 
better  understanding  of  the  mind,  and  a  greater  ability  to 
control  its  activity  for  the  fulfilment  of  our  purposes.*^  If 
the  artificial  methods  of  science  are  helpful  in  these  two  ways, 
they  are  justifiable;  otherwise,  not.  Professor  Creighton  has 
well  stated  this  point.  "It  is  possible,"  he  says,  "and  often 
necessary,  to  pass  from  the  concrete  to  the  abstract — i.e.,  to 
adopt  abstract  analysis  as  a  m^ans  to  further  concrete  intel- 

*7  Miinsterberg,  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  p.  291. 
*^  Cf.  sect.  55,  on  the  Validity  of  Conceptual  Hypotheses. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      117 

ligibility;  but  .  .  .  the  transformation  into  abstract  terms  can 
never  be  an  end  in  itself,  it  is  justifiable  only  when  the  process 
of  abstraction  serves  to  promote  an  understanding  [theoretical 
justification]  and  to  facilitate  control  [practical  justifica- 
tion]."*' 

Truth  for  science,  then,  is  always  relative  to  the  scientific 
purpose :  it  consists  not  so  much  in  the  conformity  of  scientific 
concepts  to  reality  as  in  their  practical  utility.  In  other  words, 
these  concepts  are  true  for  the  purposes  of  science  if  they  are 
practically  or  theoretically  necessary  even  though  they  have 
no  ultimate  truth  for  metaphysics. 

67.  The  Place  of  the  Contemporary  Schools  of  Psychol- 
ogy.— The  view  we  have  been  considering  throughout  the 
present  chapter  should  throw  new  light  upon  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  the  preceding  chapter,  in  that  it  offers  a  reconciliation 
of  structuralism  and  functionalism,  acknowledging  the  place 
of  each  of  these  theories  as  important  aspects  of  scientific  psy- 
chology and  giving  "self-psychology"  entirely  over  to  meta- 
physics. Structural  psychology  treats  the  mind  as  a  complex 
of  sensations,  affections,  etc.,  and  so  has  to  do  primarily  with 
the  problem  of  description — general  description,  analysis,  and 
classification.  Functional  psychology  treats  mental  processes 
as  phases  of  a  continuous  stream  of  consciousness,  and  so  has 
its  primary  value  in  the  field  of  explanation.  Now  both  of 
these  are  legitimate  and  scientific  aims,  but  so  soon  as  we  dis- 
cuss mental  acts  as  expressions  of  the  purposes  of  a  self,  we 
have  passed  entirely  out  of  the  field  of  science  into  that  of 
metaphysics. 

5.  Psychology  and  Other  "Mental  Sciences." 

68.  The  Mental  Sciences  and  the  Fine  Arts. — At  this  point 
an  important  problem  arises,  namely,  as  to  the  relation  which 
psychology  bears  to  the  other  sciences  which  have  to  do  with 
the  human  mind — the  historical  sciences,  the  social  sciences 
(sociology,  economics,  politics),  the  linguistic  sciences  (phi- 

*»  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXIII,  p.  166  (1914). 


ii8         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

lology,  grammar,  rhetoric)  the  normative  sciences  (logic, 
ethics,  aesthetics)  ;  and  to  the  arts  which  are  the  products  of 
the  human  mind — painting,  hterature,  music,  and  the  rest. 
Does  psychology  bear  the  same  relation  to  these  mental  sciences 
that  physics  and  chemistry  bear  to  the  material  sciences  ?  Are 
these  so-called  "mental  sciences"  indeed  sciences  at  all,  in  the 
sense  in  which  psychology  has  been  defined  to  be  a  science? 

The  problem  clears  considerably  if  we  adopt  the  distinction 
first  proposed  by  Professor  Max  Dessoir,  in  his  History  of 
Psychology,  between  three  points  of  view  from  which  the 
mind  may  be,  and  throughout  the  history  of  thought  has  been, 
studied.  From  the  beginning,  this  writer  tells  us,  man  has 
had  a  threefold  interest  in  the  study  of  the  mind — (i)  a  re- 
ligious interest  in  the  destiny  of  the  soul,  (2)  a  scientific  in- 
terest in  the  mind  as  guiding  principle  of  the  body,  and  (3) 
a  practical  interest  in  the  understanding  of  individual  char- 
acter. Out  of  the  first  of  these  has  developed  what  Dessoir 
calls  Psychosophy,  which  corresponds  to  what  we  have  in  the 
preceding  pages  described  as  metaphysical,  rational,  or  pur- 
posive psychology;  out  of  the  second  has  come  what  we  now 
know  as  empirical  or  scientific  Psychology;  while  the  third 
constitutes  what  Dessoir  denominates  Psychognosis,  the  un- 
derstanding of  the  individual  mind. 

Most  worthy  of  notice  is  the  above  relation  between  "psy- 
chosophy" and  "psychognosis,"  in  that  both  of  them,  as  op- 
posed to  psychology  proper,  approach  the  mind  from  the 
purposive  rather  than  the  causal  point  of  view;  both  of  them 
aim  to  understand  and  interpret,  rather  than  to  explain,  their 
objects ;  both  are  concerned  rather  with  motives  and  meanings 
than  with  processes  and  contents.  But  along  with  this  close 
similarity  in  point  of  view  is  to  be  noticed  also  this  important 
distinction  between  them — that  psychognosis  is  concerned  en- 
tirely with  individual  minds,  whereas  psychosophy  is  inter- 
ested in  the  universal,  the  nature  of  the  mind  as  such.  From 
this  distinction  of  Dessoir's  as  a  base,  we  can  start  out  more 
understandingly  upon  our  task  of  correlating  psychology  with 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      119 

the  other  mental  sciences  and  arts  referred  to  at  the  beginning 
of  this  section. 

Let  us  note  first  of  all  that  when  any  one  of  us  wishes  to 
behold  a  true  picture  of  human  life  and  character,  it  is  never 
to  the  psychological  textbooks  nor  to  the  publications  of  the 
exi^erimental  laboratories  that  he  goes,  but  rather  to  the  his- 
tory books,  the  biographies,  the  character-studies  of  the  poets 
and  novelists.  Of  whom  do  we  most  naturally  think  as  the 
greatest  portray ers  of  human  character — of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, Locke  and  Spencer,  Herbart  and  Wundt?  or,  rather,  of 
Shakespeare  and  Balzac,  Xenophon  and  Macaulay,  Plutarch 
and  Vasari?  Would  Hartley  or  Reid  have  depicted  the  life 
and  character  of  Samuel  Johnson  better  than  Bos  well  has 
done  ?  No  one  would  hesitate  as  to  the  correct  answer  to  these 
inquiries,  and  for  the  simple  reason  that  everyone  knows  that 
it  is  the  purpose  of  the  scientist  to  analyze  and  explain  rather 
than  to  understand  and  appreciate,  and  that  the  historian  and 
literateur  understand  human  nature  as  it  really  is  far  better 
than  the  psychologist  because  they  approach  it  from  the  pur- 
posive rather  than  the  causal  point  of  view.'^"  And  it  is  for 
precisely  the  same  reason  that  we  turn  to  Wordsworth  and 
Corot  rather  than  to  Linnaeus  and  Darwin  for  a  true  appre- 
ciation and  understanding  of  the  soul  of  the  nature  which 
lies  about  us. 

In  the  same  way,  the  "normative  sciences"  are  concerned 
with  the  evaluation  of  mental  life — its  meanings,  ideals,  pur- 
poses— rather  than  with  the  description  and  causal  explanation 
of  the  actual  mental  processes  of  reasoning,  feeling,  and  con- 
duct. Logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics  are  regarded  as  branches 
of  philosophy  rather  than  independent  sciences  because  of  this 

^*>  It  is  interesting  at  this  point  to  call  attention  to  the  now  forgotten 
controversy  of  a  half-century  ago  over  Buckle's  theory  that  human  his- 
tory is  subject  to  the  same  causal  laws  that  govern  the  history  of  the 
earth  and  the  physical  universe.  Today  the  purposive  theory  of  history, 
however,  holds  the  stage  unchallenged,  (v.  Thayer,  Atlantic  Monthly, 
Vol.  122,  pp.  635  flf.,  Nov.  1918.) 


I20         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

very  fact  that,  like  metaphysics,  they  view  their  subject-matter 
purposively  rather  than  causally. 

Contrasted,  however,  with  the  historical  and  normative 
groups  of  sciences,  and  the  fine  arts  including  literature,  as 
purposive  in  their  outlook  and  interpretative  in  their  aim,  are 
the  distinctly  causal  and  explanatory  sciences  of  the  social  and 
Imguistic  groups.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  point  of 
view,  methods,  and  aims  of  such  sciences  as  sociology,  eco- 
nomics, and  politics,  philology,  grammar  and  rhetoric  are  the 
same  as  those  of  psychology  and  the  physical  sciences.  When 
we  say  that  psychology  is  the  central  mental  science,  then,  it  is 
with  reference  to  the  above  groups  that  we  speak ;  just  as  when 
we  say  that  physics  and  chemistry  are  the  central  physical 
sciences,  we  are  referring  to  their  relation  to  astronomy,  ge- 
ology, biology,  and  the  rest. 

69.  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences. — We  have  now  re- 
plied to  the  first  of  the  two  inquiries  propounded  in  the  open- 
ing paragraph  of  the  preceding  section,  but  what  of  the  sec- 
ond question?  Are  the  so-called  "sciences"  of  the  historical 
and  normative  groups  really  sciences  at  all?  The  apparent 
confusion  is  due  to  the  ambiguous  use  in  our  language  of  the 
term  "science."  In  its  broadest  and  historic  sense  the  term 
includes  all  systems  of  knowledge,  whether  of  the  causal  or 
the  purposive  type :  in  the  stricter  and  more  technical  sense, 
however,  it  is  limited  to  knowledge  systems  of  the  causal 
type,  and  it  is  in  this  latter  significance  that  we  have  above 
(50-56)  discussed  the  problems,  aims,  and  methods,  of  science 
as  opposed  to  those  of  metaphysics.  We  may  avoid  all  am- 
biguity by  speaking  of  the  mechanistic  or  causal  or  positive 
sciences  when  referring  to  the  narrower  group. 

In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said  we  may  approach  the 
age-old  problem  of  the  classification  of  the  sciences,  in  which 
expression  the  broader  meaning  of  the  term  "science"  is  al- 
ways connoted.  In  making  our  classification  we  are  con- 
cerned only  with  the  larger  groups,  and  need  not  consider 
the  place  of  every  individual  science  in  the  general  scheme, 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      121 

since  our  immediate  purpose  is  merely  to  discover  the  place 
which  psychology  and  the  other  so-called  "mental  sciences"  of 
the  preceding  section  occupy  therein. 

The  main  division  will  be  between  the  sciences  strictly  so- 
called,  in  accordance  with  our  analysis  in  the  early  pages  of 
the  present  chapter — i.e.,  the  mechanistic  or  causal  sciences, 
whose  problems  are  description  and  explanation ;  and  the  teleo- 
logical  or  purposive  sciences,  whose  problems  are  appreciation 
and  interpretation.  The  mechanistic  sciences  will  include  in 
their  turn  the  two  great  groups  of  the  material  and  the  mental 
sciences,  the  latter  being  further  specialized  into  psychology 
and  the  linguistic  and  social  sciences,  in  all  of  which  the  aim 
is  a  mechanistic  one  and  the  methods  causal  rather  than  pur- 
jxDsive.  The  teleological  disciplines  will  include  the  historical 
and  the  philosophical  sciences,  distinguished  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  that  the  former  (like  the  fine  arts)  are  interested  in  indi- 
viduals, either  singly  (biography)  or  in  groups  (history), 
whereas  philosophy  has  to  do  with  universals  (reality,  and  the 
"norms"  of  thought,  feeling,  etc.). 

TABLE  VI 
The  Classification  of  the  Sciences 

I.  THE  MECHANISTIC  SCIENCES.     (Causal  point  of  view.     Prob- 

lems:   Description  and  Explanation.) 

A.  Material  Sciences:    Physics,  Chemistry;  Astronomy,  Geology;   Bi- 

ology, etc, 

B.  Mental  Sciences — 

1.  Psychology. 

2.  Linguistic  Sciences :  Philology,  Grammar,  Rhetoric. 

3.  Social   Sciences :    Sociology,  Economics,   Politics. 

II.  THE   TELEOLOGICAL   SCIENCES.      (Purposive   point   of    view. 

Problems :    Interpretation  and  Appreciation.) 

A.  Historical  Sciences   (Individuals). 

1.  History      ]       „„      ,  .   ,. 

2.  Biography!        Psychognos.s. 

B.  Philosophical  Sciences   (Universals). 

1.  Metaphysics  (including  Rational  Psychology  or  "Psychosophy"). 

2.  Epistcmology. 

3.  The  Normative  Sciences :     Logic,  Ethics,  Aesthetics. 


122         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

70,  Psychology  and  Religion. — Most  important  is  it  in  clos- 
ing this  part  of  our  subject  to  keep  clearly  in  mind  the  inde- 
pendence of  psychology  and  religion.  By  this  expression  I 
mean  to  emphasize  the  point  that  the  results  of  scientific  in- 
vestigation into  the  inner  activities  of  the  human  mind  can 
never  have  any  effect  one  way  or  the  other  in  determining  the 
truth  or  validity  of  those  experiences  of  the  human  mind 
which  seem  to  give  evidence  of  a  personal  relationship  be- 
tween man  and  God.  The  determination  of  this  latter  point 
is  distinctly  an  epistemological  or  philosophical  problem,  not 
a  scientific  one.  Psychology  may  discuss  as  freely  the  mental 
processes  involved  in  religious  experience  as  it  does  those 
concerned  in  our  experience  of  physical  things,  but  in  neither 
case  do  its  decisions  affect  in  either  direction  the  question  of 
the  meaning,  validity,  or  truthfulness  of  those  experiences. 
The  question  of  the  nature  of  the  processes  undergone  by  the 
human  mind  in  any  spheres  of  activity  is  a  question  of  fact, 
calling  for  analytical  description  and  explanation  in  causal 
terms:  the  problem  of  the  validity  or  truth-value  of  these 
processes  is  a  question  of  meaning,  calling  for  interpretation 
and  appreciation. 

William  James,  in  his  wonderful  chapter  on  "Religion  and 
Neurology"  in  his  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  has  put 
to  scorn  forever  those  who  maintain  that  "an  existential  ac- 
count of  the  facts  of  mental  history"  can  "decide  in  one  way 
or  another  upon  their  spiritual  significance,"^^  and  insists 
that  the  latter  "can  only  be  ascertained  by  spiritual  judgments 
based  on  our  own  immediate  feeling  primarily;  and  second- 
arily on  what  we  can  ascertain  of  their  experimental  rela- 
tions to  our  moral  needs  and  to  the  rest  of  what  we  hold  as 
true.  Immediate  litminousness,  in  short,  philosophical  reason- 
ableness, and  moral  helpfulness  are  the  only  available 
criteria."" 

As  literature,  music,  and  the  other  fine  arts  are  allied  with 

51  P.  14. 

52  p.  18.     Italics  the  author's. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      123 

the  historical  sciences  in  their  teleological  view  of  human  be- 
havior, so  religion  is  allied  with  the  philosophical  sciences  for 
the  same  reason.  The  former  together  constitute  the  "psy- 
chognostic"  view  of  man,  the  latter  the  "psychosophic"  view 
of  him,  to  follow  out  Dessoir's  analysis  (68). 

REFERENCES 
The  Problems  of  Science — 

Hoffman,  F.  S.,  The  Spliere  of  Science  (1898):  especially. 

Chaps.  I-III,  VII,  IX. 
Pearson,  Karl,  The  Grammar  of  Science   (Third  Edition, 

Vol.  I,  191 1). 
More,  P.  L.,  The  Limitations  of  Science  (1915). 

Conceptual  Hypotheses  in  Psychology — 

Hart,    Bernard,    in   Subconscious   Phenomena,    by    various 

authors.  Chap.  VI,  especially  pp.  111-122. 
Hart,  Bernard,  The  Psychology  of  Insanity,  Chap.  II. 

The  Artificiality  of  Science — 

Titchener,  A  Beginner's  Psychology,  Chap.  I. 
Miinsterberg,  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  Chap.  II. 

"  The  Eternal  Values,  Chap.  I. 

"  Science  and  Idealism. 

Psychology  and  Meaning — 

Titchener,  A  Beginner's  Psychology,  Chap.  V. 

"  Text  Book  of  Psychology,  pp.  103-106. 

"  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  XXIII,  i65ff . 

(1912). 
Cf.   Dewey,  Mind,   Old   Series   Vol.   XII.   3820.    (1887). 
[What  he  calls  "idea  as  existence"  is  subject-matter  of 
psychology:  what  he  calls  "idea  as  meaning"  is  subject- 
matter  of  logic] 

Psychology  and  Metaphysics — 

Klemm,  History  of  Psychology,  pp.  155-159- 
Miinsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life,  pp.  1-34. 

"  Psychotherapy,  Chap.  II. 

"  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  Chaps.  II, 

XXI,  xxn. 

"  The  Eternal  Values,  Chaps.  I  and  II. 

Psychological  Review,  V,  639  if.  (1898),  VII, 
I  ff.  (1900). 
Scripture,  Mind,  O.  S.,  XVI,  319-324  (1891). 


124         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  True  Personality — 

Miinsterberg,  Psychology,   General  and  Applied,   Book   U, 
especially  Part  I,  and  most  particularly  Chap.  XXII. 
Psychology  and  the  other  "Mental  Sciences" — 
Scripture,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  315-319. 
Miinsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life,  pp.  179-228. 

"  Psychological     Review     Monograph     Supple- 

ments, IV,  641  ff. 
(Contrast    Creighton,    Philosophical    Review,    XXIII, 
159  ff.  1914). 

Psychology  and  Religion — 

James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  Chap.  I. 
Galloway,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Chap.  VI. 
Moore,  J.   S.,  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  XV,  76  ff. 
(1918). 


CHAPTER  V 

Psychology  and  the  Material  Sciences 

I.  Theories  of  their  Differentiation. 

71.  The  Problem. — We  have  now  marked  off  the  field  of 
psychology  from  that  of  metaphysics  and  of  the  other  mental 
sciences.  It  remains  to  us  in  the  present  chapter  to  determine 
the  essential  distinction  between  psychology  and  the  sciences 
which  have  to  do  with  material  things. 

Wundt  describes  for  us  two  theories  as  to  the  nature  of  this 
distinction — the  Inner  Sense  theory,  as  we  may  call  the  first 
of  these,  and  the  Immediate  Experience  theory.^  We  shall 
consider  these  in  turn. 

y2.  The  Inner  Sense  Theory. — According  to  this,  the  tra- 
ditional view  of  the  relationship  between  psychology  and  the 
non-mental  sciences,  the  distinction  is  primarily  one  of  "sphere" 
or  subject-matter.  Experience  is  distinguished  into  two 
"spheres" — called  "outer"  and  "inner"  experience,  respectively 
— the  former  being  the  sphere  of  the  material  sciences,  the 
latter  of  psychology.  The  methods  of  investigation  in  these 
two  fields  also  are  thought  of  as  correspondingly  different, 
the  data  of  the  material  sciences  being  derived  through  sense- 
perception  (the  "outer  senses"),  and  the  data  of  psychology 
through  introspection  (the  "inner  sense,"  as  it  was  called).* 

The  distinction  may  be  traced  back  historically  to  the  ancient 
and  mediaeval  periods  of  philosophy,  during  which  the  phe- 
nomena of  sensation  and  perception  were  commonly  referred 
to  the  "outer  sense,"  and  the  phenomena  of  ideation  (memory, 
imagination,  and  thought)  to  the  "inner  sense."    Such  a  view, 

^  Outlines  of  Psychology,  translated  by  Chas.  Hubbard  Judd,  §1 ;  and 
§  2,  Nos.  3  and  4.  Pp.  1-6,  8- 11.  (Page  references  are  to  the  Third  Re- 
vised English  Edition,  1907.) 

2  V.  Wundt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  8  f.    Klemm,  History  of  Psychology,  pp.  69  flF. 


126         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

is,  of  course,  merely  one  phase  of  the  faculty  theory  of  the 
mind. 

Beginning  with  Locke  (1632-1704)  the  more  modern  con- 
ception of  the  "inner"  and  "outer"  senses  appears,  according 
to  which  each  of  these  represents  a  source  of  experience  quite 
independent  of  the  other.  The  line  of  demarcation  is  no 
longer,  as  under  the  older  theory,  between  sense-perception  as 
"outer"  and  ideation  as  "inner,"  but  between  all  physical  phe- 
nomena as  objects  of  outer  sense  alone  and  all  mental  phe- 
nomena as  objects  of  inner  sense  alone.  In  Locke's  own 
terminology,  the  sources  of  all  knowledge  are  two — (i)  sen- 
sation, or  "outer  perception"  {i.e.,  the  physical  sense-organs, 
to  interpret  his  doctrine  in  modern  terms),  which  gives  us  our 
knowledge  of  the  material  world;  and  (2)  reflection,  or  "in- 
ner perception"  (what  we  today  call  "introspection"),  which 
gives  us  quite  independently  a  knowledge  of  the  workings  of 
our  own  minds.  Reflection  always,  according  to  Locke,  pre- 
supposes sensation,  and  in  both  of  them  the  mind  is  merely 
passive;  and  yet  Locke  insists  that  reflection  is  an  entirely  in- 
dependent source  of  experience  from  sensation.  The  follow- 
ing table  may  make  this  distinction  and  relationship  clearer : 

Locke's  Theory  of  the  Sources  of  Knowledge 

Experience  Sources  Objects  Sciences 

Outer       Sensation  (Physical  Senses)  Material  World     Material   Sciences 
Inner       Reflection  (Introspection)       Mental  Processes        Psychology 

Psychology,  then,  according  to  this  general  doctrine,  is  the 
science  of  inner  experience,  having  for  its  subject-matter  the 
phenomena  of  the  inner  sense:  the  material  sciences  are  sci- 
ences of  outer  experience  having  for  their  subject-matter  the 
phenomena  of  the  outer  sense.  The  distinction  is  a  perfectly 
simple  one,  and,  if  simplicity  were  the  only  criterion  of  truth, 
an  acceptable  one ;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  will  not  hold  when 
viewed  in  the  light  of  modern  criticism.  This  criticism  in- 
cludes three  principal  points. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  objection  that  the  inner  sense 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      127 

theory  involves  a  false  dxialism  between  the  two  sources  of 
knowledge.  Modern  psychology  refuses  to  admit  any  such 
sharp  divisions  of  organs  of  knowledge  or  of  spheres  of  ex- 
perience. Experience  is  one,  and  the  difference  between 
"inner"  and  "outer"  merely  a  distinction  in  point  of  view."' 

In  the  second  place,  the  field  of  psychology  is  really  inclusive 
of  that  of  the  material  sciences,  and  even  more  extensive  than 
the  latter.  It  is  true  that  there  are  some  contents  of  experience 
which  are  open  to  investigation  by  psychological  methods 
alone — the  world  of  ideas,  memories,  feelings,  etc. ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  any  physical  phenomenon  may  become  an  object 
of  psychological  investigation  also.  Sensations,  in  other 
words,  are  both  mental  and  material  objects.  "A  stone,  a 
plant,  a  tone,  a  ray  of  light,  are,  when  tested  as  natural  phe- 
nomena, objects  of  mineralogy,  botany,  physics,  etc.  In  so 
far,  however,  as  they  are  at  the  same  time  ideas  [sensations], 
they  are  objects  of  psychology.  .  .  .  There  is,  then,  no  such 
thing  as  an  'inner  sense'  which  can  be  regarded  as  an  organ 
of  introspection,  and  so  distinct  from  the  outer  senses,  or  or- 
gans of  objective  perception."* 

Finally,  it  is  well  to  point  out  that  the  inner  sense  view  of 
psychology  inevitably  gives  rise  to  the  necessity  of  showing  the 
relation  between  the  two  kinds  of  experience  and  the  two  or- 
gans of  knowledge  assumed,  and  to  do  this  is  to  call  in  meta- 
physical and  epistemological  presuppositions  and  hypotheses  to 
the  detriment  of  the  purely  scientific  interests  of  psychology.' 
On  all  these  grounds  the  subject-matter  distinction  between 
psychology  and  the  natural  sciences  must  be  rejected. 

73.  The  Immediate  Experience  Theory  of  psychology  in  its 
relation  to  the  material  sciences,  defended  by  Wundt,  makes 
the  distinction  between  them  one  of  point  of  view  rather  than 
of  subject-matter.  It  "recognizes  no  real  difference  between 
outer  and  inner  experience,  but  finds  the  distinction  only  in 

'  Klemm,  op.  cit.,  p.  71. 

*  Wundt,  op.  cit.,  p.  2.    Cf.  sect.  31,  sup. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  9  f . 


128  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  different  points  of  view  from  which  unitary  experience  is 
considered  in  the  two  cases."®  There  are  no  longer  two  dis- 
tinct fields  of  experience,  but  one  experience  which  may  be 
studied  in  either  of  two  ways. 

Wundt  explains  the  basis  of  the  distinction  by  reference  to 
the  two  factors  involved  in  every  concrete  experience,  namely, 
(i)  a  content  objectively  presented  to  the  mind — and  (2)  a 
subject  ("mind")  to  whom  this  content  is  presented — in  brief, 
an  experienced  object  and  an  experienced  subject.  Every  con- 
crete experience  involves  these  two  factors — that  I  as  subject 
apprehend  or  experience  some  content  objectively  presented 
to  me. 

Now,  according  to  the  theory  of  immediate  experience,  the 
natural  sciences  "concern  themselves  with  the  objects  of  ex- 
perience, thought  of  as  independent  of  the  subject,"  whereas 
psychology  "investigates  the  whole  content  of  experience  in 
its  relations  to  the  subject."'^  The  distinction  is,  therefore,  en- 
tirely one  of  point  of  view,  "The  point  of  view  of  natural 
science  may  be  designated  as  that  of  mediate  experience,  since 
it  is  possible  only  after  abstracting  from  the  subjective  factor 
present  in  all  experience;  the  point  of  view  of  psychology,  on 
the  other  hand,  may  be  designated  as  that  of  immediate  ex- 
perience, since  it  purposely  does  away  with  this  abstraction."' 

By  "immediate"  experience,  therefore,  Wundt  means  prac- 
tically experience  "just  as  it  comes,"  the  total  "content"  in  its 
relation  to  the  experiencing  subject;  by  "mediate"  experience 
he  means  the  purely  objective  factor,  the  objects  of  experience 
thought  of  as  independent  of  the  subject  experiencing  them. 
Psychology  and  the  natural  sciences  may,  according  to  this 
theory,  and  in  conformity  with  the  considerations  brought 
forward  in  the  preceding  section,  investigate  precisely  the  same 
objects,  the  former  from  the  "immediate"  and  the  latter  from 
the  "mediate"  point  of  view.  Thus  we  may  have  on  the  one 
hand,  physical  experiments  on  light,  sound,  weight,  etc.,  and 

^  Ibid.,  p.  9. 
7  Ibid.,  p.  3. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      129 

on  the  other  hand  psychological  experiments  on  sight,  hearing, 
weight-discrimination,  etc. :  in  the  former  of  these  we  are  ab- 
stracting the  objective  factor  and  rejecting  the  subjective, 
studying  the  objects  as  they  may  exist  independently  of  our- 
selves; and  in  the  latter  we  are  taking  experience  just  as  it 
comes  to  us,  and  without  abstracting  or  rejecting  any  factor : 


PSYCHOLOGY 

(Science  of  "Immedi- 
ate Experience") 


Experience 


Subjective 
Factor 


Objective  )  MATERIAL    SCIENCES, 
Factor    j   (of  "Mediate  Experience") 

For  this  view  of  our  problem  Wundt  claims  two  advantages 
especially* — (i)  that  it  allows  for  the  use  of  the  same  well- 
tested  scientific  methods  in  the  study  of  both  mental  and  ma- 
terial things;  (2)  that  "from  this  point  of  view,  the  meta 
physical  question  of  the  relation  between  psychical  and  physi- 
cal objects  disappears  entirely,"  since  these  are  no  longer  con- 
sidered as  "different  objects  at  all,  but  one  and  the  same  con- 
tent of  experience,"  viewed  now  "after  abstracting  from  the 
subject,"  and  now  in  "its  complete  relation  to  the  subject.  All 
metaphysical  hypotheses  as  to  the  relation  of  psychical  and 
physical  objects  are,  when  viewed  from  this  position,  attempts 
to  solve  a  problem  which  never  would  have  existed  if  the  case 
had  been  correctly  stated,"  and  so  may  be  dispensed  with 
altogether. 

74.  Criticism  and  Conclusions. — Now,  as  between  these  two 
theories  the  school  of  Immediate  Experience  is  undoubtedly 
right  in  overruling  its  opponent's  division  of  the  mind  into 
two  different  organs  and  of  experience  into  two  separate 
spheres,  and  in  making  the  distinction  between  psychology  and 
the  material  sciences  one  purely  of  point  of  view.  But  if 
our  contentions  in  the  last  chapter  regarding  the  nature  of 
science  in  general  are  worthy  of  sup{X)rt,  a  further  point 
of  the  Immediate  Experience  theory  is  open  to  objection — 

■  Op.  cit.,  pp.  10  f . 


130         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

namely,  the  assertion  of  Wundt  that  psychology  is  a  concrete 
science  and  that  the  natural  sciences  are  by  contrast  abstract.^ 

The  natural  sciences  do,  as  Wundt  contends,  abstract  the 
objective  factor  of  experience  and  disregard  the  subjective, 
but  is  it  not  just  as  true  that  psychology  abstracts  the  sub- 
jective factor  and  disregards  the  objective? — at  least,  if  by 
objective  we  mean,  "that  which  is  independent  of  the  ex- 
periencing subject."  To  apply  Wundt's  own  illustration  (p. 
2),  the  natural  sciences  are  interested  in  stones,  plants,  tones, 
rays  of  light,  etc.,  as  objects  which  exist  whether  anyone  ob- 
serves them  or  not :  as  such,  these  sciences  are  abstract  in  their 
treatment  of  these  objects,  because  they  disregard  the  sub- 
jective factor  which  is  involved  when  someone  does  observe 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  psychology  is  interested  in  these 
same  objects  only  so  far  as  they  are  parts  of  the  experience 
of  some  individual  subject,  and  disregards  all  phenomena 
which  take  place  in  connection  with  those  objects  when  some- 
one does  not  observe  them.  Psychology,  for  this  reason,  is 
just  as  "abstract"  in  its  point  of  view  as  the  material  sciences, 
but  the  two  groups  of  sciences  are  abstract  in  different  direc- 
tions. 

All  sciences,  then,  are,  by  their  very  nature  as  sciences,  ab- 
stract in  their  point  of  view  and  artificial  in  their  methods,  and 
only  Philosophy  is  absolutely  and  thoroughly  concrete.  Phi- 
losophy and  science  are  alike  empirical,  in  that  they  are  all 
studies  of  experience;  but  whereas  psychology  abstracts  the 
subjective  factor  of  experience  and  the  natural  sciences  the 
objective  factor,  philosophy,  and  philosophy  alone,  studies  ex- 
perience as  a  concrete  whole.  This  conclusion  is  symbolized 
in  a  table  which  will  be  found  at  the  bottom  of  page  131,  and 
which  should  for  purposes  of  contrast  be  compared  with  the 
table  symbolizing  Wundt's  theory  in  the  preceding  section. 

But  though  the  conclusion  above  set  forth  may  be  said  to 
afford  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  relation  between  psy- 
chology and  the  natural  sciences  so  far  as  they  have  to  do  with 

8  Op.  cit.,  pp.  3-5  (Nos.  3  and  3a). 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      131 

the  same  objects,  it  is  defective  in  that  it  does  not  allow  for 
that  large  group  of  contents  of  experience  referred  to  above 
{72,^  which  we  especially  associate  with  psychology,  and  which 
cannot  become  objects  of  investigation  by  the  material  sciences 
at  all — I  mean,  the  so-called  "world  of  ideas,"  of  memories, 
feelings,  desires,  etc.  So  far  the  problem  has  been,  "How  do 
psychology  and  the  material  sciences  differ  in  their  respective 
studies  of  those  physical  things  which  are  also  possible  con- 
tents of  experience?"  The  problem  now  becomes,  "What  is 
there  about  ideas  and  things  which  make  both  of  them  con- 
tents of  experience,  and  objects  of  psychological  investigation, 
and  removes  the  former  entirely  from  investigation  from  the 
natural  sciences  without  also  removing  the  latter  ?"  We  seem 
to  have  three  kinds  of  objects  instead  of  two — (i)  "things" 
as  objects  of  investigation  by  the  natural  sciences,  (2)  "things" 
as  objects  of  investigation  by  psychology,  and  (3)  "ideas"  as 
objects  of  investigation  by  psychology  alone.  Our  previous 
discussion  has  taken  care  of  the  relation  between  the  first  two 
of  these  groups.  What  are  we  to  say  about  the  second  and 
third  groups  in  their  relation  to  the  first? 

Now  we  have  a  name  for  those  things  which  are  "objects 
of  investigation  by  psychology":  we  call  them  "mental  con- 
tents" or  "mental  facts,"  and  distinguish  them  from  the  "ma- 
terial facts"  (group  i,  above)  which  the  natural  sciences 
study.  All  sciences,  we  say,  have  to  do  with  facts,  but  there 
are  two  great  groups  of  facts — mental  facts,  which  psychol- 
ogy studies,  and  material  facts,  which  are  investigated  by  the 
natural  sciences:  our  next  task  is  to  differentiate  clearly  be- 
tween these  two  great  groups  of  facts. 


PHILOSOPHY    J 


{ 


Subjective  [•  Psychology 

Factor 


Experience 

Objective  V  Material  Sciences 

Factor  J 


132         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

2.  The  Differentiation  of  Mental  from  Material  Facts. 

75.  The  Non-Spatial  Character  of  Mental  Objects. — The 
most  obvious  distinction  characteristic  of  mental  objects  is  a 
purely  negative  one — namely,  their  non-spatial  character.  A 
comparison  of  mental  objects  with  physical  shows  them  to 
possess  a  variety  of  attributes  in  common — as  quality,  inten- 
sity, number,  and  the  temporal  or  time  attributes  of  duration, 
coexistence,  succession,  etc. ;  but  the  spatial  or  space  attributes 
which  physical  objects  also  possess — extension,  weight,  in- 
ertia, motion,  position,  etc. — are  entirely  inapplicable  in  the 
realm  of  mental  phenomena.  Ideas  and  feelings  may  be  strong 
or  weak,  few  or  many,  brief  or  of  long  duration,  simultaneous 
or  successive,  just  as  physical  things  or  events  may  be;  but 
we  cannot  think  of  an  idea  as  measuring  so  many  cubic  inches, 
weighing  so  many  pounds,  or  moving  from  one  place  to  an- 
other. "To  realize  this  truth,"  says  Dr.  Sidis,  *T  think  it  a 
good  preliminary  psychological  exercise  for  the  reader  to  try 
to  find  how  many  grams  or  grains  his  idea  of  beauty  weighs, 
how  many  millimeters  long,  wide,  and  high  his  feeHngs  of 
love  are;  let  him  indulge  in  the  fancy  of  conceiving  an  en- 
gineer building  a  bridge  with  mathematical  formulae  as  links, 
and  his  feelings  of  virtue  and  patriotism  as  supports."" 

But  though  the  distinction  is  a  simple  one  to  grasp  in  its 
main  outlines,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  comprehend  in  its  full 
significance.  One  may  freely  admit  the  truth  of  the  statement 
that  mental  objects  do  not  exist  in  space  and  have  no  space 
characteristics,  but  when  we  come  to  apply  this  truth  in  specific 
instances  we  find  it  to  be  by  no  means  easy  to  do  so.  Our  in- 
terests are  ordinarily  so  wrapped  up  in  material  things,  our 
very  language  so  permeated  with  spatial  terminology  and 
figures  of  speech,  and  our  mental  life  itself  so  dependent  on 
material  sense-data  and  imagery,  that  it  is  quite  inevitable 
that  we  should  constantly  fall  into  materialistic  ways  of  think- 
ing when  we  make  our  mental  processes  themselves  our  ob- 
jects of  study.     How  natural  it  is  to  speak  and  think  of  the 

10  The  Foundation  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology,  p.  19. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      133 

mind  as  "in  the  brain,"  or  "in  the  head"  just  as  the  brain  is 
"in  the  head" ;  or  even  to  go  so  far  as  to  identify  mental  pro- 
cesses with  brain  processes.  The  average  person  makes  no  dis- 
tinction whatever  between  an  animal's  or  a  man's  "mind"  and 
that  same  animal's  or  man's  "brains,"  to  employ  the  common 
pluralization  of  the  latter  term;  and  this  confusion  is  sup- 
ported rather  than  cleared  away  by  the  too  prevalent  tendency 
among  physiologists  and  others  to  identify  mental  with  cere- 
bral processes.  And  yet  the  tendency  is  altogether  a  falla- 
cious one.  As  Dr.  Sidis  says  again,  "psychic  life  is  no  doubt 
the  concomitant  of  nervous  brain  activity,  and  certain  psychic 
processes  may  depend  on  definite  local  brain  processes;  but 
the  given  psychic  process  is  not  situated  in  a  definite  brain 
centre,  nor  for  that  matter  is  it  situated  anywhere  in  space."" 
It  would  be  just  as  true,  and  just  as  false,  for  me  to  say,  if  I 
am  thinking  of  a  mountain  in  Japan,  that  my  mind  is  in  Japan, 
as  to  say  that  my  mind  is  in  my  brain :  as  a  matter  of  fact  it 
is  not,  in  the  usual  local  significance  of  that  preposition,  in 
either  place.  The  mind  may  be  "in"  the  brain  in  the  sense 
that  the  harmony  is  "in"  the  musical  chord,  or  that  the  artist's 
soul  is  "in"  his  painting ;  but  this  does  not  involve  any  spatial 
relation  between  the  one  or  the  other  in  any  case,  but  only  a 
functional  relation. 

And  as  it  is  with  the  attribute  of  location  or  position,  so 
also  is  it  as  regards  the  attributes  of  size,  weight,  shape,  etc. 
Although  it  is  by  no  means  so  common  to  think  of  the  mind 
as  having  a  size,  shape,  or  weight  as  it  is  to  think  of  it  as  lo- 
cated in  the  brain  or  in  the  head,  there  is  a  common  popular 
error  which  amounts  in  the  end  to  the  same  spatializing  of 
the  mind  as  that  which  we  have  already  observed  and  con- 
demned. Ask  the  average  man  who  asserts  that  his  mind  is 
located  in  his  brain  how  large  or  how  heavy  he  thinks  his 
mind  to  be,  or  whether  it  is  spherical,  cubical,  conical,  or  what 
not,  in  shape;  and  he  will  probably  admit  the  inappropriate- 
ness  of  the  question,  though  as  a  matter  of  fact  such  a  ques- 

*i  Op.  cit.,  pp.  24  f.    Italics  mine. 


134         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

tion  is  no  more  inappropriate  than  the  question  of  location. 
But  press  him  further  as  to  what  he  means  by  denying  size, 
weight,  and  shape  to  his  mind,  it  is  quite  possible  that  he  may 
reply  that  the  mind  is  too  small  and  too  light  to  be  measured 
or  weighed,  or  may  imply  in  his  answer  that  such  is  his  real 
view  of  the  matter.  But  to  reduce  the  size  and  weight  of 
the  mind  to  a  minimum  does  not  deprive  it  of  spatiality  alto- 
gether, and  it  is  only  by  refusing  to  apply  spatial  notions  to 
the  mind  at  all  that  we  can  satisfy  the  demands  of  our  nega- 
tive conception. 

76.  Consciousness  as  Potential  Energy. — Obvious  as  the 
above  considered  distinction  between  mental  and  physical  facts 
seems  to  be,  there  are  some  who  would  deny  its  validity  and 
insist  that  mental  phenomena  like  physical  ones  have  spatial 
attributes.  Among  these  is  Professor  W.  P.  Montague,  whose 
doctrine  that  consciousness  is  a  form  of  potential  physical 
energy  I  shall  briefly  consider  in  the  present  section.^^ 

In  the  first  place.  Professor  Montague  seeks  to  justify  the 
plain  man's  belief  that  his  consciousness  is  located  in  his  head 
on  the  ground  that  in  so  believing  he  is  merely  applying  to 
the  series  of  mental  processes  "a  rule  which  has  always  proved 
valid  for  the  location  of  every  other  series  of  events" — namely, 
that  "every  invisible  thing  is  in  the  same  place  as  the  visible 
thing  which  varies  directly  and  immediately  with  it."  For 
example,  "electricity,  though  in  itself  invisible,  is  located  in 
the  battery  and  wires  on  which  it  is  found  to  depend" ;  gravi- 
tation is  located  in  the  masses  which  it  seems  to  hold  together, 
and  in  the  space  between  them;  etc.  With  equal  right,  says 
Professor  Montague,  "we  locate  the  invisible  mental  processes 
of  other  persons  in  their  visible  bodies  because  .  .  .  they  vary 
directly  and  immediately  with  .  .  .  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem of  their  owner."^^ 

This  inference  of  the  "plain  man"  is,  of  course,  based  on 

^^The  Monist,  XVIII,  pp.  21  ff.  (1908).    Also,  in  "Essays  Philosophical 
and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  William  James,"  same  year,  pp.  105  ff. 
"^^  Monist  article,  p.  22. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      135 

an  identification  of  functional  relationship  with  location.  If 
two  things  vary  together,  we  do  naturally  infer  that  there  is 
some  logical  connection  between  them,  but  to  infer  their  lo- 
cation one  within  the  other  on  this  ground  alone  is  surely  to 
advance  beyond  the  evidence.  And  to  extend  an  inference, 
which  may  be  justified  as  regards  the  mutual  relations  of 
things  recognized  to  be  physical,  beyond  the  physical  to  include 
the  mutual  relations  of  things  and  mental  processes,  is  still 
more  unwarranted.  We  have  no  right,  then,  to  infer  that  the 
mind  is  located  in  the  brain  merely  because  mental  and  cerebral 
processes  vary  concomitantly;  and  this  negative  conclusion  re- 
ceives positive  confirmation  when  we  pass  to  the  second  point 
of  Professor  Montague's  doctrine. 

This  second  point  is  that  though  mental  processes  have  lo- 
cation, they  do  not  all  (though  some  do)  have  size  and  shape. 
Objectors,  he  says,"  erroneously  assume  that  to  locate  mental 
processes  in  space  would  be  to  attribute  size  and  shape  to 
them,  but  this  is  true  only  so  far  as  visual  and  tactual  ex- 
periences are  concerned.  Pains,  odors,  sounds,  etc.,  are  located 
in  space,  though  they  have  no  size  or  shape.  "It  is  only  with 
color,  and  to  a  less  extent  with  solidity,  that  spatiality  [size] 
and  figure  [shape]  are  indissolubly  associated." 

But  in  this  argument  Professor  Montague  is  at  the  same 
time  confusing  mental  experience  with  the  physical  objects  of 
that  experience,  and  also  drawing  an  invalid  antithesis  be- 
tween two  groups  of  sensory  experience.  So  far  as  pains, 
odors,  sounds,  etc.,  are  qualities  of  physical  things — our 
bodies,  flowers,  organ  pipes,  etc. — they  do  have  size  and  shape 
as  well  as  location.  As  sensations,  however,  in  my  mind,  as 
parts  of  my  mental  experience,  these  pains,  odors,  and  sounds 
have  neither  size,  shape,  nor  location ;  but  precisely  the  same 
things  are  true  of  colors  and  solids — as  physical  objects  and 
qualities  they  have  all  these  spatial  attributes,  as  sensations 
or  mental  experiences  they  have  none  of  them.  The  only  valid 
basis  of  distinction  between  the  two  groups  of  sensory  ex- 

»*  Op.  cit..  p.  23. 


136         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

periences  is  the  fact  that  visual  and  tactual  experiences  alone 
seem  to  give  us  our  direct  knowledge  of  space  and  its  attri- 
butes, and  that  whatever  knowledge  of  space  we  may  have 
through  smell,  sound,  and  the  other  sensations  seems  to  be 
indirect  and  indistinct ;  but  that  the  experiences  themselves  are 
non-spatial  and  the  objects  of  those  experiences  spatial  is  true 
of  both  groups  of  sensations. 

Professor  Montague  sums  up  these  (first  two  points  of  his 
argument  in  the  statement  that  consciousness  occupies  space 
intensively — "as  the  force  of  gravity  between  two  planets,  or 
the  stress  in  a  watch  spring" — rather  than  extensively.  Con- 
sequently, and  this  is  his  third  and  constructive  suggestion, 
consciousness  is  not  a  form  of  matter  but  of  energy,  and,  more 
specifically,  of  potential  energy.  This  accounts  for  the  fact 
that  mental  processes  cannot  be  perceived  by  an  external  ob- 
server. "Objects,  in  order  to  be  perceived  by  us,  must  impress 
our  sense  organs  with  some  kind  of  kinetic  energy.  Kinetic 
energy  is  a  public  fact,  externally  accessible  to  many  observers ; 
but  potential  energy,  which  is  admitted  to  be  in  space,  can  only 
be  externally  perceived  by  passing  into  a  kinetic  state — that  is, 
by  ceasing  to  be  itself.  To  feel  it  as  it  is,  we  must  participate 
in  it.  To  perceive  a  stress,  our  muscles  must  undergo  stress; 
just  as  to  perceive  a  pain  or  pleasure,  we  must  be  pained  or 
pleased."" 

Consciousness,  therefore,  is  identified  by  Montague  with 
potential  energy,  though  not  with  all  potential  energy,  but  only 
with  some — namely,  the  potential  energy  of  brain  currents.^® 
It  is  a  form  of  potential  energy — that  form  which  is  found  in 

15  Op.  cit.,  p.  25  and  note.    Italics  mine. 

16  R.  McDougall,  however,  thinks  that  the  potential  energy  theory 
of  consciousness  involves  the  notion  that  "wherever  latent  energy  appears, 
consciousness  must  be  posited.  It  is  thus,"  he  adds,  "made  a  character- 
istic not  of  nervous  matter  or  of  living  substance,  but  of  all  grades  of 
material  organization,  and  may  appear  equally  [i.e.,  with  equal  reality] 
in  a  stone  and  in  a  man";  though  probably  in  different  degrees  of  com- 
plexity in  the  various  cases.  (American  Journal  of  Psychology,  XXV, 
p.  491.     1914.) 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      137 

the  nerve  currents  of  the  brain.  The  briefest  comparison, 
however,  of  the  results  of  introspection  with  those  of  neuro- 
logical investigation  shows  at  once  that  mental  processes  and 
neural  processes  are  not  identical  in  themselves,  even  should 
they  have  an  identical  source.  In  fact  Professor  Montague 
himself  gives  away  his  entire  point  when  he  says:  "what  we 
know  directly  from  within  as  the  psychical  or  subjective  side 
of  experience  may  be  the  same  as  what  we  know  indirectly 
from  without  as  the  potential  energy  of  the  nerve-currents  of 
the  brain."^^  And  again,  in  another  article  published  the  same 
year:  "what  I,  from  within,  would  call  my  sensations  are 
neither  more  nor  less  than  what  you,  from  without,  would  de- 
scribe as  the  forms  of  potential  energy  to  which  the  kinetic 
energies  of  neural  stimuli  would  necessarily  give  rise  in  pass- 
ing through  my  brain."^^  Here  we  have  a  distinction  of 
aspects,  which  destroys  the  absolute  identity  of  consciousness 
and  potential  energy,  and  admits  all  that  the  advocate  of  the 
non-spatial  character  of  mental  processes  could  desire.  Con- 
sciousness may  be  correlated  with  the  potential  energy  of  the 
brain,  may  be  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  latter,  but  cannot  be 
identified  with  it.  This  is  what  is  known  in  philosophy  as  the 
"double  aspect  theory"  of  the  relation  between  the  mental  and 
the  physical,*"  and  is  practically  the  position  which  we  shall 
adopt  at  the  close  of  the  present  discussion  (80)  ;  but  to  say 
that  consciousness  is  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  potential 
energy  of  the  brain  is  not  to  say  that  "consciousness  is  in  the 
brain"  in  the  local  or  spatial  sense,  but  merely  that  con- 
sciousness is  functionally  related  to  the  potential  energy  which 
is  in  the  brain. 

We  adhere,  then,  to  our  first  characterization  of  mental  facts 

*^  Montst  article,  p.  27.    Italics  mine. 

^^  Essays  Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  IVilliam  James, 
p.   128.     Whole  passage  is  in  italics  in  original. 

^"  C/.  Warren,  Psychological  Reincw,  XXI,  pp.  79  flf.  (1914).  Espe- 
cially, p.  83:  "if  Professor  Montague  regards  consciousness  as  the  inner 
aspect  of  potential  energy,  then  he  merely  adds  a  limiting  clause  to  the 
double  aspect  theory." 


138         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  non-spatial.  This  is  a  merely  negative  definition,  however : 
it  tells  us  what  mental  facts  are  not,  but  not  what  they  are. 
The  essential  positive  characteristic  of  mental  facts  is  their 
privacy,  to  the  discussion  of  which  we  shall  now  turn. 

yy.  The  Privacy  of  Mental  Facts  vs.  the  Cotnmunity  of  Ma- 
terial Facts. — The  essential  characteristic  of  physical  or  ma- 
terial facts  is  that  they  are  common  objects  of  experience  for 
all  experiencers :  the  essential  characteristic  of  psychical  or 
mental  facts  is  that  they  are  private  objects  of  experience  for 
one  experiencer  only.  Physical  facts  are  by  their  very  na- 
ture facts  which  may  be  experienced  by  any  number  of  experi- 
encers together:  mental  facts  are  by  their  very  nature  facts 
which  may  be  experienced  by  only  one  experimencer.  This 
is  the  distinction  between  mental  and  physical  that  meets 
with  the  approval  of  the  greatest  number  of  modern  investi- 
gators of  the  problem — such  psychologists,  for  example,  as 
Miinsterberg,  Royce,  Calkins,  Titchener,  Stout,  etc.  I  shall 
quote  at  length  from  the  writings  of  two  of  these. 

When  we  examine,  says  Professor  Calkins,  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  so-called  "inner  phenomena"  of  perception,  feeling, 
memory,  etc.,  and  the  things  and  events  of  the  so-called  "out- 
side world,"  "we  find  two  reasons  for  it.  In  the  first  place, 
the  inner  facts — the  memories,  emotions,  and  all  the  rest — are 
realized  as  private,  unshared  experiences  belonging  to  me 
alone;  whereas  the  things  or  events  are  public,  shared  facts, 
common  property,  as  it  were.  My  fear  or  delight  is  my  own 
private  experience;  and  so,  for  that  matter,  is  my  perception, 
for  I  have  my  own  particular  way  of  looking  at  everything, 
which  I  share  with  no  one  else.  But  the  beast  who  frightens 
me,  the  spring  day  which  delights  me,  the  sunset  of  which  I 
have  my  own  particular  perception — all  these  are  public  facts 
shared  with  an  unlimited  number  of  other  selves,  facts  which 
no  longer  bear  the  stamp  of  my  individuality."  This  is  the 
first  and  essential  distinction,  but  "close  upon  [it]  follows 
another.  Just  because  the  shared  or  public  facts  are  not  re- 
ferred to  any  particular  self,  they  tend  to  seem  independent  of 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      139 

all  selves,  and  to  become  externalized;  whereas  the  private 
facts  continue  to  be  referred  to  a  self,  and  in  this  way,  also, 
are  contrasted  with  events  or  things  which  seem  to  us  quite 
cut  off  from  selves."^"  To  this  secondary  and  subsidiary  dis- 
tinction we  shall  return  in  the  next  section. 

As  Professor  Royce  has  stated  it :  "By  our  mental  life,  as 
opposed  to  our  physical  life,  we  mean  a  certain  collection  of 
states  and  of  processes  with  which,  from  moment  to  moment, 
each  one  of  us  is,  in  his  own  case,  very  directly  and  imme- 
diately acquainted;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible 
that  anyone  else  besides  the  original  observer,  whose  mental 
life  this  is,  should  ever  get  this  immediate  sort  of  acquaintance 
with  just  this  collection  of  states  and  processes.  Herein,  then, 
lies  the  essential  characteristic  of  our  mental  life.  Others  may 
learn,  from  observing  our  acts  and  our  words,  a  great  deal 
about  this,  our  own  mental  life,  but  each  one  of  us  is  the  only 
being  capable  of  becoming  directly  aware  of  his  own  mental 
states.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  our  physical  life,  in  its 
external  manifestations,  may  be  observed  by  anyone  who  gets 
the  opportunity.  .  .  .  Thus  physical  facts  are  usually  con- 
ceived as  'public  property,'  patent  to  all  properly  equipped  ob- 
servers. All  such  observers,  according  to  our  customary  view, 
see  the  same  physical  facts.  But  psychical  facts  are  essentially 
'private  property,'  existent  for  one  alone."^^ 

The  objection  which  may  be  offered  that  our  inner  physio- 
logical processes  also  are  "private"  and  open  to  our  observa- 
tion alone,  and  yet  are  not  therefore  considered  to  be  mental, 
is  commented  on  by  Royce  as  follows :  "The  fact  that  other 
observers  cannot  directly  watch  our  inner  physiological  pro- 
cesses is  itself  something  relatively  accidental,  dependent  upon 
the  limitations  of  the  sense  organs,  or  upon  the  defective  in- 
strumental devices,  of  those  who  watch  us.  But  the  fact  that 
our  mental  states  are  incapable  of  observation  by  anybody  but 
ourselves  seems  to  be  not  accidental,  but  an  essential  character 
of  these  mental  states.     Were  physiologists  better  endowed 

^'^  Introduction  to  Psychology,  p.  6. 
'^  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  i  f. 


I40         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

with  sense  organs  and  with  instruments  of  exact  observation, 
we  can,  if  we  choose,  conceive  them  as,  by  some  unknown  de- 
vice, coming  to  watch  the  very  molecules  of  our  brains;  but 
we  cannot  conceive  them,  in  any  possible  case,  as  observing 
from  without  our  pains  or  our  thoughts  in  the  sense  in  which 
physical  facts  are  observable."" 

Several  critics  have  denied  the  validity  of  this  distinction, 
which  seems  so  fundamental  to  those  who  uphold  it,  just  as 
the  non-spatial  theory  of  mental  phenomena  is  rejected  by 
many.  I  shall  quote  from  four  of  these  criticisms,  comment- 
ing upon  each  of  them. 

"It  is  so  far  from  self-evident,"  says  one,  "that  each  man's 
mental  state  is  his  own  indisputable  possession,  that  no  one 
hesitates  to  confess  at  times  that  his  neighbor  has  read  him 
better  than  he  has  read  himself,  nor  at  other  times  to  claim 
that  he  knows  his  neighbor's  state  of  mind  more  truly  than  the 
neighbor  himself  knows  it."^^  Of  course,  we  reply;  but  this  ia 
inference,  the  "knowledge  about"  of  which  Royce  speaks 
above,  not  direct  "knowledge  of  observation."  The  very  term 
used  (to  "read")  shows  this;  for  to  read,  here,  means  to  in- 
terpret behavior,  not  to  observe  directly.  I,  only,  am  con- 
scious of  my  own  mental  states;  but  others  may  understand 
them  much  better  than  I  do. 

Professor  Bawden  objects^*  that  if  psychology  is  "concerned 
with  what  is  common  to  many  or  to  all  human  minds,"^^  and 
if  only  that  which  is  physical  is  "common,"  then  psychology 
cannot  deal  with  the  "psychical"  at  all.  We  must,  then,  either 
accept  Professor  Baldwin's  distinction  between  the  "psychical" 
and  the  "psychological,"^®  or  else  give  a  different  meaning  to 

22  op.  cit.,  p.  4.     Italics  mine. 

23  Singer,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  VIII,  p.  180  (1911). 
^'^Philosophical  Rev.,  XIII,  pp.  315-321   (1904). 

25  Royce,  Outline  of  Psychology,  p.  17. 

28  In  his  Development  and  Evolution  (pp.  4  f.),  Professor  Baldwin  de- 
fines the  "psychological"  as  the  mental  "viewed  from  the  outside" — i.e., 
objectively,  as  that  which  is  common  to  all  minds;  and  the  "psychical"  as 
the  mental  as  experienced  by  some  individual  mind — i.e.,  as  subjective. 
This  difficulty  will  be  returned  to  in  Division  3  of  the  present  chapter. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      141 

the  former.  But  though  the  Baldwin  terminology  has  its  un- 
doubted uses,  it  is  quite  unnecessary  to  press  it  into  service  in 
this  connection;  and  Professor  Bawden's  objection  is  ob- 
viously grounded  in  an  ambiguous  interpretation  of  the  word 
"common."  Mental  facts  may  be  "private"  or  "not-common" 
objects  so  far  as  observation  is  concerned,  and  yet  the  facts 
about  mental  life  may  be  "common"  to  all  normal  rninds;  just 
as  what  is  in  the  usual  sense  "my  property"  (money,  land,  etc.) 
is  most  certainly  not  "common  property,"  although  there  are 
laws  which  apply  to  all  "private  property,"  and  so  are  "com- 
mon" principles  governing  "private  property"  in  general. 
Psychology,  then,  has  to  do  with  the  "common"  principles  of 
that  "private"  thing  which  we  call  mental  life. 

But  the  most  complete  and  searching  criticism  of  the  privacy 
theory  of  mental  contents  is  that  of  Professor  Perry.^^  "It  is 
characteristic  of  content  of  mind,  such  as  perceptions  and 
ideas,  to  belong  to  individual  minds,"  he  admits.  "My  idea 
is  mine;  and  in  some  sense,  then,  falls  within  my  mind.  .  .  . 
But  it  does  not  follow,"  he  insists,  "that  my  idea  may  not  also 
be  your  idea.  ...  It  will  doubtless  remain  true  that  my  idea 
simply,  and  your  idea  of  my  idea,  will  differ  through  the  ac- 
cession of  the  last  cognitive  relationship;^*  and  that  in  this 
sense  my  idea  cannot  be  completely  identicaP^  with  your  idea. 
But  it  is  impossible  even  to  state  this  trivial  proposition  with- 
out granting  that  you  may  know^^  my  idea,  which  is  the  point 
at  issue."'" 

Is  this,  however,  the  true  "point  at  issue"?  Certainly,  no 
one  can  deny  the  "trivial  proposition"  and  its  underlying  as- 
sumption referred  to.  All  would  cheerfully  agree  that  my 
idea  may  in  some  perfectly  valid  sense  be  the  same  as  your 
idea,  but  are  they  by  that  fact  one  identical  idea?  That  is  the 
real  point  at  issue:  can  one  identical  idea  be  in  two  different 

*^  Present  Philosophical   Tendencies,  pp.   286-298. 

"  That  is  to  say,  "will  differ  by  virtue  of   the   fact  that  'my   idea'  i? 
mine  and  'your  idea  of  my  idea'  yours." 
**  Italics  mine. 
»°  Op.  cit..  pp.  286  f. 


142  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

minds?  To  this  question,  Professor  Perry  practically  admits 
the  negative  reply  which  we  also  are  defending.  The  essence 
of  an  "idea,"  as  we  see  it,  is  that  it  can  he  only  in  one  mind; 
but  one  mind  may  certainly  know  an  idea  in  another  mind — 
whether  directly  or  indirectly  {v.  Perry's  p.  290)  is  indifferent. 

The  essence  of  the  doctrine  we  are  defending,  in  its  relation 
to  Professor  Perry's  criticism,  is  stated  by  Professor  Rogers, 
in  a  reply  to  Perry,  as  follows :  "I  can  say  plausibly  that  my 
idea,  and  my  neighbor's  idea  which  it  knows,  are  the  'same' 
idea,  because  usually  in  such  a  statement  I  am  concerned  with 
content,  and  not  with  psychological  existence" — or,  as  I  should 
rather  put  it,  "because  in  such  a  statement  I  am  concerned 
with  meaning,  and  not  with  psychological  content."  "But  it 
is  not  so  plausible  to  affirm  that  my  idea  of  his  emotion,  and 
the  emotion  itself,  are  the  same.  And  it  is  of  course  on  the 
side  of  existence  that  the  imperviousness  of  minds  is  intended 
to  be  understood. "^^ 

Compare  also  the  following  words  of  Miinsterberg:  "The 
star  which  I  see  is  conceived  as  the  same  star  which  you  see." 
But  "my  visual  impression  of  the  star,  that  is,  my  optical  per- 
ception, is  a  content  of  my  own  consciousness  only,  and  your 
impression  of  the  star  can  be  a  content  of  your  consciousness 
only.  We  both  may  mean  the  same  by  our  ideas,  but  I  can 
never  have  your  perception  and  you  can  never  have  my  per- 
ception. My  ideas  are  enclosed  in  my  mind.  I  may  awaken 
in  your  mind  ideas  which  have  the  same  purpose  and  mean- 
ing, but  they  are  new  copies  in  your  mind.  We  both  may  be 
angry,  but  your  anger  can  never  be  my  anger,  and  your  voli- 
tions can  never  enter  my  mind."^^ 

This,  then,  in  brief,  is  our  position:  as  psychological  con- 
tent or  "existence,"  ideas  in  two  different  minds  are  by  that 
very  fact  two  ideas,  though  in  their  logical  meaning  they  may 
be  the  same  idea. 

78.  Sidis's  Doctrine  of  Mental  vs.  Physical. — Dr.  Sidis  sub- 

^^Jour.  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  XIII,  pp.  169  ff.  (1916). 
82  Psychotherapy,  pp.  18  f .     Italics  mine. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      143 

stitutes  for  the  prevailing  Privacy-Community  distinction  be- 
tween mental  and  physical  facts  a  distinction  of  Internality  vs. 
Externality/'  Physical  facts,  he  says,  are  (i)  external  and 
(2)  independent  of  consciousness:  mental  facts  are  (i)  in- 
ternal and  (2)  dependent  on  consciousness.  Of  these,  the  first 
is  taken  as  the  primary  distinction,  and  the  other  is  added  at 
the  close  of  his  chapter  on  the  subject  as  further  definitive  of 
the  primary  distinction. 

"Psychologically  considered,  the  characteristic  trait  of  a 
physical  object  is  not  that  it  is  common,  but  that  it  is  external" 
we  are  told.  "The  tree  yonder  is  to  me  a  physical  object,  not 
because  it  is  common  to  many  minds,  but  because  I  perceive  it 
as  external,  the  sensory  elements  of  the  perception  carry  with 
them  external  objectivity."'*  "It  is  true  that  community  of 
object  is  one  of  the  criteria  of  external  reality,  but  it  is  cer- 
tainly not  true  that  the  community  of  the  object  gives  rise  to 
the  perception  of  externality.  It  may,  on  the  contrary,  be 
claimed,  and  possibly  with  far  greater  reason,  that  it  is  the 
object's  externality  that  gives  rise  to  its  community."''  In 
other  words,  the  physical  universe,  genetically  regarded,  is  ex- 
ternal not  because  it  is  common,  but  it  is  common  because  it 
is  extertml."^^  Externality  is  the  original  criterion:  com- 
munity, the  derived  criterion. 

Criticism  of  this  position  involves  three  points:  (i)  the 
genetic  question  raised  by  Sidis,  as  to  whether  community  or 
externality  is  the  original  subjective  or  mental  criterion  of 
objective  or  physical  reality;  (2)  the  question  of  fact,  as  to 
whether  externality  is  per  se  a  sufficient  psychological  cri- 
terion of  the  physical;  and  (3)  the  question  of  definition,  as 
to  whether  the  internality-externality  distinction  is  a  logically 
defensible  one. 

The  first  question  is  not  an  important  one  for  our  discus- 

'^  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology,  Chap.  III. 
'*  Op.  cit.,  p.  26. 
»5  Op.  cit.,  p.  27. 
««  Op.  cit..  pp.  28  £ 


144         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

sion,  and  the  evidence,  it  must  be  admitted,  is  largely  on  his 
side.  Perception  does  undoubtedly  carry  with  it,  normally 
speaking,  a  vague  something  which  may  be  called  for  want  of 
a  better  term  an  original  (i.e.,  underived)  mark  of  "extern- 
ality"; while  imagination — normally  speaking,  again — lacks 
both  these  marks.  But  in  the  case  of  an  illusion  or  hallucina- 
tion, there  may  be  a  very  vivid  feeling  of  "externality,"  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  an  illusion  is  largely  and  an  halluci- 
nation wholly  mental. 

Dr.  Sidis  himself  is  rather  inconsistent  on  this  point.  In 
Chapter  HI  he  writes  as  follows :  "Had  my  perception  of  the 
house  yonder  been  a  hallucination,  I  would  have  still  seen  it 
as  external  and  therefore  regarded  [it]  as  a  physical  object."^^ 
But  this  statement  involves  an  admission  that  gives  away  his 
entire  point.  I  might  indeed,  in  the  case  cited,  "regard"  the 
hallucinatory  house  as  physical,  but  it  would  be  psychical,  just 
the  same.  This  view  is  somewhat  modified  for  the  better  in 
a  later  chapter  in  which  the  whole  question  of  externality  is 
under  discussion.^^  "Psychologically  regarded,"  it  is  there 
asserted,  "the  percept  is  as  much  a  private  experience  as  the 
image  is.  In  fact,  every  psychic  state  has  the  privacy  ascribed 
to  the  image,  and  as  such  is  unshared  by  other  selves."^^  Here 
we  have  the  commonly  approved  "privacy"  or  "unshared"-ness 
criterion  of  the  psychical  for  which  we  have  been  arguing. 
All  psychic  states,  percepts  as  well  as  images,  are  private  and 
unshared ;  but  percepts  have  referetice  to  physical  (i.e.,  public 
or  common)  objects,  while  images  do  not,  and  it  is  this  "ref- 
erence to"  the  physical  which  gives  the  former  their  mark  of 
"externality." 

The  various  questions  thus  aroused  by  the  doctrine  of  the 
externality  of  the  physical  seem  to  leave  that  doctrine  in  an 
unenviable  position  of  vagueness.  Percepts  do  carry  with 
them  a  feeling  of  externality,  but  so  also  do  hallucinations : 

^'^  Op.  cit.,  p.  27. 

38  Chap.  XXIV. 

20  P.  172.     Italics  mine. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      145 

externality,  therefore,  is  not  a  sufficient  criterion  of  the  physi- 
cal. Even  if  the  internal-external  distinction,  then,  be,  as  it 
probably  is,  the  first  distinction  to  be  made  between  the  mental 
and  physical  reality,  its  inadequacy  soon  forces  ns  into  a 
search  for  a  truer  one;  and  in  the  privacy-community  theory 
our  problem  seems  to  find  its  best  solution. 

It  should  also  be  noted,  in  answer  to  our  third  question  pro- 
pounded above,*°  that  there  is  also  a  serious  logical  objection 
to  Dr.  Sidis's  doctrine — namely,  that  the  internal-external  dis- 
tinction is  in  its  very  terminology  spatial,  and  so  contradicts 
the  spatial  vs.  non-spatial  distinction  between  the  physical  and 
the  psychical  formulated  in  an  earlier  section  (75).  Dr.  Sidis 
draws  a  line  in  space  between  the  mental  as  "internal"  (i.e., 
"within"  something,  presumably  mind  or  brain)  and  the  physi- 
cal as  "external"  (i.e.,  "outside"  the  mind  or  brain) — a  pro- 
cedure which  is  vitiated  throughout  by  its  attribution  of  spatial 
terminology  to  that  which  is  in  its  essential  nature  non-spatial. 

Before  leaving  Dr.  Sidis,  we  must  say  a  word  or  two  about 
his  second  distinction  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  re- 
ferred to  above.  "I  think  it  is  best,"  he  says,  "to  define  the 
physical  phenomenon  as  the  object  or  process  conceived  as  be- 
ing independent  of  consciousness,  while  the  psychic  object  or 
process  is  one  that  is  conceived  as  being  directly  dependent  on 
consciousness."*^  These  definitions,  however,  do  not,  it  is  to 
be  feared,  throw  any  light  upon,  or  add  anything  to,  the  defi- 
nition of  the  mental  as  internal  and  the  material  as  external: 
rather  do  they  beg  the  very  question  at  issue,  namely,  what  is 
ii  that  characterizes  dependence  u[X)n  consciousness  and  in- 
dependence of  consciousness  respectively? 

Our  criticism  of  Sidis's  doctrine,  then,  is  threefold:  (i) 
that  the  internal-external  distinction  is  a  spatial  one,  and  so 
ruled  out  by  our  previous  characterization  of  the  mental  as 
non-spatial;  (2)  that  the  coiu<;cious  dependence-independence 
distinction  begs  the  question  at  issue;  and  (3)  that  both  these 

*«  P.  143- 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  30. 


146         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

distinctions  are,  as  Miss  Calkins  treats  them  {v.  previous  sec- 
tion, yy),  subsidiary  to  the  privacy-community  distinction,  and 
logically  inadequate  until  explained  in  terms  of  the  latter/^ 
The  internal-external  distinction  may  be  genetically  prior,  in 
the  history  of  the  individual  consciousness,  to  the  private-public 
distinction;  but  it  is  logically  based  upon  the  latter.  Things 
may  first  seem  external  and  only  then  be  explained  as  com- 
mon or  public,  but  it  is  the  latter  fact  which  makes  the  former 
true.  Or,  once  more,  and  making  use  of  an  ancient  philosophi- 
cal expression :  externality  is  the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  com- 
munity, but  community  is  the  ratio  essendi  of  externality. 

79.  Various  Secondary  Characteristics  of  Mental  Phenom- 
ena.— We  have  now  established  the  two  primary  distinctive 
characteristics,  one  negative  and  one  positive,  of  mental  phe- 
nomena. There  are  a  number  of  other  secondary  character- 
istics, however,  which  it  is  desirable  to  note.  William  James 
has  summed  these  up  in  his  Principles  of  Psychology  under 
the  expression,  "the  five  characters  of  thought."*^  These  "five 
characters"  are: 

"i )  Every  thought  tends  to  be  part  of  a  personal  conscious- 
ness. 

2)  Within  each  personal  consciousness,  thought  is  always 

changing. 

3)  Within  each  personal  consciousness,  thought  is  sensibly 

continuous. 

4)  It  always  appears  to  deal  with  objects  independent  of 

itself. 

5)  It  is  interested  in  some  parts  of  these  objects  to  the  ex- 

clusion of  others,  and  welcomes  or  rejects — chooses 

from  among  them,  in  a  word — all  the  while." 

In  his  later  abridgment  of  his  great  work,  known  as  the 

Briefer  Psychology*^  James  alters  his  terminology  somewhat, 

and  reduces  his  "five  characters"  to  four  by  the  omission  of 

*2  V.  also  next  section  for  further  dscussion  of  this  characteristic. 
*2  Op.  cit..  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IX.     The  summary  quoted  is  on  p.  225. 
**  Chap.  XI.     Summary  on  p.  152. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      147 

No.  4  of  the  original  list.  By  "thought,"  it  should  be  said, 
he  means  what  we  have  called  "content,"  or,  as  he  puts  it  in 
his  second  list,  mental  "states."  The  fifth  character  is  the  fact 
of  interest  or  attention,  and  though  a  basic  mental  activity, 
it  is  specific  rather  than  general,  and  may  be  disregarded  by 
us  in  this  connection.  The  fourth  proposition  asserts  the  close 
concern  which  consciousness  has  with  things  beyond  itself,  the 
intimate  relation  of  the  mental  with  the  physical;  but  was 
wisely  omitted  in  the  revision  in  the  Briefer  Psychology,  and 
may  wisely  also  be  disregarded  by  us  here.  Omitting  these 
leaves  us  with  three  secondary  cliar  act  eristics  of  the  psychical 
which  will  occupy  our  attention  in  the  ensuing  paragraphs — 
Introspectiveness,  Transitoriness,  and  Continuity,  as  we  shall 
call  them. 

(i)  Introspectiveness.  James's  first  proposition  asserts  in 
dififerent,  and,  perhaps,  more  familiar  language,  the  private 
character  of  mental  phenomena.  "Every  thought  ['state,'  'con- 
tent'] tends  to  be  [rather,  is'\  part  of  a  personal  consciousness"  : 
that  is  to  say,  it  is  a  fundamental  truth  about  psychical  as  dis- 
tinguished from  physical  phenomena  that  they  are  personal, 
intimate,  individual,  "private,"  "unshared,"  parts  of  a  personal 
"stream,"  objects  of  which  same  "I"  is  "conscious" — and  that 
apart  from  such  characteristics  they  can  have  no  existence. 
This  being  "part  of  a  personal  consciousness"  is  what  Sidis 
calls  the  "dependence"  of  mental  facts  upon  consciousness, 
and  from  it  follows  directly  what  he  designates  as  the  "in- 
ternality"  of  mental  objects — i.e.,  as  I  have  put  it  above,  their 
introspectiveness.  Psychical  phenomena,  in  other  words,  are 
characteristically  such  as  can  be  experienced  only  by  introspec- 
tion, not  through  the  physical  senses.*' 

(2)  Transitoriness.  "Within  each  personal  consciousness, 
thought  is  always  changing."  In  the  physical  world  we  may 
always  distinguish  between  the  things  in  the  world,  and  the 
processes  which  those  things  undergo.  "Living  things,"  ani- 
mals and  plants,  undergo  the  processes  of  generation,  growth, 

«  Cf.  Klemm,  History  of  Psychology,  p.  84. 


148         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

decay,  and  death;  and  science  may  be  interested  either  in  the 
structure  of  these  things  (morphology,  anatomy),  or  in  their 
activities  (physiology,  "praxiology").  So  manufactured  arti- 
cles— houses,  tables,  cabinets,  machines — undergo  the  pro- 
cesses of  construction,  function,  and  decay,  and  we  separate 
easily  in  our  minds  the  structure  of  the  finished  product  from 
the  processes  involved  in  the  making  and  using  of  that  pro- 
duct. But  in  the  psychical  world  this  distinction  is  in  any 
literal  sense  invalid:  all  mental  phenomena  are  of  the  nature 
of  processes,  there  are  no  -fixed  things;*^  and  the  distinction 
which  we  have  freely  drawn  between  structural  and  functional 
psychology  is,  as  was  pointed  out  when  the  distinction  was 
under  investigation,  an  artificial  one,  made  for  the  purpose  of 
a  more  thorough  scientific  understanding  of  mental  life,  and 
does  not  correspond  to  any  real  distinction  in  the  mental  world. 

(3)  Continuity.  Notwithstanding  the  transitoriness  of  the 
individual  mental  process,  personal  consciousness  ("thought") 
as  a  whole  is  "sensibly  continuous."  Consciousness  "flows" : 
the  individual  states  are  not  isolated  from  one  another,  like 
the  films  of  a  moving  picture,  but  flow  into  one  another,  as  the 
films  seem  to  do  when  projected  on  to  a  screen  by  a  cinemeta- 
graph.  Hence  comes  James's  powerful  and  often  used  figure 
of  "the  stream  of  consciousness."  And  even  when  the  stream 
of  consciousness  is  broken  into — as  it  regularly  is  by  our 
nightly  periods  of  sleep,  and  sometimes  is  in  the  abnormal 
disturbances  known  as  periods  of  amnesia  or  loss  of  memory 
— the  personality  seems  to  attach  the  first  moment  of  waking 
directly  on  to  the  last  moment  before  losing  consciousness,  so 
that  the  gap  is  filled  and  the  continuity  of  actual  consciousness 
preserved. 

80.  The  Interpretation  of  the  Mental-Physical  Distinction. 
— ^We  have  been  concerned  so  far  in  making  the  line  of  sepa- 
ration between  mental  and  physical  phenomena  as  sharp  and 
clear  as  possible  for  the  purpose  of  delimiting  the  field  of  psy- 
chology and  dispelling  the  too  prevalent  confusion  between 

*^  Cf.  Titchener,  Primer  of  Psychology,  pp.  6  f. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      149 

psychology  and  the  material  sciences.  We  should  not  wish  it 
thought,  however,  that  in  so  doing  we  are  desiring  to  advance 
any  dualistic  conception  of  the  relation  between  the  psychical 
and  the  material.  It  is  perfectly  possible  to  interpret  our  dis- 
tinction dualistically,  and  it  is  also  perfectly  possible  to  in- 
terpret it  monistically.*^  The  view  we  have  been  defending 
does  not  necessarily  imply  two  distinct  sets  of  facts,  but  is 
completely  satisfied  by  the  assertion  of  two  standpoints  from 
which  a  single  fact  may  be  viewed. 

Which  of  these  two  possible  interpretations  is  to  be  ac- 
cepted is  entirely  a  metaphysical  question,  whereas  we  are  con- 
cerned here  solely  with  the  question  of  fact.*'  It  may  be 
noted,  however,  that  the  Inner  Sense  theory  discussed  and 
refuted  above  (72)  leads  most  naturally  to  a  dualistic  inter- 
pretation of  the  mental-physical  distinction;  whereas  the  Im- 
mediate Experience  theory  (73),  and  the  modification  thereof 
which  we  have  adopted  (74),  as  naturally  point  to  a  monistic 
interpretation. 

81.  Conclusion. — In  thus  completing  our  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  mental  as  distinguished  from  material  phenomena, 

"  By  a  dualistic  interpretation  is  meant  one  which  would  regard  mental 
phenomena  and  physical  phenomena  as  separate  entities  or  realities:  by 
a  monistic  interpretation  is  meant  one  which  would  regard  mental  and 
physical  as  two  aspects  of  the  same  phenomenon  or  reality  (4-6). 

*^  An  interesting  monistic  interpretation  of  the  relation  between  mental 
and  physical  is  the  context  theory  of  that  relationship,  or,  as  it  is  more 
commonly  called,  the  relational  theory  of  consciousness.  According  to 
this  view,  the  same  phenomenon  is  physical  so  far  as  its  space  context 
is  concerned,  and  mental  so  far  as  it  is  connected  with  the  context  of  my 
own  personal  past  and  future  experience.  For  example,  the  table  is  physi- 
cal in  its  relation  to  the  room  and  the  other  furniture  therein,  and  mental 
in  its  relation  to  preceding  and  succeeding  moments  of  my  own  experience. 
See  James,  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism  (especially  Chaps.  I,  II,  VIII)  ; 
The  Meaning  of  Truth,  Chap.  Ill  (especially  pp.  46-50)  ;  Perry,  Present 
Philosophical  Tendencies,  pp.  306-313.  Cf.  also  Montague:  "What  we 
know  directly  from  within  as  the  psychical  or  subjective  side  of  ex- 
perience may  be  the  same  as  what  we  know  indirectly  from  without  as 
the  potential  energy  of  the  nerve  currents  of  the  brain"  (Monist,  XVIII, 
p.  27.    Italics  mine). 


150         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

we  have  also  brought  to  a  solution  the  problem  of  the  differ- 
entiation of  the  fields  of  those  sciences  which  take  these  two 
sets  of  phenomena  for  their  respective  subject-matter — namely, 
psychology,  and  the  material  sciences.  Psychology  is  the 
science  of  mental  phenomena  as  above  defined:  the  material 
sciences  are  sciences  of  material  phenomena  as  also  above  de- 
fined. The  fact  of  the  privacy  of  mental  phenomena,  how- 
ever, generates  another  serious  problem — namely,  How  is  it 
possible  (if  description  involves,  as  it  seems  to  do,  communi- 
cation of  facts  from  one  individual  to  another)  to  describe 
phenomena  which  can  be  known  directly  by  only  one  indi- 
vidual? This  question  must  be  answered;  for  if  we  cannot 
describe  mental  phenomena,  a  science  of  psychology  is  im- 
possible. 

3.  Conditions  of  Psychological  Description. 

82,  General  Conditions  of  a  Scientific  Psychology. — We 
have  learned  (51,  53,  etc.)  that  psychology  has  for  its  prob- 
lem (i)  the  description  of  mental  phenomena,  and  (2)  the 
determination  of  their  causal  relations.  The  conditions  which 
make  causal  explanation  in  psychology  possible  will  be  con- 
sidered in  a  later  connection,*^  and  we  shall  concern  ourselves 
at  this  point  only  with  the  conditions  of  a  scientific  description 
of  mental  facts. 

83.  Miinsterberg's  Theory. — Description  involves  a  com- 
munication by  the  observer  to  some  one  else  of  the  facts  which 
he  has  observed.  This  is  a  perfectly  simple  matter  in  the 
physical  sciences,  because  physical  facts  are  common  objects 
of  experience  to  many  experiencers ;  but  in  psychology,  whose 
objects  (i.e.,  mental  facts)  are  by  their  very  nature  private  and 
individual  experiences,  direct  description  or  communication  of 
facts  from  one  mind  to  another  is  impossible.  "We  cannot 
communicate  a  psychical  object  directly,  as  it  lies  in  the  nature 
of  the  psychical  state  to  be  exclusively  the  property  of  one  in- 
dividual."   The  physical  world,  on  the  other  hand,  "is  public 

*9  V.  especially  Chap.  VI,  Division  3. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      151 

property  which  any  two  subjects  share  with  each  other  and 
about  which  a  direct  communication,  a  common  taking  hold, 
is  possible.  We  can  therefore  communicate  a  mental  state 
only  indirectly,  and  only  insofar  as  it  is  necessarily  linked 
with  a  part  of  the  outer  world."^° 

Psychological  description,  then,  is  possible  only  if  we  can 
link  our  mental  contents,  which  in  themselves  are  private  and 
so  not  directly  communicable,  with  physical  facts  which  by 
their  common  or  public  nature  are  directly  communicable.  But 
such  a  necessary  linkage  is  found  only  in  the  case  of  percepts, 
which  refer  to  existing  objects  in  the  physical  world,  and 
ideas,  which  are  composed  of  the  same  elements  ("sensa- 
tions") of  which  percepts  themselves  are  composed.  "The 
idea  means  the  thing,  and  any  sensation  in  the  idea  means  a 
feature  of  the  thing.  The  tone,  the  smell,  the  color  as  sensa- 
tion can  thus  be  communicated  indirectly  by  reference  to  the 
sounding,  smelling,  luminous  physical  object,  and  any  degree 
of  exactness  can  be  reached  by  the  increasingly  accurate  de- 
scription of  the  physical  side."^^  Percepts,  ideas,  and  their 
elements  can  thus  be  scientifically,  though  indirectly,  described. 

Other  mental  states,  however, — feelings,  emotions,  volitions, 
etc., — are  in  a  different  situation.  "We  understand  what  we 
mean  by  the  words  fear,  or  shock,  or  joy,  because  we  have 
learned  to  use  the  words  for  those  mental  states  which  are 
connected  with  special  physical  occurrences" — their  "forego- 
ing causes  or  following  effects."  But  this  is  not  strictly  speak- 
ing "a  description,  because  the  constitution  and  the  elements 
of  the  state  are  not  communicable  at  all.""  These  mental 
states  (affective  and  conative)  may,  then,  be  described  only 
if  they  can  be  reduced  to  the  same  elements  {inc.,  "sensations") 
as  those  out  of  which  percepts  and  ideas  are  composed.  "An 
emotion  or  volition  is  never  an  idea,  but  their  elements  may 
be  the  same,  just  as  the  organic  and  inorganic  substances  in 

8"  Munsterberg,  Psychological  Review,  VII,  pp.  3  f .   (1900). 
"*  Psychology  and  Life,  p.  50. 
52  Op.  cit.,  p.  49. 


152         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

nature  are  composed  of  the  same  chemical  elements.'"^  Care- 
ful analysis,  Miinsterberg  thinks,  shows  this  supposition  to  be 
well-founded,  and  establishes  the  describability  of  affective  and 
conative  as  well  as  of  cognitive  contents. 

Such  is  Miinsterberg's  doctrine  of  the  nature  and  conditions 
of  psychological  description.  "The  aim  of  the  psychologist  is 
to  describe  mental  facts :  he  must,  therefore,  presuppose  that 
all  mental  facts  are  describable,  and,  since  only  elements  of 
ideas  can  be  described,  that  every  content  of  consciousness  is 
in  reality  a  combination  of  sensations. "°*  Introspective  analy 
sis  confirms  this  presupposition,  and  guarantees  the  fulfilment 
of  the  ideal  of  scientific  description  in  psychology. 

84.  Criticism  of  Miinsterberg's  Doctrine. — The  theory  may 
be  stated  in  the  form  of  the  following  six  propositions:  (i) 
that  description  involves  communication  of  the  facts  observed, 
by  the  observer  to  some  other  mind;  (2)  that  mental  as  dis- 
tinguished from  physical  facts  are  by  their  very  nature  private, 
and  so  not  directly  communicable;  (3)  that  mental  facts  may 
be  communicated  indirectly  so  far  as  they  may  be  "necessarily 
linked  with  a  part  of  the  material  world";  (4)  that  percepts 
and  ideas  and  their  elements  ("sensations")  can  be  correlated 
with  physical  things,  and  so  described;  (5)  that  emotions  and 
volitions  cannot  be  correlated  with  physical  things,  and  so 
cannot  be  described  unless  they  can  be  analyzed  into  the  same 
elements  (vis.,  "sensations")  as  those  of  which  percepts  and 
ideas  are  composed;  but  (6)  that  emotions  and  volitions  can 
thus  be  analyzed  into  sensations,  and  consequently  can  be  de- 
scribed. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  inherently  private  and  in- 
communicable nature  of  mental  facts  offers  a  serious  theoreti- 
cal difficulty  to  the  scientific  description  of  them,  and  yet  it  is 
equally  undeniable  that  we  do  as  a  matter  of  fact  manage  to 
describe  our  inner  experiences  to  one  another  with  a  sure  con- 

53  Op.  cit.,  p.  51. 

54  Op.  cit.,  p.  53. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      153 

fidence  that  the  hearer  will  understand  what  we  are  talking 
about.    How  do  we  do  this? 

The  medium  of  this  description  is  always  a  physical  medium 
— speech,  writing,  gesture,  facial  expression,  etc. — the  de 
scriber  transforming  his  mental  content  into  such  physical 
terms  as  these,  and  the  recipient  of  the  description  interpret- 
ing those  physical  expressions  into  mental  terms  again.  Our 
knowledge  of  the  contents  of  other  persons'  minds,  therefore, 
is  ordinarily  acquired  by  the  method  of  analogy,  through  the 
interpretation  of  those  persons'  behavior.  But  such  a  pro- 
cedure does  not  satisfy  the  more  rigorous  and  analytical  de- 
mands of  science,  and  for  scientific  purposes  a  more  accurate 
procedure  is  resorted  to — vis.,  the  method  of  analysis,  whereby 
complex  mental  contents  are  analyzed  into  their  elements, 
these  being  correlated  with  physical  phenomena  and  so  ren- 
dered standard  media  of  exchange  from  mind  to  mind.  The 
psychologist,  then,  describes  mental  phenomena  simply  by  an- 
alyzing them  into  their  elements,  which  elements  must  have 
previously  been  accepted  as  standards  of  communication  be- 
cause of  their  necessary  linkage  with  the  common  or  public 
objects  of  the  physical  world. 

So  far  we  follow  Miinsterberg,  our  exposition  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph  paralleling  his  first  four  propositions.  But 
the  fifth  and  sixth  propositions  suggest  two  queries — (i)  do 
emotions  and  volitions  really  stand  on  such  a  different  ground 
from  percepts  and  ideas  as  Miinsterberg  insists?  and  (2)  must 
emotions  and  volitions,  if  they  are  to  be  described,  be  analyz- 
able  into  "sensations  only"?  Miinsterberg  tells  us  that  "emo- 
tions link  themselves  with  physical  causes  or  effects,  and  every- 
thing in  respect  to  them  is  dependent  upon  doubtful  observa- 
tions and  interpretations;  ideas,  on  the  other  hand,  stand  in  a 
relation  to  physical  things  which  is  anchored  in  philosophical 
ground  and  independent  of  chance  observation.""  Again,  "if 
there  were  mental  states  which  are  composed  of  other  elements 
than  sensations,  they  would  necessarily  remain  indescribable; 

"  Psychology  and  Life,  p.  50. 


154         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

we  could  not  grasp  them  because  they  would  not  have  any 
definite  relation  to  the  common  physical  world.  We  might 
say,  for  instance,  that  our  mental  content  is  made  up  of  sen- 
sations and  feelings,  but  if  such  feelings  were  really  entirely 
different  from  sensations,  they  would  have  to  remain  for  all 
time  mysterious  and  unknown.  We  could  not  compare  notes. 
The  feeling  which  I  call  joy  may  feel  just  like  the  one  which 
you  call  despair."^^  But  "modern  psychology  has  recognized 
that  volitions  and  emotions  and  feelings  and  judgments,  and 
the  whole  stream  of  inner  life,  are  made  up  of  sensations,""'^ 
and  the  difficulty  is  therefore  overcome. 

Now,  is  this  sharp  distinction  between  ideational  and  non- 
ideational  content  in  the  matter  of  their  relative  describability 
a  valid  distinction,  and  is  the  reduction  of  emotions  and  voli- 
tions to  sensational  elements  only  essential  for  the  overcoming 
of  the  difficulty  of  describing  non-ideational  contents?  The 
theory  of  psychical  analysis  to  which  Miinsterberg  subscribes 
is  called  "sensationism,"  the  doctrine  that  all  mental  contents 
are  analyzable  into  sensations.  The  merits  of  this  doctrine  we 
cannot  at  present  discuss:  suffice  it  to  say  that  the  majority 
of  psychologists  accept  also  a  second  type  of  element — the 
affective  element,  or  the  "simple  feeling" — and  many  of  them 
three  or  more  types.  For  our  present  purpose  we  do  not  need 
to  solve  the  problem  of  the  existence  of  affective  elements, 
but  merely  to  inquire  whether  Miinsterberg  is  correct  when 
he  says  that  if  feelings  ("affections")  were  different  from 
sensations  we  could  never  communicate  them  to  one  another. 

Now  it  is  certain  that  I  find  no  more  difficulty  in  practice  in 
describing  or  talking  about  an  emotion,  or  differentiating  be- 
tween another's  joy  and  another's  despair,  than  I  find  in  de- 
scribing a  red  sensation  or  differentiating  another's  experience 
of  red  from  his  experience  of  yellow;  and  in  reality  I  seem 
to  find  much  less  difficulty  in  the  former  case  than  in  the  lat- 
ter.    I  do  not  see  that  the  linkage  of  emotions  with  their 

^^  Psychotherapy,  p.  23.     Italics  mine. 
^"f  Ibid.,  p.  24. 


THE  FIELD  OF  SCIENTIFIC  PSYCHOLOGY      155 

physiological  {i.e.,  physical,  not  mental)  accompaniments  or 
expressions  is  any  weaker  or  less  "philosophically  grounded," 
or  any  more  "dependent  on  chance  observation,"  than  the 
linkage  of  sensations  and  percepts  with  their  corresponding 
stimuli  and  physical  objects :  in  fact,  the  usual  modern  psycho- 
logical theory  of  emotion  links  mental  emotion  and  physiologi- 
cal accompaniment  in  the  very  closest  possible  bonds,  so  that 
it  is  often  doubtful  whether  an  emotion  should  be  called  pri- 
marily a  mental  content  or  primarily  a  physiological  condi- 
tion. The  description  of  emotion  by  analogy,  i.e.,  by  the  in- 
terpretation of  its  outward  expressions,  therefore,  seems  to 
offer  absolutely  no  difficulty. 

As  to  the  more  accurate  method  of  description  by  analysis, 
what  effect  would  the  recognition  of  a  non-sensational  element 
have  upon  that  method?  None  whatever.  The  affective  ele- 
ments as  usually  enumerated  by  those  who  recognize  them  at 
all  are  two — pleasantness  and  unpleasantness.  Pleasantness 
is  an  indication  that  the  individual  wants  more  of  the  object 
or  experience  producing  it,  and  leads  to  an  approach  to  the 
object  or  a  retention  of  it  if  there  is  danger  of  loss,  or  to  a 
prolongation  of  the  experience:  unpleasantness  has  the  oppo- 
site characteristics.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  in  the  case  of  pleas- 
antness and  unpleasantness,  as  in  the  case  of  sensations,  there 
is  a  very  definite  "linkage  to  the  physical  world,"  and  no  pos- 
sibility of  doubting  the  presence  of  either  when  it  is  present, 
or  of  confusing  the  two  types.  Miinsterberg's  difficulties  on 
this  point,  therefore,  fall  to  the  ground,  and  we  conclude  that 
all  mental  contents,  non-ideational  as  well  as  ideational,  are 
describable  by  analysis  into  elements  which  are  linked  neces- 
sarily with  events  in  the  physical  world. 

REFERENCES 

Psychology  and  the  Material  Sciences — 

Klemm,  A  History  of  Psychology,  pp.  69-86,  159-165. 

Villa,  Contemporary  Psychology,  Chap.  II. 

Wundt,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  §  i ;  §  2,  Nos.  3  and  4. 


156  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Mental  vs.  Physical  Phenomena — 

Sidis,  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology, 

Chaps.  H-IV. 
Royce,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pp.  1-4. 

"        Studies  of   Good  and   Evil    (Essay   entitled,   "Self- 
Consciousness,  Social  Consciousness,  and  Nature") 
Montague,  Monist,  XVUI,  pp.  21  ff.    (1908). 

"  Consciousness   a   Form    of   Energy    (in    Essays 

Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of 
William  James). 
Moore,  G.  E.,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  X,  pp. 

36  ff.   (1909-10), 
Sellars,  Critical  Realism,  Chap.  IX. 
James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IX. 

"        Psychology,  Briefer  Course,  Chap.  XI. 
Laird,  Monist:  XXXI,  pp.   i6iff.   (1921). 

Conditions  of  Psychological  Description — 

Munsterberg,  Psychology  and  Life,  pp.  44-53,  191-194. 
"  Psychotherapy,  pp.  19-26. 

"  Psychological  Review,  V,  pp.  643-645  (1908). 

Criticism  by  Thorndike,  Do.,  pp.  645  f. 
"  Psychological  Review,  VII,  pp.  1-4  (1900). 

Titchener,    American   Journal   of   Psychology,    XXIII,    pp. 
165  ff.   (1912). 


BOOK  III 
THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Postulates  in  General 
I.  The  Statement  of  the  Postulates. 

85.  Every  science  is  based  on  postulates,  that  is  to  say,  upon 
certain  fundamental  and  essential  presuppositions  without 
which  the  science  in  question  would  be  impossible.  Science 
accepts  such  postulates  as  true,  leaving  to  metaphysics  the 
task  of  inquiring  into  the  validity  of  that  assumption,  and 
into  the  nature  and  reality  of  the  thing  assumed.  What,  then, 
are  the  postulates  of  the  science  of  psychology?  What  must 
psychology  postulate  if  it  is  to  be  a  complete  and  independent 
science?  We  shall  find,  I  think,  four  of  such  indispensable 
presuppositions. 

I.  The  first  of  these  is  a  postulate  held  in  common  by  psy- 
chology and  the  material  sciences — namely,  the  Existence  of 
the  Material  World.  "With  all  other  sciences,"  says  Dr. 
Sidis,  "psychology  must  postulate  the  existence  of  an  external 
material  world  of  space,  time,  and  objects.  Psychology  does 
not  inquire  into  the  nature  of  these  objects,  as  to  what  they 
are  in  themselves.  This,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  is  the  busi- 
ness of  metaphysics,  not  of  science.  Psychology,  however, 
does  ask  how  we  come  to  know  the  outside  world;  it  inquires 
as  to  the  process  by  which  external  reality  comes  to  be  pre- 
sented in  consciousness."^  In  other  words,  the  psychologist  is 
as  such  not  interested  in  the  nature  or  laws  of  the  material 
world,  but  he  is  interested  in  that  world  so  far  as  it  may  be- 
come an  object  of  knowledge. 

II.  The  second  postulate  is  peculiar  to,  and  distinctive  of, 
psychology — namely,  the  Existence  of  Consciousness.^     Con- 

*  Foundations,  p.   106.     For  a  superficially  different  but   fundamentally 
similar  position,  v.  Bichowsky,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  XVIII,  295  ff.  (1921). 

*  Ibid.,  pp.  14-16,  106  f. 


i6o  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

sciousness  itself  is  the  subject-matter  of  psychology:  hence 
there  can  be  no  science  of  psychology  unless  the  existence  of 
consciousness  is  assumed.  But  the  question  of  the  nature  of 
consciousness  is  handed  over  by  the  psychologist  to  the  meta- 
physician. 

HI.  The  third  postulate  is  more  complex,  combining  as  it 
does  the  truths  of  the  first  two.  This  is  the  postulate  of  the 
Interrelation  of  Consciousness  and  the  Material  World.  "Psy- 
chology, we  said,  deals  with  states  of  consciousness;  but  these 
states  are  not  independent,  floating  in  the  air,  so  to  say.  They 
are  in  connection  with  some  material  existences;  and  not  di- 
rectly with  physical  reality  as  a  whole,  but  with  some  definite 
individual  body."^  This  postulate  involves  two  subordinate 
ones :  ( I )  that  consciousness  can  be  studied  only  so  far  as  it 
is  connected  with  some  definite  human  organism;  and  (2) 
that  the  interrelation  between  consciousness  and  the  world 
beyond  the  body  is  always  through  the  medium  of  the  indi- 
vidual body — especially  of  the  nervous  system,  and  most  par- 
ticularly of  the  brain.  The  interrelation  itself,  therefore,  is 
twofold — a  psychophysical  and  a  psychophysiological  inter- 
relation; and  each  of  the  latter  is  also  in  its  turn  twofold,  as 
we  shall  see. 

A.  The  Psychophysical  Interrelation  is  that  between  con- 
sciousness and  external  objects  {i.e.,  objects  beyond  the 
body),*  and  is  of  two  types — (i )  the  perceptual  or  knowledge 
relation,  the  relation  by  which  external  objects  become  known 
to  consciousness  through  the  bodily  senses;  and  (2)  the  co 
native  or  action  relation  (which  Sidis  strangely  omits),  or  the 
relation  by  which  consciousness  impresses  itself  upon  the  ex- 
ternal world  through  the  muscular  system  of  the  body.  Psy 
chology  must  postulate  these  two  things — a  true  knowledge  of 
the  material  world  by  the  mind  (which  becomes  in  philosophy 
the  "epistemological  problem"),  and  an  efifective  power  of  the 
mind  ("the  will,"  as  we  commonly  call  it)  to  make  changes  in 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  36. 

*  v.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  107-9. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     i6i 

the  material  world  (giving  rise  to  the  philosophical  problem 
of  "free  will"). 

But,  as  the  above  postulates  themselves  inform  us,  the  in- 
terrelation between  consciousness  and  the  external  world  is 
not  direct,  but  mediated  by  the  nervous  and  muscular  systems 
of  the  body.®    Hence — 

B.  The  Psychophysiological  Interrelation,  or  that  between 
consciousness  and  the  individual  organism.  Numerous  facts 
of  common  knowledge,  and  of  experimental  and  pathological 
science,  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  enumerate  here,"  show  the 
dependence  of  many  of  our  mental  processes  upon  certain 
physiological  conditions  of  one  sort  or  another,  chiefly  cere- 
bral; and  the  fact  that  the  behavior  of  the  organism  is  or 
may  be  the  expression  of  consciousness  is  also  a  commonplace. 
So  strong  is  this  evidence  that  psychologists  are  impelled  to 
go  beyond  the  exact  boundary  of -the  evidence  itself,  and  make 
two  universal  assumptions  as  presuppositions  of  all  their  in- 
vestigations :  ( I )  that  all  mental  processes  have  physiological 
conditions;  and  (2)  that  all  mental  processes  tend  to  express 
themselves  physiologically — either  (a)  internally  only,  in  the 
brain,  vital  organs,  and  internal  muscles  (Watson's  "implicit 
behavior":  2^)  ;  or  (b)  externally  also,  in  motor  activity 
(Watson's  "explicit  behavior").^  Of  these  two  aspects  of 
the  psychophysiological  interrelation,  the  first  gives  rise  to  an 
extremely  important  principle  of  modern  psychology,  which 
will  occupy  us  at  greater  length  in  the  next  section — namely, 
the  Principle  of  Psychocercbral  Parallclisfn. 

IV.  The  fourth  postulate  of  psychology  is  that  of  the  Uni- 
formity of  Mental  Life.  "Uniformity  of  relations  among 
phenomena  must  be  postulated  if  science  is  to  be  at  all."  By 
uniformity  is  meant  the  principle  that  "under  similar  condi- 

'  v.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  107  f . 

"  v.,  op.  cit.,  Chap.  XII.  Also,  Mun.sterbcrg,  Pnychology,  General  and 
Applied,  pp.  34-39;  and  Psychotherapy,  pp.  34-40. 

^  Note  the  suhordinatc  adverbs.  Consciousness  always  expresses  itself 
in  internal  behavior:  it  may  also  express  itself  outtvardly. 


i62  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

tions  like  results  follow."  But  "if  under  the  same  conditions 
different  results  follow,  science  would  be  an  impossibility." 
Now  psychology,  like  other  sciences,  must  assume  uniformity : 
"it  assumes  that  there  exist  constant  uniform  types  of  mental 
activity  with  definite  relations  that  can  be  formulated  into 
psychological  laws."*  But  the  psychologist's  postulate  of  uni- 
formity is  necessarily  more  complex  than  that  of  the  natural 
scientist,  since  psychology  must  not  only  postulate  for  itself 
the  uniformity  of  mental  phenomena,  but  must  also  join  with 
the  material  sciences  in  their  assertion  of  the  uniformity  of 
natural  phenomena,  since  the  world  of  natural  phenomena  is 
the  object  of  consciousness  (v.  the  First  Postulate).  And  this 
is  not  all,  for  if  psychology  postulates  the  interrelation  of 
mental  and  physiological  phenomena,  and  the  uniformity  of 
each  of  these,  it  must  also  postulate  as  a  corollary  of  the  above 
the  uniformity  of  psychophysiological  relations.  "Definite 
physical  processes  must  be  concomitant  with  certain  well  de- 
fined psychic  states.  Were  this  otherwise,  the  two  series,  the 
mental  and  the  physical,  would  be  out  of  joint."® 

The  postulate  of  uniformity  leads  to  a  second  great  prin- 
ciple of  modern  psychology,  though  one  not  so  widely  ac- 
cepted as  that  of  parallelism — ^namely,  the  Principle  of  Inde- 
pendent Psychical  Causation.  To  the  discussion  of  this  prin- 
ciple I  shall  devote  a  later  division  of  this  chapter.  I  append  a 
summary  of  the  postulates  herein  defined. 

TABLE  VII 
Summary  of  the  Postulates 

First  Postulate:     The  Existence  of  the  Material  World. 
Second  Postulate:    The  Existence  of  Consciousness. 
Third  Postulate:     The  Interrelation  of   Consciousness  and  the  Material 
World. 
A.     The  Psychophysical  Interrelation;  between  Consciousness  and  Ex- 
ternal Objects. 

1.  The  Perceptual  or  Knowledge  Relation. 

2.  The  Conative  or  Action  Relation. 

^Foundations,  p.  i6.    Author's  italics  reduced  to  Roman  type. 
^  Op.   cit.,  p.   Ill,     Author's  italics  reduced. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     163 

B.     The    Psychophysiological    Interrelation;    between    Consciousness 
and  the  Individual  Organism. 

1.  The  Dependence  of  Consciousness  on  the  Body: — 

The  Principle  of  Psychocerebral  Parallelism. 

2.  The  Expression  of  Consciousness   in   Behavior:  either — 

a.  Internally  only;  or 

b.  Externally  also. 

Fourth  Postulate:     The  Uniformity  of  Mental  Life. 

Corollary:     The  Uniformity  of  Psychophysiological  Relations. 
The  Principle  of  Independent  Psychical  Causation. 

2.  The  Principle  of  Psychocerebral  Parallelism. 

86.  The  expression  "psychophysical  parallelism"  is  one 
which  occurs  frequently  in  metaphysical  and  metaphysico- 
psychological  discussion;  and  yet  when  we  examine  into  its 
meaning  we  find  that  it  actually  covers  three  distinct  principles, 
to  only  one  of  which  is  it  in  the  strictest  sense  applicable." 

(i)  In  the  first  place,  the  expression  is  often  used  to  stand 
for  the  inductive  generalization,  noted  under  the  head  of  HI 
B  I  in  the  preceding  section,  that  "all  mental  processes  have 
physiological  conditions."  This  principle,  together  with  its 
associated  principle  that  "all  mental  processes  tend  to  express 
themselves  physiologically,"  constitutes  what  we  have  called 
the  Postulate  of  Psychophysiological  Interrelation — a  "postu- 
late" because  presupposed  in  all  psychological  investigation. 
The  term  "psychophysiological"  is  better  than  "psychophysi- 
cal" here,  because  it  states  explicitly  what  part  of  the  "physi- 
cal" world  is  most  directly  associated  with  consciousness;  and 
since  the  nervous  system  is  that  part  of  the  body  upon  which 
consciousness  principally  depends,  it  is  possible  to  narrow  down 
our  general  principle  to  the  statement  that  "all  mental  pro- 
cesses have  neural  conditions."  Furthermore,  since  it  is  the 
brain,  or  more  properly  the  cerebrum,  which  investigation  has 
shown  us  to  be  the  true  "organ"  or  instrument  of  conscious- 
ness, we  can  still  further  reduce  our  formula  to  the  proposi- 

10  Ward,  article  on  "Psychology,"  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  Vol.  XXII 
pp.  600  f.     (The  reference  is  to  the  eleventh  edition.) 


i64         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

tion  that  "all  mental  processes  have  cerebral  conditions."  Both 
of  these  formulae,  however,  involve  a  certain  idea  of  depen- 
dence of  consciousness  on  nervous  system  or  brain  which  goes 
beyond  the  actual  evidence,  since  all  that  we  need  to  postulate 
is  a  correspondence  or  concomitance  between  consciousness  on 
the  one  hand  and  cerebral  or  neural  process  on  the  other. 
Hence  the  former  of  these  two  principles  is  often  expressed 
in  the  formula,  "No  psychosis  without  neurosis" — that  is  to 
say,  in  positive  terms,  "every  state  of  consciousness  is  ac- 
companied by  some  distinctive  condition  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem" ;  and  the  latter  will  find  itself  most  naturally  expressed  in 
the  proposition  that  "every  mental  process  is  accompanied 
by  some  distinctive  brain  process."  The  former  I  call  the 
"principle  of  psycho-neural  concomitance,"  the  latter  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Psychocerebral  Concomitance.^^ 

(2)  The  expression  "psychophysical  parallelism"  is  also 
sometimes  used  with  reference  to  a  certain  methodological 
principle  based  upon,  but  in  its  significance  extending  far  be- 
yond, the  above  generalization — the  principle,  namely,  that  in 
both  psychological  and  physiological  investigations  the  con- 
cepts of  psychology  and  of  physiology  must  be  kept  distinct, 
and  the  facts  of  each  science  be  explained  only  in  the  terms  of 
that  science ;  that  physiological  terms  and  concepts  must  not  be 
introduced  into  investigations  of  mental  life,  nor  psychological 
terms  and  concepts  into  investigations  of  bodily  activities; 
that  psychological  facts  should  be  explained  in  purely  psycho- 
logical terms,  and  physiological  facts  in  purely  physiological 
terms.  This  principle  does  not  preclude  psychophysiological 
investigations  as  such — investigations  in  the  field  of  what  is 
commonly  known  as  "physiological  psychology,"  or  of  the  in- 
terrelations which  actually  exist,  according  to  our  former 
principle,  between  mental  and  physiological  processes — but 
merely  to  assert  that  there  is  an  independent  field  of  "pure  psy- 
chology" into  which  physiological  concepts  are  not  permitted 
to  intrude,  just  as  there  is  a  field  of  pure  physiology  into  which 

^1  v.,  Munsterberg,  Psychology  General  and  Applied,  pp.  39  f . 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  165 

psychological  concepts  are  not  permitted  to  intrude.  This 
principle  can  perhaps  best  be  designated,  the  Principle  of  Psy- 
cJwlogical  and  Physiological  Independence. ^'^ 

(3)  Finally,  there  is  included  in  the  same  general  expres- 
sion a  metaphysical  principle  to  which,  and  to  which  alone,  the 
term  Psychophysical  Parallelism  is  properly  applicable — name- 
ly the  principle  that  the  interrelation  between  mind  and  body, 
and  between  the  mind  and  the  outside  world,  is  not  a  causal 
interrelation,  but  merely  one  of  concomitance."  This  prin- 
ciple is  opposed  to  that  of  psychophysical  inter actionism,  which 
accepts  the  causal  interpretation  of  the  interrelation  between 
mental  and  physical.  With  this  question  of  interpretation, 
however,  we  are  not  here  concerned.  The  fact  of  interrelation 
or  concomitance,  as  formulated  above  in  our  first  principles, 
we  must  accept  because  experience  shows  it  to  be  true ;  and  we 
find  it  convenient  to  accept  also  the  methodological  principle 
of  independence  as  expressed  in  our  second  formula;  but  the 
question  of  the  interpretation  of  this  interrelation,  whether  it  is 
or  is  not  causal,  the  psychologist  gladly  leaves  to  the  meta- 
physician." 

12  v..  Note  at  close  of  this  section. 

^3  The  term  "parallelism"  is  intended  to  emphasize  the  fact,  not  only 
that  there  is  something  physical  corresponding  to  or  concomitant  with 
every  mental  process,  but  that  this  is  a  mere  correspondence  or  concomi- 
tance; that  mental  processes  and  their  concomitant  physical  or  physio- 
logical processes  go  on  side  by  side — in  "parallel"  lines,  as  it  were — 
without  interfering  with  or  causally  affecting  each  other.  The  concept 
of  parallelism,  therefore,  involves  more  than  that  of  concomitance,  and 
is  in  fact  a  combination  of  the  concepts  of  concomitance  and  of  inde- 
pendence. 

**  Many  psychologists,  as  Sidis,  seem  to  find  it  necessary  to  deny  dog- 
matically the  causal  interpretation  (v.  Foundations,  pp.  78-81),  but  in 
doing  so  they  are  advancing  beyond  the  demands  of  science.  I  accept 
as  heartily  as  they  the  non-causal  interpretation,  but  I  do  so  on  meta- 
physical grounds  which  do  not  concern  even  the  theoretical  psychologist. 
The  relation  between  the  nervous  system  and  the  external  world  is  of 
course  a  causal  one  (v.  Sidis,  op.  cit..  p.  no);  but  all  that  we  need  to 
assume  as  to  the  interrelation  of  nervous  and  mental  processes  is  their 
coexistence  or  concomitance,  which  may  or  may  not  be  a  causal  con- 
comitance, according  as  metaphysical  considerations  may  determine. 


i66         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Disregarding,  then,  this  third  principle,  we  may  combine  the 
first  two,  which  alone  concern  us  here,  under  the  term,  the 
Principle  of  Psychocerebral  Parallelism,  formulating  the  same 
as  follows:  Every  mental  process  is  accompanied  by  some 
distinctive  brain  process,  but  in  the  description  and  explanation 
of  the  fortner  only  psychological  concepts  and  terms  m^y  be 
employed. 

Note  on  the  Principle  of  Independence 

It  seems  well  to  add  in  a  note  a  few  words  quoted  from  the 
writings  of  Dr.  Bernard  Hart  concerning  the  importance  of 
the  Principle  of  Independence.  "It  is  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance," he  says,  "that  in  the  final  'laws'  obtained  by  either 
[psychological  or  physiological  methods]  there  should  be  no 
mixing  of  terms.  The  physiological  laws  must  contain  no 
psychological  terms,  and  the  psychological  laws  must  contain 
no  physiological  terms.  Nothing  but  hopeless  confusion  can 
result  from  the  mixture  of  'brain  cells"  and  'ideas.'  "^^ 

Again :  "The  physiologist  must  not  introduce  psychological 
conceptions  into  his  chain  of  cause  and  effect,  nor  must  the 
psychologist  fill  up  the  gaps  in  his  reasoning  with  cells  and 
nerve  currents."^®  "The  various  elements  entering  into  a  con- 
ceptual construction  must  all  be  of  the  same  mode:  they  may 
be  either  physical  or  psychical,  but  cannot  consist  in  a  mixture 
of  the  two."" 

Dr.  Hart  seems  to  think  the  psychologist  is  much  the  more 
frequent  offender  against  this  principle  than  the  physiologist. 
"No  physiologist,"  he  says,  "would  consent  to  admit  'ideas' 
as  active  elements  in  the  sequence  of  changes  which  take 
place  in  the  nervous  system.  He  simply  points  out  that  he  has 
no  use  for  such  a  conception,  and  that,  so  far  from  helping 
him  in  his  explanation  of  phenomena,  it  vitiates  his  reasoning, 
and  destroys  the  validity  of  all  his  former  concepts.     The 

15  Psychology  of  Insanity,  p.  i8. 

1^  Article  in  Subconscious  Phenomena,  p.  Ii8. 

"Ibid.,  p.  122. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  167 

psychologist,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  weaker  vessel."^*  Pro- 
fessor FuUerton,  however,  has  shown,  in  a  careful  study  of 
Foster's  Textbook  of  Physiology,  taken  as  a  sample  of  text- 
books of  that  science,  that  physiologists  are  by  no  means  free 
from  this  error/®  "Exact  knowledge  of  the  antecedents  of 
any  bodily  movement  does  not  exist,"  says  Professor  Fuller - 
ton,  "and  in  its  absence  the  physiologist  is  forced  to  give  such 
fragmentary  explanations  as  he  can,  often  even  overstepping 
the  limits  of  his  own  science  and  using  concepts  which  are  out 
of  place  in  it,  but  which  he  seems  to  be  compelled  to  use." 
This  may  be  necessary  "in  the  existing  state  of  the  science  of 
physiology,"  but  "a  completed  science  of  physiology"  would 
be  "wholly  independent  of  psychology,  and  a  book  on  physi- 
ology would  have  no  excuse  for  containing  psychology."  In- 
dependence, then,  is  accepted  by  Professor  F4illerton  as  an 
ideal,  but  an  ideal  which,  he  says,  "smiles  at  us  from  a  hope- 
less distance." 

Personally,  and  as  regards  the  science  of  psychology,  I  do 
not  view  the  matter  quite  so  "hopelessly,"  and  I  do  feel  the 
principle  of  independence  to  be  a  valuable  guiding  principle  in 
all  psychological  investigation,  and  that  any  psychological  in- 
vestigation which  violates  this  principle  is  "vitiated"  and  ren- 
dered unscientific  by  that  very  failure.  And  should  any  feel 
that  strict  adherence  to  the  demands  of  this  principle  would 
involve  the  psychologist  in  useless  pedantry,  let  him  take  heart 
from  Professor  Titchener's  words  that  "for  all  practical  pur- 
poses" we  may  continue  to  speak  of  our  mental  grief  as  the 
cause  of  our  physical  tears  [or  as  the  effect  of  the  words  of 
a  physical  telegram] ,  just  as  "the  astronomer  does  not  scruple 
to  talk,  with  the  rest  of  us,  about  sunrise  and  sunset."  "What 
we  have  to  guard  against  is  not  the  phrasing  of  these  state- 
ments, but  their  popular  interpretation."  The  scientist  must 
explain  physical  tears  in  physical  (physiological)  terms,  and 
mental  grief  in  mental  terms  {v.  next  division  of  this  chapter)  ; 

^*lbid.,  pp.  ii8f. 

^'Psychological  Rev.,  Ill,  pp.  1  flF.   (1896). 


i68  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

but  he  is  quite  at  liberty  in  ordinary  discourse  to  "explain" 
either  in  terms  of  the  other. 

3.  The  Principle  of  Independent  Psychical  Causation. 

a.  The  Problem  of  Psychological  Explanation. 

87.  The  aim  of  scientific  explanation  in  any  field  is  the  de- 
termination of  the  causal  relations  which  subsist  among  the 
various  phenomena  contained  within  that  field  (52,  53).  The 
aim  of  psychological  explanation,  therefore,  must  be  the  de- 
termination of  the  causal  relations  which  subsist  among  mental 
phenomena.  If  psychology  is  to  be  a  complete  and  inde- 
pendent science,  it  must  postulate  that  every  mental  phenome- 
non has  a  mental  cause.  Such  a  principle  of  independent  psy- 
chical causation,  as  it  may  be  called,  would  seem  to  be  an  es- 
sential condition  of  a  complete  and  independent  science  of 
psychology. 

Certain  obvious  and  pressing  difficulties,  however,  in  the  ap- 
plication of  the  causal  concept  to  mental  phenomena  have  led 
many  to  deny  the  possibility  of  a  distinct  psychical  causation, 
and  to  affirm  that  mental  processes  can  be  causally  explained 
only  in  terms  of  the  accompanying  brain  processes.  Hence 
we  have  as  a  matter  of  fact  two  opposing 

Theories  of  Psychical  Causation 

1.  The  Independence  Theory,  represented  by  such  psycholo- 
gists as  Wundt,  Yerkes,  etc.,  that  mental  phenomena  are 
scientifically  explicable  in  purely  psychical  terms. 

2.  The  Cerebral  Theory,  represented  by  Miinsterberg,  Sidis, 
and  others,  that  mental  phenomena  are  scientifically  explicable 
only  in  terms  of  the  accompanying  brain  processes. 

All  the  psychologists  named  above  are  advocates  of  meta- 
physical parallelism;  but  whereas  Wundt  and  Yerkes  accept 
also  the  methodological  principle  of  independence,  Muunster- 
berg  and  Sidis  reject  this.  On  the  basis  of  our  combined 
postulate  of  psychocerebral  parallelism  we  assert  also  the  above 
formulated  principle  of  independent  psychical  causation  as  a 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     169 

necessary  consequence  of  the  former  when  taken  in  connection 
with  the  postulate  of  uniformity  defended  in  section  85.  Our 
first  task  at  this  point  will  be  to  take  account  of  the  objections 
which  may  be  offered  to  the  principle  of  independent  psychical 
causation,  our  second  to  consider  the  cerebral  theory  which 
has  been  proposed  as  an  alternative  to  the  independent  prin- 
ciple, and  our  third  to  defend  the  independent  theory  against 
its  critics. 

b.  The  Difficulties  of  Independent  Psychical  Causation. 

88.  The  Laws  of  Psychology. — It  is  impressive  to  note  how 
few  are  the  "scientific  laws"  which  psychology  has  up  to  the 
present  time  developed  when  compared  with  the  enormous 
number  of  such  laws  which  refer  to  the  realm  of  physical  na- 
ture. And  yet  this  discrepancy  is  rather  the  fault  of  the  writ- 
ers of  psychological  textbooks  than  the  defect  of  psychologi- 
cal science.  Professor  Yerkes  has  taken  cognizance  of  this 
unfortunate  condition  of  affairs,  and  has  devoted  the  entire 
Fourth  Part  of  his  Introduction  to  Psychology  to  a  specifica 
tion  of  the  various  laws  or  generalizations  which  psychological 
research  has  actually  achieved.  "It  is  rather  because  of  the 
youth  of  the  science  as  science,"  he  thinks,  "than  because  of 
the  character  of  its  materials,  that  psychology  has  not  accumu- 
lated a  larger  body  of  generalizations,  and  that  the  textbooks 
do  not  more  frequently  contain  the  word  law."^°  And  yet 
even  Yerkes  has  been  able  to  accumulate  but  eighty  or  so  gen- 
eralizations in  his  chapters  devoted  to  the  subject,  and  many 
of  these  are  psychophysical  rather  than  psychological  in  the 
strict  sense.    As  examples,  the  following  may  be  cited — 

The  Law  of  After-images:  "Under  certain  conditions,  a 
sensation  is  uniformly  followed  by  an  after  sensation  which 
bears  a  definite  qualitative  and  intensive  relation  to  the  origi- 
nal sensation."** 

"0/».  cit.,  p.  250. 
21  P.  264. 


lyo         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  Law  of  the  Relation  of  Affections  to  Sensations: 
"Every  sensation  is  accompanied  by  an  affection."^^ 

The  Law  of  the  Relation  of  the  Intensity  of  an  Emotion  to 
its  Duration:  "The  more  intense  an  emotion,  the  shorter  its 
duration."'^ 

The  Law  of  the  Relation  of  Repetition  to  Clearness:  "The 
repetition  of  an  experience  tends  at  first  to  increase  its  clear- 
ness, but  beyond  a  certain  Hmit  it  tends  rather  to  diminish  it."" 

And  most  important  of  all,  the  General  Law  of  Association: 
"When  two  sensations,  affections,  or  other  experiences,  occur 
together  or  successively,  they  tend  to  form  a  whole,  and  are 
said  to  be  associated.  Later  the  appearance  in  consciousness 
of  one  of  the  experiences  tends  to  be  followed  by  the  appeal - 
ance  of  the  other."^^ 

Let  us  inquire  into  the  reason  for  the  paucity  of  psycho- 
logical laws.^^ 

89.  Catisation  in  the  Physical  and  Mental  Realms. — "The 
concept  of  causality,"  says  Dr.  Sidis,  "cannot  be  worked  in 
psychology  in  the  same  way  that  it  can  in  the  physical  sciences. 
The  circle  of  physical  processes  is  complete  in  itself.  A  physi- 
cal process  without  ceasing  to  be  physical  can  be  traced  end- 
lessly in  the  past  or  future,  all  the  links  of  the  endless  process 
must  all  be  physical  in  their  nature.  For  if  we  permit  in  the 
endless  chain  of  links  of  the  physical  process  any  other  but 
physical  links  to  be  interpolated,  all  the  physical  sciences  must 
fall  to  the  ground,  since  at  any  stage  we  may  get  hold  of  a 
process  of  which  the  antecedent  link  is  not  of  a  physical  na- 
ture. In  short,  the  postulate  that  forms  the  basis  of  physical 
science  is  that  the  antecedent  and  consequent  of  a  physical 
process  taken  at  any  stage  of  the  process  are  physical  in  their 
nature.  This  is  the  principle  of  continuity.  The  whole  edifice 
of  the  physical  sciences  is  based  on  this  principle. 

22  p.  267. 

23  P.  288. 
2*  P.  296. 

25  p.   301. 

26  Cf.,  through  the  ensuing  discussion,  Table  IX,  at  the  close  of  sect.  95. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  171 

"If  we  now  turn  to  psychology,  we  find  that  it  cannot  be 
based  on  a  postulate  of  similar  character.  Psychology  cannot 
work  on-the  assumption  that  the  processes  it  deals  with  can  be 
traced  endlessly  in  either  direction,  past  or  future.  Unlike 
the  physical,  the  psychic  process  is  finite  and  final — it  has  a 
beginning  and  an  end."^'^  In  other  words,  the  mental  realm  as 
contrasted  with  the  physical  is  governed  by  the  principle  of 
discontinuity ;  and  the  problem  of  psychical  causation  is 
throughout  the  problem  of  overcoming  this  defect  (for  such 
it  must  be  regarded)  of  discontinuity,  and  saving  the  inde- 
pendence of  psychological  science  in  the  face  of  that  defect. 

This  discontinuity,  however,  shows  itself  in  various  ways, 
so  that  beside  the  general  problem  of  discontinuity,  which  con- 
stantly confronts  us,  there  are  two  special  problems  which  call 
for  distinct  treatment — the  problems  of  the  finiteness  of  mental 
sequences,  and  of  the  trajtsitoriness  of  mental  processes  as 
such.    We  shall  consider  these  in  the  order  given. 

(i)  The  General  Problem  of  Discontinuity  shows  itself  in 
three  directions:  (a)  the  conscious  mental  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  subject  to  numerous  temporary  suspensions  which 
produce  gaps  in  the  individual  stream  of  consciousness — as  in 
sleep,  hypnosis,  periods  of  amnesia  or  loss  of  memory,  etc. ; 
(b)  the  conscious  mental  life  of  the  individual  has  a  definite 
beginning  (at  or  near  birth)  and  a  definite  end  (at  or  near 
death,  so  far  as  the  possibility  of  scientific  observation  is 
concerned) — "if  the  psychic  life  of  the  individual  is  taken  as 
a  whole  and  traced  backward  in  the  past,  we  arrive  at  some 
ix)int  when  the  stream  of  consciousness  begins,  and  on  follow- 
ing it  forward  we  finally  arrive  at  a  point  where  the  stream  of 
consciousness  ends";^^  (c)  phylo genetically,  "in  the  history  of 
biological  evolution,  there  was  a  time  when  psychic  life  began, 

^''Foundations,  p.  82.  Italics  mine.  Cf.  Titchener's  Textbook,  pp.  39  f. 
(first  part  of  paragraph  in  fine  print). 

"  Sidis,  Foundations,  p.  83.  "Ends,  so  far  as  scientific  means  of  ap- 
proach are  possible"  is  what  is  meant,  of  course.  The  question  of  im- 
mortality, and  the  methods  of  psychical  research,  arc  not  involved  here. 


172         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  there  will  come  a  time  when  all  psychic  life  will  disap- 
pear from  our  globe. "^® 

(2)  The  Finiteness  of  Mental  Sequences:  Any  physical 
process  may  be  traced  backward  and  forward  in  time  indefi- 
nitely, each  antecedent  and  each  consequent  being  itself  physi- 
cal; but  every  sequence  of  mental  processes  has  a  definite  be- 
ginning and  end  as  mental.  Two  variations  of  this  general 
fact  may  be  noted,  (a)  Many  mental  sequences  may  be  actu- 
ally traced  backward  and  forward  to  their  initial  and  final 
stages,  the  typical  mental  sequence  being  a  medium  of  sensori- 
motor adjustment.  That  is  to  say,  all  mental  sequences  prob- 
ably, and  many  by  actual  observation,  begin  originally  with 
some  sensation  and  end  finally  in  some  conative  process — im- 
pulse or  volition.  But  the  antecedent  of  a  sensation  is  not 
a  psychical  cause,  but  a  physical  stimulus;  and  the  obvious 
consequent  of  a  conation  is  not  a  psychical  effect,  but  a  muscu- 
lar (i.e.,  physical)  action,  (b)  Some  mental  sequences  or 
"trains  of  ideas"  seem  to  start  off  without  any  antecedent  in 
actual  consciousness  (as  when  an  idea  "suddenly  pops  into 
one's  head,"  and  then  leads  to  a  train  of  associated  ideas), 
and  may  be  checked  or  completely  diverted  by  a  physical 
stimulus^"  (as  when,  in  the  midst  of  a  conversation  between 
two  persons,  a  third,  who  is  a  mutual  friend  of  the  others, 
unexpectedly  enters  the  room).  These  conditions  with  regard 
to  mental  sequences  may  be  symbolized  as  follows  in  their  con- 
trast to  the  situation  as  it  concerns  physical  sequences. — 

Sequence  of  Physical  Sequence  of  Mental 

Phenomena.  Phenomena. 


JKLMNOP 


ABCDEFG 
t 

^^  Loc.  cit. 

8''  It  is  for  this  reason  that  so  many  of  the  "laws"  of  psychology  have 
to  be  stated  in  terms  of  tendency — "if  A  occurs,  B  tends  to  follow";  "un- 
der certain  conditions,  A  produces  B,"  etc.  (v.  examples  in  preceding 
section). 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     173 

Physical  phenomenon  M  may  be  the  effect  of  physical  phe- 
nomenon L,  L  the  effect  of  K,  and  so  forth  indefinitely;  and 
M  may  be  the  cause  of  N,  N  the  cause  of  O,  and  so  forth  in- 
definitely. Idea  D  may  be  traced  back  to  C  as  its  "cause,"  C 
to  B,  and  B  to  A;  but  when  we  come  to  the  sensation  A  the 
only  antecedent  is  a  physical  one :  so  D  may  arouse  E,  E  may 
arouse  F  and  F  may  arouse  G;  but  with  G  the  sequence  may 
come  to  an  abrupt  conclusion. 

(3)  Miinsterberg's  argument  against  the  principle  of  inde- 
pendent psychical  causation  is  founded  on  a  more  fundamental 
difficulty  than  those  to  which  we  have  heretofore  directed  our 
attention — namely,  the  fact  of  the  Transit oritiess  of  Mental 
Processes  as  such  (79  (2)).  The  regular  and  indefinitely  ex- 
tending sequence  of  causes  and  effects  in  the  physical  world  is 
understandable,  he  tells  us,  because  we  know  that  through  all 
the  changes  of  form  and  position  in  physical  things,  their 
atoms  or  ultimate  constituents  persist;  whereas  each  mental 
fact  exists  only  for  the  moment  of  its  actually  being  experi- 
enced, every  new  moment  of  consciousness  bringing  new 
contents  before  the  experiencer.  For  example,  "the  candle 
may  disappear  when  it  burns  down,  but  every  atom  of  it  can 
still  be  traced  in  the  atmosphere";  whereas  when  an  idea  or 
feeling  disappears  from  the  mind,  it  is  gone  irretrievably — 
"we  may  have  a  thousand  times  new  ideas  of  the  same  object, 
but  the  same  idea  cannot  come  back  a  second  time."'^  There- 
fore, though  there  may  be  regularity  and  uniformity  of  se- 
quence in  the  mental  realm,  there  is  no  detectable  necessary 
causal  connection  among  the  phenomena  of  that  realm.'* 

These  various  difficulties  affecting  the  principle  of  indepen- 
dent psychical  causation  will  be  met  in  a  later  division  of  this 
chapter;  but  so  far  as  this  objection  of  Miinsterberg's  can  be 
separated  from  the  general  problem  of  discontinuity,  it  may  be 
disposed  of  in  a  few  words  at  this  point.    For  while  the  fact 

*^  Psychology,   General  and   Applied,   p.   31.     Cf.   also,   Psychotherapy, 
p.  31. 
'*  Cf.  Sidis,  Foundations,  p.  85. 


174         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  transitoriness  is  undoubtedly  a  difficulty,  it  is  by  no  means 
an  absolute  hindrance  to  our  principle,  should  the  latter  be 
called  for  on  other  grounds.  For  it  is  extremely  questionable 
whether  the  idea  of  "necessary  connection"  is  an  essential  part 
of  the  idea  of  cause :  rather  is  it  the  case  that  "uniformity  of 
sequence"  is  all  that  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  causality  (53). 
As  Yerkes  puts  it,  "the  essence  of  the  causal  relation  is  uni- 
formity of  the  order  of  events."  "We  never  observe  neces- 
sary^^ uniformity."  "The  important  point  for  present  con- 
sideration is  that  of  observed  sequences  of  events  in  conscious- 
ness. If  the  sort  of  regularity  which  we  discover  in  the  world 
about  us,  and  upon  which  we  have  learned  to  depend  in  all 
of  the  affairs  of  Hfe,  does  not  exist  also  in  mental  life,  there  is 
no  ground  for  a  science  of  psychology  similar  to  the  science 
of  physiology,  no  ground  for  the  explanation  of  conscious- 
ness in  terms  of  mental  processes,  and  no  ground  for  the  as- 
sumption that  psychical  events  may  be  predicted  and  controlled 
as  are  physical  events."^*  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  as  Miinster- 
berg  himself  admits,  and  as  Yerkes  by  many  examples^^  shows 
to  be  the  case,  "the  sort  of  regularity  which  we  discover  in  the 
world  about  us"  does  "exist  also  in  mental  life,"  that  is  all  we 
need  to  postulate  the  presence  of  causation  in  the  psychical 
realm. 

c.  The  Cerebral  Theory  of  Psychical  Causation. 

90.  The  Cerebral  Theory. — Those  psychologists  who  con- 
sider the  above  objections  to  the  independence  theory  insuper- 
able, refer  the  causes  of  mental  phenomena  to  the  physiologi- 
cal realm,  and  explain  the  sequence  of  mental  phenomena  in 
terms  of  the  accompanying  brain  processes.  Psychologists 
who  reject  methodological  parallelism  interpret  this  as  a  di- 
rect causal  explanation  of  mental  processes  in  physiological 
terms:  advocates  of  methodological  parallelism,  on  the  other 

S3  Italics  mine. 

s*  Introduction  to  Psychology,  pp.  328  f. 

35  Op.  cit.,  Chap.  XXV. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     175 

hand,  take  it  as  a  necessarily  indirect  explanation.  As  Sidis 
puts  it,  "the  psychic  process  not  having  its  links  causally  con- 
nected, the  causal  necessity  [sic]  can  only  be  followed  along 
its  concomitant  physical  or  physiological  series."^"  Thus,  in 
the  diagram — 

Mental  Series      A     B     C     D     E 


Brain  Series        a~*  b~*  c"~^  d~^  e 

the  sequence  of  A  and  B  is  explained  by  referring  it  to  the 
brain  sequence,  at."  B,  we  say,  invariably  follows  A,  be- 
cause the  accompanying  brain  process  b  is  the  effect  of 
the  accompanying  brain  process  a.  "To  explain  mental 
facts,"  says  Miinsterberg,  "means  to  think  them  as  parallel  to 
the  brain  processes  which  have  their  own  causal  connections 
in  the  physical  world."^^ 

Miinsterberg  insists  that  this  denial  of  causal  relations  to 
mental  processes  does  not  imply  that  mental  phenomena  have 
no  independent  inner  connections,  but  merely  that  they  have 
no  causal  relations :  on  the  other  hand,  they  do  have  a  pur- 
posive connection.  Mental  processes  in  their  inner  reality  are 
an  expression  of  purpose;  but  since  this  inner  life-purpose  is 
also  always  further  expressed  through  brain  processes,  we  may 
give  the  mental  phenomena  an  indirect  scientific  explanation 

'"  Foundations,  p.  85. 

'^  The  arrows  connecting  the  members  of  the  brain  series  indicate  the 
causal  relation  of  the  brain  processes.  The  absence  of  similar  arrows 
connecting  the  members  of  the  mental  series  indicates  the  separateness  of 
the  various  mental  processes  as  viewed  by  the  advocates  of  the  cerebral 
theory.  The  arrows  pointing  from  the  various  members  of  the  brain 
series  to  the  corresponding  members  of  the  mental  scries  indicate  the 
complete  dependence,  according  to  this  theory,  of  the  latter  upon  the 
former. 

*^  Psychotherapy,  pp.  41  f.  Cf.  also  Psychology  General  and  Applied, 
pp.  40  f. 


176  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

through  the  causal  connections   which  subsist  among  those 
brain  processes.^^ 

91.  Criticism  of  the  Cerebral  Theory. — However  one  may 
feel  impressed  by  the  weight  of  the  arguments  against  the  in- 
dependence theory,  it  is  hardly  possible  not  to  feel  equally  im- 
pressed by  the  artificiality  and  inadequacy  of  the  alternative 
doctrine.  The  scientist  wants  to  be  able  to  say,  "A  is  the  cause 
of  B,"  "B  is  the  effect  of  A" ;  and  is  certain  to  feel  that  such 
expressions  as,  "B  is  explained  when  we  think  of  it  as  parallel 
to  b,  which  in  its  turn  is  the  effect  of  o" — or,  "the  sequence 
AB  is  to  be  explained  by  following  along  the  concomitant 
series  ab" — are  poor  substitutes  for  the  more  direct  formula. 
Of  course,  if  we  can  say  at  once,  "mental  process  B  is  the 
effect  of  brain  process  b"  or  "of  brain  process  a,"  the  demand 
of  simplicity  is  satisfied;  but  if  we  take  this  position,  we  are 
renouncing  the  independence  of  psychology,  even  if  we  see 
no  metaphysical  objections  to  such  a  statement.  What  such 
writers  as  Sidis  and  Miinsterberg  are  trying  to  do  is  to  save 
the  science  of  psychology  from  dependence  upon  that  of  physi- 
ology, in  the  face  of  what  seems  to  them  to  be  an  almost  in- 
superable obstacle  to  the  success  of  that  endeavor — namely, 
the  absence  of  any  causal  relations  in  the  mental  realm.  But 
if  we  can  satisfy  ourselves  that  the  difficulties  of  the  principle 
of  independent  psychical  causation  are  not  insuperable,  we  can 
save  the  science  of  psychology  without  sacrificing  simplicity. 
Before  taking  steps  in  this  direction,  however,  there  are  one  or 
two  other  points  to  be  noted  in  the  way  of  criticism. 

In  the  first  place,  we  should  recognize  that  the  explanation 
of  mental  processes  in  terms  of  the  accompanying  brain  pro- 
cesses is  not  in  any  sense  a  causal  explanation  of  the  former, 
but  a  distinct  type  of  explanation  peculiar  to  psychology — 
namely,  explanation  by  correlation;  and  that  the  problem  of 
correlating  mental  processes  with  brain  processes  is  not  strictly 
speaking  a  psychological  problem  at  all,  but  a  psychophysio- 
logical problem. 

^^Psychotherapy,  p.  33. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  177 

Furthermore,  as  Professor  Yerkes  reminds  us,  it  is  "even 
truer  to  say  that  when  two  processes,  the  one  physiological 
(in  the  brain)  and  the  other  psychological  (in  consciousness) 
occur  together  uniformly,  either  may  be  offered  by  science  as 
an  explanation  of  the  other.""  That  is  to  say,  the  mental 
sequence  AB  may  be  explained  by  the  brain  sequence  ab,  or 
the  brain  sequence  ab  by  the  mental  sequence  AB,  indiffer- 
ently; but  in  neither  case  is  the  explanation  a  causal  one. 

The  complete  truth,  indeed,  is  that  every  phenomenon  in- 
volving intelligence  is  a  double  effect  of  a  double  cause.  One 
state  of  mind-brain  produces  another  state  of  mind-brain: 
neither  is  A  the  cause  of  b  nor  a  the  cause  of  B,  but  Aa  is  the 
cause  of  B6."  For  the  complete  understanding  of  any  mental 
or  cerebral  phenomenon,  both  kinds  of  explanation  are  neces- 
sary; but  in  purely  psychological  investigations,  the  cerebral 
aspect  may  be  disregarded. 

The  above  criticism  of  the  cerebral  theory  of  psychical  caus- 
ation may  be  summed  up  as  follows :  ( i )  It  is  an  artificial  and 
inadequate  theory,  which  should  not  be  accepted  if  it  is  pos- 
sible to  escape  it;  (2)  it  is  not  a  substitution  of  one  type  of 
causal  explanation  for  another,  but  the  complete  rejection  of 
the  causal  concept  as  inapplicable  in  psychology,  and  the  sub- 
stitution for  it  of  the  principle  of  explanation  by  correlation; 
(3)  this  method  of  explanation  is  a  psychophysiological  rather 
than  a  psychological  method,  and  if  substituted  entirely  for 
the  causal  method  results  in  the  denial  of  the  claim  of  psychol- 
ogy to  be  an  independent  science  within  its  own  field ;  (4)  the 
principle  of  correlation  may  be  employed  with  equal  justifica- 
tion to  explain  either  mental  phenomena  in  terms  of  cerebral, 
or  cerebral  phenoment  in  terms  of  mental;  (5)  the  complete 
truth  with  regard  to  phenomena  involving  consciousness  is 
that  the  mental  and  cercljral  processes  taken  together  are  joint 
eflfects  of  other  mental  and  cerebral  processes  taken  together, 

**  Introduction,  p.  36. 

**  v.,  Bain,  Mind  and  Body,  pp.  131  f. 


178         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

but  we  are  at  liberty  to  ignore  either  aspect  if  our  concern  is 
entirely  with  the  other. 

d.  Defence  of  the  Independence  Theory. 

92.  Methods  of  Explanation  in  Psychology. — Our  examina- 
tion of  the  cerebral  theory  has  introduced  us  to  a  method  of 
explanation  which  psychology  employs,  and  which  is  as  dis- 
tinctive of  psychology  as  is  the  observational  method  of  intro- 
spection— namely,  the  method  of  explanation  by  correlation. 
Advocates  of  the  cerebral  theory  use  this  method  alone,  and 
fail  to  recognize  that  in  doing  so  they  are  rejecting  the  causal 
concept  in  psychology  together :  advocates  of  the  independence 
theory  accept  the  correlation  method  of  explanation  as  well  as 
the  causal  method,  just  as  all  psychologists  today  who  employ 
the  method  of  introspection  admit  also  the  value  of  the  methud 
of  observation  of  behavior;  but  they  insist  that  the  correlation 
method  is  an  indirect  method  of  explaining  mental  processes, 
just  as  observation  of  behavior  is  only  an  indirect  method  of 
getting  at  the  facts  of  mental  life. 

Putting  these  various  considerations  together,  we  come  to 
the  following  conclusion:  All  mental  phenomena  may  be  ex- 
plained in  either  of  two  ways — (i)  in  terms  of  other  mental 
phenomena,  or  (2)  in  terms  of  the  accompanying  brain  pro- 
cesses— but  only  the  former  is  a  causal  explanation.*^ 

It  is  a  strange  fact  worthy  of  note  that  methodological  paral- 
lelists  differ  markedly  in  their  views  of  the  bearing  of  the 
principle  of  parallelism  upon  the  problem  of  psychological  ex- 
planation. Both  Wundt  and  Yerkes  hold,  in  the  words  of  the 
latter,  that  the  principle  of  parallelism  "forces  the  acceptance 
of  independent  psychical  causation,"*^  correlated  at  all  points 
with  cerebral  causation,  but  distinct  from  it.  Miinsterberg, 
Sidis,  and  Titchener,  on  the  other  hand,  insist,  as  we  have 

*2  v.,  Yerkes,  op.  cit.,  pp.  317  f. 

<3  Ihid.,  p.  333.    Cf.  Wundt,  Outlines,  p.  367. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  179 

seen,  that  the  principle  of  parallelism  "forces"  us  to  reject  all 
causal  explanation  in  psychology.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  that 
the  principle  of  parallelism  "forces"  us  to  do  is  to  reject  the 
notion  that  brain  processes  cause  mental  processes;  and  the 
real  difference  between  the  two  groups  of  parallelists  is  that 
the  second  group  regard  the  obstacles  to  the  acceptance  of  inde- 
pendent psychical  causation  to  be  insuperable,  whereas  the  first 
group  do  not.  The  principle  of  parallelism  forces  us  to  deny 
the  cerebral  causation  of  mental  processes  and  to  acknowledge 
the  explanation  of  mental  processes  in  terms  of  cerebral  pro- 
cesses to  be  a  non-causal  type  of  explanation;  and  if  we  ac- 
cept the  principle  that  only  a  causal  explanation  of  phenomena 
is  a  completely  satisfactory  explanation  from  the  scientific 
point  of  view,  the  principle  of  parallelism  also  forces  on  us  the 
alternative  of  either  accepting  also  the  principle  of  independent 
psychical  causation,  or  else  admitting  that  psychology  is  by 
its  very  nature  an  incomplete  science.  Our  next  step,  then, 
is  to  see  whether  it  may  not  be  possible  to  overcome  the  ob- 
jections to  the  independence  theory  which  we  considered 
above  (89). 

I  append  here  a  summary  of  the  two  theories  of  psycho- 
logical explanation,  and  a  diagram  of  the  position  involved  in 
the  independence  theory — 

TABLE  VIII 
Theories  of  Psychological  Explanation 

According  to  the  Mental  Phenomena  can  be  explained — 

Cerebral  Theory, —  only   in   terms   of   the   accompanying   brain 

processes 

(indirect*    causal   explanation). 
Independence  Theory, —       cither  (i)  in  terms  of  other  mental  facts 

(direct  causal  explanation)  ; 
or  (2)  in  terms  of  the  accompanying  brain 
processes 

(explanation  by  correlation). 

♦That  is  to  say,  if  the  psychologist  is  also  a  parallclist :  if  he  is  not. 
this  would  be  a  direct  causal  explanation. 


i8o 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


INDEPENDENT  PSYCHICAL  CAUSATION 

^  ^  ^  ^  ^ 

w  ^  ^  ^  ^ 


L^M 

Mental  Series 

t        t 

Physical  Series — 

1  -^m 

In  Brain 

/ 

In  External  World 

-  V  ^  W  "^  X  ~ 

b-^  c 


/^ 


S^T 

t      t 
s-^  t 


The  chief  differences  between  this  diagram  and  the  one  illustrating  the 
cerebral  theory  (90),  so  far  as  the  mental  and  cerebral  series  alone  are 
concerned,  are:  (i)  the  presence  of  arrows  along  the  mental  series,  in- 
dicating that  there  is  an  "independent  psychical"  causation  as  well  as  an 
independent  cerebral  causation;  (2)  the  arrows  connecting  the  mental  and 
cerebral  concomitants  are  double-headed,  to  indicate  that  the  members 
of  either  series  may  be  explained  (by  correlation)  in  terms  of  the  other, 
not  merely  the  mental  in  terms  of  the  cerebral.  A  series  of  events  in  the 
external  world  is  added  here,  to  indicate  that,  the  brain  and  the  world 
outside  (including,  if  you  like,  the  body  itself)  being  both  of  them  parts 
of  the  one  physical  universe,  there  is  a  perfect  causal  connection  between 

them.     Let  the  series  vwxys represent  a  series  of  events  connected 

with  the  lighting  and  shining  of  a  candle:  v — a  man,  P,  strikes  a  match; 
■w — P  lights  a  candle  with  the  match;  x — P  presents  the  lighted  candle 

before  the  eyes  of  another  man,  Q;  ys a  series  of  events  following 

the  incidents  enumerated.  Presupposing  the  above,  a  may  indicate  the 
stimulation  of  Q's  visual  centres  by  the  light  from  the  candle — a  perfect 
causal  sequence,  accompanied  at  once  by  A,  a  sensation  of  light  in  Q's 
consciousness.     Now,   in  the  diagram,   Q   is  thought  of   as  having  been 

concerned,  prior  to  the  seeing  of  the  candle,  in  a  train  of  thought LM, 

with  its  accompanying  series  of  brain  processes  -  -  -  -Im.  The  stimulus  x, 
however,  produces  results  which  interfere  at  once  with  Q's  previous  train 
of  thought,  and  start  an  entirely  new  train,  ABCDE;  which  may,  for 
some  reason  which  does  not  interest  us,  be  in  its  turn  brought  to  a  con- 
clusion with  E,  and  followed  by  a  third  sequence,  ST .  In  this  ex- 
ample, we  have  three  kinds  of  sequences — (i)  four  physical  causal  se- 
quences,   Im;  -  -  -  -vwxahcde ; vwxyz ;  and  st ;  each  of 

them  complete  in  itself :    (2)    three  mental   causal   seqiiences, LM ; 

ABCDE;   and   ST ;   each  of  them   complete  in  itself;   and,  finally, 

(3)  three  correlation  sequences,  L/-Mm;  Aa-Bt-Cc-Dd-E^ ;  and  Ss-Tt — 
all  the  requirements  of  psychological,  physiological,  and  physical  science 
being  allowed  for. 

93.  The  Difficulties  of  Independent  Psychical  Causation. — 
It  will  be  remembered  (89)  that  acceptance  of  the  postulate  of 
independent  psychical  causation  gives  rise  to  three  problems — 
the  general  problem  of  the  discontinuity  of  mental  life,  the 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  i8i 

problem  of  the  finiteness  (to  use  Dr.  Sidis's  term)  of  mental 
sequences,  and  the  problem  of  the  transitoriness  of  mental 
processes  as  such.  Of  these  three  problems  the  last,  so  far  as 
it  can  be  separated  from  the  first,  has  already  been  dealt  with 
(89)  ;  and  we  shall  find  that  in  only  one  point  can  the  second 
problem,  either,  be  distinguished  from  the  more  general  one. 
Let  us  see  how  this  is. 

The  expression,  "finiteness  of  mental  sequences,"  means,  in 
general,  that  every  series  of  mental  processes  has  a  definite  be- 
ginning and  a  definite  termination,  as  mental.  More  specifi- 
cally, we  may  for  our  present  purpose  distinguish  three  points : 
(i)  that  most  mental  sequences  are  traceable  back  to  sensa- 
tions, which  in  turn  have  no  psychic  cause,  but  originate  in 
physical  stimuli;  (2)  that  many  mental  sequences  cannot  be 
traced  to  any  apparent  cause,  mental  or  physical — they  seem 
to  start  off  without  any  antecedent  in  actual  consciousness; 
(3)  that  all  mental  sequences  issue  finally  in  some  conative 
process  (impulse  or  volition),  and  so  in  motor  {i.e.,  physical) 
activity.  The  third  point,  however,  we  can  easily  dispose  of; 
for  though  it  is  true  that  conative  processes  issue  in  motor 
activity,  and  have  such  motor  activity  as  their  raison  d'etre,** 
nevertheless  they  do  also  have  psychical  effects  (as  in  char- 
acter, memory,  etc.)  :  hence,  there  is  after  all  no  real  problem 
here.  The  first  difficulty  we  shall  call  "the  problem  of  sensa- 
tions," and  shall  consider  at  once :  the  second  is  really  a  part 
of  the  general  "problem  of  discontinuity,"  which  is  to  occupy 
our  attention  throughout  most  of  the  remainder  of  this  book. 

94.  The  Problem  of  Sensations. — How  can  we  defend  the 
principle  of  independent  psychical  causation  in  the  face  of 
the  evident  fact  that  mental  sequences  originate  with  sensa- 
tions, and  that  sensations  in  their  turn  have  an  acknowledged 
physical  origin?  Three  answers  to  this  question  are,  I  think, 
possible : 

(i)  We  may  take  the  easiest  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  and 
admit  that  when  we  have  traced  our  mental  sequences  back  to 

♦*What  Aristotelians  would  call  their  "final  cause." 


i82  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

sensations  we  have  gone  as  far  as  the  principle  of  independent 
psychical  causation  can  carry  us;  acknowledge  that  sensations 
Jiave  a  physical  cause,  and  are  exceptions  to  the  general  rule ; 
and  resort  in  their  case  to  the  indirect  method  of  explanation, 
by  correlating  them  with  the  accompanying  brain  processes. 
But  thus  to  allow  any  exceptions  to  our  general  principle  is 
at  once  to  renounce  our  entire  claim  to  the  independence  of 
psychology,  and  retract  all  the  objections  we  have  been  offer- 
ing to  the  cerebral  theory.  Far  better  would  it  be  to  accept  the 
cerebral  theory  throughout  than  to  employ  two  separate  prin- 
ciples of  explanation  in  different  parts  of  the  same  general 
field.  The  independence  theory  applies  both  methods  of  ex- 
planation (by  causation  and  by  correlation)  throughout  the 
entire  field,  the  cerebral  theory  applies  the  correlation  method 
throughout;  but  this  proposed  compromise  would  apply  one 
method  in  one  part  of  the  field,  and  fall  back  upon  the  other 
in  those  parts  of  the  same  field  in  which  it  seems  that  the  first 
method  cannot  be  worked.  We  cannot,  however,  allow  such 
tearing  asunder  of  that  which  is  in  its  essential  nature  one. 

(2)  We  may  admit  frankly  that  sensations  have  no  cause. 
In  so  doing  we  are  not,  as  in  the  former  case,  explaining  what 
can  be  explained  in  two  different  ways  at  different  times,  but 
admitting  that  there  are  some  mental  processes  which  by  their 
very  nature  are  scientifically  inexplicable.  Only  complex  phe- 
nomena can  be  explained :  absolutely  simple  and  elementary 
phenomena  are  ultimate  data,  primary  facts,  and  so  inexplic- 
able. This  is  as  true  of  physical  phenomena  as  of  mental,  and 
not  merely  a  condition  that  hampers  the  psychologist  alone 
among  all  scientists:  the  ultimate  elementary  constituents  of 
the  physical  universe  (atoms,  electrons,  or  whatever  they  may 
be)  are  as  inexplicable  as  are  the  ultimate  elementary  con- 
stituciits  of  the  psychical  universe.  As  Professor  Yerkes  puts 
it:  "A  sensation  is  just  a  psychic  fact,  an  atom  is  similarly  a 
physical  fact.  Each  is  useful  in  enabling  us  to  describe  and 
explain  more  complex  phenomena,  but  neither  can  be  ex- 
plained by  the  science  which  makes  use  of  it."*^ 

*^  Introduction  to  Psychology,  p.  323. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     183 

So  far  as  physical  things  are  concerned,  the  theologian  may 
go  one  step  further  than  the  scientist,  and  refer  the  elements 
out  of  which  the  physical  world  is  composed  to  God  as  their 
Creator,  though  in  so  doing  he  is  transcending  the  bonds  of 
the  physical  universe  altogether,  and  introducing  a  non-scien- 
tific principle  of  reference.  In  the  same  way,  so  far  as  mental 
phenomena  are  concerned,  the  physicist  may  refer  sensations 
to  physical  stimuli  as  their  source,  but  in  so  doing  is  tran- 
scending the  bounds  of  the  mental  world,  even  though  still 
employing  scientific  (if  non-psychological)  concepts.  Physi- 
cal science  as  science  can  only  accept  the  ultimate  facts  of  the 
physical  universe  as  given,  and  pure  psychology  must  simply 
treat  the  ultimate  facts  of  mental  life  in  the  same  way. 

Let  us  press  the  analogy  a  little  further.  Let  us  accept  for 
the  purpose  of  the  illustration  the  theory  of  successive  as  op- 
posed to  that  of  simultaneous  creation — the  theory  that  the 
elements  out  of  which  the  physical  universe  as  we  know  it 
today  are  composed  were  created,  not  at  a  single  moment  in 
remote  time,  but  gradually,  at  successive  times  in  the  history 
of  things.  If  we  had  been  privileged  as  onlookers  to  be  pres- 
ent during  any  period  of  this  creative  process,  we  should  have 
observed  a  series  of  creative  acts  resulting  in  the  production 
of  a  greater  and  greater  number  of  atoms  as  time  passed  on. 
Now  the  history  of  the  mental  universe  of  each  one  of  us  is 
of  just  this  nature — a  series  of  experiences,  a  "stream"  of 
conscious  moments;  each  experience  of  a  sensory  type — each 
new  color,  sound,  odor,  etc. — in  the  early  weeks  or  months  of 
our  individual  lives  at  least,  being  a  new  creation  in  our  mental 
universe.  Even  if  our  later  mental  lives  give  us  no  absolutely 
new  sensations,  but  merely  new  combinations  of  elements 
which  have  been  experienced  before,  nevertheless  in  our  first 
years  our  mental  universe  was  being  gradually  built  up  in  the 
same  way  as  was  the  physical  universe  according  to  the  theory 
I  have  described.  So  long  as  we  are  in  the  world,  we  must 
take  the  primary  facts  of  that  world  just  as  they  are — we  can- 
not explain  them  in  scientific  language,  and  we  can  neither 


i84         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

annihilate  them  nor  create  new  ones.  In  the  same  way,  so 
long  as  we  are  shut  up  within  the  confines  of  our  own  indi- 
vidual mental  universes,  we  must  take  the  primary  facts  of 
mental  life  as  they  are;  for  we  can  neither  explain  them  in 
psychological  terms,  nor  annihilate  or  create  them.  Theology, 
in  other  words,  bears  the  same  relation  to  the  facts  of  the 
physical  world  that  the  physical  sciences  bear  to  the  facts  of 
the  mental  world. 

The  method  just  outlined  of  solving  the  "problem  of  sen- 
sations" is,  I  think,  the  best  one  for  the  scientific  psychologist 
to  adopt;  but  there  is  a  third  possible  solution — 

(3)  We  may  extend,  as  many  philosophers  have  done,  the 
principle  of  psycho-cerebral  parallelism  into  the  external 
world,  and  adopt  the  metaphysical  doctrine  of  Panpsychism  or 
Universal  Psychophysical  Parallelism  (86  (3)) —  that  every 
physical  thing  (not  merely  every  brain  process)  has  a 
psychical  aspect.  In  that  case,  a  sensation  would  be  ex- 
plained as  the  effect  of  a  psychical  cause — namely,  the  psychi- 
cal aspect  of  the  stimulus.'*''  This  theory  is  not  so  fantastic 
or  baseless  as  it  seems  as  thus  abruptly  stated,  when  taken  in 
connection  with  certain  general  metaphysical  considerations; 
but  we  cannot  go  into  ultra-scientific  questions  here,  and  for 
the  purposes  of  scientific  psychology  such  a  solution  of  our 
problem  as  this  would  be  undesirable. 

95.  The  Problem-  of  the  Discontinuity  of  Mental  Life, 
which  meets  us  at  every  turn  in  our  attempt  to  explain  psychi- 

*6  Our  diagram  would  then  take  on  somewhat  the  following  form,  the 
letters  having  the  same  significance — 


Psychical  Series 
Physical  Series 


In  External  World 

u-^v-^w->x 

$        1:        $       ^ 
u~^v~^w~^x 


In  Individual 
•A-^B-^C 

X      t     X 


— > 


Mental  process  A  (Q's  observation  of  the  candle)  would  not  be  the  effect 
of  brain  process  a,  as  the  cerebral  theory  would  demand;  and  would  not 
be  denied  any  cause  at  all,  as  our  second  solution  has  it;  but  would  be 
explained  as  the  effect  of  psychical  phenomenon  X,  the  correlate  of  the 
physical  process  x. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  185 

cal  processes,  can  be  solved  on  independent  principles  only  by 
the  postulation  of  some  form  of  mental  life  extending  beyond 
the  field  or  below  the  level  of  personal  consciousness — i.e.,  by 
the  Postulate  of  the  Siih conscious.  If  this  postulate  is  ac- 
cepted, the  principle  of  psychical  causation  is  extended  to  in- 
clude subconscious  as  w^ell  as  conscious  psychical  causes.  The 
two  following  chapters  will  be  devoted  to  a  consideration  of 
this  postulate. 

TABLE  IX 

Difficulties  in  Accepting  the  Principle  of  Independent  Psychical  Causation, 
and  How  they  may  he  Met. 
Difficulties  Proposed  Solutions 

I.  General  Problem  of  Discontinuity        Postulation  of  the  Subconscious. 
II.  Finiteness  of  Mental   Sequences : — 

A.  Sequences  having  Physical  Ante- 

cedents and  Consequents: — 

1.  Sensations  have  Physical 

Antecedents.  a.  May  say  they  have  physical  cause. 

b.  May  say  they  have  no  cause. 

c.  May  say  they  have  psychical  cause  in 
outer  world   (panpsychism) 

2.  Conation  has   Physical 

Consequents.  Has  also  psychical  effects. 

B.  Sequences  having  no  apparent  (Belongs  to  general  problem  of 

Antecedents  or  Consequents.        discontinuity) 
III.  Transitoriness  of  Mental  Processes.  {Do.) 

e.  The  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Psychology. 

96.  Sidis's  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Mental  Life. — Dr.  Sidis 
applies  the  biological  concept  of  "chance  variations"  to  psy- 
chology. He  admits  that  there  is  a  "purposive  thought"  un- 
derlying the  actual  stream  of  conscious  contents,  but  claims 
that  the  ideas  that  present  themselves  in  consciousness  at  any 
one  moment  are  "simply  the  accidental  chance  material  which 
the  given  momentary  purposive  thought  selects"  as  means  for 
"the  achievement  of  its  purpose.""  The  agent  of  this  mental 
selection   is  Attention,  which   for   Sidis   corresponds   to   the 

*''  Foundations,  p.  98. 


i86         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

factor  of  "natural  selection"  in  the  biologist's  scheme  of 
things.  In  other  words,  ideas  come  into  consciousness  by 
chance — i.e.,  without  any  cause;  but  through  the  instrumental- 
ity of  attention,  useless  ideas  which  do  not  satisfy  the  needs 
of  the  "momentary  purposive  thought"  are  rejected,  and  only 
the  valuable  ones  are  permitted  to  survive.*^ 

This  is,  of  course,  a  purely  negative  doctrine  of  attention, 
and  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  more  usual  positive  view  that 
attention  actively  selects  out  of  its  material  those  ideas  which 
are  at  the  time  the  most  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  mind.  One 
might  accept  the  chance  view  of  how  ideas  come  into  the  mind, 
and  either  the  active  or  passive  theory  of  attention  as  to  how 
some  ideas  stay  in  the  mind  and  others  do  not, 

Sidis  distinguishes,  furthermore,  three  degrees  of  attention. 
( I )  "When  the  selective  process  of  attention  is  rigid,  more 
of  the  chance  comers  are  rejected  as  not  adapted  to  the  pur- 
pose";*^ (2)  "when  the  process  of  attention  relaxes  in  the 
rigidity  of  its  selective  activity,  more  chance  images  and  acci- 
dental variations  of  thoughts  are  presented  to  and  accepted  by 
consciousness"^" — as  in  reverie,  alcoholic  delirium,  mild  hyp- 
nosis, etc.;  and  (3)  "when  the  process  of  attention  becomes 
completely  relaxed — as  in  sleep,  fever,  or  in  the  acute  forms  of 
mental  maladies — the  chance  images  and  accidental  variations 
of  ideas  come  and  go  without  aim  or  purpose."^"  "Not  pur- 
pose," then,  "but  chance,"  says  Sidis,  "is  at  the  heart  of  mental 
life."^^ 

97.  Criticism  of  the  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Psychology. — 
But  to  accept  this  doctrine  would  be  to  surrender  all  claims  as 
to  the  scientific  status  of  psychology.  When  the  biologist 
speaks  of  "chance  variations,"  he  cannot  mean,  if  he  is  to 
be  consistent,^^  that  those  variations  have  no  cause,  but  merely 

*8  Cf.  the  biological  concept  of  "survival  of  the  fittest." 
*8  Op.  cit.,  p.  98.    Italics  mine. 
•^^  Op.  cit.,  p.  99.    Italics  mine. 
"P.  100. 

^2  Of  course  he  may  mean  just  this;  but  when  he  does,  he  is  open  to 
the  same  charges  that  I  am  presenting  here. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     187 

that  their  cause  is  too  complex  or  too  obscure  to  be  determin- 
able; and  the  same  is  true  of  the  psychologist.     No  postulate 
can  ever  be  empirically  verified  beyond  any  possibility  of  its 
refutation  in  the  future,  but  the  causal  postulate  is  neverthe 
less  essential,  as  a  postulate,  to  any  complete  science. 

Even  Sidis  admits  a  certain  degree  of  independent  psychical 
causation  in  the  sense  of  "invariable  sequence" — which  is,  after 
all,  the  only  sense  that  causation  ever  has  in  science.  "If  of 
two  phenomena,  one  antecedent  and  the  other  consequent,  the 
consequent  is  invariably  observed  to  depend  in  its  variation  on 
the  antecedent,  such  an  antecedent  is  declared  to  be  the  cause 
of  the  consequent" :  "where  the  phenomena  are  observed  to 
stand  to  each  other  in  functional  relation  of  invariable  se- 
quence, the  antecedent  is  declared  to  be  the  cause  of  the  con- 
sequent"— such  are  his  definitions  of  causation."  Later  on 
he  tells  us  that  "finite  as  the  psychic  process  is,  it  has  a  series 
of  antecedents  and  consequents,"  and  "insofar  as  these  can 
be  traced,  one  can  keep  within  the  bounds  of  the  psychic  pro- 
cess only.""  In  admitting  this,  Sidis  is  conceding  a  partial 
independence  to  psychology;  but  if  the  latter  is  to  be  a  com- 
plete as  well  as  an  independent  science,  the  causal  process 
must  be  held  universally  "within  the  bounds  of  the  psychic 
process  only,"  In  other  words,  the  principle  of  psychical 
causation  must  be  what  the  Freudians  call  a  principle  of  "psy- 
chological determinism."" 

^^  Foundations,  pp.  loi  f. 

"P.  105. 

"'  Dr.  Sidis's  repeated  strictures,  throughout  the  hook  under  review  and 
its  two  successors,  upon  what  he  is  pleased  to  refer  to  as  the  Freudian 
"so-called  'psychoanalytic  science'"  (op.  cit.,  p.  99  especially),  are  petty, 
unfair,  and  indicative  of  that  partial  (in  both  senses  of  the  term)  knowl- 
edge which  is  often  more  pernicious  than  complete  ignorance.  We  can- 
not at  present  enter  into  the  question  of  the  pros  and  cons  of  Freudian- 
ism,  which,  it  is  true,  is  based  upon  this  universalized  postulate  of  "psy- 
chological determinism" — the  term  being  merely  an  especially  powerful 
synonym  for  "independent  psychical  causation"  as  we  have  been  defining 
it;  but,  in  any  case,  the  validity  of  the  Freudian  doctrine  and  method  must 
be  judged  finally  by  its  fruits,  not  /rejudgcd  by  a  priori  criticism. 


i88         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

REFERENCES 

The  Postulates  in  General — 

Sidis,  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology, 
Chaps.  I,  V,  XH,  XVH. 

Psychocerebral  Parallelism — 

Sidis,  Foundations,  Chap.  XH, 
Titchener,  Textbook  of  Psychology,  §  4, 
Miinsterberg,  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  pp.  38-42. 
Wundt,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  §  22,  No.  9. 
Ward,  Encyclopedia  Britannica  article  on  "Psychology,"  pp. 
600  ff. 

Principle  of  Independence — 

Fullerton,  Psychological  Review,  111,  pp.  i  ff.  (1896). 
Hart,  in  Subconscious  Phenomena,  pp.  1 18-122. 
Titchener,  loc.  cit. 

Causation  in  the  Physical  Sciences  and  in  Psychology — 
Sidis,  Foundations,  Chaps.  XHI  and  XIV. 
Miinsterberg,  Psychology,   General  and  Applied,  Chap.  Ill 
(especially  pp.  21-24,  30"32). 

The  Cerebral  Theory — 

Munsterberg,  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  Chap.  IV. 
"  Psychology   and  Life,   essay  on   "Psychology 

and  Physiology." 
"  Psychotherapy,  Chap.  III. 

The  Independence  Theory — 

Yerkes,  Introduction  to  Psychology,  Chaps.  Ill   (especially 

PP-  33-36),  XXIV,  and  XXV. 
Wundt,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  §  22,  No.  10. 

The  Doctrine  of  Chance  in  Psychology — 

Sidis,  Foundations,  Chaps.  XV  and  XVI. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Subconscious 
/.  The  Concept  of  the  Subconscious. 

98.  Meaning  of  the  Term. — The  term  "subconscious,"  dis- 
regarding all  its  deeper  elaborations  of  meaning  and  all  specific 
theories  as  to  its  nature,  denotes  any  form  of  psychical  ex- 
istence which  underlies,  hut  is  not  identical  with,  the  personal 
consciousness.  That  is  to  say,  to  call  a  phenomenon  "sub- 
conscious" is  to  imply  (i)  that  it  is  psychical  rather  than 
physical  or  physiological  in  its  nature;  (2)  that  personal  con- 
sciousness is  in  some  way  dependent  upon  subconsciousness; 
but,  (3)  that  the  personality  is  not  aware  of  that  which  is 
subconscious. 

99.  The  Place  of  the  Concept  in  Modern  Psychology. — The 
psychology  of  the  subconscious  is  a  favorite  and  almost  com- 
monplace topic  among  popular  writers,  but  the  concept  has 
been  so  abused  and  misunderstood  by  them  that  many  psychol- 
ogists reject  it  altogether.  In  view  of  this  fact  it  is  rather 
strange  to  find  James  writing  in  1902  that  "the  subconscious 
self  is  nowadays  a  well-accredited  psychological  entity,"^  and 
even  Coriat  asserting  ten  years  later  that  "all  psychopatholo- 
gists  agree  .  .  .  that  our  minds  are  made  up  of  certain  states 
for  some  of  which  we  are  conscious  and  for  some  not  con- 
scious."* 

However,  the  criticisms  that  have  been  offered  against  the 
subconscious  are  after  all  proj)erly  of  weight  only  against  cer- 
tain specific  theories  and  interpretations  of  it,  and  not  at  all 
against  the  concept  as  such  when  rightly  understood."     Cor- 

^The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  511. 
*  Abnormal  Psychology,  p.  10.     Italics  mine. 
"  V.  Prince,  The  Unconscious,  p.  ix. 


ipo         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

rectly  interpreted,  the  concept  is  of  fundamental  importance  to 
psychology. 

100.  The  Grounds  for  Postulating  the  Subconscious. — Ac- 
ceptance of  the  subconscious  is  based  primarily  and  historically 
on  theoretical  grounds,  but  the  theoretical  demand  has  been 
confirmed  by  the  observation  of  certain  phenomena  which  seem 
to  call  for  an  explanation  in  subconscious  terms.  We  recog- 
nize, therefore,  a  twofold  root  for  the  concept — (i)  its  basis 
as  a  postulate,  and  (2)  its  basis  as  an  inference  from  ob- 
served phenomena. 

(i)  Historically,  the  concept  of  the  subconscious  was  con- 
structed to  fulfill  a  demand  for  continuity  in  mental  life,  corre- 
sponding to  that  which  characterizes  the  physical  world  (95). 
"It  was  early  seen  in  the  history  of  philosophy,"  says  Bernard 
Hart,  "that  among  the  contrasts  to  be  observed  between  the 
physical  and  the  mental,  one  of  the  most  prominent  was  the 
comparative  discontinuity  of  the  latter.  The  psychical  life 
made  its  appearance  in  an  irregular  manner,  in  flashes  of 
limited  duration,  and  in  the  intervals  between  these  flashes  it 
appeared  to  altogether  cease  to  exist.  In  contrast  to  this  the 
material  world  seemed  relatively  continuous,  permanent,  and 
independent  of  the  individual.  Hence,  if  the  study  of  the 
mind  was  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the  rest  of  our  knowl- 
edge, an  attempt  had  to  be  made  to  get  rid  of  the  apparent 
discontinuity  and  irregularity  of  psychical  experience."* 

This  discontinuity  in  mental  life  is  observable  in  two  differ- 
ent directions — (a)  in  the  mental  life  of  the  individual,  and 
(b)  in  the  relation  between  individual  minds.  Concerning  the 
former  sufficient  has  already  been  said  (89,  93,  95)  ;  but  let 
us  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  contrast  between  mental  and 
physical  occurring  under  the  second  head. 

*  Subconscious  Phenomena,  p.  104.  Leading  representatives  of  this 
tendency  in  the  history  of  philosophy  have  been  Leibniz,  Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann,  Herbart,  and  Sir  William  Hamilton:  opposed  to  them  may 
be  named  Descartes,  Lotze,  and  the  English  associationists.  V.,  Subcon- 
scious Phenomena,  pp.  105-107;  Klemm's  History  of  Psychology,  pp.  172- 
181 ;  and  Villa's  Contemporary  Psychology,  pp.  280-282. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     191 

It  is  perfectly  possible  for  one  human  body  to  get  in  touch 
with  another  human  body  upon  the  terrestrial  globe  by  passing 
over  the  intermediate  physical  space,  or  by  communicating 
through  such  material  media  as  the  telephone  wire  or  the 
postal  service.  In  fact,  it  is  even  possible  to  imagine,  if  not 
to  accomplish,  passage  from  one  planet  or  star  to  another 
through  intermediate  physical  space,  just  as  we  actually  ob- 
serve the  passage  of  light  from  the  most  distant  stars  to  the 
earth.  In  all  these  transitions  we  are  merely  moving  from  one 
place  to  another  in  a  single  continuum.  But  if  I  wish  to  com- 
municate a  thought  from  my  mind  to  that  of  my  friend,  I 
find  it  impossible  to  do  so  without  making  use  of  some  physi- 
cal medium — as  the  sound-waves  of  the  voice,  the  light-waves 
produced  by  gesture  or  facial  expression,  etc.  In  other  words, 
our  physical  bodies  are  parts  of  a  great  physical  continuum, 
but  our  minds  are  not  parts  of  any  psychical  continuum — not 
of  any  conscious  one,  at  least. 

It  is  because  of  the  absence  of  any  such  conscious  psychical 
continuum  between  minds  corresponding  to  the  physical  con- 
tinuum which  subsists  between  bodies  that  some  have  sug- 
gested that  there  may  be  a  .yt^^conscious  continuum  between 
minds,  as  there  is  a  submarine  continuum  between  the  various 
continents  and  islands  on  the  surface  of  the  earth."  Each  con- 
scious mind  may  be  cut  off  entirely  from  every  other,  as  every 
island  on  the  earth  is  cut  off  from  any  land  communication 
with  other  islands;  but  just  as  if  we  go  beneath  the  surface 
of  the  ocean  we  find  a  continuous  submarine  land  connecting 
these  various  islands,  so  if  we  pass  beneath  the  threshold  of 
consciousness  we  may  find  that  all  conscious  minds  are  merely 
separate  "islands"  projecting  out  of  a  single  subconscious 
continuum. 

I  merely  introduce  this  speculation  (for  it  is  only  a  specu- 
lation) at  this  point  in  order  to  give  our  discussion  a  certain 
degree  of  completeness.  The  at  least  apparent  discontinuity 
between  minds  calls  for  notice  in  passing,  because  it  is  one  of 

*  V.  James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  pp.  507-515, 


192  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  historic  reasons  for  postulating  some  kind  of  a  subcon- 
scious, but  it  is  the  discontinuity  within  the  individual  mind 
which  alone  demands  our  further  attention. 

(2)  The  second  root  of  the  concept  of  the  subconscious  is 
the  empirical  or  observational  root — the  observation  of  cer- 
tain phenomena  which  seem'  to  involve  psychical  activity,  and 
yet  of  which  the  subject  is  not  personally  conscious.  The  ex- 
istence of  such  phenomena  seems  to  call  for  some  explanation 
of  them  in  subconscious  terms,  and  thus  to  offer  empirical 
confirmation  to  the  postulate  which  has  been  constructed  his- 
torically on  purely  theoretical  grounds.  These  phenomenal 
evidences  of  the  subconscious  I  shall  group  under  three  heads, 
each  group  containing  three  chief  varieties. 
2.  Evidences  of  the  Subconscious. 

1 01.  Group  I.  Phenomena  involving  Personal  Continuity. 
— The  first  group  includes  those  phenomena  which  seem  to  in- 
dicate that  the  apparent  discontinuity  of  mental  life  is  merely 
superficial,  and  that  underneath  there  is  a  real  persisting  self 
binding  together  the  more  or  less  discrete  moments  of  con- 
sciousness.    These  phenomena  are: — 

( I )  The  Sense  of  Personal  Continuity — the  feeling  that  is 
in  each  of  us,  however  we  may  differ  in  our  explanation  of  it, 
that  notwithstanding  the  gaps  in  the  "stream  of  consciousness" 
produced  by  sleep,  amnesia  (periods  of  loss  of  memory),  de- 
lirium, etc. — each  of  us  is  nevertheless  the  same  person  after 
waking  up  from  sleep,  or  "coming  to  himself"  after  an  attack 
of  fever  or  amnesia,  that  he  was  before.  I  go  to  sleep  at 
night,  and  for  a  time  consciousness  ceases;  but  when  I  awake 
I  have  no  doubt  that  I  am  the  same  person  I  was  the  day  be- 
fore, and  the  first  moment  of  waking  attaches  itself  directly 
to  the  last  moment  before  going  to  sleep.®  So,  notwithstand- 
ing the  changes  which  occur  in  each  of  us  as  the  years  pass 
by  from  infancy  to  adulthood,  we  nevertheless  feel  ourselves 
to  be  the  same  person  today  that  we  were  ten,  twenty,  or 
more  years  ago. 

'  Cf.  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  237-239. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  193 

These  facts  of  consciousness  seem  to  show  that  mental  life 
is  not  merely  an  aggregate  of  several  distinct  "streams  of 
consciousness"  succeeding  one  another  at  intervals  in  time, 
but  a  single  stream — disappearing  periodically  below  the  sur- 
face of  the  landscape,  as  it  were,  but  nevertheless  continu- 
ously one. 

(2)  Recognition  as  a  Factor  in  Memory. — Memory,  as  the 
psychologist  regards  it,  includes  three  essential  factors,  with- 
out any  one  of  which  we  have  no  true  memory  at  all.  These 
three  essential  factors  are  retention,  reproduction  or  recall,^ 
and  recognition.  Retention  is  simply  a  name  for  the  fact  that 
an  experience  has  so  impressed  itself  upon  the  mind  that  it 
may  be  recalled  at  some  future  time — i.e.,  retention  is  merely 
the  potentiality  of  recall.  Recall  is  the  act  of  producing  in 
consciousness  an  image  ("memory-image")  of  some  previous 
experience,  and  is  often  regarded  as  the  essential  feature  of 
memory.  This  is  not  the  case,  however;  for  unless  the 
memory-image  with  some  perception  or  idea  in  one's  own 
which  /  myself  have  had  before,  it  is  not  true  memory,  but 
merely  a  form  of  reproductive  imagery.  The  third  factor, 
therefore, — Recognition,  the  conscious  identification  of  a 
memory-image  with  some  perception  or  idea  in  one's  own 
past  experience — is  the  essential  distinguishing  mark  of  true 
psychological  memory. 

Now,  it  is  this  recognition  factor  of  memory  which  is  ad- 
duced by  advocates  of  the  subconscious  as  evidence  of  the  ex- 
istence of  a  subconscious  continuum  connecting  past  and  pres 
ent  consciousnesses  in  the  lifetime  of  an  individual.  That  I 
am  able  to  produce  in  consciousness  an  image,  more  or  less 
similar  to  some  former  image  or  perception  in  my  past  ex- 
perience, is  a  conscious  phenomenon,  and  may  be  accounted 
for  in  terms  of  consciousness;  but  that  I  should  connect  this 
present  moment  of  conscious  recollection  with  some  past 
moment,  perhaps  many  years  ago,  and  recognize  these  two 
moments   as  parts  of  a  single  mental  lifetime — as   "mine," 

^  Other  synonyms  are  "revival"  and  "recollection." 


194  THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

rather  than  yours  or  his — seems  to  be  an  inexpHcable  fact  un- 
less there  is  some  psychical  continuum,  a  personal  continuity, 
underlying  and  connecting  the  separate  consciousness  of  those 
two  moments.^ 

(3)  The  Revival  of  Lost  Memories. — A  third  and  espe- 
cially striking  type  of  phenomenon  seeming  to  imply  a  sub- 
conscious continuum  in  mental  life  is  the  revival  under  ab- 
normal circumstances — as  in  dreams,  the  deliria  of  fever, 
automatic  writing,  crystal  gazing,  hypnosis,  waking  hallucina- 
tions ("visions"),  and  the  artificial  devices  of  psychoanalysis 
— of  experiences  which  have  long  been  forgotten,  and  which 
no  amount  of  conscious  effort  on  the  part  of  the  subject  has 
succeeded  in  bringing  into  the  subject's  consciousness. 

The  first  four  chapters  of  Dr.  Prince's  book  on  The  Un- 
conscious contain  numerous  instances  of  this  phenomenon^ 
A  classic  example  is  that  recorded  by  Coleridge  of  the  illiter- 
ate servant-girl  who,  in  a  delirium,  was  heard  uttering  Latin, 
Greek,  and  Hebrew  sentences.  Later  inquiry  revealed  that 
she  had  formerly  been  employed  in  the  house  of  a  scholarly 
clergyman  who  was  accustomed  to  read  aloud  to  himself 
Classic  and  Hebrew  passages  as  he  walked  up  and  down  the 
floor  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  kitchen,"  The  words,  which 
of  course  were  to  the  woman  mere  meaningless  sounds,  had 
penetrated  her  mind,  and  awaited  only  the  stress  of  the  fever 
to  bring  them  back  into  consciousness.  I  say  "back  into  con- 
sciousness," though  in  reality  it  is  doubtful  if  they  were  con- 
sciotisly  presented  to  her  mind  even  in  the  first  instance; 
rather  were  they  subconscious  impressions  even  then,  and  not 
so  much  forgotten  or  "lost"  in  the  interval  between  the  time 
of  the  original  impression  and  that  of  the  fever,  as  non-exis- 
tent so  far  as  the  woman's  normal  consciousness  was  con- 
cerned "at  any  time.     But  even  should  this  phenomenon  be  ex- 

8  V.  Sidis,  The  Psychology  of  Suggestion,  pp.  124-127.  Foundations, 
pp.  182  f . 

°  Cf.  also  Sidis,  Psychology  of  Suggestion,  Chap.  XI. 
1°  V.  James,  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  681. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  195 

plained  in  physiological  terms,  as  a  simple  case  of  delayed  re- 
flex action,  the  innumerable  instances  in  which  definitely  con- 
scious experiences  are  known  completely  to  drop  out  of  con- 
sciousness for  years,  and  are  revived  only  under  unusual  stress 
at  some  later  time,  seem  more  naturally  to  call  for  a  psychical 
than  a  physiological  explanation. 

102.  Group  II.  Phenomena  having  no  Conscious  Cause, 
and  therefore  involving  ^Mfeconscious  causes  if  they  are  to  be 
explained  in  purely  psychological  terms  at  all.  These  phe- 
nomena belong  to  each  of  the  three  aspects  of  consciousness 
which  psychologists  recognize  in  their  structural  analyses  of 
mind — the  cognitive,  the  affective,  and  the  conative;  and  in- 
clude, accordingly  unaccountable  ideas,  unaccountable  feelings, 
and  unaccountable  acts.  If  these  conscious  phenomena  have 
no  conscious  causes,  and  yet  are  to  be  explained  in  psychical 
terms  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  independent  psychical 
causation,  their  causes  must  be  inferred  to  be  subconscious. 

(i)  Unaccountable  Ideas. — By  this  is  meant  the  sudden  ap- 
pearance in  consciousness  of  ideas  which  have  no  antecedents 
in  consciousness — as  when  one  forgets  a  perfectly  familiar 
name  or  other  word,  searches  for  it  in  vain,  although  all  the 
while  it  seems  to  be  "just  on  the  tip  of  the  tongue,"  and  finally 
gives  up  the  search  in  despair,  only  to  have  the  looked-for 
word  rush  into  full  consciousness  some  time  after,  when  we 
are  thinking  of  something  else."  Frequently,  also,  strange 
ideas  come  into  consciousness  without  any  such  preliminary 
effort,  seeming  to  have  no  explanation  at  all ;  and  yet  the  psy- 
chologist is  loath  to  admit  that  any  psychical  phenomenon  is 
inexplicable.  Where  do  these  ideas  come  from?  Why  did 
I  think  of  this  just  at  this  time?  These  seem  to  be  legitimate 
questions,  and  to  demand  a  satisfactory  answer. 

In  ordinary  conversation,  and  in  any  sustained  course  of 
thinking,  ideas  follow  one  another  easily,  according  to  the 
familiar  so-called  "laws  of  successive  association."  At  any 
time  during  the  progress  of  such  a  "train  of  ideas,"  it  is  usu- 

'^  V.  Coriat,  Abnormal  Psychology,  p.  22. 


196         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

ally  possible  to  stop  and  trace  the  series  back  step  by  step, 
perhaps  to  its  origin.  And  so,  when  we  are  searching  the 
memory  for  some  temporarily  forgotten  incident,  we  approach 
our  goal  by  way  of  associated  ideas  in  the  same  manner  as  in 
the  other  instances  referred  to.  The  most  natural  explanation 
of  "unaccountable  ideas,"  then,  would  seem  to  be  in  similar 
psychical  terms — of  the  nature  in  this  case,  however,  of  ^w&- 
conscious  rather  than  conscious  sequence  of  ideas. 

(2)  Unaccountable  Feelings,  and  Emotional  States  having 
no  apparent  rational  basis — as  moods  of  depression  or  ela- 
tion, personal  likes  and  dislikes,  fears  and  antipathies,  moral 
and  religious  prejudices,  etc.  We  cannot  always  explain  why 
we  wake  up  on  one  morning  "with  a  grouch  on,"  and  on  some 
other  occasion  in  a  particularly  "good  humor";  why  we  like 
certain  people  and  dislike  others;  why  we  are  afraid  of  cats, 
or  have  a  special  loathing  for  frogs ;  why  one  person  considers 
playing  tennis  on  Sunday  a  perfectly  permissible  occupation, 
and  another  regards  it  as  a  violation  of  the  Sabbath, 

These  feelings  are  "unaccountable"  in  conscious  terms,  we 
cannot  give  our  "reasons"  for  them ;  and  yet  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  every  affective  state  has  a  cognitive  basis  some- 
where. We  say — "I  do  not  like  you,  Dr,  Fell :  the  reason  why, 
I  cannot  tell" — but  we  do  not  say,  "I  have  no  reason."  The 
real  reason,  in  other  words,  is  subconscious. 

(3)  Unaccountable  Acts  of  everyday  life. — Of  these,  the 
most  common  instances  are  the  so-called  "slips  of  the  tongue" 
or  "of  the  pen" :  we  intend  to  write  or  say  one  thing,  and  to 
our  own  surprise  we  discover  ourselves  saying  or  writing 
something  quite  different;  or  we  may  not  make  the  discovery 
until  long  afterward,  when  someone  else  calls  it  to  our  atten- 
tion. Nor  is  it  uncommon  to  find  ourselves  doing  things  with 
our  hands  or  feet  without  conscious  intention — starting  to 
walk  in  a  given  direction,  and  actually  proceeding  in  some 
quite  different  one;  going  into  an  adjacent  room  to  get  a 
knife,  for  example,  and  finding  when  we  have  returned  that 
we  have  brought  back  a  pencil  instead ;  and  so  on.     Now,  all 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  197 

these  actions  are  unaccountable  in  terms  of  consciousness,  but 
no  doubt  can  in  every  case  be  referred  to  a  subconscious  source. 

103.  Group  III.  Phenomena  apparently  involmng  Intelli- 
gence.— We  come  now  to  a  group  of  phenomena  of  a  quite 
different  character  from  those  already  considered,  in  that  they 
seem  not  only  to  call  for  a  psychical  explanation,  but  also  ac- 
tually to  involve  reasoning  on  the  part  of  the  subject.  As 
heretofore,  three  types  of  phenomena  are  included  under  this 
head. 

(i)  Solutions  of  Problems  which  have  been  temporarily 
laid  aside  by  consciousness.  The  solutions  may  manifest 
themselves  in  ordinary  waking  life,  in  the  form  of  hallucina- 
tions, in  dreams  or  hypnosis,  through  automatic  writing,  or  in 
the  crystal.  Chapters  VI  and  VII  of  Prince  on  The  Uncon- 
scious are  full  of  instances  of  this  character,  and  I  shall  not 
attempt  to  reproduce  any  of  them  in  this  place.  It  is  by  no 
means  uncommon  for  a  student  to  work  in  vain  upon  some 
baffling  problem,  and  to  retire  finally  with  the  difficulty  un- 
solved, and  then  to  awake  the  next  morning  after  a  sound  sleep 
with  the  solution  clearly  presented  before  his  consciousness. 
A  striking  instance  of  a  similar  character  is  the  dream  of 
Professor  Hilprecht,  during  which  a  problem  in  Assyriology 
was  in  a  dramatic  manner  solved.^^ 

Under  the  same  head  should  be  mentioned  the  rapid  solu- 
tion of  mathematical  problems  by  those  strange  anthropologi- 
cal freaks  known  as  "lightning  calculators";  and  the  "flashes 
of  genius"  of  which  F.  W.  H.  Myers  writes  so  fascinatingly 
in  the  third  chapter  of  his  Human  Personality}^  It  is  known 
that  Sir  W.  R.  Hamilton  invented  the  abstruse  mathematical 
system  of  quarternions  "while  walking  with  Lady  Hamilton  in 
the  streets  of  Dublin,  the  flash  of  discovery  coming  to  him 
just  as  he  was  approaching  the  Brougham  Bridge."" 

Now  all  these  phenomena  are  of  a  distinctly  and  uncscapably 

*'  Proceedings  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research,  Vol.  XII,  pp.  14  f. 
*"  The  chapter  includes  an  account  of  some  of  the  "lightning  calculators." 
**Jastrow,  The  Subconscious,  p.  95. 


198         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

psychical  nature,  involving  not  merely  concepts  or  single  ideas 
but  actual  reasoning,  sometimes  of  a  highly  elaborate  charac- 
ter. The  reasoning  itself,  however,  is  not  conscious  but  sub- 
conscious, and  the  solutions  appear  in  consciousness  as  the 
end-products  of  a  series  of  subconscious  acts  of  reasoning. 

(2)  Anszvers  to  Questions,  or  solutions  of  simple  problems 
set  by  some  outsider,  may  be  made  by  a  hypnotized  subject, 
or  through  automatic  writing;  the  subject  himself  being  quite 
unaware,  so  far  as  his  waking  consciousness  is  concerned, 
either  of  the  question  or  of  having  made  any  reply  to  the 
same.  For  example,  I  may  set  the  subject  to  reading  aloud, 
place  a  pencil  in  his  right  hand,  and  then  whisper  in  his  right 
ear  some  simple  arithmetical  sum ;  and  the  subject  may  proceed 
to  add  up  the  figures  quite  unconsciously  and  automatically, 
v/hile  in  no  wise  retarding  or  otherwise  modifying  his  con- 
scious reading. 

(3)  Post-hypnotic  Phenomena — i.e.,  responses  made  after 
waking  from  an  hypnotic  trance,  to  suggestions  made  during 
hypnosis.  The  most  striking  variety  of  such  reactions  to  sug- 
gestion are  those  which  involve  subconscious  time-apprecia- 
tion— i.e.,  when  the  suggestion  is  made  that  the  subject  per- 
form some  action  (as,  "get  up  and  shut  the  door")  at  a  cer- 
tain time  (e.g.,  a  quarter  past  four),  or  after  a  given  num- 
ber of  moments  have  elapsed  (e.g.,  439  seconds  after  the  sub- 
ject has  been  awakened).  In  experiments  of  this  kind  it  is 
quite  surprising  how  accurately  the  subject  will  respond  to  the 
suggestion  of  time,  and  how  carefully  the  subconscious  calcu- 
lates the  interval  between  suggestion  and  reaction. ^^ 

J.  Dissociation  and  the  Coconscious. 

104.  Meaning  of  the  Terms. — *Tf  we  are  asked,"  writes 
Bernard  Hart^®  "to  turn  our  mental  eye  inwards  and  carefully 
observe  at  any  given  moment  the  content  of  our  mind : — or, 

*^  Bramwell's  The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Hypnotism  contains  numer- 
ous cases  of  this  kind. 
^'^  The  Psychology  of  Insanity,  pp.  40  f. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  199 

as  it  is  technically  termed,  the  momentary  'field  of  conscious- 
ness'— we  should  probably  describe  it  as  an  indivisible  whole, 
a  uniform  stream  of  thought  progressing  towards  some  defi- 
nite end.  .  .  .  Yet  this  statement  is  only  partially  true  of  the 
normal  mind,  and  it  is  hardly  true  at  all  of"  the  abnormal.  In 
other  words,  a  complete  Integration  of  the  various  mental 
contents,  in  conformity  with  the  above  description,  is  the  ideal, 
but  hardly  the  normal,  condition  of  the  mind.  In  such  a 
condition,  every  part  of  the  subconscious  field  would  be  per- 
fectly continuous  with  every  part  of  the  conscious  field,  so 
that  any  given  content  (idea  or  feeling)  could  pass  freely 
from  one  field  to  the  other — out  of  or  into  consciousness  as 
needed.  Usually,  however,  to  say  the  least,  and  probably  al- 
v/ays  as  a  matter  of  fact,  some  degree  or  other  of  discontin- 
uity or  Dissociation  exists  between  the  conscious  and  the  sub- 
conscious fields. 

Dissociation  is  a  condition  in  which  the  mind  seems  to  be  di- 
vided, some  of  its  contents  being  split  off  from  the  stream  of 
personal  consciousness,  and  leading  a  more  or  less  independent 
existence  beyond  the  control  of  the  personality.  When  these 
dissociated  contents  become  active,  they  are  usually  nowadays 
said  to  be  Coconscious,  and  most  of  the  phenomena  of  Group 
III,  above  noted  (103),  are  manifestations  of  coconscious  pro- 
cesses going  on  in  a  state  of  dissociation  {e.g.,  hypnosis). 
Subconscious  contents  which  are  inactive  or  dormant,  and  so 
do  not  come  under  the  head  of  "coconscious,"  are  usually  called 
Unconscious;  and  the  phenomena  of  Groups  I  and  II  are  usu- 
ally manifestations  of  wwconscious  rather  than  coconscious 
contents." 

^^  This  division  of  subconscious  phenomena  into  coconscious  and  un- 
conscious we  owe  to  Morton  Prince  {v.  Coriat,  Abnormal  Psychology,  p. 
15-16,  and  note;  Prince,  The  Unconscious,  pp.  x,  249-254.)  Fuller  con- 
sideration will  be  given  to  this  distinction  in  the  succeeding  chapter  (119). 
Meanwhile  the  table  on  following  page  may  clarify  our  usage  of  the 
various  terms  in  their  relations  to  one  another,  though  this  does  not  always 
conform  precisely  to  the  usage  of  Dr.  Prince. 


200         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 
MENTAL  CONTENTS 


|- 1     . 

Conscious  Subconscious 


(Personal  Consciousness) 


Continuous  with                              Dissociated 
Personal  Consciousness 
(known  as  "Forecon- 
scious")    (ii8)  1 


■| 
Dormant  or     Active  and 

Inactive  Intelligent 

I    .  I  . 

Unconscious      Co  conscious 

105.  Examples  of  Dissociation. — A  curious  contradiction  is 
found  in  Coriat's  Abnormal  Psychology.  On  page  4  the 
author  states  that  "dissociation  is  a  pathological  phenomenon," 
and  yet  on  page  33  we  find  him  declaring  that  "dissociation  re- 
mains normal  so  long  as  it  is  transitory."  The  latter  of  these' 
two  statements  is  undoubtedly  more  true  to  the  facts,  and  ten 
pages  of  the  book  under  consideration  are  devoted  to  illustra- 
tions of  the  dissociations  of  everyday  life.^* 

Common  examples  of  dissociation  in  everyday  waking  life 
are  the  sudden  forgetting  of  a  name,  of  the  topic  of  a  con- 
versation, or  of  the  intention  of  an  action  ;^®  slips  of  the  tongue 
or  pen;  etc.  In  all, these  cases,  the  name,  topic,  purpose,  or 
other  datum  has  become  dissociated  from  the  personal  con- 
sciousness, and  the  subject  is  at  a  loss  what  to  do  or  say  next. 

Dreams  are  dissociation  phenomena  occurring  normally  dur- 
ing sleep.  It  is  likely  that  most  of  our  dreams  are  completely 
forgotten — i.e.,  "unconscious,"  in  the  sense  above  distin- 
guished; though  some  of  them  are  synthetized  with  conscious- 
ness after  waking.  Ahsentmindedness  is  a  typical  dissociation- 
psychosis,  in  which  the  entire  mental  field,  with  the  exception 
of  that  portion  thereof  on  which  "the  attention"  is  concen- 
trated, is  split  off  from  the  personal  consciousness.     In  such 

18  Pp.  22-32. 

19  E.g.,  going  into  a  room  for  a  definite  purpose,  and  then  forgetting 
why  we  are  there. 


LIBRARY 

•TAT&  TEACHERS  COLLFat 

SANTA  BARBARA.  CALIFORNIA 


s:Da,/7 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  201 

a  condition,  special  opportunity  is  open  for  the  manifestation 
of  subconscious  phenomena.^" 

Pathological  dissociations  differ  from  these  in  their  depth 
and  duration.  The  ordinary  non-pathological  types  of  dissoci- 
ation are  superficial  and  transitory — they  do  not  produce  a  very 
deep  cleft  in  the  mental  field,  and  they  last  but  a  short  time: 
when  the  dissociation  is  prolonged  a;id  the  phenomena  conse- 
quent thereupon  exaggerated,  it  becomes  pathological,  or  at 
least  abnormal."  The  most  striking  examples  of  these  are  the 
hypnotic  state,  the  "somnambulisms"  of  hysterics,  and  the 
various  trance  states  of  neurotics  and  insane  persons.  In  these 
conditions  the  subject  may  be  leading  a  very  active  psychical 
life,  and  yet  in  his  normal  state  may  be  quite  ignorant  of  the 
events  occurring  during  the  trance. 

REFERENCES 

History  of  the  Concept — 

Klemm,  A  History  of  Psychology,  Chap.  VL 
Villa,  Contemporary  Psychology,  Chap.  VH. 

The  Subconscious  in  General — 

Subconscious  phenomena,  by  various  authors.      (Reprinted 

from  The  Journal  of  Abnormal  Psychology  1910). 
Jastrow,  The  Subconscious  (1906). 
Prince,  The  Unconscious  (1914). 

Coriat,  Abnormal  Psychology  (Second'EcVit'wn,  1914),  Chap.  I 
Myers,  Human  Personality  and  its  Survival  of  Bodily  Death 

(1903),  Chap.  L 
Ward,  Psychological  Principles  (1918),  pp.  90-101. 

Dissociation — 

Hart,  The  Psychology  of  Insanity,  Chap.  IV. 
Wells,  Mental  Adjustments,  Chap.  V. 

**  Coriat's  "chocolate  pie  case"  is  a  good  example  of  this.    Op.  cit.,  p.  43 
"  Op.  cit..  p.  33.    Cf.  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  43- 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Theories  of  the  Subconscious 

I.  Types  of  Theory. 

1 06.  The  Main  Problem  with  regard  to  the  explanation  of 
the  phenomena  described  in  the  last  chapter  is  as  to  whether 
they  should  be  interpreted  as  psychical  or  physiological  in  their 
nature.  Of  the  six  theories  propounded  in  the  introduction  to 
the  volume  entitled  Subconscious  Phenomena,^  and  reviewed 
by  Coriat  on  pp.  11-13  of  his  Abnormal  Psychology,  five  are 
psychological  explanations  and  one  (that  defended  in  Subcon- 
scious Phenomena  by  Miinsterberg,  Ribot,  and  Jastrow,  and 
the  fifth  in  Coriat's  list)  a  physiological  one.  Advocates  of  a 
physiological  explanation  reject  the  concept  of  the  subcon- 
scious altogether — chiefly,  however,  on  the  basis  of  arguments 
which  are  of  real  weight  only  when  directed  against  one  spe- 
cial form  of  the  subconscious  theory. 

The  dominating  question  becomes,  then,  this :  Are  the  phe- 
nomena called  subconscious  really  manifestations  of  Subcon- 
scious Mentation — i.e.,  psychical,  but  not  conscious;  or  are 
they  merely  expressions  of  Unconscious  Cerebration — i.e.,  of 
brain  processes  entirely  unaccompanied  by  any  psychical  ac- 
tivity? In  the  remainder  of  this  division  of  the  present  chap- 
ter we  shall  consider  two  psychological  views  of  the  subcon- 
scious, and  in  succeeding  divisions  shall  give  our  attention  to 
a  more  critical  study  of  the  subconscious,  defending  it  in  the 
proper  place  against  the  attacks  of  the  unconscious  cerebra- 
tionists.^ 

1  Originally,  in  the  Journal  of  Abnormal  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  No.  i 
(1907). 

2  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  very  term  "subconscious"  involves 
"mentation"  or  psychical  activity.  The  issue  is  not  between  psychological 
and  physiological  theories  "of  the  subconscious,"  but  between  psychologi- 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  203 

107.  The  Dual  Mind  Theory. — ^The  popular  conception  of 
the  subconscious  is  that  of  a  separate  "secondary"  or  subcon- 
scious "self"  or  "mind,"  having  all  the  reality  of  the  "primary" 
or  conscious  mind,  but  living  an  independent  life  alongside  of 
it.  According  to  this  view,  man  has  two  minds,  one  conscious 
and  the  other  subconscious,  sharply  separated  from  each  other 
but  interacting.* 

This  theory  was  promulgated  by  T.  J.  Hudson  some  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  years  ago  in  his  book,  The  Law  of  Psychic  Phe- 
nomena— no  doubt  one  of  the  most  popular  books  on  psychol- 
ogy ever  written,  and  yet  one  having  no  scientific  standing 
whatever.  The  two  minds  Hudson  calls  the  "objective"  and 
"subjective"  minds  respectively,  and  to  each  of  these  minds 
he  ascribes  distinct  "faculties"  or  powers.  The  "objective 
mind,"  he  asserts,  is  that  by  which  we  become  aware  of  the 
objective  world  through  the  mediation  of  the  physical  senses : 
the  "subjective  mind,"  on  the  other  hand,  "takes  cognizance 
of  its  environment  by  means  independent  of  the  physical 
senses" — namely,  by  "intuition,"  whatever  that  may  mean. 
This  "subjective"  or  subconscious  mind  is  "the  seat  of  the 
emotions  and  the  storehouse  of  memory,"  "is  constantly  amen- 
able to  the  power  of  suggestion,"  and  has  unlimited  powers  of 
deductive  inference,  but  is  quite  "incapable  of  inductive  reason- 
ing." The  "objective"  or  conscious  mind,  on  the  other  hand, 
"is  capable  of  reasoning  by  all  methods,"  but  is  not  control- 
able  by  suggestion. 

Such  a  view  of  the  mind  undoubtedly  simplifies  many  prob- 
lems— or  would,  if  there  were  any  truth  in  it — but,  unfortu- 
nately for  its  advocates,  it  also  introduces  many  new  problems 
which  would  be  quite  insoluble  on  its  own  basis,  and  is  totally 
indefensible  from  a  scientific  standpoint.*    Any  such  artificial 

cal  and  physiological  explanations  of  the  phenomena  described  in  the  pre- 
vious chapter,  and  called,  by  those  who  explain  them  psychologically, 
"subconscious." 

«  V.  Subconscious  Phenomena,  pp.  12  f .  Munsterberg — Psychotherapy, 
pp.  126-129. 

*Coriat,  however,  strangely  enough,  would  give  the  unguarded  reader 


204         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

division  of  the  mind  is  open  to  all  the  objections  offered  to 
the  historic  "faculty  theory"  (ii),  and  is  thoroughly  unscien- 
tific, all  psychologists  today  agreeing  that,  normally  at  least, 
the  mind  is  a  unit,  and  that  man  has  in  any  case  but  one  mind. 
Because  of  the  misconceptions  associated  with  this,  the  most 
widely  held  theory  of  the  subconscious,  the  term  "subconscious 
mind,"  which  is  perfectly  defensible  when  understood  as  mean- 
ing the  subconscious  portion  of  the  mind's  content,  should 
nevertheless  ordinarily  be  avoided,  and  the  single  word  "sub- 
conscious" substituted. 

1 08.  The  Ultra-Marginal  View  of  the  Subconscious. — The 
best  approach  to  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
conscious is,  I  think,  from  the  point  of  view  which  regards  the 
subconscious  as  a  field  of  mental  activity  outside  the  margin 
of  personal  consciousness.  This  conception  I  denominate  the 
"ultra-marginal  view"  rather  than  "theory"  for  the  express 
purpose  of  counteracting  any  tendency  to  regard  this  concei>- 
tion  as  in  any  way  an  explanation — certainly  not  a  final  theory 
— of  the  subconscious :  it  is  a  descriptive  conception  solely,  a 
method  of  approach  to  an  understanding  of  the  subconscious, 
and  in  no  sense  an  explanatory  theory.  Furthermore,  the  view 
of  the  subconscious  which  I  shall  present  in  this  section  does 
not  pretend  to  be  a  complete  description  of  what  we  mean  by 
the  subconscious,  but  merely  an  "approach"  to  such  a  descrip- 
tion; for  the  subconscious  is  much  more  that  the  ultra-mar- 
ginal. Succeeding  divisions  of  the  chapter,  however,  will 
elaborate  what  is  here  merely  preliminary.^ 

to  understand,  quite  unjustifiably,  that  the  dual  mind  theory  is  the  domi- 
nating view  among  psychologists,  when  he  tells  us  on  p.  3  of  his  Ab- 
normal Psychology  that  "the  psychologist  [i.e.,  every  psychologist]  regards 
the  subconscious  as  an  independent  consciousness,  coexistent  with  the 
healthy  consciousness  [does  he  mean  to  imply  by  this  word  "healthy"  that 
the  "subconscious  mind"  is  pathological?]  but  detached  from  it."  This  is, 
of  course,  a  very  unfortunate  way  of  putting  the  matter. 

5  The  best  presentation  of  the  ultra-marginal  view  is  to  be  found  in 
Prince,  The  Unconscious,  pp.  340-352.  (C/.  also  Coriafs  first  theory— 
Abnormal  Psychology,  p.  11;  also.  Subconscious  Phenomena,  p.  10.  This 
treatment,  however,  ignores  the  very  important  distinction  between  margin- 
al and  ultra-marginal — v.,  inf.,  sect.  113.) 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  205 

General  psychology  recognizes  that  the  field  of  personal  con- 
sciousness at  any  one  moment  is  not  identical  with  the  field  of 
attention.  As  Dr.  Prince  puts  it:  "If  you  were  to  state  what 
was  in  your  mind  at  a  given  moment,  it  is  the  vivid  elements 
upon  which  your  attention  was  focused,  that  you  would  de- 
scribe. But  as  everyone  knows,  these  do  not  constitute  the 
whole  field  of  consciousness  at  any  given  moment.  Besides 
these  there  is  in  the  background  of  the  mind,  outside  the  focus, 
a  conscious  margin  or  fringe  of  varying  extent  (consisting  of 
sensations,  perceptions,  and  even  thoughts)  of  which  you  are 
only  dimly  aware.  It  is  a  sort  of  twilight  zone  in  which  the 
contents  are  so  slightly  illuminated  by  awareness  as  to  be 
scarcely  recognizable."® 

The  field  of  consciousness  at  any  one  moment,  therefore, 
contains  two  more  or  less  clearly  distinguished  regions — (i) 
a  central  or  focal  region  of  attention  or  clearest  consciousness, 
and  (2)  a  surrounding  marginal  or  subattentive  region  of  less 
clear  contents.  The  latter  was  called  by  James  the  "fringe" 
of  consciousness,  to  indicate  its  less  solid,  more  hazy  char- 
acter, and  that  the  total  field  of  consciousness  is  frayed  out  at 
the  edges,  so  to  speak,  rather  than  of  equal  consistency 
throughout.  This  distinction  within  the  field  of  consciousness 
is  analogous  to  that  made  by  all  psychologists  between  the 
central,  "focal"  portion  of  the  field  of  vision — the  region  of 
clearest  vision — and  the  marginal  or  "peripheral"  region. 

Now  the  subconscious  is  to  be  thought  of  primarily  as  the 
further  extension  of  this  fringe  into  what  may  be  called  (3) 
the  ultra-marginal  region,  containing  a  number  of  instable 
contents,  any  of  which  may  at  any  moment,  under  normal 
conditions,  come  into  actual  consciousness.  From  this  point 
of  view,  the  subconscious  is  the  potentially  conscious,  and  does 
not,  normally  at  least,  constitute  a  "self"  distinct  from  the 
conscious  self.     The  following  diagram,  a  modification  of  a 

•  Op.  cit.,  p.  341- 


2o6 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


common  form  of  graphic  representation  of  the  field  of  con- 
sciousness, may  help  to  clarify  these  distinctions/ 

THE  FIELD  OF  MENTAL  CONTENT 


1.  Central  Region:     Attentive   Consciousness. 

2.  Marginal  Region :     Subattentive  Conscious- 

ness. 

3.  Ultra-Marginal  Region:     Subconsciousness. 


Ahsentmindedness,  it  is  interesting  to  point  out  in  this  con- 
nection {cf.  105),  is  a  condition  in  which  the  field  of  con- 
sciousness is  narrowed  down  to  that  of  attention,  and  all  other 
contents  beside  those  attended  to  are  entirely  subconscious. 
Such  a  state  may  be  represented  as  follows — 


— circle  2  being  absent. 

Prince  summarizes  his  presentation  in  these  words :  "If  all 
that  I  have  said  is  true,  it  follows  that  the  whole  content  or 
field  of  mind^  at  any  given  moment  includes  not  only  consider- 
ably more  than  that  which  is  within  the  field  of  attention,  but 

7  The  lines  between  circles  i  and  2,  and  2  and  3,  are  dotted  to  indicate 
that  normally  contents  may  pass  more  or  less  freely  from  one  portion  of 
the  general  field  to  another. 

8  Prince  uses  here  the  word  "consciousness,"  and  for  what  we  have 
called  "personal  consciousness"  he  uses  the  term  "awareness."  I  prefer, 
however,  in  the  interests  of  clearness  and  simplicity  not  to  distinguish 
"awareness"  from  "consciousness,"  but  to  use  these  terms  interchangeably. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  '   207 

more  than  is  within  the  field  of  personal  consciousness^  The 
field  of  conscious  states  as  a  whole  comprises  the  focus  of  at- 
tention plus  the  marginal  fringe ;  and  besides  this  there  may  be 
a  true  subconscious  ultra-marginal  field  comprising  psychical^" 
states  of  which  the  personal  consciousness  is  not  even  dimly 
aware."" 

109.  The  Subconscious  as  the  Subliminal. — In  addition  to 
the  metaphor  which  speaks  of  the  subconscious  as  that  which 
is  "beyond  the  margin  of  consciousness,  it  may  also  be  viewed 
as  that  which  lies  "below  the  threshold"  of  consciousness — 
i.e.,  as  that  which  is  "subliminal.""  In  contrast  to  this,  the 
personal  consciousness  is  "supraliminal,"  or  "above  the  thres- 
hold." This  is  a  terminology  which  extends  the  familiar  psy- 
chophysical concept  of  the  psychic  threshold  or  "limen""  to 
the  field  of  subconscious  psychology.  It  is  a  terminology 
made  familiar  especially  by  Myers,^*  but  not  so  much  favored 
at  the  present  time.  The  whole  field  of  mental  content  was 
likened  by  Dr.  Stanley  Hall  to  an  iceberg,  of  which  only  a 
small  portion  is  visible  above  the  surface  of  the  water:  in  the 
same  way,  it  is  said,  only  a  small  portion  of  the  mental  con- 
tent is  above  the  threshold  of  consciousness. ^°  Any  given  con- 
tent, moreover,  may  at  any  time  (under  given  conditions) 
"rise  above"  or  "fall  below"  this  threshold,  as  a  swimmer  or  a 

'  Prince  uses  here  the  word  "awareness,"    But  see  previous  note. 

1°  Prince  uses  the  term  "conscious"  here. 

"  Op.  cit.,  p.  351. 

12  Sub  limine,  "under  the  threshold." 

^'  In  psychophysics,  a  stimulus  (of  sound,  for  example)  which  is  too 
faint  to  be  perceived  is  said  to  be  "below  the  threshold  of  consciousness," 
and  one  which  is  just  intense  enough  to  be  perceived  and  no  more  is  said 
to  be  "at  the  threshold." 

^*  Human  Personality. 

1"  Myers'  own  favorite  analogy  was  that  of  the  spectrum  of  light,  con- 
sciousness corresponding  to  the  visible  portion,  and  subconscious  processes 
to  the  potent  but  invisible  ultra-violet  rays. 


2o8 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


submarine  may  rise  above  or  fall  below  the  surface  of  the 
water  at  will." 

All  these  figurative  representations  of  the  subconscious  are 
useful  for  clearing  up  our  understanding  of  the  matter,  pro- 
vided we  do  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  carried  away  by  them. 
Generally  speaking,  we  may  regard  the  ultra-marginal  form 
of  speech  as  involving  a  view  of  the  mind  from  above,  and  the 
subliminal  figure  as  a  cross-section  of  the  mind.  The  latter 
may  be  graphically  represented  as  below,  using  what  I  shall 
hereafter  designate  the  "Reservoir  Figure"  of  the  subcon- 
scious." 


Threshold  of  Attention- 


Threshold  of  Consciousness—^ 


Attention 

Subattention 

Subconscious 


Conscious 


^Subconscious 


2.  Criticisms  of  the  Concept  of  the  Subconscious. 

no.  The  Subconscious  and  its  Critics. — Most  psychologists 
are  willing  to  accept  the  coconscious,  and  explain  the  phe- 
nomena of  our  third  group  (103)  as  expressions  of  such  dis- 
sociated or  coconscious  activity;^®  but  many  refuse  to  accept 
the  broader  concept  of  the  subconscious  as  applied  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  Groups  I  and  II  (loi,  102),  and  explain  all  these 
in  physiological  terms  (the  theory  of  "unconscious  cerebra- 
tion," inf.).  Among  these,  the  most  prominent  are  probably 
Hugo  Miinsterberg,  Theodore  Ribot,  and  Joseph  Jastrow.     I 

18  As  it  is  important  to  guard  ourselves  in  the  use  of  the  expression 
"subconscious  mind,"  so  it  is  highly  advisable  to  avoid  entirely  the  use  of 
the  term  "subliminal  self." 

17  The  other  representation  may  be  called  the  "Circle  Figure."  Of 
course,  if  we  were  considering  the  mathematical  proportion  of  the  various 
parts  of  the  psychical  field,  our  reservoir  figure  would  not  have  parallel 
sides,  but  sides  which  would  slope  inward  in  passing  up  from  the  bot- 
tom.   But  such  details  must  be  ignored  in  our  present  study. 

^^E.g.,  Miinsterberg — Psychotherapy,  pp.  155  f. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  209 

shall  follow  Miinsterberg's  criticisms  in  my  presentation  of 
this  viewpoint. 

Miinsterberg  opens  his  discussion  of  the  subconscious  in  his 
Psychotherapy  with  the  sentence — "The  story  of  the  subcon- 
scious mind  can  be  told  in  three  words:  there  is  none."  Of 
course,  such  a  summary  method  of  rejecting  a  proposition  in 
which  one  disbelieves  by  merely  asserting  its  contradictory, 
can  never  carry  conviction  to  those  one  most  wishes  to  con- 
vince. Fortunately,  however,  for  those  who  have  a  serious  in- 
terest in  understanding  both  sides  of  an  issue,  the  author  at 
once  proceeds  to  admit  that  it  needs  "many  more  words  to 
make  clear  what  that  means,"  and  follows  this  admission  by 
thirty-two  pages  of  valuable  criticism.  The  objections  offered 
may  be  considered  under  three  heads,  as  follows: 

III.  (i)  The  notion  of  "subconscious  mental  facts"  is  self- 
contradictory.  What  is  not  conscious  is  not  mental  at  all,  but 
physiological.  So-called  "subconscious  mental  facts  are  either 
not  mental  but  physiological,  or  mental  but  not  subcon- 
scious";" for  "to  have  psychical  existence  at  all  means  to  be 
object  of  awareness  for  a  consciousness."^"  Therefore,  "psy- 
chical objects  which  have  their  existence  below  consciousness 
are  as  impossible  as  a  wooden  piece  of  iron."" 

The  issue  here  is  between  those  who  identify  "mind"  and 
"consciousness,"  and  those  who  allow  for  a  possible  differen- 
tiation between  them — making  "mind"  a  more  inclusive  term 
than  "consciousness,"  according  to  the  "iceberg"  principle 
above  elucidated  (109),  and  others  of  that  nature.  The  for- 
mer view  is  well  represented  by  Mark  Baldwin,  who  asserts 
that  "consciousness  is  the  one  condition  and  abiding  character- 
istic of  mental  states.""  And  again — "Consciousness  is  the 
common  and  necessary  form  of  all  mental  states:  without  it 
mind  is  not  and  cannot  be  conceived.     It  is  the  point  of  di- 

*"  Psychotherapy,  p.  130. 

*o  Ibid.,  p.  133. 

'1  Ibid.,  p.  134. 

'* Handbook  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I  (Senses  and  Intellect),  p.  45. 


2IO         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

vision  and  differentiation  between  mind  and  not-mind."^^  The 
opposite  view  is  expressed  in  Coriat's  exaggerated  statement 
that  "all  [sic]  psychopathologists  agree  .  ,  .  that  our  minds 
are  made  up  of  certain  states,  for  some  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious and  for  some  not  conscious,"^* 

But,  after  all,  this  issue  is  one  of  fact  rather  than  of  theory. 
If  the  evidence  of  subconscious  mental  processes — of  processes 
going  on  in  the  organism  which  are  psychical  in  their  nature, 
but  of  which  the  personality  is  unaware — is  strong  enough  to 
be  convincing,  we  must  alter  our  notion  of  "mind"  to  make 
it  include  these  new  facts;  only  taking  care,  of  course,  that 
we  do  not  allow  ourselves  to  fall  into  real  contradition.  But 
when  the  subconscious  is  thought  of  from  the  ultra-marginal 
point  of  view,  and  defended  as  we  have  done  from  the  be- 
ginning, this  first  objection  loses  weight.  For,  according  to 
the  ultra-marginal  view,  "subconscious"  does  not  mean  "not 
conscious  in  any  sense  of  that  word,"  but  merely  "outside  the 
margin  of  personal  consciousness."  The  concept  is  not  op- 
posed to  that  of  "consciousness,"  as  a  general  term  for  mental 
activity,  but  to  that  of  "personal  consciousness" — of  aware- 
ness by  the  personality,  whatever  philosophers  may  define  that 
to  be.  In  order  to  avoid  all  ambiguity,  however,  I  prefer  for 
the  present,  at  least,^^  to  restrict  the  term  "consciousness"  to 
"personal  consciousness,"  and  to  use  "mind"  or  "mental  con- 
tent" in  the  broader  sense  (v.,  footnote  at  end  of  section  104). 
The  expression  'subconscious  mental  facts,"  then,  is  self-con- 
tradictory only  if  we  arbitrarily  and  before  examining  the 
evidence  identify  "mind"  and  "personal  consciousness,"  and 
then  refuse  to  alter  our  ideas  in  the  face  of  disturbing  facts. 

23  Ibid.,  p.  44. 

^* Abnormal  Psychology,  p.  10.  Just  above  this  quotation,  the  author 
has  naively  classed  those  who  regard  "unconscious  mental  facts"  as  a  "con- 
tradiction in  terms"  among  the  psychologists  "who  have  not  had  experience 
in  investigating  abnormal  mental  phenomena" !  This  is  as  bad  as  Miinster- 
berg's  brief  condemnation  of  the  whole  notion  of  the  subconscious  in 
three  words ! 

25  But  V.  also  sect.  120,  where  another  terminology  is  suggested  for 
final  adoption. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  211 

112.   (2)  The  hypothesis  of  subconscious  ideas  is  futile. 

This  objection  follows  from  and  is  inextricably  bound  up 
with  Miinsterberg's  views  of  psychical  causation  and  his  criti- 
cism of  the  independence  theory  (89  (3)).  He  maintains,  it 
will  be  remembered,  that  mental  facts,  being  purely  transitory 
and  discontinuous,  have  no  causal  connection,  but  only  a  tele- 
ological  one.  But,  he  adds,  if  mental  facts  qiui  mental  have 
no  causal  connection,  it  would  be  useless  to  try  to  fill  up  the 
gaps  in  the  series  of  conscious  ideas  by  the  introduction  of 
purely  hypothetical  jt^&conscious  ideas.^^  Or,  to  put  it  in  an- 
other way:  mental  facts  are,  by  their  very  nature  as  mental, 
discontinuous — i.e.,  lack  causal  connection;  conscious  facts, 
then,  being  mental,  lack  causal  cormection;  therefore,  even  if 
we  concede  that  jwtconscious  mental  facts  are  possible,  they, 
too  would  lack  causal  connection — not  because  they  are  sub- 
conscious, but  because  they  are  mental,  and  nothing  mental 
has  causal  connection.  Hence,  the  postulation  of  subconscious 
mental  causes  would  be  futile  and  fruitless. 

By  parity  of  reasoning,  however,  if  we  accept  the  principle 
of  independent  psychical  causation  on  general  grounds,  as  we 
have  decided  to  do,  then  acceptance  of  the  subconscious  neces- 
sarily follows.  H  we  find  it  possible  to  admit  "causal  connec- 
tion" between  conscious  processes  (conscious  causes),  then  we 
need  have  no  hesitation  in  admitting  it  between  subconscious 
processes,  or  between  conscious  and  subconscious  processes 
(j«6conscious  causes).  For  advocates  of  independent  psychi- 
cal causation,  then,  the  hypothesis  of  subconscious  ideas  is  not 
futile,  but  actually  necessary. 

113-  (3)  The  concept  of  the  subconscious  is  gratuitous,  and 
so  unnecessary,  since  all  the  phenomena  may  be  sufficiently  ex- 
plained without  it.  For  the  purpose  of  such  explanation, 
Miinsterberg  in  effect  classifies  the  phenomena  in  three  groups, 
which,  to  distinguish  this  classification  from  our  earlier  one 
(101-103),  I  shall  designate  by  letters: 

''^Op.  cit.,  pp.   138  f. 


212         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

A.  Coconscious  processes — active  and  intelligent  processes, 
which  are,  however,  dissociated  from  the  personality. 

B.  ''Mental,  but  not  subconscious,"  processes — mental  con- 
tents which  are  outside  the  field  of  attention,  but  inside  the 
field  of  consciousness. 

C.  "Not  mental,  but  physiological,"  processes — phenomena 
which  may  be  explained  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration. 

The  phenomena  of  Group  A  have  already  received  sufficient 
attention  from  us,  and  we  have  treated  the  "coconscious"  as  a 
species  of  the  broader  genus  "subconscious."  The  theory  of 
unconscious  cerebration,  adduced  in  explanation  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  Group  C,  will  occupy  our  thought  in  the  next  suc- 
ceeding division  of  this  chapter.  Further  consideration  must 
be  given  at  this  point,  however,  to  the  phenomena  of  Group  B. 

"There  are,"  says  Miinsterberg,  "plenty  of  mental  experi- 
ences which  we  do  not  notice,  or  which  we  do  not  recognize. 
Yet  if  we  do  find  later  that  they  must  have  influenced  our 
mind,  we  are  easily  inclined  to  refer  them  to  subconscious  ac- 
tivity. But  it  is  evident  that  to  be  content  of  consciousness 
means  not  at  all  necessarily  to  be  object  of  attention  or  ob- 
ject of  recognition.  Awareness  does  not  involve  interest  [i.e., 
'consciousness'  includes  more  than  'attention' — viz.,  the 
'subattentive  margin'].  If  I  hear  a  musical  sound,  I  may  not 
recognize  at  all  the  overtones  which  are  contained  in  it.  As 
soon  as  I  take  resonators  and  by  them  reenforce  the  loudness 
of  those  tones,  they  become  vivid  for  me  and  I  can  now  notice 
them  well  even  when  the  resonators  are  removed.  I  surely 
was  aware  of  them^ — that  is,  had  them  in  consciousness — all 
the  time,  but  there  were  no  contrast  feelings  and  no  associa- 
tions in  consciousness  which  gave  them  sufficient  clearness  to 
attract  attention."^''  Again,  in  walking  along  the  street  I  may 
suddenly  think  of  some  person,  and  later  discover  that  I  had 
actually,  a  few  moments  before  the  thought  "came  into  my 
mind,"  passed  him  without  noticing  or  recognizing  him. 

27  op.  cit.,  pp.  158  f. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  213 

Now  it  is  evident  that  what  impels  Miinsterberg  to  call  such 
experiences  as  these  "mental  indeed,  but  not  subconscious,"  is 
the  fact  that  he  rejects  the  distinction  we  have  made  between 
the  "subconscious"  and  the  "subattentive"  (108).  These  ex- 
periences, he  avers,  are  outside  the  field  of  attention  it  is  true ; 
but  if  they  are  mental  at  all,  as  they  certainly  must  be,  and  if 
the  mental  and  the  conscious  are  identical,  as  Miinsterberg  all 
along  presupposes  and  insists,  then  they  must  lie  within  the 
field  of  consciousness.  But  to  refuse  to  call  these  phenomena 
subconscious  is  merely  a  question  of  terms,  and  reduces  back 
to  the  question  as  to  whether  two  subdivisions  of  the  field  of 
mentality  are  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  facts,  or  whether 
a  threefold  division  is  necessary.  Munsterberg  identifies 
"mind"  and  "consciousness,"  dividing  the  field  into  an  (atten- 
tive) centre  and  a  (subattentive)  margin,  and  including  in 
the  latter  what  we  have  called  "subconscious":  advocates  of 
the  subconscious,  in  the  other  hand,  distinguish  "mind"  from 
"consciousness,"  dividing  the  total  field  of  mental  content  into 
three  concentric  regions,  and  distinguishing  the  subconscious 
from  the  subattentive.  The  justification  for  the  latter  distinc- 
tion, which  Miinsterberg  rejects,  lies  in  the  fact  that  investi- 
gation seems  to  show  that  there  is  a  real  difference  between 
being  subattentively  aware  of  a  certain  fact,  and  being  sub- 
conscious of  it. 

For  example,  when  attending  an  orchestral  concert,  I  am 
conscious  of  the  total  volume  of  sound,  of  the  lights  and  the 
appearances  of  the  players  and  the  portions  of  the  audience 
within  my  field  of  vision,  perhaps  of  the  hardness  of  the  seat 
on  which  I  am  sitting  and  the  closeness  of  the  atmosphere; 
though  very  likely  my  attention  is  concentrated  upon  the  tones 
produced  by  whichever  may  be  the  dominating  instruments  of 
the  moment — violins,  oboe,  kettledrums,  or  what  not — and  all 
the  rest  of  the  content  of  my  consciousness  is  in  the  subatten- 
tive region.  But  over  and  above  all  this  there  will  be  a  vast 
number  of  phenomena  going  on  of  which  I  am  totally  "un- 
conscious" so  far  as  "/"  (my  personality)  am  concerned,  and 


214         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

yet  of  which  I  may  easily  become  conscious  under  the  proper 
conditions — the  portion  of  the  audience  outside  my  momentary 
field  of  vision,  of  which  I  may  at  any  time  think,  even  if  I  do 
not  look  at  them;  the  feeling  of  my  clothing,  the  pressure  of 
my  feet  on  the  floor,  a  pain  in  my  left  forefinger;  ideas  of 
music  in  general,  of  the  composer  of  the  symphony  being 
played,  of  philosophy,  or  of  domestic  events,  etc.  So  long  as 
I  am  not  conscious  of  these  things,  and  yet  may  become  con- 
scious of  them  as  soon  as  the  required  conditions  arise,  they 
have  a  claim  to  be  called  in  some  sense  "mine" ;  and  it  is  to 
such  phenomena  as  these  that  the  terms  "subconscious,"  "sub- 
liminal," and  "ultra-marginal"  are  applicable. 

In  the  case  of  a  single  musical  sound,  of  which  Miinsterberg 
writes,^^  I  should  deny  what  he  implicitly,  but  probably  unin- 
tentionally, asserts — viz.,  that  we  are  attentively  conscious  of 
the  fundamental  tone  only,  and  siibattentively  of  the  overtones. 
Rather,  are  we  attentively  conscious  of  the  entire  "clang"^®  as 
a  unit,  and  only  the  trained  musician  is  even  suhattentively 
conscious  of  the  various  partial  tones  as  such,  the  ordinary 
hearer  who  knows  nothing  of  the  science  of  music  being  but 
subconscious  of  them. 

So,  in  the  instance  of  unconsciously  passing  a  friend  on  the 
street,  I  may  at  the  time  have  been  vividly  aware  of  some  other 
person  who  was  momentarily  obstructing  my  passage,  and 
suhattentively  conscious  of  the  store  windows  along  the  side 
of  the  walk ;  and  immediately  afterward  the  order  of  vividness 
may  have  been  reversed,  the  store  windows  and  their  contents 
becoming  focal  and  the  passers-by  marginal,  the  thought  of 
my  friend  bring  entirely  "beyond  the  margin"  until  a  still  later 
time.  And  yet  the  fact  that  I  did  pass  him,  and  that  the  light 
reflected  from  him  stimulated  my  optic  nerve  even  if  it  did  not 
penetrate  my  consciousness,  requires  me  to  admit  that  I  was 
subconscious  of  him  all  along. 

28  Loc.  cit. 

29  The  technical  term  for  the  complete  musical  tone,  which  the  musician 
analyzes  into  fundamental  and  overtones. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  215 

The  distinction  between  the  subattentive  and  the  subcon- 
scious which  Miinsterberg  ignores  should,  therefore,  I  think, 
be  recognized;  and  if  so,  the  phenomena  which  our  critic  ex- 
plains as  "mental  but  not  subconscious"  (Group  B)  must — 
some  of  them,  at  least — be  classified  as  ultra-marginal. 

3.  The  Theory  of  Unconscious  Cerebration. 

114.  The  Cerebral  Explanation  of  the  So-called  Subcon- 
scious Phenomena  is  a  natural  application  of  the  general  cere- 
bral theory  of  psychical  causation  to  the  particular  facts  now 
under  investigation.  The  theory  and  the  term  "unconscious 
cerebration"  we  owe  primarily  to  Wm.  B.  Carpenter.^"  Ad- 
vocates of  this  theory  explain  all  phenomena  which  are  neither 
coconscious  (Group  A)  nor  subattentive  in  the  sense  of  which 
we  have  just  been  speaking  (Group  B) — namely,  those  of 
Miinsterberg's  Group  C — as  expressions  of  brain  activities,  en- 
tirely unaccompanied  by  mental  activity  (cerebration,  rather 
than  mentation). 

The  great  test  of  theories  of  the  subconscious  is  the  problem 
of  memory.  What  are  the  conditions  that  make  it  possible  to 
reproduce  earlier  sensory  experiences  in  terms  of  memory- 
images?  The  usual  explanation  is  that  every  sensory  experi- 
ence leaves  some  modification  in  the  neurones  of  the  brain — 
"physiological  dispositions,"  as  they  are  sometimes  called ;  and 
that  memory  in  its  reproductive  stage  (101(2))  is  the  con- 
scious accompaniment  of  renewed  activities  in  those  same 
neurones.  This  is  the  explanation  adopted  by  those  who  de- 
fend cerebral  theories  of  psychical  causation."  Advocates  of 
the  subconscious,  on  the  other  hand,  assert  the  existence  of 
psychical  dispositions  also  in  the  subconscious  region  itself,  as 
the  source  of  the  revived  memory-image,  and  as  the  psychical 
correlates  of  the  dispositions  in  the  brain  cells.  This  is  in 
conformity    with    the    general    "principle    of    independence" 

^'^  Principles  of  Mental  Physiology  (1874). 
"»  E.g.,  Munsterberg — Psychotherapy,  p.  138. 


2i6         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

(86(2)),  which  demands  a  psychical  cause  for  all  mental 
processes. 

To  the  theory  of  psychical  dispositions,  Miinsterberg  offers 
what  can  only  be  called  an  absurd  objection,  and  one  which 
it  is  difficult  to  take  seriously.  "If  we  really  needed  a  mental 
disposition  for  each  memory  picture,  in  addition  to  the  physio- 
logical disposition  of  the  brain  cells,"  he  asks,  "can  we  over- 
look that  exactly  the  same  thing  would  then  be  necessary  for 
every  perception  also?  The  outer  impression  produces,  per- 
haps through  eye  or  ear  or  skin,  an  excitement  of  the  brain 
cells,  and  this  excitement  is  accompanied  by  a  sensation;  and 
no  one  fancies  that  the  appearance  of  this  sensation  is  de- 
pendent upon  a  special  disposition  for  it  on  the  mental  side."^^ 
"I  hear  the  bells  ringing.  The  sounds  enter  my  consciousness. 
Must  I  suppose  that  I  have  a  subconscious  disposition  for  these 
bell  sounds,  and  even  for  this  new  melody  of  the  bells  which 
I  have  never  heard  before?  Of  course,  then,  I  must  have  such 
a  disposition  for  everything  on  earth  which  can  enter  into  the 
sphere  of  my  senses.  I  must  have  a  disposition  for  the  smell 
of  the  chemical  substance  which  some  chemist  may  produce 
tomorrow  in  his  laboratory.  All  those  dispositions  resulting 
from  my  little  personal  experiences,  which  are  postulated  by 
advocates  of  the  subconscious  in  explanation  of  memory,  are, 
then,  insignificant  compared  with  the  trillions  for  all  which 
may  possibly  become  the  object  of  my  sense-perception."" 

It  is  indeed  difficult  to  take  this  criticism  seriously.  Mem- 
ory-images by  their  very  nature  have  psychical  antecedents: 
it  never  occurs  to  us  to  call  an  experience  memory  unless  it  is 
a  reproduction  of  some  previous  conscious  experience,  and  the 
theory  of  psychical  dispositions  is  just  an  attempt  to  tide  over 
the  interval  between  the  original  and  reproduced  experiences 
by  means  of  psychological  rather  than  physiological  concepts. 
Perception,  on  the  contrary, — at  least,  on  its  sensory  side — is 
an  original  primary  fact  of  mental  life,  having  no  psychical 

32  op.  cit.,  pp.  139  f.     Italics  mine. 

83  Psychology  General  and  Applied,  pp.  zj  f . 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     217 

antecedents  whatever  (94(2)).  Only  the  doctrine  of  uni- 
versal psychophysical  parallelism  (94(3))  calls  for  such  an 
explanation  of  perception  as  that  which  Miinsterberg  criti- 
cizes; and  this  is  a  metaphysical,  not  a  scientific,  doctrine. 

115.  Criticism  of  the  Theory  of  Unconscious  Cerebration. — 
Three  criticisms  of  the  cerebral  explanation  of  the  so-called 
subconscious  phenomena  may  be  offered — 

(i)  The  cerebral  theory  of  memory,  as  outlined  above,  ap- 
plies only  to  retention  and  recall,  and  fails  to  explain  recogni- 
tion. This  difficulty  has  already  been  discussed  at  length,  and 
need  hardly  delay  us  again  now." 

(2)  The  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  fails  to  account 
for  the  intelligent  character  of  many  of  those  phenomena  in 
which  no  definite  "coconscious"  activity  or  "dissociation"  is 
observable. 

Though  accepting  the  concept  of  the  coconscious,  Miinster- 
berg inclines  to  regard  the  phenomena  of  our  Group  HI  as 
explicable  physiologically  as  merely  highly  complex  reflex 
activity,  connected  "by  continuous  transitions"  with  the  "sim- 
plest automatic  reactions."  "In  the  simple  cases,"  he  says,  "of 
course  no  one  doubts  that  a  purely  physiological  basis  is  in- 
volved. The  decapitated  frog  rubs  its  skin  where  it  is  touched 
with  a  drop  of  muriatic  acid  in  a  way  which  is  ordinarily  re- 
ferred to  the  trained  apparatus  of  his  spinal  cord,  as  no  brain 
is  left,  and  the  usefulness  of  the  action  and  its  adjustment  is 
very  well  understood  as  the  result  of  the  connecting  paths  in 
the  nervous  system.  From  such  simple  adjustments  of  reac- 
tions of  the  spinal  cord,  we  come  step  by  step  to  the  more 
complex  activities  of  the  subcortical  brain  centres,  and  finally 
to  those  which  are  evidently  only  short-cuts  of  the  higher  brain 
processes."''  All  these,  however,  even  the  most  complex,  and 
those  which  involve  reasoning,  he  regards  as  perfectly  ex- 
plicable in  physiological  terms. 

It  is  always  difficult  to  know  where  to  draw  the  line  between 

**V.,  sect.  101(2),  and  references. 
"  Psychotherapy,  p.  143. 


2i8         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  which  docs  and  that  which  docs  not  involve  rational  in- 
telligence, but  that  the  line  must  be  drawn  somewhere  is  in- 
dubitable. And  the  phenomena  referred  to  under  Group  III 
(103)  seem  to  be  of  the  type  which  can  only  be  accounted  for 
on  the  ground  of  rational  intelligence — and  if  not  conscious, 
then  subconscious,  intelligence.  Even,  then,  if  unconscious 
cerebration  will  account  for  the  phenomena  of  Groups  I  and 
II,  it  fails  entirely  to  account  for  those  of  Group  III. 

(3)  Our  final  objection,  however,  is  one  which  applies  to 
the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  in  its  broadest  signifi- 
cance, and  is  the  natural  consequence  of  our  general  prin- 
ciples of  independence  and  of  independent  psychical  causation. 
This  objection  is  that  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration 
confuses  the  psychical  with  the  physiological.  However 
plausible  this  theory  may  be  in  itself,  if  we  have  no  preposses- 
sions as  to  the  independence  of  psychology  from  physiology, 
nevertheless,  if  we  are  to  have,  in  accordance  with  our  postu- 
lates, a  purely  psychical  explanation  of  all  psychical  phe- 
nomena, the  concept  of  the  subconscious  is  a  necessary  one. 
Miinsterberg,  of  course,  rejects  the  whole  idea  of  an  indepen- 
dent causal  psychology,  and  so  does  not  need  (except,  as  I 
should  insist,  in  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  Group  III) 
the  concept  of  the  subconscious :  we,  on  the  contrary,  who  are 
attempting  to  lay  the  foundations  of  an  independent  causal 
psychology,  find  the  postulation  of  that  concept  essential. 

In  conclusion,  my  criticism  of  the  theory  of  unconscious 
cerebration  and  defence  of  that  of  subconscious  mentation 
may  be  summed  up  in  two  propositions :  ( i )  The  phenomena 
of  Group  III  are  by  their  very  nature  inexplicable  in  purely 
physiological  terms,  and  therefore  call  for  an  explanation  in 
terms  of  subconscious  mentation — this  is  the  empirical  defence 
of  the  principle  of  subconscious  mentation.  (2)  The  postu- 
late of  independent  psychical  causation  forbids  reference  of 
any  psychical  phenomenon  to  a  cerebral  cause,  and  demands  its 
explanation  in  purely  psychical  terms — this  is  the  theoretical 
defence  of  the  principle  of  subconscious  mentation.    In  view  of 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  219 

this  latter  basis  for  our  doctrine,  the  chief  purpose  of  this  and 
the  preceding  chapter  has  up  to  this  point  been  not  so  much  to 
prove  empirically  that  subconscious  mentation  goes  on,  as  to 
show  that  the  concept  of  the  subconscious  thus  called  for  on 
theoretical  grounds  is  reasonable;  the  empirical  proof  being  a 
confirmation  of  the  postulate,  rather  than  an  independent 
demonstration. 

116.  Consciousness  and  Content. — One  paragraph  in  Miin- 
sterberg's  chapter  in  the  Psychotherapy  calls  for  special  com- 
ment at  this  point,  although  its  subject-matter  is  hardly  perti- 
nent to  that  of  the  chapter  as  a  whole.  I  refer  to  that  para- 
graph in  which  the  author  distinguishes  between  consciousness 
and  content.'® 

"Consciousness,"  he  writes,  "is  an  inactive  spectator  [of] 
the  procession  of  its  contents."  "Consciousness  itself  cannot 
change  anything  in  the  content,  nor  can  it  connect  the  contents. 
No  other  function  is  left  to  [it]  but  merely  that  of  awareness." 

The  only  criticism  I  should  care  to  make  of  this  description 
would  be  directed  against  the  use  of  the  term  "inactive."  By 
its  very  nature,  even  when  merely  a  "spectator"  (as  in  per- 
ception or  reproductive  imagery),  consciousness  is  always  ac- 
tive: there  is  no  such  thing  possible  as  a  purely  passive  state 
of  consciousness.  But  if  the  word  "inefficient"  is  substituted 
for  "inactive,"  this  objection  is  compensated.  Consciousness 
is  indeed  an  inefficient  spectator  of  the  procession  of  its  con- 
tents, in  the  sense  that  consciousness  is  never  a  cause  producing 
its  effects.  One  content  may  be  the  cause  of  another,  and  all 
may  be  the  expressions  of  the  metaphysical  self,  but  conscious- 
ness, as  psychologists  study  it,  is  never  a  cause  but  an  effect- 
less spectator  of  these  contents. 

Dr.  Sidis,  however,  would  not  be  satisfied  with  this  single 
criticism.  He  thinks  that  Miinsterberg  is  in  this  paragraph 
reviving  the  old  substance  view  of  consciousness.  "Conscious- 
ness," he  says,  "is  regarded  in  the  light  of  a  substance  which 
contains  the  mental  content  somewhat  after  the  fashion  of  a 

••Paragraph  beginning  on  page  134. 


220         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

material  substance  underlying  physical  qualities."^^  But  this, 
surely,  is  a  false  interpretation.  For  Miinsterberg,  conscious- 
ness is  not  in  any  sense  a  substance,  but  rather  a  subject,  as  the 
very  expression  "spectator  of  the  contents"  implies.  This 
phase  of  his  doctrine  follows  naturally  from  his  general  con- 
ception of  scientific  psychology,  according  to  which  the  "con- 
sciousness" that  psychologists  study  and  analyze  is  an  arti- 
ficial construction,  not  the  "real  self" — an  objective  treatment 
of  what  is  in  its  true  nature  subjective.  Sidis,  indeed,  criti-. 
cizes  this  latter  view  also,^*  but  we  cannot  return  to  this  point 
now. 
4.  Recent  Developments  in  the  Theory  of  the  Subconscious. 

117.  Freud  and  Prince. — Two  contemporary  writers  have 
propounded  theories  which  involve  the  division  of  the  subcon- 
scious into  regions,  somewhat  after  the  fashion  of  the  usual 
division  of  the  field  of  consciousness  into  focus  and  margin. 
These  psychologists  are  Drs.  Sigmund  Freud  of  Vienna,  and 
Morton  Prince  of  Boston.  The  divisions  they  propose  are 
quite  different,  and  each  must  occupy  some  of  our  attention. 

118.  Freud's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious. — Freud  divides 
the  subconscious  into  two  "levels,"  as  we  may  call  them — {i) 
an  upper  level  designated  the  "foreconscious"  (sometimes 
translated  "preconscious"),  and  (2)  a  lower  level  known  as 
the  "unconscious."  The  chief  distinction  between  them  is 
this:  the  Foreconscious  is  made  up  of  contents  which  may 
become  conscious  at  any  time  on  attaining  a  certain  degree  of 
intensity,  whereas  the  Unconscious  is  made  up  of  contents 
which  cannot  enter  into  consciousness  except  by  overcoming 
a  certain  "resistance."  Foreconscious  contents  are  subject  to 
voluntary  recall :  unconscious  contents  can  be  recalled  only  by 
the  use  of  certain  artificial  devices  known  as  "psychoanalytic." 
The  Foreconscious  is  the  "ultra-marginal" :  the  Unconscious 
is  a  deeper  stratum  of  the  "psyche"  (i.e.,  the  total  mental  con- 

37  Foundations,  p.  194. 

28  Op.  cit.,  pp.  195  f  •     See  also  our  sect.  124. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


221 


tent),  whose  contents  can  rise  into  consciousness  only  by  pass- 
ing first  through  the  foreconscious  level,  the  latter  acting  as 
a  "screen"  between  Conscious  and  Unconscious/® 

The  Unconscious,  according  to  Freud,  is  the  "real  self," 
whose  inner  nature  is  unknown  to  us,  and  is  only  imperfectly 
revealed  to  us  in  consciousness.  It  is  made  up,  he  teaches,  of 
memories,  thoughts,  desires,  etc.,  which  have  been  "repressed" 
because  they  are  for  one  reason  or  another  painful  to  con- 
sciousness, or  contrary  to  the  higher  moral  nature;  the  result 
being  that  a  certain  "resistance"  is  set  up  against  their  recall 
into  consciousness,  which  can  be  overcome  only  by  special 
methods.  This  particular  hypothesis  with  regard  to  the  nature 
and  content  of  the  Unconscious  Freud  infers  from  the 
phenomena  of  hysteria,  hypnosis,  dreams,  etc.,  which  have 
long  occupied  his  attention:  it  is,  therefore,  an  extremely  im- 
portant hypothesis  for  abnormal  psychology,  but  its  details  are 
of  no  interest  to  us  in  our  present  purely  theoretical  investiga- 
tion. Our  sole  immediate  concern  is  with  the  general  division 
of  the  field  of  the  subconscious  which  Freud  has  suggested. 
This  may  be  symbolized  by  the  following  modification  of  our 
earlier  "Reservoir  Figure"  (109) — 


Threshold  of  Consciousness 


Threshold  of  the  Foreconscious—^ 
("Resistance") 


Conscious 


Foreconscious 


Unconscious 


Subconscious 


J 


(The  ease  with  which  foreconscious  contents  can  rise  into  conscious- 
ness is  indicated  by  the  dotted  line  representing  the  threshold  of  con- 
sciousness, and  the  difficulty  with  which  unconscious  contents  become 
foreconscious  is  indicated  by  the  solid  line  representing  the  threshold  of 
the  foreconscious.) 

119.  Prince's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious. — Reference  has 
already  been  made  (104)  to  Prince's  division  of  the  subcon- 
scious into  the  Coconscious  and  the  Unconscious.  His  use  of 
the  latter  term,  however,  is  quite  different  from  that  of  Freud 


«»  V.  especially,  The  Interpretation  of  Dreams,  pp.  429, 


222         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

(120).  According  to  Prince,  the  Coconscious  is  made  up  of 
active,  intelligent  processes,  coexisting  with,  but  dissociated 
from,  the  personality;  the  Unconscious  is  composed  of  traces 
of  previous  conscious  processes  in  the  neurones  of  the  brain^° 
The  Coconscious,  therefore,  is  a  psychological  concept,  the 
Unconscious  a  physiological  one,  in  Prince's  system;  this, 
consequently,  being  a  kind  of  compromise  between  the  two 
usual  theories — that  of  Subconscious  Mentation  and  that  of 
Unconscious  Cerebration. 

The  distinctive  feature  of  Prince's  physiological  conception 
of  the  Unconscious  is  his  theory  of  neurograms.  Every  men- 
tal experience,  as  all  physiological  psychologists  admit  (114), 
leaves  traces  or  residua  ("dispositions")  in  the  neurones  of 
the  brain.  But  as  every  such  experience  involves,  not  merely 
a  single  neurone,  but  a  number  of  distinct  but  related  neurones, 
this  "brain  record"  is  a  complex  and  highly  organized  one  in 
each  case — a  "brain  pattern."  These  organized  residua  or 
brain  patterns,  Prince  calls  Neurograms^  and  these  neuro- 
grams have  the  same  relation  to  ideas  that  a  phonogram 
(phonograph  record)  has  to  the  voice  which  produces  and  is 
produced  by  it."  The  Unconscious  as  a  whole,  then,  is  "the 
great  storehouse  of  neurograms,  which  are  the  physiological 
records  of  our  mental  lives."*^ 

120.-  Comparison  and  Suggested  Modification  of  Freud's 
and  Prince's  Theories. — The  chief  differences  between  Freud's 
and  Prince's  theories  of  the  Unconscious  are  (i)  that  Freud's 
conception  is  a  psychological  one  and  Prince's  conception  a 
physiological  one,  and  (2)  that  Prince's  doctrine  does  not  in- 
volve the  Freudian  concept  of  "resistance."*^  From  our  "in- 
dependent" point  of  view,  therefore,  Freud's  general  view  is 
preferable. 

*"  V.  especially,  The  Unconscious,  pp.  x,  249-254. 
*^  Op.  cit.,  p.  131. 
*2  Ibid.,  p.  149. 

■*3  It  does  not,  however,  necessarily  exclude  that  concept.  V.  op.  cit., 
pp.  147  f. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY     223 

But  the  difference  between  Freud  and  Prince  in  their  gen- 
eral theory  of  the  Subconscious  is  more  fundamental  than 
this,  in  that  their  divisions  of  the  subconscious  field  are  based 
on  entirely  different  principles.  This  may  be  best  stated  in 
figurative  language  by  saying  that  Freud's  division  is  a  hori- 
zontal one,  into  levels;  and  Prince's  a  vertical  one,  into  kinds. 
Because  of  the  fact  that  the  two  classifications  are  based  on 
different  "principia  divisionis,"  the  divisions  themselves  are  en- 
tirely compatible  with  each  other,  and  we  shall  find  that  each 
has  a  value  for  our  complete  system.  Let  me  further  elucidate 
these  points,  and  in  so  doing  suggest  some  modifications  in 
the  usual  terminology  and  classification  which  will  have,  I 
think,  the  value  of  greater  simplicity  and  comprehensiveness. 

As  to  Freud,  if  we  disregard,  as  we  have  a  right  to  do,  his 
specific  theories  as  to  the  Unconscious  and  "resistance,"  we 
have  left  three  levels  of  psychical  existence — Conscious,  Fore- 
conscious,  and  Unconscious — distinguished  fundamentally  as 
regards  the  relative  degree  of  intensity  of  the  various  contents. 
The  term  ( i )  Conscious  may  then  be  applied  to  any  active  psy- 
chical state,  whether  actually  part  of  the  personal  stream,  as  is 
normally  the  case,  or  dissociated  from  it  {i.e.,  "coconscious"  v. 
inf.).  The  term  (2)  Subconscious  may  be  applied  to  all  in- 
active (dormant  or  potential)  states — those  below  the  "thres- 
hold of  consciousness."  The  latter  would  again  be  divisible 
into  (a)  the  Foreconscious — the  aggregate  of  those  contents 
which  may  at  any  time  rise  into  consciousness  on  attaining  the 
requisite  degree  of  intensity;  and  (b)  the  Uttconscious — the 
aggregate  of  all  contents  which  cannot  rise  into  consciousness 
without  first  passing  through  the  Foreconscious,  and  only 
under  special  conditions  whose  exact  nature  is  not  yet  under- 
stood. 

Prince's  concept  of  the  Coconscious,  however,  belongs  to  an 
entirely  different  category  from  the  Foreconscious  and  the 
Unconscious,  and  always  indicates  an  abnormal,  if  not  neces- 
sarily a  pathological,  condition  of  mind.  The  term  refers  to 
any  active  (i.e.,  conscious,  as  this  term  is  defined  in  the  pre- 


224 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 


ceding  paragraph)  psychical  states  which  are  dissociated  from 
the  personaHty.**  The  term  "conscious,"  in  this  usage,  would 
apply  equally  to  the  personally  conscious  (to  which  we  have 
heretofore  restricted  it)  and  to  coconscious  states;  the  latter 
becoming,  therefore,  a  subdivision  of  "conscious"  rather  than 
of  "subconscious."  Thus  the  division  into  the  personally  con- 
scious and  the  coconscious  is  a  ''vertical"  division  of  mind, 
quite  distinct  from  and  additional  to  the  "horizontal"  division 
into  "levels." 

I  append  several  tables  and  diagrams  to  illustrate  different 
aspects  of  our  doctrine  as  elucidated  in  this  section. 

Table  X 

Classification  of  Psychical  States 

1.  Conscious  (any  active  psychical  state). 

a.  Personally  Conscious. 

b.  Coconscious  (active  dissociated  state). 

2.  Subconscious  (all  inactive  psychical  states:  potentially  conscious). 

a.  Foreconscious  (can  easily  be  recalled). 

b.  Unconscious  (cannot  easily  be  recalled:  inactive  dissociated  states). 


Continuous 

Dissociated 

Conscious   (active) 
Subconscious    (inactive) 

Personal 
Foreconscious 

Coconscious 
Unconscious 

Personal 


Foreconscious 


o 
U 


Unconscious 


**  The  Unconscious  is,  of  course,  by  its  very  nature,  always  dissociated. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Personality  and  Its  States 
Under  Normal  Conditions 


225 


^^ccyi^^C4fu^ 


Under  Dissociation 


vocffn^Kcotii 


(The  upper  figure  symbolizes  in  greatly  simplified  form  a  fully  syn- 
thetized  mind,  the  lower  figure  a  case  of  dissociation.  Ci,  2,  3,  and 
4  indicate  four  contents — Ci  a  content  of  personal  consciousness ;  C2  a 
foreconscious  content;  and  C3  and  C4,  in  the  upper  figure,  two  un- 
conscious contents.  The  last  of  these,  C4,  is  represented  in  the  lower 
figure  as  manifesting  itself  coconsciously. 

5.  Conclusions. 

121.  Principles  of  Psychological  Explanation. — In  order  to 
bring  to  a  close  our  long  discussion  of  the  subconscious,  and 
therewith  our  entire  program,  it  is  necessary  to  recall  at  this 
point  what  was  said  in  a  former  chapter  concerning  the  two 
kinds  of  scientific  explanation  which  may  be  employed  by  the 


226         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

psychologist  in  explanation  of  his  phenomena  (54,  55) — a 
phenomenal  explanation  in  terms  of  other  phenomena,  and  a 
conceptual  explanation  in  terms  of  concepts  specially  con- 
structed for  the  purpose.  Also  we  must  renew  our  acquain- 
tance at  this  time  with  our  earlier  Principle  of  Psychological 
and  Physiological  Independence,*^  according  to  which  psy- 
chologists are  precluded  from  introducing  physiological  con- 
cepts into  their  explanations  of  psychological  phenomena.*® 
The  subconscious  itself,  of  course,  was  postulated  by  us  origi- 
nally to  save  this  principle  and  to  make  independent  psychical 
causation  possible  (95),  and  these  two  last  chapters  of  our 
book  are  devoted  to  a  defence  and  explication  of  this  concept. 

122.  The  Explanation  of  Memory. — As  remarked  before 
(114),  "the  great  test  of  theories  of  the  subconscious  is  the 
problem  of  memory."  The  explanation  in  terms  of  uncon- 
scious cerebration  has  been  rejected  because  it  violates  the 
principle  of  independence,  even  if  no  other  argument  were 
valid  against  it.  Let  us  see  how  advocates  of  the  subconscious 
would  explain  the  phenomenon. 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  recognized  that  "the  phenome- 
non" referred  to  is  not  memory  as  a  process^  but  the  image 
which  we  call  the  "memory-image."  Memory  itself  is  a 
psychological  concept  "constructed  to  fill  up  the  gap  in  the 
phenomenal  psychic  series" — to  explain  the  recurrence  of  pre- 
vious experiences,  and  satisfy  the  demand  for  continuity  in 
the  interval,  without  abandoning  psychology  for  physiology.*^ 

All  I  experience  directly  or  observe,  for  example,  is  a  pic- 
ture in  my  mind  of  a  New  England  landscape,  or  a  scrap  of 
melody,  or  an  odor  of  roses  where  no  roses  are.  In  one  way 
or  another  I  discover  the  identity  of  this  imaged  scene  or 
melody  or  fragrance  with  some  actually  perceived  experience 
of  yesterday  or  last  summer — i.e.,  I  "recognize"  the  image  as 

*' Sect.  86(2),  and  note  to  that  section. 

*^  On  these  two  points,  v.  Hart's  chapter  in  Subconscious  Phenomena, 
pp.  1 18-123.  This  entire  chapter  is  probably  the  best  essay  on  the  sub- 
conscious that  has  ever  been  written. 

*'f  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  227 

a  "reproduction"  of  some  previous  experience  of  my  own,  and 
therewith  dub  it  a  "memory-image."  Why?  The  phenome- 
non is  the  image  as  a  content  of  my  mind  now,  plus  its  re- 
semblance to  the  perception  at  some  former  time :  "we  as- 
sume, in  order  to  satisfy  our  demand  for  continuity,  that  it  has 
in  some  way  existed  during  the  interval,  and  we  invent  the 
conception  of  memory  to  explain  this  continued  existence."*® 
But  the  image,  being  by  its  very  nature  transitory,  did  not 
exist  in  consciousness  in  the  interval:  it  must,  therefore,  if 
psychical  at  all,  as  the  principle  of  independence  demands,  have 
been  subconscious. 

This  "storehouse  theory  of  the  subconscious,"  as  it  is  some- 
times called  by  its  enemies,  is  often  criticized  on  the  ground 
that  as  mental  processes  are  by  their  very  nature  transitory, 
memories  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  psychical  existence  what- 
ever in  the  interval  between  perception  and  recall.  "Psychical 
processes,"  says  A.  H.  Pierce,  "are  evanescent  affairs  that 
cannot  under  any  circumstances  be  stored.  To  try  to  store  a 
psychical  process  would  be  like  trying  to  retain  the  flame  of  a 
candle  after  the  candle  itself  had  been  consumed.  All  that 
one  can  possibly  mean  by  such  storage  is  that  the  cerebral 
modifications  are  still  existent  as  latent  dispositions,  ready 
again  to  function  under  adequate  provocation.""  But  though 
this  is  true,  no  doubt,  of  conscious  phenomena,  it  does  not 
affect  the  validity  of  the  concept  of  the  subconscious,  which  is 
constructed  for  the  very  purpose  of  accounting  for  the  phe- 
nomenon of  the  "memory-image,"  among  other  equally  im- 
portant psychological  phenomena  as  discussed  above  (lOi- 
103). 

To  explain  the  phenomena  physiologically,  however,  as 
Prince  and  Miinstcrberg  and  Pierce  do  is  not  only  to  violate 
the  principle  of  independence,  but  is  to  make  no  advance 
whatever  toward  a  phenomenal  explanation,  since  "brain  pat- 
terns," "neurograms,"  and  "physiological  dispositions"  in  gen- 

"  Ibid. 

*"  Carman  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  p.  343. 


228         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

eral  are  as  conceptual  and  hypothetical  as  "psychical  disposi- 
tions" and  "latent  memories."^"  "Translating  memory  into 
the  physical  series  does  not  make  it  a  phenomenal  fact :  it  must 
inevitably  remain  a  conception.  And  if  memory  from  both 
points  of  view  is  merely  a  conception,  then  surely  if  we  are 
talking  of  the  recurrence  of  mental  phenomena,  it  is  a  psycho- 
logical conception."^^ 

123.  Explanation  of  the  Varieties  of  the  Subconscious: — By 
its  very  nature,  the  subconscious  can  never  become  an  object 
of  introspection,  for  as  soon  as  we  are  able  to  introspect  a  sub- 
conscious content  it  by  this  fact  becomes  conscious.  Rather 
is  the  subconscious  an  inference  from  the  observation  of  be- 
havior, just  as  is  our  knowledge  of  consciousness  in  other  per- 
sons. "We  have  actual  experience  only  of  our  own  conscious 
phenomena — we  deduce  the  conscious  phenomena  of  others" 
from  their  speech  and  actions ;  and  our  knowledge  of  the  sub- 
conscious in  ourselves  and  others  is  derived  in  the  same  way.**^ 
For  example,  when  an  automatist  enters  into  conscious  con- 
versation with  another  person,  and  at  the  same  time  writes 
automatically  the  solution  of  some  problem  whispered  into  his 
ear  by  a  third,  we  infer  intelligence  in  both  cases  equally. 

But  the  term  "subconscious"  has  been  used  by  various 
authors  to  denote  such  different  kinds  of  phenomena  that  no 
one  method  of  explanation  is  applicable  to  all  of  them.^'  In 
reviewing  in  our  minds  the  various  usages  and  different  varie- 
ties of  the  subconscious  as  we  have  been  considering  them,  we 
find  ourselves  coming  to  the  following  conclusions: 

^o  Sidis,  Foundations,  pp.  184,  190,  212. 

^1  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  124.  Italics  mine.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in 
Prince's  own  chapter  in  Subconscious  Phenomena  (p.  98),  he  admits  that 
with  regard  to  the  subconscious  he,  as  a  parallelist,  finds  "no  difficulty  in 
accepting  both  a  physiological  and  a  psychical  interpretation."  A  com- 
plete explanation  of  any  human  phenomenon  must,  of  course,  allow  for 
both  (34,  35),  but  the  two  principles  of  explanation  should  not  be  con- 
fused (86(2)). 

•52  Op.  cit.,  pp.  127  f. 

^8  Ibid.,  p.  140. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  229 

(i)  The  "ultra-marginal  view"  of  the  subconscious  is  ap- 
plicable only  to  what  we  have  come  to  call  the  Foreconscious. 

(2)  This  Foreconscious,  and  Prince's  Coconscious,  are 
phenomena,  as  truly  as  consciousness  itself  is  a  phenomenon. 
The  Foreconscious  is  a  phenomenon  just  as  is  the  other  side 
of  the  moon,  which  no  one  has  ever  observed,  but  which  is 
inevitably  inferred,  not  only  to  exist,  but  to  be  merely  a  con- 
tinuation of,  and  so  of  the  same  nature  with,  the  side  which 
can  be  directly  observed.  And  the  Coconscious  is  a  phenome- 
non for  the  same  reason  that  a  star  which  has  never  been  seen 
through  the  telescope,  but  has  impressed  itself  upon  the  photo- 
graphic plate,  is  a  phenomenon. 

(3)  The  Unconscious,  on  the  contrary,  is  not  a  phenomenon 
at  all,  but  a  concept  constructed  for  the  definite  purpose  of  ex- 
plaining phenomena  which  seem  to  be  proper  subject-matter 
for  the  psychologist,  and  yet  are  not  parts  of  the  conscious  or 
the  ultra-marginal  field. °*  We  know  nothing  of  its  nature, 
but  only  of  its  manifestations. 

This  concept  of  the  Unconscious  is  a  concept  of  "potential 
psychical  energy,"  analogous  to  that  of  "potential  physical 
energy"  with  which  modern  physics  has  made  us  so  familiar. 
It  is  as  valid  and  as  valuable  for  psychology  as  the  concept  of 
"potential  physical  energy"  is  for  physics  or  that  of  "potential 
brain-cell  energy"  for  physiology."  "We  thus  owe  to  Freud," 
says  Hart,  "the  first  consistent  attempt  to  construct  a  con- 
ceptual psychology":"  whatever  we  may  think  of  his  special 
psychopathological  theories,  we  cannot  take  from  him  the 
credit  of  laying  the  foundations  of  a  true  independent  science 
of  psychology.'^ 

^*Ihid.,  pp.  130  f. 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  119. 

5"  Ibid.,  p.  131. 

"  Jung  has  succeeded  in  overcoming  to  a  large  extent  the  onesidcdness 
of  Freud's  doctrine  of  the  "Hbido,"  or  the  energy  of  the  Unconscious,  and 
a  complete  treatment  of  the  subject  should  no  doubt  include  this  modifi- 
cation by  the  well-known  founder  of  the  "Zurich  School."  This  must  be 
left,  however,  for  some  future  time.  {V.  especially,  Jung's  Theory  of 
Psychoanalysis,  Chap.  Ill,  etc.) 


230         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

124.  Sidis's  Criticism  of  the  Doctrine  of  The  Unconscious. 
— Dr.  Sidis,  doughty  champion  of  the  subconscious  as  he  is, 
is  nevertheless  a  severe,  and  by  no  means  always  a  fair,  critic 
of  the  Freudian  psychology.  His  objections  are  three — the 
first  being  directed  against  the  general  principle  of  conceptual 
explanation,  the  others  against  the  concept  of  "unconscious 
ideas." 

(i)  The  principle  of  conceptual  explanation,  Sidis  regards 
as  fantastic — as  a  revival  of  the  Herbartian  form  of  associa- 
tionism  (12,  13),  in  which  mental  contents  (Herbart's  "con- 
cepts") are  treated  as  metaphysical  "reals,"  "forces,"  which 
"conflict  with"  and  "resist"  one  another.^^  The  weight  of  this 
criticism  is  directed  against  Hart's  interpretation,  but,  as  the 
latter  has  replied  to  an  earlier  criticism  of  the  same  purport, 
"all  sciences  are  compelled"  to  treat  their  subject-matter  "more 
or  less  arbitrarily"  and  artificially,  for  their  own  practical  and 
theoretical  purposes. ^^  The  associationists,  however,  regarded 
their  elements  ("concepts"  or  "ideas")  as  metaphysically  real, 
whereas  the  "conceptual  theory  of  the  unconscious"  admits 
them  to  be  artificial. 

Sidis  also  criticizes  the  concept  of  ''unconscious  ideas"  as 
(2)  baseless  and  (3)  self -contradictory.  Under  the  former 
head  he  insists  (2)  that  any  "hypothetical  agency  must  either 
be  a  fact  directly  observed  in  nature,  or  a  fact  which  can  be 
verified  later  on."^°  In  reply  we  assert  that  though  it  is  true 
that  the  Unconscious  has  not  been  and  never  can  be  observed, 
any  more  than  many  of  the  entities  of  the  natural  sciences,  it  is 
nevertheless  a  necessary  inference  from  facts  which  have  been 
observed  in  our  mental  "nature,"  and  its  results  have  been 
verified  innumerable  times.  Furthermore,  it  only  claims  to 
be  a  provisional  explanation,  to  be  made  use  of  so  long  as 
theoretically  and  practically  valuable,   and  until  some  more 

^^Foundations,  pp.  199-201. 

^^Subconscious  Phenomena,  p.  137.     Cf.  our  Chapter  IV. 

60  Op.  cit.,  p.  201. 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  231 

satisfactory  one  within  the  limits  of  psychology  can  be  of- 
fered. 

Finally,  (3)  Sidis's  alarm  concerning  the  danger  of  intro- 
ducing into  psychology  "the  self -contradictory  impossible  con- 
cept of  unconscious  conscious  ideas,"  which  he  thinks  to  be 
"equivalent  to  the  assumption  of  an  unconscious  conscious- 
ness,"®^ is,  as  our  previous  discussion  should  have  made  clear 
(ill),  quite  unwarranted.  "Unconscious  ideas"  are  no  more 
self -contradictory  than  "subconscious"  ones. 

Sidis's  criticisms  of  Freud's  specific  psychopathological 
doctrines  concerning  "repression,"  sexuality,  etc.,''^  need  not 
here  concern  us,  since  it  is  not  our  present  aim  to  demonstrate 
the  validity  of  any  of  Freud's  concepts.®^  These  doctrines  are 
inferences  from  Freud's  study  of  dreams  and  abnormal  phe- 
nomena, but  they  do  not  in  any  way  affect  his  general  theory 
so  far  as  we  have  adopted  it. 

It  is  well  to  note,  however,  that  Dr.  Sidis  is  right,  and  well 
within  his  province  as  an  advocate  of  an  independent  psychol- 
ogy, in  his  criticism  of  Prince's  physiological  theory  of  the 
Unconscious."  "  'Unconscious'  brain  processes  are  proble- 
matical entities"  indeed,  for  which  there  is  no  direct  evidence, 
and  they  are  quite  valueless  for  psychology. 

REFERENCES 
The  Theory  of  Unconscious  Cerebration — 

Miinsterberg,  Psychology,  General  and  Applied,  pp.  24-33. 
"  Psychotherapy,  Chap.  VI. 

Subconscious    Phenomena,    Chaps.     I     (Munsterberg),     IT 
(Ribot),  and  III  (Jastrow). 

Pierce,  A.  H.,  in  Carman  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psy- 
chology, pp.  315  ff. 

The  Unconscious  (various  writers),  in  British  Jourtial  of 
Psychology,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  230-256,  and  281  flF. 

8*  Ibid.,  p.  202. 

"2  Ibid.,  p.  199. 

"'  Subconscious  Phenomena,  pp.  137  f. 

"♦  Foundations,  pp.  207,  212. 


232         THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 
Defence  of  Subconscious  Mentation — 

Sidis,  Foundations  of  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology, 
Chaps.  XXV-XXVn. 

Freud's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious — 

Freud,  The  Interpretation  of  Dreams,  pp.  425-435,  483-493. 
"       British  Journal  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  265-271. 
Coriat,  Abnormal  Psychology,  Second  Edition,  pp.  16-21. 
Mitchell,  British  Journal  of  Psychology,  Medical  Section,  I, 
pp.  327  ff.   (1921). 

Criticisms 
Solomon,  Jour,  of  Abnormal  Psychology,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  98  ff. 

(1914). 
Solomon,  Psychoanalytic  Review,  Vol.  II,  pp.  52  ff.  (1915) 
Bellamy,  Jour,   of  Abn.  Psych.,  Vol.   X,  pp.    11  ff.,   32  ff. 

(1915)- 
Haeberlin,  Jour,  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV,  pp.  543  ff.  (1917). 
Woodworth,  Jour,   of  Abn.   Psych.,  Vol.  XII,   pp.    174  ff. 

(1917). 

(Reply  by  Tannenbaum,  same  Journal  and  Vol.,  pp. 
390  ff.) 

Prince's  Theory  of  the  Subconscious — 

Prince,  The  Unconscious,  Chaps.  V  and  VIII. 
"       in  "Subconscious  Phenomena,"  Chap.  V. 

The  Conceptual  Interpretation  of  the  Subconscious — 

Hart,  in  "Subconscious  Phenomena,"  Chap.  VI   (especially, 
pp.  118-141). 

Criticism 
Sidis,  Foundations,  Chaps.  XXVIII,  XXIX. 


INDEX 

(References  are  to  Sections) 
Abbot,  E.  S.  :  17,  24,  28f. 
Absentmindedness :  105,  108. 
Aesthetic  Attitude :  63. 

Aesthetics  and  Psychology:     See  Normative  Sciences. 
Analysis:  51. 
Angell,  J.  R.:  22. 
Anthropology:  35. 
Aristotle:  5,  8. 
Association :  12,  124. 
Associationism :  12-14,  lOO. 
Attention:  96,  io8,  113. 
Automatic  Writing:  103. 

Bain,  A.:  12. 

Baldwin,  J.  M. :  37,  77,  in. 

Bawden,  H.  H.  :  77. 

Behavior:  22;  behavior  vs.  consciousness,  25-29;  implicit  and  explicit  be- 
havior, 26,  85;  need  of  science  of,  35f ;  relation  to  consciousness,  85. 
See  also  Behaviorism. 

Behaviorism :  24-36,  47.    See  also  Behavior. 

Berkeley,  George:  6. 

Biography  and  Psychology:  68f. 

Biological  Sciences  and  Psychology:   Introduction,  22,  28,  35,  49. 

Bode,  B.  H.  :  24. 

Brain  and  Mind :  75f.    See  also  Mental  vs.  Material ;  Mind  and  Body. 

Brentano,  F.  :  37. 

Buchner:  6. 

Calkins,  M.  W.  :  37-46,  64,  77f • 
Carpenter,  W.  B.  :  i  14. 

Causation:  52f ;  independent  psychical,  85,  87-97,  102,  115;  cerebral  theory 
of,  87,  90f.  (See  also  Psychocerebral  Parallelism)  ;  in  physical  and  men- 
tal realms,  89.    See  also  Explanation, 
Chance :  96f. 
Classification:  11,  51. 

Coconscious:  104,  no,  113,  iigi.    See  also  Dissociation. 
Coleridge:  102. 
Comte:  32. 

Conceptual  Explanations  :    See  Hypotheses. 
Concomitance,  Psychocerebral :  86.     See  also  Parallelism. 
Consciousness:  3,  48,  120;  motor  theory  of,  28;  as  postulate,  85;  and  Con- 
tent, 116.    See  also  Behavior;  Mental  vs.  Material;  Self;  Subconscious. 


234  INDEX 

Continuity:  79,  loi.    See  also  Discontinuity. 

CORIAT,   I.:  99,    102,   104-107,   III. 

Correlation  as  Method  of  Explanation:  91.     See  also  Concomitance;  Ex- 
planation ;  Parallelism. 
Creighton,  J.  E. :  Z7- 
Crystal  Visions :  103. 
Curtis,  J.  N. :  43-45. 

Democritus  :  6. 

Descartes  :  5,  100. 

Description:  9,  Z2i,  5i.  56;  in  psychology,  82-84.     See  also  Introspection j 

Science,  Problem  of. 
Dessoir,  M.  :  68. 
Diderot:  6. 

Discontinuity  in  Mental  Realm:  89,  95,  ico.     See  also  Subconscious. 
Dispositions,  Physiological  and  Psychical :  1 14,  122.    See  also  Neurograms. 
Dissociation :  I04f,  120.    See  also  Coconscious. 
Dreams :  103,  105. 
Dual  Mind  Theory:  107. 
Dualism  :  4,  5,  80. 
DuNLAP,  K. :  17. 

Economics  and  Psychology :    See  Social  Sciences. 

Empirical   Psychology:     I,  3,  8;   development  of,  8-15.     See  also  under 

Psychology. 
Ends:  57. 

Energy,  Mind  and:  76. 
Ethics :    See  Normative  Sciences. 
Evaluation :  S7f . 

Experience:  I,  3,  17,  37,  73f.     See  also  Empirical  Psychology. 
Experimental  Psychology:  16. 
Explanation:  9,  11,  52-56;  in  psychology,  87,  92,  121.    5"^^  also  Causation; 

Correlation ;  Hypotheses ;   Science,  Problem  of. 
Extension  of  Mental  Objects:  See  Space. 

Faculty  Psychology:  lof. 
Fine  Arts  and  Psychology:  68. 

Finiteness  of  Mental  Sequences:  89,  93.    See  also  Sensations,  Problem  of. 
Foreconscious :  118,  120,  123. 

Freud,  S.  :  ii7f,  120,  i23f.    See  also  Psychoanalysis. 
Frost,  E.  P. :    24,  27. 
FuLLERTON,  G.  S. ;  86  note. 

Functional  Point  of  View:  18-20,  23.    See  also  Functionalism. 
Functionalism :  20,  22f,  47,  67;  and  Self-Psychology,  38,  41,  45.    See  also 
Behaviorism;  Functional  Point  of  View, 


INDEX  235 

Gamble,  E.  A.  McC. :  44,  46. 

Grammar  and  Psychology:     See  Linguistic  Sciences. 

Haeckel  :  6. 
Hall,  G.  S.  :  109. 
Hallucinations:  103. 
Hamilton,  Sir  W.  :  100. 
Hamilton,  Sir  W.  R,  :  103. 
Hart,  Bernard:  86  note,  100,  104,  122-124. 
Hartley,  D.  :  12. 
Hartmann,  E.  von  :  100. 
Herbart:  I2f,  100,  124. 
Herrick,  C.  J.:  28. 
HiLPRECHT  dream:  103. 
History  and  Psychology :  68f . 
HoBBES,  T. :  6. 
Holt,  E.  B.  :  24. 
Hudson,  T.  J.:  107. 
Hume,  D.:  12. 
Hypnosis :  103. 

Hypotheses,  Phenomenal  and  Conceptual ;  54!,  121-124.    See  also  Expla- 
nation; Law,  Scientific. 

Ideas:  13!,  38,  74. 

Immediate  Experience  Theory:  73f,  80. 

Independence,  Principle  of:  86  and  note,  ii4f,  I20f. 

Independence  Theory  of  Psychical  Causation :    See  Causation,  Independent 

Psychical. 
Inner  Sense  Theory:  31,  72,  80. 

Interaction  of  Mind  and  Body :  5,  6.    See  also  Mind  and  Body ;  Parallelism. 
Interpretation :  57. 
Introspectiveness :  79. 
Introspection :  16,  30-33 ;  and  self-consciousness,  39,  43f. 

James,  W.  :  37,  42,  70,  79,  99-101. 
Jastrow,  J,:  106,  no. 
JuDD,  C.  H.:  Z7- 
Jung,  C  G.  :  123. 

Kant:  6,  10. 

Laboratory  Psychology:  16. 

Law,  Scientific:   52,  56;   in  psychology,  88.     Sec  also  Explanation;  Hy- 
potheses. 
Leibniz  :  6,  100. 
Linguistic  Sciences  and  Psychology:  68f. 


236  INDEX 

Locke,  John:  8,  72. 

Logic  and  Psychology:  59.     See  also  Normative  Sciences. 

Lotze:  6,  100. 

McCoMAs,  H.  E. :  28. 

McDouGALL,  R. :  76. 

McDouGALL,  W. :  22,  35. 

Marshall,  H.  R.  ;  36. 

Material  Sciences  and  Psychology :  Chap.  V. 

Material  Sciences  and  the  Real  World :  65. 

Material  World  as  Postulate:  85. 

Materialism :  4-6,  29,  65. 

Meaning:  57,  59. 

Memory:  loi,  ii4f,  122. 

Mental,  Nature  of :    See  Mental  vs.  Material. 

Mental  Content:  17-19,  116.  See  also  Mental  vs.  Material;  Structural 
Point  of  View ;  Structuralism. 

Mental  Function :  See  Mental  Process ;  Functional  Point  of  View ;  Func- 
tionalism. 

Mental  Process :  17-19.    S^^  also  Functional  Point  of  View ;  Functionalism 

Mental  vs.  Material :  7S-8i. 

Mentalism :  26,  34,  47. 

Metaphysics  and  Psychology :  i,  7f,  15 ;  Chap.  IV. 

Metaphysics,  Problem  of:  57. 

Mill,  James  :  12. 

Mind,  Psychology  as  Science  of :  3,  48 ;  necessity  of  scientific  study  of,  ^. 
See  also  Consciousness;  Self. 

Mind  and  Body,  Behaviorism  and:  29;  Self-Psychology  and,  40;  as  postu- 
late, 85.  See  also  Interaction;  Mental  vs.  Material;  Parallelism; 
Psychocerebral ;  Psychophysiological. 

Moleschott:  6. 

Monism :  4,  6,  80. 

Montague,  W.  P.:  76. 

More,  L.  T.  :  56,  60. 

Munsterberg,  H.  :  21,  42,  58,  61-65,  77,  Ssi,  87,  89-92,  106,  110-116,  122. 

Myers,  F.  W.  H.  :  103,  109. 

Nature,  Attitudes  toward :  63 ;  and  material  sciences,  65. 
Neurograms :  119,  122.    See  also  Dispositions. 

Neurology  and  Psychology:   Introduction,   16.     See  also  Physiology. 
Normative  Sciences  and  Psychology:  68f. 

Panpsychism :    See  Parallelism,  Universal  Psychophysical. 

Parallelism :    8sf . ;  methodological,  86,  92 ;  universal  psychophysical,  94. 

Pearson,  K.  :  56,  60. 


INDEX  237 

Perry,  R.  B.  :  ^^. 

Personality:    See  Self. 

Philology  and  Psychology:    See  Linguistic  Sciences. 

Philosophy  and  Psychology :     Introduction,  8,  15.    See  also  Metaphysics. 

Physical  Sciences:    See  Material  Sciences. 

Physiology  and  Psychology:  Introduction,  16,  35,  86  and  note.  See  also 
Mind  and  Body;  Psychophysiological. 

Pierce,  A.  H. :  122. 

PiLLSBURY,  W.  B. :  22,  25,  31-33. 

Plato:  5,  8. 

Politics  and  Psychology:    See  Social  Sciences. 

Postulates  of  Psychology:    Chap.  VI.    See  also  Subconscious. 

Praxiology:  35f. 

Prince,  M.  :  99,  loi,  I03f,  108,  117,  iigf,  122. 

Privacy  of  Mental  Facts :  77f . 

Psychoanalysis,  Sidis  and :  97,  124.    See  also  Freud. 

Psychobiology :  35. 

Psychocerebral  Parallelism:  Ssf.  See  also  Causation,  Cerebral  Theory; 
Mind  and  Body;  Psychophysiological. 

Psychodynamics :    23,  note  13. 

Psychognosis :  68,  70. 

Psychologism :  65. 

Psychology,  Present  Status :  Introduction ;  relation  to  philosophy,  Intro- 
duction, 8,  15  (see  also  Metaphysics)  ;  relation  to  other  sciences,  Intro- 
duction, 68f,  Chap.  V;  metaphysical  vs.  scientific,  i,  3,  61-63  (see  also 
Metaphysics)  ;  rational  vs.  empirical,  i,  7  (see  also  under  each  head)  ; 
conditions  of  a  scientific,  9,  isf,  45,  49,  82;  historic  concepts.  Chap.  I; 
current  concepts.  Chaps.  II  and  III,  67;  individual  and  social,  46; 
definition  of,  48;  field  of.  Chaps.  IV  and  V;  necessity  of,  66;  rela- 
tion to  other  "mental  sciences",  68f.  See  also  Biography,  Fine  Arts, 
History,  Linguistic  Sciences,  Material  Sciences,  Normative  Sciences, 
Religion,  etc. 

Psychophysical  Interrelation:  85.  See  also  Mind  and  Body;  Parallelism; 
Psychocerebral ;  Psychophysiological. 

Psychophysiological  Interrelation :  85.  See  also  Mind  and  Body ;  Parallel- 
ism; Physiology;  Psychocerebral;  Psychophysical. 

Psychosophy:  68,  70. 

Psychosis:  11. 

Psychostatics :    23,  note  13. 

Purposes:   57.    See  also  Self,  purposive  vs.  causal. 

Rational  Psychology:  i,  2;  schools  of,  4-7.     Sec  also  Metaphysics;  Psy- 
chology. 
Religion  and  Psychology:  70. 
Resistance:  118,  120. 


238  INDEX 

Rhetoric  and  Psychology:    See  Linguistic  Sciences. 
RiBOT,  Th.  :  io6,  110. 
Rogers,  A.  K. :  yy. 
RoYCE,  J. :  37,  77- 

Scholasticism :  5. 

Schopenhauer:  100. 

Science,  Psychology  as  a :     {See  Psychology)  :  as  abstract  and  artificial,  45, 

58;  problem  of,  50-56;  relation  to  metaphysics,  57-60;  classification  of, 

69.    See  also  Material  Sciences;  Metaphysics. 
Scripture,  E.  W.  :  32. 
Self:  3,  77;  psychologist's  use  of  term,  40,  42;  as  metaphysical  concept, 

42;  purposive  vs.  causal  points  of  view  in  the  study  of,  58,  6if,  64,  68. 

See  also  Consciousness;  Soul. 
Self-Consciousness :  39,  43f. 
Self-Psychology:  37-47,  67. 

Sensations,  Problem  of :  94.    See  also  Finiteness  of  Mental  Sequences. 
SiDis,  B. :  75,  78,  85-87,  89-92,  96f,  loi,  116,  122,  124. 
Singer,  E.  A.,  Jr.  :  77. 
Slips  of  Tongue  and  Pen:  102,  105. 
Social  Sciences :    35,  68f ;  and  Self-Psychology,  46. 
Sociology :   See  Social  Sciences. 
Soul:  2,  3.    See  also  Self. 
Space  and  Mental  Objects :  7Sf. 
Spencer,  H.  :  12. 
Spinoza:  6. 
Spiritualism :  4. 
Stout,  G.  F.  :  32,  37,  77. 
Stratton,  G.  S.  :  32,  42. 

Structural  Point  of  View:  18-20,  23.    See  also  Structuralism. 
Structuralism:  2of,  23,  47,  67;  and  Self-Psychology,  38,  41,  45.    See  also 

Structural  Point  of  View. 
Subattentive :  108,  113. 
Subconscious :  48,  95,  Chaps.  VII  and  VIII. 
Subconscious  Causes :  102. 
Subconscious  Intelligence:  103. 
Subliminal :  109.  See  also  Subconscious. 
Teleology:   57.    See  also  Self,  purposive  vs.  causal. 
Tetens:  id. 

Things  vs.  Ideas :    See  Mental  vs.  Material. 
Thorndike,  E.  L.  :  22,  24. 

TiTCHENER,  E.  B. :  21,  33,  43,  58f,  65,  77,  86  note,  92. 
Transitoriness  of  Mental  Objects :  79,  89. 


INDEX  239 

Ultra-Marginal  View  of  the  Subconscious:  108,  113,  118,  123. 
Unconscious:  118-120,  I23f.    See  also  Subconscious. 
Unconscious  Cerebration:  106,  ii4f. 
Uniformity  as  Postulate :  85. 

Values:  SjL 

Ward,  J. :  37. 

Washburn,  M.  F.  :  43,  64. 

Watson,  J.  B. :  24.    See  ako  Behaviorism. 

Wolff,  Ch.  :  10. 

WuNDT,  W. :  21,  71-74,  87,  92. 

Yerkes,  R.  M,:  21,  87f,  91  f,  94. 


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